WITHDRAWN FROM
OREGON STATE LIBRARY
OREGON STATE LIBRARY
FEB 8 - 1966

THE American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

Vol. LIX *December, 1965* No. 4

Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline *David B. Truman* 865
The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence ...... *Robert E. Lane* 874
The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting .... *Raymond E. Wolfinger* . 896
A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes .... *Duncan MacRae, Jr.*... 909
The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee .... *John F. Manley* 927
Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis .... *Glendon Schubert* 940
Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs *Otto Kirchheimer* 964
The Modernity of Tradition: The Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India .... *Lloyd I. Rudolph* 975
Obligation and Consent—I .... *Hanna Pitkin* 990
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography .... *Austin Ranney (ed.)* ... 1001
News and Notes .... *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 1104
Index to Volume LIX .... *Corinne Silverman* 1119

(For list of book reviews, see page 1000)

Published quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Recent Research Projects
Conducted at the request of Federal,
state and local government agencies,
universities, and
foundations:

Community Renewal Planning
Planning Action for Public Housing
Integrated Housing
Longitudinal Study of School Districts
Attitudes toward Negro Demonstrations
Transportation Planning Study
Poverty & Social Isolation
Fertility and Family Planning
Manpower Needs of New York City
Reasons non-Federal Scientists Remain non-Federal
Longitudinal Study of Consumer Expenditures
Retail Food Pricing Practices
Food Consumption Behavior
Motivations and Beliefs of Mutual Fund Investors
High School Graduates: Four-Year Follow Up
Attitudes & Aspirations of Teenagers
Voting Referenda on Fluoridation
Community Opinions about Cancer
Attitudes toward Smoking & Health
Community Knowledge of Communicable Diseases

METHODOLOGICAL RESOURCES:
Trained Interviewers . . . Probability Samples
Efficient Questionnaires . . . Coding and Tabulating
Computer Programming . . . Research Designs . . . Consulting

For information write: Aaron J. Spector, Ph.D.,
Vice President and Director, Social Science Department

NATIONAL ANALYSTS, INC.
1015 CHESTNUT STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19107

The Nation's Leading Social Science and Marketing Research Organization
Founded 1943

EFFICIENCY
INSIGHT
INTEGRITY
NA
A SYMBOL OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

18 17

Harper & Row, Publishers

Coming in January

DE GAULLE: IMPLACABLE ALLY

Roy C. Macridis De Gaulle's important pronouncements and writings are brought together here, with emphasis on the World War II period and the years since his return to power as president of the Fifth Republic. The editor's analysis of De Gaulle's political philosophy facilitates an understanding of present French national government and foreign relations. The preface by Maurice Duverger appraises the relevance of De Gaulle's policies to the problems of contemporary world politics. 245 pp. Paper. $2.60

New and Recent

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:
Its Government and Politics

Peter H. Odegard • Hans H. Baerwald A comprehensive analysis of the spirit and structure of the American Republic, focusing on political power, the ideas, values, and theories that have given direction and purpose to the U. S. government, and emphasizing process and policy. Instructor's manual. 851 pp. $8.50. AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: *Readings and Documents,* edited by Peter H. Odegard, may be used with THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC or any other text. Paper. 617 pp. $4.75.

MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Felix A. Nigro This introductory text reflects the fundamental changes in the public administration field by emphasizing the policy-making role of administration and the analysis of human behavior in governmental organizations. Examples from all levels of government. Case studies. 539 pp. $6.75.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES

William C. Havard A brief, yet sophisticated basic text on the U. S. government, with a critical evaluation of organization, functions, and policies and a full treatment of the working system of American politics at all levels. 245 pp. Paper. $2.95.

POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT

Alexander M. Bickel Presents American democracy as a government of men as well as laws, arguing that politics as much as legal precedent determines whether Supreme Court decisions become social practice, using as examples the decisions on school desegregation, school prayer, Federal aid to education, and political reapportionment. 320 pp. $6.95

THE RISE OF URBAN AMERICA

Constance McLaughlin Green A Pulitzer-prize winner traces the economic, political, and social forces that led to today's urban civilization and shows that the American city is not a recent phenomenon. 224 pp. $4.95.

WHO'S RUNNING THIS TOWN?

Ritchie P. Lowry "An examination of the leadership in a California community and . . . an effort to work out a scientific typology of the different kinds of leadership that might be applicable to other small American cities and towns . . . displays clear evidence of a lively intellect deeply involved with some of the important problems of contemporary social science and American life."—W. Lloyd Warner. 250 pp. $5.95.

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS • 49 EAST 33d STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Managing Editor, Columbia University*

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University*
ANDREW HACKER, *Cornell University*
J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*
HAROLD STEIN, *Princeton University*
ROWLAND EGGER, *Princeton University*
STANLEY HOFFMANN, *Harvard University*
ROBERT E. LANE, *Yale University*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

AUSTIN RANNEY, *Book Review Editor, University of Wisconsin*
LEO B. LOTT, *News and Notes Editor, Ohio State University*
FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, *University of Maryland*
S. SIDNEY ULMER, *University of Kentucky*
ISAAC KRAMNICK, *Harvard University*
RICHARD L. MERRITT, *Yale University*
CORINNE SILVERMAN, *Philadelphia*
NIMROD RAPHAELI, *University of Michigan*

EDITORIAL OFFICE
Managing Editor, APSR
216 N. Oval Dr.,
Columbus, Ohio 43210

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Executive Director, APSA
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 5th day of the month of publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706; *books intended for review,* to James W. Prothro, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.; *News and Notes items,* to Leo B. Lott, 216 N. Oval Drive, Columbus, Ohio 43210; *advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence,* to the Executive Director at the Washington office. *See notice herein, p. 1104.*

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* The *International Index to Periodicals* indexes current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the REVIEW, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 816 University Place, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1966, by The American Political Science Association

AIDS TO UNDERSTANDING, INQUIRY, AND DISCUSSION—POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS FROM MACMILLAN

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY

by *Emmette S. Redford,* University of Texas, with contributions by *Charles B. Hagan,* University of Illinois

This book astutely fuses political and economic analysis, relating economic facts to political realities, urging students to see the government's relation to the economy as an aspect of the total process and problem of government. *1965, 672 pages, $8.95*

THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS, *Second Edition*

by *Frederick H. Hartmann,* University of Florida

A systematic treatment of foreign relations proceeding from general background material to specific relations among The United States, Russia, England, France, Germany, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, China, Japan, India, and Pakistan.

1962, 710 pages, $7.95

THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

by *Duane Lockhard,* Princeton University

A realistic conception of state and local political operations combining current research in community power and public administration with ideas from legal and literary theory.

1963, 566 pages, $8.50

POLITICAL SCIENCE: An Introduction

by *J. Roland Pennock* and *David G. Smith,* both of Swarthmore College

In its thorough coverage of the processes and institutions in democratic, semi-democratic, and non-democratic countries, this text relates political science to many other disciplines.

1964, 850 pages, $7.50

A BILL BECOMES A LAW: Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation, *Second Edition*

by *Daniel M. Berman,* The American University

The way in which a bill proceeds through Congress to become law is the subject of this revised edition illustrated by the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964. The student is able to compare the factors that resulted in a weak bill of 1960 with those that contributed to the strong 1964 bill. Though emphasis is on a complete reading of the passage of the 1960 Act, the more recent material has been interpolated into the book in such a way as to insure a continuity of narrative. *Coming 1966, approx. 160 pages, paper, prob. $1.95*

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 10011

new and recent P-H texts of special interest

DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS: An Introduction to the Contemporary Study of Politics

by Cyril Roseman, Charles G. Mayo, and F. B. Collinge, all of San Francisco State College

Dimensions of Political Analysis provides first-hand familiarity with the perspectives and methods of prominent twentieth century studies in political science. This new text-reader presents and analyzes thirty selections which are organized to illustrate the major concerns of the discipline: a) traditional and behavioral analysis, b) the science of politics, c) power, d) communications, and e) competition, conflict, and control. The volume is designed to dramatize the use of basic concepts of political analysis in actual research, relating these concepts to the issues confronting students of government and politics. *February 1966, approx. 384 pp., $6.95*

THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN ASIA: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements

edited by Robert A. Scalapino, University of California, at Berkeley

Covering all of the major countries of East and South Asia, this volume presents the first comprehensive study of Asian Communism. Chalmers Johnson, Chong-sik Lee, John H. Badgely, and Ralph Retzlaff, among others, focus upon all aspects of Communist Party activity. Accent is on present trends and situations in Asia. Ample, well-documented background material serves to convey a sense of the historical nature, as well as the immediacy, of the struggle. *1965, 432 pp., $7.50*

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

edited by

M. Kent Jennings, The University of Michigan, and Harmon Zeigler, University of Oregon

This new book views the electoral process from two main perspectives; the level of the individual voter and citizen and the level of the political parties and candidates. The contributions present a picture of the current trends in research and scholarship on the electoral process. Blending theoretical and empirical materials, the essays stress comparative and longitudinal data as well as emphasize parties and candidates as vital segments of the electoral process. *January 1966, approx. 384 pp., $6.75*

GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS: A Casebook

Prepared by The Inter-University Case Program, Inc.

edited by Edwin A. Bock, Syracuse University, and President of the Inter-University Case Program, Inc.

Each of the seven case studies in this new volume "describes the flow of events and the pattern of forces that led a federal government agency to initiate a regulatory action, and the actions and forces that went into consideration and decision of the case. Moreover, each case study narrative depicts the purposes, tactics, or outlooks in the regulatory process . . . a collection that will enable the reader to see the workings of regulatory processes from the different vantage points or perspectives of the major types of participants or contestants."—from the editor's Introduction. *1965, approx. 528 pp., $9.95*

SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY: Readings in Social Philosophy

edited by Frederick A. Olafson, The Johns Hopkins University

This collection of readings contains some of the most famous and influential views on the ways in which moral considerations impinge upon law, particularly in the area of civil disobedience. A thematic continuity is maintained by long excerpts from the really fundamental writers on the subject. *1961, 518 pp., $8.95*

For approval copies, write: Box 903

Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 07632

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

The American
Political Science Review

VOL. LIX DECEMBER, 1965 NO. 4

DISILLUSION AND REGENERATION: THE QUEST FOR A DISCIPLINE*

David B. Truman
Columbia University

A discipline, at least to the initiated, is known more by the questions it asks than by the answers that it provides. For questions indicate goals or aspirations that answers may not reach. At certain periods, however, a field of knowledge may be more conspicuously characterized by the controversies that occur among those who work in it. When these take the form of debates over the adequacy of particular answers, as determined by agreed, even though sometimes imprecise, criteria of assessment, they are unlikely to be highly prominent, except for the immediate participants. When, on the other hand, such controversies extend to the standing of the questions asked and place in dispute the means of appraising answers, it becomes obvious to all that something is happening that has implications for the entire field. Clearly the discipline is undergoing redefinition or at least an attempt at redefinition that may sharply alter its meaning. If the criteria for admitting questions and for validating answers are changed, the discipline is changed. Inescapably, therefore, controversies of this sort involve participants and observers in considerable numbers.

The pertinence of these observations to the field of political science in the past decade or so needs no elaboration, I am sure. It may be less obvious, however, that this situation in the field has a history that extends back a good many years. A view of that history may both shed useful light on our current controversies and perhaps help us to assess their implications.

At the very outset I am willfully going to commit the sin of parochialism by confining my remarks primarily to the discipline in the United States. In justification I would argue that the problems of political science are, if only because of the number of practitioners involved, chiefly problems of American political science. In the period on which I shall focus, beginning roughly two decades before the turn of the century, the influences upon the men who were developing the American discipline did not have their origin solely in the United States, but their responses to these influences were highly distinctive. These responses, moreover, set the stage for the controversies that have had their center in the United States, though their margins have extended far beyond this country.

In thinking about the contemporary development of political science I find particularly suggestive the notion of the paradigm, which is one of the two key concepts in Thomas S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.[1] By this term he means a common set of beliefs, constituting a kind of open-ended model that more or less explicitly defines the legitimate problems and methods of a research field, the working elements of what he calls "normal science." The developmental pattern of a mature science, he argues, is a movement from one generally accepted view of a research field to a successor. Prior to the emergence of such a research consensus, a field—such as physical optics before Newton—is characterized rather by a number of competing schools, not necessarily "unscientific" but bearing at most a loose resemblance to one another.

Kuhn is concerned, of course, with the physical sciences, but he explicitly does not rule out the possibility that comparable patterns of development characterize the social sciences. He leaves open the question of whether any parts of the social sciences have yet acquired paradigms or ever will. He would not, however, deny that many, if not all, of those fields display most of the features of the pre- or non-paradigmatic stage of inquiry.

---

* Presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 8, 1965.

[1] Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962.

In the formative years of political science in the United States, in the decades around the turn of the century, the field did not have a paradigm, nor has it acquired one since. Unquestionably the absence of such an agreed model has influenced the pace and pattern of change in the field, for a crucial feature of a true paradigm is its precision. This gives form and direction to "normal science." More important for the birth of scientific revolutions, precision in the paradigm permits the investigator to know when something is wrong, *i.e.*, contrary to what should be expected, and to see the need for paradigm change. In the absence of a paradigm and hence of a relatively precise means of knowing where, if not why, an existing conception is deficient, dissatisfactions with existing formulations in a field are not eliminated. Rather they may be multiplied. But they are likely to lack the coherence and the sharpness of focus that can be provided by a true paradigm.

I think it is accurate to argue, nevertheless, that something loosely analogous to a paradigm characterized American political science for at least the half-century running from sometime in the 1880s into the 1930s. In order not to distort Kuhn's provocative conception, this should be thought of as simply an implicit though fairly general agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field. Because the matters in agreement were vague and the terms applicable to them loose and imprecise, they permitted a product diverse both in quality and in intent. Despite this diversity, however, the works of most political scientists had a number of qualities in common that serve to identify the nature of the general agreement and the form and character of the discipline.

The political science that emerged about the turn of the century gradually displaced and was in considerable part a revolt against an older tradition of preceptive and scholastic formalism. The new trend was toward contemporaneity and "facts," in the name of "realism" and of "science." Its early stirrings can be illustrated by Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government* (1885) but interestingly not by his later treatise on *The State*, which was clearly of the older mold. More than by Wilson or by any American, the note of change was struck by James Bryce in his *American Commonwealth* (1888). The trend that it signified lasted well into the 1930s, but it reached something of a peak about the turn of the century as part of the general pursuit of "realism" that was characteristic of the Progressive Movement in literature, in journalism, and in most of the emerging social sciences.

At the risk of distortion and over-simplification, I shall propose six closely related features of this predominant agreement that profoundly marked the discipline. That mark helps to put our current quandaries and controversies in instructive context. These six features, stated for the moment without elaboration, were: (1) an unconcern with political systems as such, including the American system, which amounted in most cases to taking their properties and requirements for granted; (2) an unexamined and mostly implicit conception of political change and development that was blandly optimistic and unreflectively reformist; (3) an almost total neglect of theory in any meaningful sense of the term; (4) a consequent enthusiasm for a conception of "science" that rarely went beyond raw empiricism; (5) a strongly parochial preoccupation with things American that stunted the development of an effective comparative method; and (6) the establishment of a confining commitment to concrete description.

Lack of concern for the political system as such meant, first of all, that the discipline worked within implicit and common-sense assumptions about the requirements of the system, its boundaries, and the articulation of its elements. Yet these assumptions essentially fixed many of the questions that the discipline could ask and set the limits on the answers that could be supplied, whether in analytical or in prescriptive terms. This in turn meant that particular segments of the system could be described and prescribed for without reference to implications for or effects upon the system as a whole. This tendency, it seems to me, is at the heart of the negative connotations recently attached to the label "institutionalist." The target of such criticism can hardly be the study of institutions, since one can scarcely imagine a political science in which institutions, as persistent patterns of political action, would not be a proper and central focus of concern. Criticism rather bears on treating an institution in its own terms, at face value, and without reference to other portions of the inclusive scheme or to the functions of a particular pattern within the system.

Unconcern with the system as such meant that political scientists, and commentators generally, assumed in effect a kind of atomistic non-system. Preoccupation with isolated particulars and a commitment to the concrete and the "practical" led so far away from concern with the political system as a whole that it was virtually assumed out of existence. The field in consequence was condemned to working within the conventional, legalistic conceptions of the system, since it lacked the means of dealing with it, conceptually and empirically, in any other terms.

Closely and quite logically associated with this unconcern for the characteristics of the system was a view of political change or development that optimistically and uncritically assumed an inevitable progress toward democracy and the rule of law, provided only that enlightenment through education and the public channels of communication was sensibly provided for. The apparent facts of the relevant political world—Western Europe, the Americas except for some trouble spots south of the border, the self-governing British Dominions, China, and Japan—did not, at least until the 1920s, sharply contradict this bland view. In any case, the conception was essentially taken for granted. This did not inhibit, rather it encouraged, an enthusiasm for particularistic reform. Unconcern about the political system permitted championing proposals such as the direct primary without attention to their ramifying effects, and the assumption of democratic progress confidently justified the effort. An uncritical preoccupation with reform relied upon a conception of linear democratic development that seemed likely to terminate in a withering away of politics and the realization of an immanent harmony among enlightened and right-minded men.

It is not remarkable that this unconcern with the political system and with a critical view of political change should have carried with it, especially among American political scientists, an indifference to theory as an element having anything but a conventional, ornamental utility for the field. Theory in any systematic sense was for the most part peripheral, not in the main stream of the discipline. Albert Bushnell Hart was not much exaggerating the temper of his profession when he observed in 1907, "The most distinctive American theory of government is not to theorize."[2] This attitude was in part an over-reaction to the abstract formalism of an earlier day, but it also followed logically from the unexamined assumption that the system provided its own theory and that the task before the profession was to facilitate the inevitable flowering of democracy. Small wonder if the textbooks through which students in this period were introduced to political science (via American government) changed their implicit conceptual positions from chapter to chapter, from page to page, and even from paragraph to paragraph. A less obvious consequence of this indifference to theory was that the sub-fields of political science tended to develop in increasing isolation. They had nothing in common except that many of them dealt with American phenomena and that all of them talked about government in some way. Without theory, politics tended to become defined as itself an isolated sub-field, rather than as the process permeating every phenomenon studied by the discipline.

The discipline in these years also tended to take its "science" seriously, but the type of science, almost inevitably, was a rank, non-theoretical empiricism. The dominant commitment was to the collection of facts, in many cases almost for their own sake. This preoccupation may have been one influence toward developing, especially in the 1920s, new devices for the collection and analysis of data—primitive population samples, interviews, word-association tests, and so on. But the climate of the field was such that the facts normally were assumed to speak for themselves. Empirical description, usually in association with uncritical reformist inferences, was a hallmark of the field.

An understandable consequence of the new realism was that political science became increasingly parochial, primarily engrossed in things American and, almost inescapably, in the minutiae of American phenomena. A natural result of this and related commitments was that the discipline did little to develop comparison as a basic component of investigation. One of the saving features of the older formalist persuasion was that it had displayed at least a rudimentary interest in comparative analysis. After the succession of the new realism, however, what was known as "comparative government" largely involved a description of the institutions and structures of particular European governmental schemes. The comparative element rarely went beyond legalistic distinctions and literary gestures.

Finally and ironically, all five of these factors combined to insure that, in rejecting confinement by the abstract formalism of the earlier period, the new realism adopted instead an equally confining and in some ways even more rigid mode of concrete description. Without an explicit concern for political systems as such, without an interest in the patterns and directions of political change, without some commitment to theory, and with a compulsion to raw empiricism and parochial concerns, the narrowness of this political science was virtually inescapable.

---

[2] Albert Bushnell Hart, "The Growth of American Theories of Popular Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 1 (August, 1907), p. 560.

This brief and perhaps unfairly simplified sketch is not presented in a spirit of condescension. If it emphasizes shortcomings, moreover, that is not because I assume that the period produced no gains. Given the temper of the American scene in the Age of Reform, the state of the means of communication, the paucity of data, and the limited manpower available to the discipline, the emergence of these characteristics was natural if not inevitable. Within the limits that it accepted, the gains that the field made were not trifling ones.

This summary is offered rather to indicate that once the experiences of political scientists, whether as professionals or as citizens, began to raise questions that fell outside the implicit general agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field, none of the features of this largely implicit consensus could long go unquestioned. As such non-congruent experiences multiplied, the positions assumed by the discipline became successively untenable and a search for alternatives inescapable.

No purpose would be served by attempting to pinpoint a time at which experiences inconsistent with the general agreement began to occur with disturbing frequency; the choice would be arbitrary and the effort meaningless. The process in any case was one of cumulation. Thus the immediate results of World War I probably were mixed in their impact. The dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy, the formal institutions of the successor states, the establishment of the Weimar Republic, and the launching of the League of Nations presented no immediate inconsistencies. Many political scientists, in fact, found it easy to attach to the League and to other international organizations both the uncritical optimism of the professional consensus and the analytical assumptions associated with it. On the other hand, the Bolshevik Revolution, with its apparent and apparently successful rejection of these assumptions, may have had a more disturbing effect. Also the retrospective views of the politics of the War, illustrated in a rash of semi-popular books on propaganda and reflected in Walter Lippmann's essays on public opinion, indicated some degree of disillusion. Probably more disturbing were the Fascist coup in Italy and the later Nazi take-over in Germany, with their open and effective repudiation of the expectations and practices that underlay the implicit agreements of the profession. The associated political instabilities and counter-currents of change throughout Europe, especially in Spain and France, and the bankruptcy of the Third Republic in 1940, liquidated the intellectual utility of the rootless, untheoretic concern for descriptive detail that hobbled what was known as "comparative government," but they almost as obviously undermined the assumptions and the conventional imperatives of much of the rest of the field.

An order of experience different but of comparable consequence for the profession occurred during the New Deal and World War II periods as academic political scientists in unprecedented numbers were transplanted to Washington. The impact of such first-hand experience with problems and processes at the level of the national government cannot be calculated, of course, but one cannot doubt that it was substantial. This re-shuffling, moreover, probably was important not merely for the element of direct confrontation with national government but also for a confrontation of a different sort—with the practitioners of other social science disciplines. As political scientists found themselves in mutually instructive collaboration with men from other fields, they were almost compelled to reckon with the utilities that these disciplines offered, not only for coming to grips with questions of immediate urgency but also for dealing with questions more strictly professional in character. These influences undoubtedly were reciprocal, but the political scientists' side of the transaction is the one that concerns us here.

Finally, at least two sorts of development in the decades since World War II have contributed to the dissolution of the established professional consensus. One was the drastically altered character of world politics after Potsdam. As "over there" moved here, the need for a systematic concern with the processes of international relations and with political and national security strategy became compelling. The reality of nuclear weapons and the politico-military implications of operations in space could not be grasped, if they were to be understood at all, by the assumptions and concepts that had appeared viable in a world based on Geneva. A second such development was the break-up of the colonial system, the emergence of new nations or national entities, and the awakening of older ones, which revealed the inadequacy of a disciplinary posture that was essentially parochial, that took the nature of the political system for granted, and that lacked an adequate and explicit view of political change. The appearance of the new nations demanded not only some sophistication on these counts but also tools of analysis equal to the task of a genuine comparative method. The conventional descriptive language of "comparative government" was weak enough in dealing with the relatively homogeneous and generally stable institutions of the Western European tradition; it was for the most part less than useless for coming to grips with the differences, the novelties, and the fluidities of the new national systems.

Although it took experiences such as these and their cumulative effects to bring the discipline as a whole to perceive the inadequacies of the prevailing consensus, a succession of individual dissents antedated all or all but the most recent of them, and these were the seeds of counter-tendency. One thinks, for example, of Graham Wallas, whose *Human Nature in Politics* (1908), for all its over-enthusiasm about psychology's potential for political science, was an eloquent and, at least on this side of the Atlantic, influential rejection of institutional description for its own sake. You will expect me to mention the almost unclassifiable Arthur F. Bentley, who was in but not wholly of the Age of Reform. If Bentley has been misunderstood in the 1950s and 1960s, his work at least has emerged from forty years of almost complete neglect. The Bentley revival, moreover, was itself symptomatic of the widespread readiness within the profession—largely absent in 1908—to question the conventional guiding agreements. Comparable, if less explicit and less radical dissent can be seen in at least some of the work of other scholars in the same generation, including Beard, Goodnow, and Lowell.

One must certainly include, moreover, the work and the career of Charles E. Merriam, who for more than twenty years was the prophet of reconstruction in political science. The "Chicago school" that he created in the years before World War II was not strictly a school. It had no dogmas and no orthodoxy except a restless skepticism concerning the adequacy of prevailing conceptions of the discipline and a corresponding receptivity to the unconventional. Among the most distinctive products of those years, however, were several that demonstrated a reach for the coherence of political phenomena. For example, political systems, their properties and conditions of change, were, then as now, a central focus of Harold Lasswell's work. Of the same order was Frederick L. Schuman's *International Politics*, which, when it appeared in 1933, broke dramatically with the rootless moralizing and mechanical description then prevailing and foreshadowed new patterns of analysis in that growing sub-field.

There were individual stirrings elsewhere in the 1930s, as in the work of Pendleton Herring, then and since a pacemaker for his students and colleagues. But restlessness within the field as a whole did not develop until after 1945, when the effects of the full range of inconsistent experiences began to appear.

Given the looseness and especially the lack of precision in the prevailing implicit agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field, its weakening and gradual dissolution were bound to be followed by a confusion of competing and divergent, if not incompatible, views of the appropriate questions to be asked and the proper methods to be used. How long that state of affairs is likely to exist is anyone's guess. At least three possibilities suggest themselves. First, it may be that the discipline is so uninsulated from its environment that it will have to wait for a broad intellectual or social movement to give it implicit coherence, as the Progressive Movement seems to have done in the formative years. If this should be so, the wait, I suspect, will be a long one. A second possibility is that segments, at least, of the discipline have grown self-conscious enough to supply their own momentum and their own modes of coherence. These may then develop as increasingly divergent and separate schools, with little in common except some raw data and possibly, but not necessarily, a departmental label. Or, third, most of the discipline may have acquired a degree of self-awareness sufficient to permit it to set the outlines of what to do, if not altogether how to proceed, without total dependence on dominant currents of thought in the environment and without the widening cleavages in both conception and procedure that the second possibility would involve.

A case can be made for each of these, and at this stage it is impossible to say with confidence which of them, or of a number of variant patterns, will in fact develop. As an inveterate optimist, however, I am disposed to bet on something like the third possibility, and I should indicate my reasons for the wager as well as for my preference.

The first and most basic reason is the emergence—perhaps more accurately re-emergence of an explicit interest in the political system. I do not refer here to a particular kind of conception but much more broadly to a renewed awareness of the simple but important assumption that the phenomena of politics in any sphere are interrelated in persistent or recurrent patterns. More important than the awareness itself is that it has involved explicit examination of the relations among things political—efforts to specify forms or types of systems, the elements involved in them, the factors associated with alterations in systems, and probable implications of these forms and mutations for the strength of specified values. This constitutes, of course, a revival of interest in one of the classic problems in the study of politics, and it is significant for just that reason. For, if a new agreement is to emerge on what political science is about, it will not come, I am certain, from a conception that does not permit the discipline, at least in principle, to deal with such large, important, and classic problems.

This revival thus seems to point in the right direction, but its implications go beyond that advantage. As the political system becomes a central focus of inquiry, guided by careful theory—of which more in a moment—the isolation of sub-fields within the discipline should begin to break down. National and international systems are not identical, of course, but the questions they invite are not wholly dissimilar, nor are the terms in which they may be analyzed. Explorations at each level may be expected to have increasing relevance for the other. And the same may be said of subnational systems, the area last and least directly affected by the experiences that disrupted the once-prevailing agreement within the discipline. The centrality of system considerations also will make less permissible the analysis of an institutional segment or process without reference to an explicit conception of the system to which it relates. Finally, an attempt to deal seriously with the problem of the political system necessarily involves reconceptualizing, re-casting the language of inter-system comparison. This reconceptualization was clearly anticipated a dozen years ago when the Social Science Research Council set up the Committee on Comparative Politics. The committee was expected to concentrate on the developing nations, but the larger objective was to contrive ways of looking comparatively at whole systems in terms of variations in attributes common in some degree to all political systems, whatever their stage of development.

A second reason for betting on the possibility of a new disciplinary consensus is the revival of interest in theory. This development fundamentally was a predictable consequence of the break-up of the discipline's nontheoretical consensus. But it has been aided in significant measure in recent years by the increased accessibility of data in a number of sub-fields. No discipline, especially among the social sciences, has good data readily available in sufficient amounts. But when data are not easily secured, even in modest quantities, it is likely that an enormous proportion of research time will go into mere collection. In such circumstances, moreover, it is not astonishing that much professional work, even in the absence of an anti-theoretical bias, is reportorial, journalistic, and non-theoretical. Thus one has the impression that the specialties that today are least engaged in renewed theoretical concerns are those that must scramble the hardest for data. "Kremlinology" as an alternative to theory is in part traceable, I suspect, to scarcity of data.

However this may be, a renewed emphasis on theory of all kinds seems to have occurred in recent years. I emphasize "all kinds" because, as might have been expected, it seems evident that the theory chorus is less polyphonous than cacophonous. Discord seems more prominent than harmony even within what some see as the solid ranks of "the new political science." Nevertheless, the renewed concern for theory seems clear, and I cite as illustration an impression that the majority of textbooks in all parts of the field today show a degree of care, at least about consistency of assumption and coherence of expository framework, that was rare thirty years ago. This care indicates nothing about the theoretical adequacy of these efforts, but it does suggest a more sophisticated level of expectation.

In noting a revived interest in theory I refer to the creation, development, or application of theory and to "theorizing," or the readiness to draw inferences from a set of data to the class of events to which they belong. I am not here discussing the analysis and explication of documents in the history of political thought, on which I want to comment in another connection. What I want to emphasize at this point is a growing self-consciousness and fruitful awareness of the necessary conjunction of theory and empirical investigation. Such awareness involves accepting the elementary point that an investigator never has a choice of whether to use theory or not, that the facts never speak for themselves but only through the assumptions and concepts that control their selection and analysis, and that in consequence the choice is only between implicit, internally inconsistent, and hopelessly inadequate theory, on the one hand, and explicit, logically defensible, and reasonably adequate theory, on the other.

I do not anticipate that an awakened respect for theory will eliminate a division of labor in the field based on differences of disposition, training, and aptitude. Nor do I suggest that every reported research will or should display its theoretical structure prominently. We shall continue to have and should wish to have more political scientists whose talents and sense of strategy lead them to work on and from conceptual schemes and formal models of broad reach.

We shall also continue to have and to need those who, like our great colleague V. O. Key, in full awareness of their broad assumptions, prefer to work more inductively. The good-humored skepticism that helped to make Key so creative also made him brilliantly at home with his data and healthily uneasy when his sentences got much beyond them. He denied that he was a theorist, but he was one, though he was indisposed to work with higher abstractions or to embrace formal systems for which he saw no early possiblity of empirical test. His *Southern Politics*, for example, represented and probably more than any other single work encouraged the restless searching that has marked the field since 1945. The South he wrote about has all but disappeared less than two decades after the book was published. What is left? An indispensable record for the historian, but for the political scientist much more: a structure of propositions and inferences —many of them tucked away in footnotes— that have theoretical pertinence well beyond the South or the United States. One day, perhaps, someone will do what Key would have been too modest to do, namely, extract that structure from its contemporary setting and show the strength that sensitive empirical inquiry can bring to theory.

For the predictable future both modes of theorizing will be needed, and from time to time both may be profitably cultivated by the same man. In practice, though not in principle, it may not be possible to develop general models, to say nothing of hypothetico-deductive theories, with much systematizing or predictive power. Should that be the case, we should be compelled to rely upon more restricted theories of inferential origin. But even if the obstacles to general theory can be surmounted, the more restricted type is likely still to be necessary, at least to stimulate and in part to test the more inclusive. Theory of both sorts, moreover, like the revived awareness of political systems, should contribute to reducing the insulation of sub-fields and perhaps to their re-casting. It may even be possible at some future point for a sub-field to be known by the problems it addresses itself to rather than by the piece of real estate it focuses upon or the institution it investigates.

Finally, my third reason for counting on a new consensus within the discipline is what I would call a recommitment to the goal of science. Although it is at least partially implied by a revived concern for the political system and for theory, I am less confident of this tendency than of the other two and I can hardly be unaware that it is considerably more controversial. No topic in the last two decades has provoked more fruitless discussion or has more consistently produced false, or at least wholly unnecessary, oppositions. I would not touch the issue but for a desire to bury it rather than to raise it, although I probably cannot expect that a death certificate will be widely recognized or that my mortuary services will be generally welcomed.

Close to the heart of the matter, however particular issues may be phrased, is the question of definition. It is possible to define the requirements of "science" and "scientific method" in such categoric terms that nothing in the study of politics now or at any projected future time is or is likely to be eligible for the label. But, to quote from an essay by Ernest Nagel on which I shall rely heavily, such an effort also leads " . . . to the unenlightening result that apparently none but a few branches of physical inquiry merit the honorific designation."[3] Thus, to specify that "science" requires the hypothetico-deductive procedures and the integrated form of systematic explanation exemplified by the science of mechanics or that it necessitates the use of a particular set of techniques regardless of the type of inquiry is probably to deny that the discipline can be scientific or at best to confine it to problems of the most trivial character.

It is not necessary, however, so to restrict the definition or even to espouse that form of science as a goal or an ideal, and I do not see the recommitment to which I refer as involving such a definition or necessarily such an espousal. If one accepts Nagel's characterization that " . . . the sciences seek to discover and to formulate in general terms the conditions under which events of various sorts occur, the statements of such determining conditions being the explanations of the corresponding happenings";[4] and if one further agrees that "The practice of scientific method is the persistent critique of arguments, in the light of tried canons for judging the reliability of the procedures by which evidential data are obtained, and for assessing the probative force of the evidence on which the conclusions are based";[5] then the recommitment in the discipline becomes sensible and, at least presumptively, manageable.

---

[3] Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), p. 449.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Science so conceived requires generality of statement but not in a specified degree, nor does it require a particular level of precision, or a limited set of techniques. It does not assure the truth of every conclusion that it reaches or the absence of bias deriving, for example, from the value commitments of the investigator. It does not suggest that a precise line divides knowledge or beliefs that can be labeled "common sense" from knowledge that claims to be "scientific," and it does not, finally, assert that only knowledge so derived can or should be admissible as part of the discipline—a point to which I shall return. Any science does aspire to explanations of classes of events, explanations subject to the controls of empirical evidence and with sufficient systematic power at least to place its findings beyond complete invalidation by the day's events. These are aspirations, as I see it, that lie close to the heart of the restlessness that has characterized the field for at least two decades.

It is recommitment to science in this broad sense that I see as an essential part of a new consensus in the discipline. A more restricted conception, corresponding to the rigorous requirements of mechanics, for example, almost certainly cannot be fruitful in any foreseeable future and will certainly have the consequence of fostering increasingly divergent schools. Without, however, a commitment to a science somewhat more openly conceived, the empirical work of the discipline will not progress, will not move cumulatively toward explanation, toward establishing relations of dependence between events and conditions. If the empirical work of the discipline does not move, moreover, the discipline will not.

A new agreement on what the discipline is up to, resting on a broad conception of the scientific enterprise, as well as on the two tendencies previously identified, is likely to permit movement and the expectation of progress in the field. As Kuhn has argued in a somewhat different connection, the absence of such movement and of the associated expectation probably lies behind the recurrent definitional debates about the "science" of the contemporary social sciences. "What would permit X field to move ahead?" is a question more fundamental than "Is it a science?" He suggests, and I think soundly, that such debates are less frequent among economists, not because they know what science is, but because they have achieved "consensus about their past and present accomplishments"; hence it is economics rather than "science" on which they agree.[6]

But why be concerned about a fresh consensus in the field, especially one that derives from the three elements discussed here? Why not welcome a diversity of competing and increasingly separated schools? Surely the temper of the times and the state of the technology are such that someone will exploit the potentialities of science in the analysis of political events and actions; if not "political scientists," then a school, or perhaps a set of scholars who do not carry the label "political science" at all. What difference would that make? Perhaps none at all, but I suggest we should not concede the point without reflection.

Even one who may be committed to the potential of the scientific enterprise in this field must grant that he cannot know how far that effort in practice will be able to go and must seriously entertain the possibility that in fact the distance may be fairly short. If " . . . it is any man's guess whether a comprehensive social theory of . . . [a scientific sort] is destined to remain permanently as a logical but unrealized possibility,"[7] as much probably must be granted concerning such a political theory. Only a bigot would perhaps deny that significant progress recently has been made in explaining and developing a theory of electoral behavior, and only the most skeptical would reject the likelihood that other sub-areas—perhaps the comparative analysis of public policy—could make similar gains. But one would be imprudent to project these accomplishments indefinitely. The practical obstacles may be too great. For example, it may not be possible to secure enough cases, enough standardized and precise observations, to make any reasonably reliable scientific statements about political systems, though the discipline must talk about systems.

From these cautionary observations I would draw two inferences. First, if the prospect of a comprehensive *social* theory lies so far in the future as to be a matter of guessing, then theory in the *political* realm, however comprehensive, for at least that long is likely to remain distinctively political. It will work primarily from data and concepts rooted in its more restricted area, and it will not appear merely as a special case of a more comprehensive theory of society. Second, if the reach of reasonably reliable science in the area of politics may for a long time and perhaps indefinitely be shorter than many might hope, then for so long the discipline will have to place some reliance upon knowledge that is less scientific or even nonscientific in character. The alternative for a discipline based upon consensus about itself is consistently to sacrifice relevance to rigor.

---

[6] Kuhn, *op. cit.* pp. 159–60.

[7] Nagel, *op. cit.* p. 462.

This position seems to me to contain two additional implications. First, it implies the need to include under relevance the function of assessing the probable consequences of proposals and events for the system and for the values implicit in it. I cannot accept the counsel of those who would have political scientists say, "Let George do it" when the question arises of assessing matters that fall within the subject-matter that they claim as their province. That seems to me defaulting on an obligation, and further, I do not believe any responsible fraternity of social scientists gives that answer, whatever its protestations to the contrary. This does not mean that we should run up the flag for the latest panacea, that our highest aspirations should be as political actors, or that we can fail to distinguish responsibly between what we know with some degree of reliability and what we merely judge to be valid. But it does mean that as political scientists we may have something to say. It means, further, that we cannot escape the obligation to predict, and a function of prediction is to sharpen and to broaden moral choice.

Second, if a fresh consensus about the discipline must include, for an indefinite future, a less or non-scientific component and if a continued assessing or evaluating function must rest fundamentally upon that component, then it seems to me clearly to follow that the classics in this field of thought, especially perhaps the more speculative documents, must be a central part of the training for and the practice of political science. I am aware of Whitehead's epigram, that "A science that hesitates to forget its founders is lost." But one may add that perhaps a discipline that does indeed forget its founders may also be lost. Remembering them does not, however, require that their writings be treated as scripture; revision is not equivalent to neglect.

Neglect amounting to forgetting would not be new to the field. The non-theoretical bias of the earlier agreement within the discipline thrust the study of political thought out of the mainstream and retained it largely as a gesture toward polite learning. Something akin to this attitude persists, it seems to me, in the contemporary Philistinism that regards everything in the classic literature as having only an ethical or normative revelance. Small wonder if in consequence of this sort of attitude, the study of the history of politicial thought appears to be the most isolated segment of the field, if a reciprocally fruitful dialogue between that segment and the more empirically oriented areas has been rare, or if younger political scientists committed to the empirical side of the discipline may see little in the classics that is relevant to their concerns. Such isolation, though understandable, seems neither necessary nor desirable.

The study of politics is old, but political science as a self-conscious discipline has not come a long road. On that way the discipline has inevitably been marked by the intellectual, moral and political influences—often contradictory and fruitless—that have dominated the days of its growth. From such influences, as much as from its own substance, have come the conflicts and disputes we have known for at least a decade. In attempting to trace these controversies I have had no thought of urging an end to disputation, an outcome whose undesirability would be exceeded only by its improbability. Rather I have tried to argue that if we can see the sources of our disagreements, we may be able to redefine some of them and to choose for a further investment of energy those most likely to encourage the growth of our collective capabilities.

Redefinition and redirection will depend upon the emergence of a new and broadly based consensus about the discipline. That may not occur; a persistent sectarianism may be inescapable. Continued and growing dissensus, however, can have unfortunate implications. It would encourage an indiscriminate rejection of much that is valuable both in our inheritance and in our contemporary efforts. It would be likely to restrict the range and power of our inquiries. It would be likely, finally, to reduce the relevance of those inquiries in days that ask for the maximum in trained intelligence. Should a new agreement emerge, it may take a long time and may be clearly recognizable only by hindsight. The challenge, I submit, is worthy.

THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUS IN AN AGE OF AFFLUENCE

Robert E. Lane
Yale University

Marx is surely right when he says that the way men earn their living shapes their relations to each other and to the state; but this is, of course, only the beginning. Aside from all the other non-economic factors which also have these effects, there is the matter of the *source* of income, the *level* of income, and, especially, the *security* of income. Moreover, each of these factors has both an individual effect, a set of influences apparent in the study of individual enrichment or immiseration, and a social effect, the influences which appear when whole societies become richer or more secure economically. So I am led to inquire into what is happening to men's political interests, behavior, and attitudes toward politics and government in an Age of Affluence, a period when men's economic security and income have increased and when, for the first time in history, it appears likely that the business cycle can now be controlled. Like Marx's, my interest is in change over time.

Quite candidly, this is a descriptive account of attitudinal change in recent years, portrayed against a background of economic change. Only argument supports the inference that it is the economic change—implied in the term "Age of Affluence" shortly to be explicated—that is accountable for much of the attitudinal change. It would take another paper with closer attention to subsections of the population and specific economic conditions to establish this argument on a firmer footing. In the meantime, perhaps these findings can help illuminate the more general problem of the relationship between economic development and stable and effective politics, as well as to help us to see where American politics is heading.

The elements of the economy which are most relevant to such an investigation are five-fold, and the term "affluent society"[1] or "Age of Affluence" refers here to more than higher per capita national income, though it includes that. The term embraces:

(1) a relatively high per capita national income;
(2) a relatively equalitarian distribution of income;
(3) a "favorable" rate of growth of per capita Gross National Product (GNP);
(4) provisions against the hazards of life—that is, against sickness, penury, unemployment, dependence in old age, squalor—the features now associated with the term "welfare state"; and
(5) a "managed economy" in the sense of conscious and more or less successful governmental use of fiscal and monetary powers to smooth out the business cycle and avoid depressions, as well as to provide for the economic growth mentioned in (3) above.

These five points include both economic conditions and governmental policies.

The appropriateness of the term "affluent society" or "Age of Affluence" rests upon intercultural and chronological comparisons; but in making these comparisons it is important to remember that an affluent society may still include a large number of very poor people: the average income of the poorest fifth of the families (consumer units) in the United States in 1962 was $1,662 and this had to provide for a little over three people, on the average.[2] The term "affluence," however, is clearly relative both to other societies and previous periods. On the first point, comparison with other societies:

(1) The United States ranked second (out of 122 countries) in GNP per capita (Kuwait was the first) in 1957, with no other country even a close competitor.[3]
(2) According to one measure of "inequality of income distribution before taxes," the United States ranks about 7th in equality of income distribution. (Four British Commonwealth countries and India, for different reasons, are somewhat more equalitarian).[4]
(3) Although until the last few years the

---

[1] John K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston, 1958).

[2] These data and the economic and social statistics to follow are taken (or derived) from three main sources all by the U.S. Bureau of the Census: *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C., 1960), and its *Continuation to 1962 and Revisions* (1965); *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964* (85th ed., Washington, D.C., 1964).

[3] Bruce M. Russett and associates, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964), p. 155.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

annual increase of GNP was lower in the United States than in most developed and many developing countries (in Russett's volume, the United States is about 45th out of 68 countries), recently this has changed and the rate in the United States 1962–65 is about the same as in the Common Market countries.[5]

(4) Although relatively less extensive than in most European countries, the American welfare programs, now that medicare has been enacted, compare favorably in coverage and especially in absolute level of support with contemporary European programs.

(5) With the possible exception of Italy, no European or developed Commonwealth country has suffered a recession (after the postwar reconstruction period) with anything like the depth or duration of the depressions of the twenties and thirties. This is also true of the United States, as we shall see below.

But our main interest here lies, not in comparative economics and politics, but in changing patterns in the United States. Were we not always an *Affluent Society*, a *People of Plenty*,[6] bothered by the question "*Abundance for What?*[7] Relative to other nations, perhaps! But the modern era is different from previous eras in several important and relevant ways. It will be convenient to designate four economic time periods in the United States, of which only the last three are of current interest to us (and only the latter part of the earliest of these). The periods are: Agricultural State of Nature (1789-1869), Industrial State of Nature (1870–1929), Period of Economic Crisis (1930–1941), and Age of Affluence (marked by a preliminary uncertain period, 1946–50, and beginning to take on its central characteristics in 1951 and then continuing through the present). Inevitably, since we are dealing with more or less continuous change, the margins of the periods blur into each other. Each leaves its historical "deposit" in the milieu of the next, so that—as with countries still struggling with the remnants of the feudal order in the modern period—we have with us today substantial economic characteristics of the Agricultural State of Nature (not to mention the political and cultural residues of that period).

But since periods must have boundaries, let us mention our reasons for selecting these. The Industrial State of Nature began in 1870 when the society became more than half industrial and commercial, as indicated by the decline below the fifty per cent mark in value added to the national product by agriculture. During this industrial period, and prior to the great economic crisis of the 1930s, we find a decelerating rate of development, as indicated by the number of years required for the GNP to double (in constant prices): 13 years, then 18 years, then 21 years—taking us up to the mid-twenties. But we are concerned with more than economic performances; we are interested in government policy as well. "Reform" during this period focused upon the regulation of "natural monopolies," such as railroads, grain elevators, and the like; pure food and drugs laws; and policing certain trade practices. There was no concept of a welfare state, and the nearest thing to an argument over a "managed economy" was the chronic debate over "easy" *versus* "hard" money.

The period of Economic Crisis (1930–1941) was, of course, marked by economic depression, the most extended and severe in our history. In this period GNP (in constant dollars) remained below the 1929 figure until 1939; investment fell off drastically, and widespread unemployment and suffering ensued. The period defines itself by these facts of economic life *plus* two things: first, the advent of welfare state policies (especially social security, unemployment insurance, extended home and work relief, and a variety of agricultural policies designed to relieve the insecurities and penury of farm life); and second, the early beginnings of a fiscal and monetary policy (pump priming, inflationary monetary policies) designed to eliminate the troughs of the business cycle. These policies, of course, were extremely controversial, but—if we omit the war years—one might say that the passage of the Employment Act of 1946 represented a turning point in governmental (but not business) acceptance of responsibility for a "managed economy" in this special moderate sense. Specific policies to implement this concept remained controversial in many circles for a long time thereafter.

The 1940s represent an anomalous period, partly because of the war, and partly because per capita GNP (hovering around $2,000 in constant 1954 dollars) scarcely changed during the reconversion period, with its widespread shortages and rapidly rising prices, from 1946 into 1950. People were much better off than in the 1930s, but civilians generally were not much better off (economically) than they had been in the first half of the decade. Although there were no recessions as serious as the 1920–21 recession, yet both 1947 and 1949 were difficult years. As a consequence the annual rate of growth of GNP was low (1.8 per cent from 1946 to 1950), and, moreover, this period, like all postwar periods, was marked by high industrial strife. Yet there was an important difference, compared to 1929, and also compared to 1935–36; the share of income going to the very rich, the top 5 per cent, declined substantially (1929 = 30 per cent, 1935–36 = 26.5 per cent, 1946–50 = c.21 per cent). From 1950 on, this proportion going to the richest 5 per cent scarcely changed, drifting down a percentage point or two, for the next fifteen years. Aside from this last feature, however, the period of the forties seems to have been characterized by some of the economic elements of earlier periods; but at the same time, the basic welfare state measures provided assistance for the very poor, the economically insecure, and for the unemployed—rapidly increasing in 1949 and 1950.

---

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 160–61; also First National City Bank, *Monthly Economic Letter*, August 1965, p. 89.

[6] David M. Potter (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[7] David Riesman (Garden City, N.Y., 1964).

The Age of Affluence, after its poor beginning in the 1940s, may be said (for analytical purposes) to commence in the 1950s, especially after the Korean fighting had stopped. From that time on, although three recessions have occurred, only the one in 1957–58 involved any decline at all in per capita GNP in real terms. The rate of growth improved substantially: from 1950 to 1961 the annual rate of growth was 3.1 per cent in constant dollars. Industrial strife declined; prices were more stable, and in this decade available spending money rose dramatically (50 per cent increase in disposable income—current dollars) with goods to spend it on.

While the 1950s began to resemble a period appropriately termed an "Age of Affluence" (except for the unemployment), the 1960s look even better. From early 1961 into 1966 there have been *no* recessions, the longest continuous period of prosperity in our history. The annual rate of increase of GNP in constant dollars is about 4.2 per cent in real terms. Unemployment has declined somewhat, though it remains a "spot" on the affluent portrait. Equally important, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations make an explicit point of their use of fiscal policies, especially tax policies, to reduce or eliminate depressions and to encourage growth. Finally, in 1964 certain anti-poverty programs were instituted to attack unemployment, poverty and squalor with more precise instruments; and in 1965, for the first time in 20 years, major new advances were scored toward the realization of the welfare state, especially, medicare, extension of social security coverage; and a "break-through" was made on federal aid to education.

This long (but too brief) review of the economic and policy characteristics of recent times shows, then, a profile of increasing per capita income but decreasing economic effectiveness in the period of Industrial State of Nature (1870–1929); a period of Economic Crisis (1930–1941) with low income and no growth; an anomalous decade in the Forties; and then an accelerating economy in the Age of Affluence. No doubt the implications as drawn seem overly optimistic, but I see no reason to anticipate a reversal of any of the major trends (unless there is a war), though a slowing down of growth may take place. The question, then, is how these changes relate to political behavior and attitudes, especially in the contemporary period.

I. POLITICS AND CIVICS IN AN AGE OF AFFLUENCE

The relationships between individual affluence and political attitudes are comparatively well known, but the relationships between communal affluence and political behavior are somewhat obscure. Even more obscure are the relationships between *change* in affluence and *change* in politics. Consider the following plausible hypotheses:

One might expect an increased conservatism in the Age of Affluence, on the ground that as people become more prosperous they take on the known attitudes of prosperous individuals in an earlier period. Or, to the contrary, one might expect increasing support for the kinds of measures which have worked successfully in the past in helping to bring about the Age of Affluence, *i.e.*, support for an extension of the welfare state.

One might expect a declining urgency of political concern, on the ground that when men are more satisfied with their lot in life they become less desperate for political help. Or, one might expect increased political interest and concern because these attitudes are generally related to higher income and an improved capacity to take an interest in matters other than immediate day-to-day breadwinning problems.

One might expect a shift in political cleavage from social class to religious and ethnic bases on the ground that economic issues would become less important, thereby releasing men's attention for other submerged conflicts. Or, one might argue that because religious and ethnic cleavages are nourished by economic insecurity and poverty, growing affluence and security would weaken the intensity of these conflicts too.

Finally, one might expect a decline in political partisanship, *i.e.*, the extent and intensity of identification with a political party, on the ground that both parties are likely to accept the policies of the welfare state and the managed economy, thus depriving party differerences of much of their meaning. Or, one might argue that since social class is likely to lose its cuing function in elections, parties will remain important, or even become stronger, as intellectual and emotional "props" in electoral decisions.

The fact is that, as usual, both "theory" and common sense lead in diverse incompatible directions, and only evidence will help. The evidence to be presented here suggests a lessening of hostility between parties and religious groups, and a *rapprochement* between men and their government—a combination of changes which I cover in the term "politics of consensus." This does not imply that there are no sharp, intensely felt, hostile cleavages in society, but rather that these have (1) lost most of their political and emotional impact for most people (but not for Civil Rights workers), and (2) changed from cleavages in which the public was more or less evenly divided, to cleavages where the division is between a main body of opinion and a small and dwindling group. Specifically, the thesis has six themes. In the Age of Affluence:

(a) people will come increasingly to trust each other, to feel less at the mercy of chance and more in control of their lives, and so to be more optimistic regarding the future. These changes, in turn will help to promote others:

(b) people will slowly lose their sense of high national, personal, and group stakes in elections; political partisanship, while not changing on the surface, will change its meaning.

(c) people will slowly change their class awareness and consciousness, so that the relationship between ideology and class status will change; but occupation and class will continue to influence electoral choice—even as the electoral "pivot" shifts.

(d) religious institutions and dogmas will slowly lose their influence over men's secular thought, inter-faith hostility will decline, but religious community identification may retain a constant political "cuing" function.

(e) the struggle for racial equality will be facilitated by affluence and its associated attitudes, but the sense of crisis and strife in this arena will continue or grow for an indefinite period.

(f) there will be a *rapprochement* between men and their government and a decline of political alienation.

We cannot explore (for want of time and survey data) these changes in the earlier periods, so we will focus upon recent changes. The reader will understand the difficulties of relying on survey materials, with their different questions, eclectic timing, and, hence, ambiguous inference. He will, I hope, further understand that the nature of the changes we are considering are glacial in their slow movements, interrupted by dramatic events abroad and influenced by changing leadership appeals at home. One can, moreover, write interpretative historical essays without data, or more closely controlled and specific studies well documented by data, and both seem equally immune from criticism. This paper lies in between; it is a speculative historical study making use of such data as come to hand.[8]

II. TRUST, OPTIMISM AND ALIENATION

(a) *In an Age of Affluence, people will come increasingly to trust each other more, to feel more in control of their lives, and to be more hopeful regarding the future. Social alienation will decline.*

Greater economic security and protection against life's hazards should, one would imagine, increase people's sense of well-being or happiness, and occasion a decline in various kinds of anxiety. In some ways, this seems to be the case, while in other respects it is not. Over the years, both in the United States and abroad, survey organizations have asked people "In general, how happy would you say you are—very happy, fairly happy, or not very happy?" (AIPO). The question, in spite of its superficial naiveté, has been found to be related to many concrete symptoms of adjustment and happiness and thus to have a promise of some validity.[9] Comparatively speaking, by this test, the United States was in 1949 the third happiest nation (this statement sometimes amuses one's friends), with Australia by far the happiest and France the unhappiest.[10] But over time, it would be impossible to conclude that the evidence suggests that Americans have become "happier" in the Age of Affluence. In the three-year period 1946 to 1949 there seemed to be a drift in this direction (from 39 per cent "very happy" to 43 per cent), but, when in 1957 the Survey Research Center asked an almost identical question of a national sample ("Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days—would you say you're *very happy*, *pretty happy*, or *not too happy* these days?"), only 35 per cent reported themselves to be "very happy."[11] Since happiness, as the reader might suspect, is strongly related to education and income and since both education and income have been increasing, the findings are puzzling and suggest further inquiry.

---

[8] The difficulties of showing change through survey data are substantial. Sampling error may often account for the differences (though it should be recalled that most comparisons are between a proportion in one survey, with a sample usually around 1600, and a proportion in another; not, as is more familiar, proportions of sub-groups in only one survey). Great differences such as one hopes for in correlational analysis, would here imply some rather unstable attitudes and hence indicate the influence of transient events rather than historical change. The most solid evidence is provided, rather rarely, by many observed changes in the same direction over a long period. Unfortunately, the data for this paper often come from sources which do not give the size of the sample, eliminating the possibility of significance tests or correlational tests. Wherever possible [Tables I(d), I(e), IV(a), VI(a), and IX(b)], I have tested the significance of the distributions by the method of difference of proportions (Z). The dichotomized differences are all significant beyond the .01 level. I wish to thank Mary Frase for these computations.

But there is other evidence to suggest the kind of basic changes in orientation predicted in the Age of Affluence. One of the fundamental attitudinal ingredients of successful democracies is a relatively widespread sense of interpersonal trust.[12] It is a correlate of several important democratic attitudes[13] and, I believe, an ingredient in economic development itself, since this requires cooperation, responsibility and integrity to facilitate the working out of informal agreements.[14] Comparatively, the United States is a "trusting" nation, perhaps the most trusting; but we may not always have been that way. In Table I(a) there is some suggestion that inter-personal trust has increased since the war and the immediate postwar period. If this is true it would provide the strongest attitudinal foundation for some of the political changes we shall examine shortly.

While the sense of current happiness does not seem to have grown in the Age of Affluence, nevertheless an important change has occurred in attitudes about the past, present, and future chances for happiness or life satisfaction. In Table I(b) we see a very strong suggestion that, compared to people in the later phases of the Period of Economic Crisis, people today believe that their lives provide greater satisfaction than their parents or grandparents had. The nostalgia of the Thirties for an earlier, possibly "village" America, seems to have declined, in spite of the resurgence of these attitudes said to be characteristic of the Goldwater campaign. If this is a measure of an emotional traditionalism, this change, too, is important.

Looking toward the future as a period offering greater promise of a happier life, could imply some dissatisfaction with the current state of things; but, on the contrary, it seems to me to imply exactly the opposite view, namely, that the present is full of hope, carrying within it the seeds of fruitful change. In any event, the increase in the past ten years of faith in the future compared to a plateau of relatively lower hope during the previous 13 years (Table I(c) seems to me to reflect exactly that sense of security in the future which one might expect from the protective arm of the welfare state and newly acquired control over the ravages of the business cycle.[15]

This theme is further reflected and more directly stated in a question on the carrying out of plans, shown in Table I(d). Here, unfortunately, the time span between measures is short (1958 to 1964), and the change in attitudes relatively small. Moreover, the first measure is taken in a period of recovery from the only important recession in the Age of Affluence. Nevertheless it is suggestive that a growing sense of mastery over fate emerges—the very antithesis of the traditionalist orientation suggesting that one is the helpless object of forces beyond human control.

---

[9] See Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, *Reports of Happiness* (Chicago, Aldine, 1965).

[10] See compilation of survey material by Hazel Gaudet Erskine in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 28 (1964), p. 519. Future reference to these compilations will be as follows: Erskine, *POQ*.

[11] Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and Sheila Feld, *Americans View Their Mental Health* (New York, Basic Books, 1960), p. 22.

[12] See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 266–68.

[13] Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 690–5.

[14] This is the implication in David McCelland's discussion of other-directedness. See his *The Achieving Society* (New York, 1961), pp. 190–203.

[15] Candor compels me to note here that between 1937 and 1964 there was virtually no change in the belief that we will never do away with poverty in this country: in both 1937 and 1964 some 83 per cent said "no," we will never do it. Erskine, *POQ*, p. 526.

Finally, we must note in Table I(e) a somewhat larger increase in the belief that one is, in some sense, the child of fortune, blessed with better than the average share of good luck. Again we are dealing with "late" (for us) changes in the Age of Affluence, but the halving of the proportion of those who think of themselves as dogged by bad luck is surely significant. The implication is twofold: men feel more in control of their lives, as we said before, and "nature" or "the fates" or even "society" is less malevolent—perhaps even benign.

TABLE I. TRUST IN OTHERS; PERCEPTIONS OF LIFE NOW, EARLIER, AND LATER; CONTROL OVER ONE'S OWN LIFE, AND SHARE OF GOOD LUCK

(a) "Do you think most people can be trusted?" (OPOR, March 26, 1942; NORC, Aug. 1, 1948; Jan. 1964)[a]

	1942	1948	1964
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Yes	66	66	77
No	25	30	21
No opinion	9*	4	2

* includes 5% qualified answers

(b) "Do you think Americans were happier and more contented thirty years ago than they are now?" (AIPO, Mar. 8, 1939).[a] "Do you think the average man gets more satisfaction out of life these days or do you think he got more out of life 50 years ago?" (SRC, Nov. 1964)[b]

	1939	1964
	(%)	(%)
In earlier period people were happier; got more satisfaction out of life	61	34
Not happier in earlier period; get more satisfaction out of life these days	23	59
Other, it depends, no opinion	16	7

(c) "Ten years from now, do you believe Americans will generally be happier than they are today?" (AIPO, May 18, 1939). "As you look to the future, do you think life for people generally will get better—or will it get worse?" (AIPO, March 15, 1952; Aug. 29, 1962)[a]

	1939	1952	1962
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Better (happier)	42	42	55
Worse (not happier)	35	34	23
No difference		13	12
No opinion	23	11	10

TABLE I (*continued*)

(d) "When you make plans ahead, do you usually get to carry out things the way you expected, or do things usually come up to make you change your plans?" (SRC, Nov. 1958; Nov. 1964)[b]

	1958	1964
	(%)	(%)
Things work out as expected	52	59
Depends, other	1	4
Have to change plans	42	36
Don't know and NA	4	1
No. of cases	(1822)	(1450)

(e) "Do you feel that you are the kind of person that gets his share of bad luck, or do you feel that you have mostly good luck?" (SRC, Nov. 1958, Nov. 1964).[b]

	1958	1964
	(%)	(%)
Mostly good luck	63	75
Pro-con; it depends	5	10
Bad luck	29	14
Don't know and NA	4	1
No. of cases	(1822)	(1450)

[a] Erskine, *POQ*, pp. 517, 523, 525. AIPO refers to American Institute of Public Opinion; OPOR to Office of Public Opinion Research; and NORC to National Opinion Research Corp.

[b] Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, Codebook for 1964 Survey Research Center Election Study. These sources will hereafter be abbreviated as "Consortium Codebook" and the initials SRC will be used for the Survey Research Center (University of Michigan).

In review, in spite of the findings on "happiness," one can only conclude that during this period the direction of changing personal orientation has been toward a sense that life is better than it was, and will get still better; that people are more trustworthy; that events are more under control and fate is kinder. There is a group of intellectuals who have, in one sense, inherited the place once held by the proponents of Marx's immiseration theory of capitalism. With tongue in cheek, we may refer to them as "alienists," for their apostle is a psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm, and their theme is the increasing alienation of men from work, society and government. I have long suspected that they reflected their own discontent with society rather more than any mass discontent—some, like C. Wright Mills, have said as much.[16] Partly too, I think, their views reflect their own alienation from the field of endeavor where there is a true *elan*, the field of science. Whatever the reason, and somewhat apart from the main argument of this piece, I suggest that the above data cast doubt upon the principal themes of these alienist thinkers.

III. POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

(b) *In an Age of Affluence, the sense of crisis and of high national, personal, and group stakes in national elections declines; political partisanship takes on a new meaning.*

This change in "sense of crisis" is, perhaps, the most important attitudinal change from the Period of Economic Crisis to the Age of Affluence, and it is the most difficult to substantiate with really good evidence. The argument, however, is straightforward.

In an Age of Affluence an increasing proportion of the working class achieve sufficient income and security to adopt middle class social and political patterns—but they nevertheless are likely to remain Democrats. At the same time, the middle class will associate its own increasing welfare and security with the policies of the welfare state, including flexible fiscal policies, and will be in no mood for change. Many will become Democrats; others will be liberal Republicans. Many industrialists and businessmen will come increasingly to perceive that the fight against a limited management of the economy is not in their interests because these "liberal" policies provide the basis for the prosperity and growth in which they share. It is certainly not true that the more prosperous a person becomes, the less likely he is to be alarmed about political events. But, generally, I think it is true that the more secure he is about his income, and the more it appears to him that the government will not jeopardize that income, the less intense he is likely to feel about political decisions in the realm of economic affairs.

Before turning to time comparisons in the United States, something may be learned from cross-cultural comparisons of attitudes toward victory by opposition parties. From the data in Table II, one learns that the sense of electoral crisis is lower in the United States than elsewhere. This is enormously significant for the smooth functioning of democratic institutions, not only because it makes transition easier from one administration to another, but also because it reduces antagonism and hostility in electoral campaigns. The data also show a sensitivity in these foreign nations to real dangers; but for our purposes, let us note only one other point. In every country except Mexico the more conservative party is in power, but only in the United States—and there only in a minor way—is a larger proportion fearful of the conservative party policies than of the more liberal party. So much has the welfare state been accepted here that its mild opponents, even when in power, were considered more threatening than its apostles. This was true in 1960—perhaps the 1964 election may be interpreted as further confirmation of this point.

Not infrequently the American experience is taken by (American) scholars to represent a kind of prototype for modernizing societies, a model of what is to become of them. If that interpretation is true, it implies that we have passed through some of the phases of economics and politics which these other nations are now experiencing—a hypothesis which runs counter to the notion of American uniqueness, and runs counter to much common sense as well. Nevertheless, the implication of Table II is in line with our major theme: the decline of a sense of high stakes involved in national electoral decisions.

These stakes might be national stakes, where the welfare of the *country* is somehow "risked," as implied by the question eliciting the Almond-Verba data; or the stakes might be more personal, turning on one's *own economic condition*; or they might refer to the welfare of the *group* to which one belongs. Changing attitudes toward these three kinds of stakes are reflected in Tables III and IV.

The argument for a declining sense of national urgency in electoral outcomes must rest on two comparisons over time, the only comparable ones I could find (Tables III(a) and (b)). One of them compares the responses to two similar questions: how much difference it makes which party wins, in 1946, and how much difference it makes which party runs the country, nineteen years later in May 1965. Note that the latter time follows by only several months an election in which the candidates were thought to have sharply different views on domestic and foreign policy. The decline in those believing partisan victory or partisan government of one kind or another makes "a great deal of difference" is suggestive of the process of consensus revealed in Table II and anticipated in our argument. The other comparison is between attitudes directly mention-

---

[16] See Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955); C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1959), esp. pp. 165–76.

TABLE II. SENSE OF ALARM OVER THE VICTORY OF AN OPPOSITION PARTY, IN FIVE NATIONS

"The Republican Party now controls the administration in Washington. Do you think that its policies and activities would ever seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this *probably* would happen, that it *might* happen, or that it *probably wouldn't* happen?"*

"If the Democratic Party were to take control of the government, how likely is it that it would seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this would *probably* happen, that it *might* happen, or that it *probably wouldn't* happen?*"

Country	Response	Per Cent "Probably Would Happen," of total sample
United States		(%)
	Republicans probably endanger welfare	5
	Democrats probably endanger welfare	3
Great Britain		
	Conservatives probably endanger welfare	7
	Labour probably endangers welfare	17
Germany		
	Christian Democrats probably endanger welfare	7
	Socialists (SPD) probably endanger welfare	12
	Right wing (DRP) probably endangers welfare	35
Italy		
	Christian Democrats probably endanger welfare	10
	Communists (PCI) probably endanger welfare	60
	Socialists (PSI) probably endanger welfare	43
	Socialists (PSDI) probably endanger welfare	23
	Right Wing party like MSI probably endangers welfare	41
Mexico		
	Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) probably endangers welfare	13
	PAN (minor party) probably endangers welfare	18
	PP (minor party) probably endangers welfare	37

* Appropriate changes in wording, of course, for each nation.

Source: Almond-Verba five-nation study; *Consortium codebooks*. The major report on these surveys is made in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, *op. cit.* The number of cases for each country is about a thousand; U. S. survey was made in March 1960, others in June and July 1959.

ing "difference to the country" or "important to the country" in 1944 and in 1952—the beginning of the politics of consensus. Fortunately, in 1952 the question was asked twice, once before the election—mentioning only parties—and again after the election, mentioning the candidates' names. The lack of difference between these two times and wordings gives us a sense of the reliability of the attitudes involved. And the magnitude of the apparent change in attitude over this 8-year period suggests that chance or sampling error or minor differences in wording could not account for the change. But perhaps it is the difference between a war election and a peacetime election, rather than any between an election colored by the politics of the Period of Economic Crisis compared to the politics of consensus in the Age of Affluence? This would be a more plausible construct were it not for a previous (AIPO) poll in (August) 1942 asking people whether they thought the outcome of the election would "make *any* difference in the war effort"; only 30 per cent thought—correctly, as the election consequences for domestic mobilization programs showed—that it would make any difference in this particular respect, compared to 88 per cent seeing some unspecified difference in 1944. The implication is clear: people were carrying into the 1944 election—when postwar reconversion anxieties loomed—their sense of partisan alarm learned in the 1930s. In 1952, with a war in the Far East still unresolved, and the cold war in full swing, the sense that the country's welfare hinged on the election nevertheless dwindled drastically and the conditions were prepared for the very low sense of partisan alarmism seen in the 1960 Almond-Verba data presented above.

Part of the political style of the period of

TABLE III. DOES IT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO THE COUNTRY WHICH PARTY WINS?

(a) "Do you think it makes much difference or only a little difference which party wins the elections for Congress this fall?" (AIPO, Sept. 1946)[a]

"Do you think it makes a great deal of difference or just a little difference which political party runs the country?" (AIPO, May 1965)[b]

	1946	1965
	(%)	(%)
Great deal of difference	49	39
Little difference	31	40
No difference	11	14
Don't know	9	6

(b) "Which one of these ideas comes closest to the way you feel about this election: It is very important to the country that Roosevelt be elected; the country will be better off if Roosevelt is elected; the country will be better off if Dewey is elected; it is very important to the country that Dewey be elected?" (NORC, Oct. 2, 1944)[a]

"Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the election this November or that it won't make much difference which side wins?" (SRC, Oct. 1952)[c]

"Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country that Eisenhower won instead of Stevenson, or don't you think it will make much difference?" (SRC, Nov. 1952)[c]

	1944	1952	
		October	November
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Very important to the country; good deal of difference	54	21	20
Country will be better off; some difference; it depends	34	40	42
Won't make much difference; no difference	9	32	31

[a] Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion, 1936–1945* (Princeton University Press, 1951).

[b] AIPO release, May 1965.

[c] *Consortium Codebook.*

transition to the welfare state—and, we must add, its brief resurgence in 1964—is the hostile posture of each partisan toward his opponents, something which follows naturally from the view that a great deal is at stake in the political contest. Not infrequently, in such a strained atmosphere, the election seems more of an effort to keep the other man out, rather than to elect one's own candidate. The evidence (not presented here) suggests that the intensity of opposition—except on the extreme fringes—is greater among the *defenders* of the liberal established order; the threat of deprivation of the welfare state is apparently felt more intensely than the threat which the welfare state, once established, implies to its opponents. In any event, it is our thesis that the politics of consensus is also the politics of support, rather than the politics of opposition. There is some evidence for this in the responses of three national samples to questions almost identically worded asking "would you say you are voting mostly to get one man into office (for 'R's candidate'), or mostly to keep the other man out (against 'opposing candidate')?" In 1944 the oppositional vote was 25 per cent, and in 1964, with the return of anti-welfare state politics, it was 21 per cent. By contrast, in the 1960 election—marked by some anti-Catholic voting, but not by threats to the welfare state and a managed economy, and basically in the consensual style—oppositional voting was only 10 per

TABLE IV. DOES IT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO A PERSON'S OR A GROUP'S WELFARE WHICH PARTY WINS?

(a) "Do you think it will make any important difference in how you and your family get along financially whether the Democrats or the Republicans win? How is that?" (SRC, Oct. or Nov. of years indicated)[a]

	Per Cent saying "no difference" or unable to think of any difference (don't know).					
	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1964
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Presidential elections	53		66		66	66
Congressional ("off year") elections		65		72		
No. of cases	(1799)	(1139)	(1762)	(1822)	(1954)	(1571)

(b) "As of today, which political party—the Democratic or the Republican—do you think serves the interests of the following groups best: Business and professional people? White collar workers? Farmers? Skilled workers? Unskilled workers?" (AIPO, months uncertain, years as indicated)[b]

	Per Cent saying "No Difference"		
Responses referring to own group (business and professional people referring to the interests of business and professional people, etc.)	1952 (%)	1960 (%)	1964 (%)
Middle groups (less class conscious)			
White collar	12	15	17
Skilled workers	13	14	16
Farmers	10	16	17
Extreme groups (more class conscious)			
Business and professional	11	15	12
Unskilled workers	11	13	12

[a] *Consortium Codebooks* for election studies of years indicated.
[b] AIPO release, Feb. 28, 1965.

cent, less than half as large.[17]

These findings and arguments deal essentially with the question of national stakes and concerns, but one might well argue that political life more directly reflects a person's own perceived self interest—at least Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes do seem to take this position.[18] This is a fundamental question, for the heart of my argument rests on the view that the Age of Affluence produces, with occasional regression, political contests which do not jeopardize a person's income or economic security. Unfortunately, here, the time series only goes back to 1952 and hence the comparison must rely upon trends within the later era. My thesis, as it turns out, is only partially supported by the evidence, as may be seen in Table IV(a). Where, according to the argument, a slowly growing number of persons should emerge who do not believe that their own income will be greatly affected by the outcome of an election, we find instead, for the presidential years, a marked increase in this sense of "indifference" only between 1952 and 1956—followed by no change at all, a plateau. For the congressional years, a crucial datum is missing for 1962, but the change from 1954 to 1958 is in the expected direction. There are, of course, natural limits to the rise of this "indifference curve" and a counter tendency in the increased level of education in the population, for the more educated are more likely to see the links between their economic well-being and governmental policy. Nevertheless, if one might project these figures backward into time, one would infer, albeit somewhat hesitantly, a lower sense of indifference in the politics of the Period of Economic Crisis to correspond to the greater sense of national stakes we discovered in the earlier data.

---

[17] *Consortium codebooks*, NORC 1944 election study and SRC 1960 and 1964 studies.

[18] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), pp. 205–7.

Finally, there is the question of perceived group or class stakes in a national election. As has often been said, politics is a group process, men often take their cue for party identification by some simple phrase such as "party of the business man" or "party of the working man." Where issues are obscure, categoric group tradition and alignment, mediated through primary groups, is central. The measure for this perception of group stakes in politics, as seen in Table IV(b), is the response to a question on the party which best serves the interests of each of five groups, classified by the group membership of the respondent. Here I have omitted some data on 1962 since congressional years are different in most series from presidential years (these data suggest an acceleration of the indifference effect prior to the 1964 election) and I have grouped the socio-economic classes in two divisions: the more flexible middle group and the more extreme and usually more class conscious group. The evidence, again rather tenuous, suggests that within the middle groups whose class identifications are likely to be less clear, there is a slowly growing sense that neither party will jeopardize the interests of one's own particular class. Even among the unskilled workers who have been the most partisan of any of these groups, this sense of indifference seemed waxing in 1962 (when the "no difference" responses were 19 per cent, a gain of 6 points in two years), only to be sharply cut back in 1964. Since the 1964 election was, as I have mentioned, a return to welfare state issues, the fact that the sense of "no difference" continued to grow at all, compared to 1956, for these three middle groups is a tribute to the strength of this attitude.

The importance of this measure of sense of indifference is, I think, much greater than is indicated by the small size of the groups involved. For if, at this extreme, the group is slowly growing which claims that there are no important group stakes in an election, then, for a much larger group, there must be doubts, inarticulate mood changes, and declining intensity of conviction.

Before closing this section on the declining sense of crisis, declining perception of threatened policies that might endanger the country, and declining belief that personal or group welfare is involved in an electoral decision, let us note two implied consequences which do *not*, in fact, take place. One implication is that people are becoming less interested in politics. Two extensive series of questions have been asked over time, inquiring into people's interest in the elections, and neither of them shows any decline; indeed, the SRC series catching every national election from 1952 to 1964 (except 1954) shows with some variation over the years, a peak interest in 1964 (41 per cent "very much interested") and a marked increase from 1958 to 1962 (from 26 per cent to 36 per cent "very much interested")—suggesting, if anything, an increased interest in this time period.

Moreover, rather paradoxically, no decline has been reported in the strength of party identification. That is, the proportion reporting that they are "strong Democrats" and "strong Republicans" has remained remarkably constant (with a slight increase in "strong Democrats" in 1964). Furthermore, although the proportion of people reporting themselves "independent" has increased slightly—from around 20 per cent in the 1930s and 1940s, to between 21 and 24 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s—the change is very moderate indeed.[19]

The consequent pattern emerging, therefore, is of the interested, party-identified citizen, following politics at least as closely as he did in the days of the great intense clashes when the welfare state was first launched and when men were harassed by insecurity and poverty; voting more regularly, and, indeed "personally caring" about the outcome as before; but believing that the national and personal stakes involved were not so great. People need their party identification as cues for voting decisions. For most voters, these identifications are the most significant means of orientation in politics. Hence, people will not give them up easily, and if they did, they would have to find others, such as race, or class, or religion, or charismatic leadership. But people are changing the meanings assigned to their party membership, and increasingly believe that the opposition is not so dangerous after all.

We can apply one test to this theory of the politics of consensus. If partisanship has lost some of its "bite" and acrimony, one would expect the views of partisans of both parties on the way in which the president is conducting his business to vary more or less together. Approval of the way the president is "handling his job as president" has usually been higher than the partisan vote for the president, in any case. But if we could show that the difference between the approval of members of his own and of the opposition party (Republicans for Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson; Democrats for Eisenhower) was less in the Age of Affluence

---

[19] These findings on "interest," "personal caring" and partisanship are from the *Consortium codebooks* of the relevant years.

TABLE V. POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP AND APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE

"Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as President?" (AIPO)

Time	President	% Support by Pres.' own party	% Support by opposition party	Partisanship of support: Pres. party less opp. party	Average partisanship difference
A. Presidents Associated with Conflict over Welfare State					
		(%)	(%)		
Feb. 1941	Roosevelt	90	40	50	36.3
Feb. 1947	Truman	59	41	18	
Oct. 1952	Truman	50	9	41	
B. Presidents in the Age of Affluence (post-transition)					
Jan. 1953	Eisenhower	90	70	20	27.5
Jan. 1957	Eisenhower	95	66	29	
Feb. 1960	Kennedy	84	55	29	
Jan. 1964	Johnson	85	74	11	
May 1965	Johnson	77	51	26	

than in the Period of Economic Crisis (including the ambiguous 1940s), our case for historical change would be that much stronger. Since approval and disapproval fluctuate within presidential terms, an ideal measure would take each president at the beginning of his term; but we are forced here to employ the time periods in which the data are given by party breakdown as shown in Table V. By subtracting the per cent of the opposition party approving the president's handling of his job from the per cent of his own party so approving, we have a measure of partisanship.

As may be observed (Table V) from the average figures for the two periods, a substantial decline occurred in the partisanship of judgment, the degree to which the judgments reflect partisan divisions. Moreover, except for the special tragic circumstances bringing Johnson into power—circumstances which produced a burst of sympathetic good will toward the new incumbent—the variation in partisanship in this period is rather slight. It seems to have stabilized (to the extent that any set of attitudes at the mercy of historical events may be so described) in a modest 20 to 29 per cent range. In short, our expectations of the consequences of a consensual politics are generally confirmed.

IV. SOCIAL CLASS

(c) *In an Age of Affluence, (1) people slowly lose (or relax) their class awareness, (2) the link between social class and ideology changes; but, (3) in spite of their security and prosperity, people do* not *increasingly think of themselves as middle class, and (4) social class does not (after a transition period) lose its link to partisan political choice, although the changing political "pivot" diminishes the importance of class voting in many electoral districts.*

The absence, in American history, of a feudal structure or a landed class—and therefore of a peasant class—has given it a unique lack of class consciousness, as so many observers have noted. Yet American society has always been stratified and important differences in life chances, honor, and distribution of rewards inevitably enter into the experience of Americans, like others, and have been historically associated with political choice as well as many other attitudes toward society. Different social strata have always been the vehicles or *milieux* for different social movements, social ideas, and political parties. In the Age of Affluence, we would expect a continuation of past behavior and opinion modified very slowly by new feelings of security, life styles, and perspectives. I stress the slowness because social class, unlike political party, refers to the basic pattern of life experiences, learned early, reinforced daily, and inevitably loaded with emotion.

First, one wants to know both the nature of objective social change and the nature of subjective responses. Briefly, the proportion of white-collar workers has increased by an average of a little less than five percentage points in every decade for fifty years, with a much smaller increase during the Period of Economic Crisis and a larger increase in subsequent years (1940 to 1960). In 1960 43.2 per cent of the employed persons were in white-collar occupations (professional, technical, managerial, clerical and sales).

But, of course, there is a great deal of slippage between objective and subjective class identifications (some estimates indicate that self-misclassification is as large as 25 per cent), and, hence the objective occupational change is not a very good immediate indication of how people will see themselves over time. Measures on this go back to 1945[20] and 1946[21] and, after 1952 continue in rather orderly fashion to 1964.[22] Any expectation that the increasing proportion of workers engaged in white-collar jobs, and the general levelling up of economic security and income, would produce an increased middle class identification, would turn out to have been wrong; about 40 per cent thought of themselves as middle or upper in 1946, and about 40 per cent again in 1964. In between, the decline in middle class identification noted by Converse in his comparison of 1945 data with 1952 and 1956 data has subsequently been reversed[23] and, without finer examination of special groups, one can only conclude in 1965 that this aspect of "bourgeoisification" of society has not taken place. Men appear to be as willing today as they were about twenty years ago to see themselves as members of "the working class." As a nation we are certainly not "putting on airs."

But, as with party identification, it may be that class identification is slowly assuming a new meaning, a lack of intensity, a different reference. Here the SRC series shown in Table VI(a) gives us some clues, though rather slight ones. We would not—particularly just before the 1964 election—have expected much change, in any event; but we would expect a drifting decline in class awareness or consciousness in the sense of "thinking of oneself as belonging to a social class," partly because of the erosion of the intense feelings evoked by the experience of the 1930s, and partly through a change in age cohorts (in 1956 people in their fifties were the most class conscious age group).[24] The time period is short, one of the figures is anomalous and is omitted from the table (in 1960 the comparable figure was 25 per cent), but after grouping contiguous years and thus doubling the sample sizes, a slow increase does appear in the proportion of people for whom social class is not a conscious reference. And if this is overtly true of this third of the population or so, one suspects that the meaning of class is *changing* for the other two-thirds, as well.

Converse, in neat analysis, has already given a strong indication that this is probably the case. He relates, for each of the two periods, class identification and certain social opinions dealing with the government's responsibility for employment, medical care, and housing and electricity; and finds that the correlations between class and opinions decline markedly in each case. Moreover, this is true of both objective status and subjective class identification.[25] This is strong evidence for a changed meaning of class identification so far as government policy is concerned. After all, government is increasingly seen as the agent for improving *everyone's* prosperity.

But would this also be true of attitudes toward unions, organizations which do not have this trans-class role and which, indeed, are often seen as (and are) the agents of class conflict? From 1936 to 1963 the Gallup polls have asked national samples about their attitudes toward unions: "Are you in favor of labor unions?" and "In general do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?" (Responses in contiguous years to these different questions indicate no difference in response patterns.) Three things are most notable about these responses. First, in this 26-year period, some fluctuation has occurred (from 58 per cent approve in 1938 to 76 per cent in February, 1957), with increased disapproval following severe strikes or critical investigations (like McCellan's in 1957), but no long term decline or increase in public criticism or support. Second, at no time has a majority of any group, including the business and professional group, failed to approve of unions. And third, and most important for our purposes, the discrepancy between working class and middle class support of unions seems to be growing, as may be seen in Table VI(b). Moreover, in the eleven years

---

[20] Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton University Press, 1949).

[21] Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *op. cit.*, p. 116 (AIPO).

[22] *Consortium codebooks* (SRC).

[23] Philip Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class in Political Attitudes and Behavior," in E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1958), pp. 388–99. The consortium codebooks show the following proportions of national samples reporting themselves as "middle class": 1952: 37 per cent; 1956: 36 per cent; 1960: 31 per cent; 1964: 40 per cent. The 1952 figure includes "upper class."

[24] Campbell and associates, *The American Voter*, p. 357.

[25] P. Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class," *op. cit.*, pp. 391–93.

TABLE VI. CHANGING PATTERNS OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND CLASS IDEOLOGY

(a) "There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes?" (SRC, Oct., Nov. years indicated)[a]

	The late 1950s (average for 1956 and 1958)		The early 1960s (average for 1962 and 1964)	
	Per cent	(N)	Per cent	(N)
No, never thinks of self as being in a social class	34.6	(1241)	37.6	(1078)
Yes, thinks of self as being in a social class	64.2	(2302)	60.8	(1744)
Don't know and other	1.1	(41)	1.6	(46)
Total	99.9	(3584)	100.0	(2868)

(b) "Are you in favor of labor unions?" (AIPO, Oct. 26, 1941). "In general do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?" (AIPO, Feb. 19, 1949; Nov. 11, 1953; Feb. 8, May 1, 1957; Feb. 8, 1959; Feb. 15, May 26, 1961; Jan. 30, 1963)[b]

	Per Cent Approve			Index of Unlikeness	
	Manual workers	Business & professional	White collar	Manual wkrs. minus Bus. & prof.	Manual wkrs. minus White collar
	(%)	(%)	(%)		
1941 (October)	73	—	69		4
1949 (February)	67	65	63	2	4
1953 (November)	81	70	75	11	6
1957 (February)	83	73	77	10	6
1961 (February)	77	64	65	13	12
1963 (January	75	61	67	14	8

(c) "As things stand today, do you think the laws governing labor unions are too strict or not strict enough?" (AIPO, Jan. 15, 1960). "Do you think the laws regulating labor unions are too strict, or not strict enough?" (AIPO, Oct. 22, 1961)[b]

	Per cent "not strict enough"	
	1950	1961
	(%)	(%)
Business and Professional	54	60
White collar	43	48
Manual workers	34	35

[a] *Consortium codebooks.*

[b] Erskine, *POQ*, Vol. 26 (1962), pp. 284, 288 (and AIPO release, Jan. 30, 1963).

between 1950 and 1961, a modest increase has occurred in the proportion of business and professional and of white collar workers—but *not* of manual workers—who believe that the laws regulating labor unions are "not strict enough" (Table VI(c)). Such evidence, running contrary to my main thesis (the weakening effect of socio-economic status upon "ideology") suggests that there may be two themes here instead of one. Social class (objective and subjective) may have a weakening relationship to opinions about welfare state policies but not to opinions about labor unions. Perhaps, in a period when attention turns to questions of productivity and growth, rather than social justice and equality, and when the government, rather than unions, is the main agent of economic protection—especially for the underdog—unions will seem somewhat different to middle class and working class people. If this were the case, it would give us a better understanding of why it is that just at the time when the relationship between class and opinion on the welfare state is (in Converse's measure) weakening, the relationship between class and attitudes toward unions is growing stronger.

But political choices, as we know, are only loosely related to ideology. The facts seem to be as follows: the relationship between social status or class membership and political choice ("status polarization" or "class voting") tended to become closer, as one might expect in presidential elections during the Period of Economic Crisis, at least from 1936 to 1940; then, after a depressed relationship in 1944 due to attention to war issues, the correlation reached a peak in 1948, whereupon it declined in 1952 and again in 1956. At this point it reached a plateau and remained at about the 1956 level in 1960 and, surprisingly, in 1964.[26] By Alford's measure (a variation of Rice's "index of likeness")[27] this 1956–64 plateau is at about the same level as the starting point of the series in 1936, suggesting that class voting has a kind of "natural level" for a given country in a given period, altered only occasionally by certain "critical elections."

But, while the measure of likeness (or, actually, "unlikeness") which Alford uses and which I have employed elsewhere in this paper, is useful in indicating some elements of similarity, it does not taken into account the *level* at which these similarities and discrepancies occur. For example, a situation where 60 per cent of the manual workers and 40 per cent of the non-manual workers vote Democratic (index = 20), and another situation where 80 per cent of the manual workers and 60 per cent of the non-manual workers vote Democratic, (index = 20) are scored alike. Yet in the first instance, a majority of the manual workers is on one side of the political division, and a majority of the white collar and business and professional workers is on the other, whereas in the second case, a majority of both groups is on the same side.

Let us suppose that the party responsible for innovative institution of welfare state measures, and fiscal and monetary measures designed to level out the business cycle and promote growth, gradually extends its following in the Age of Affluence so that it becomes overwhelmingly the dominant party. This is done partly by a gradual shift in the middle "white collar" groups so that they see the more liberal party as appropriately "their own," and by some defection of business and professional groups, especially among Catholic and Jewish communicants. Our measure of political likeness does not change, but the pivot changes and we have a situation where class voting differences, with their winner-take-all payoff, become less important.

The evidence that this is the case is strong. A majority of the skilled and unskilled workers have been Democrats at least since 1928 and probably before,[28] with a variable minority occasionally voting outside the party (especially in 1952 and 1956). Even these defectors, however, tended to identify with the Democratic party throughout. On the other hand, historically the business and professional groups, the white collar groups, and usually the farmers, have identified with the Republican party, occasionally voting for Democratic candidates, but then returning to the fold—though returning in decreasing numbers. The consequence was that in terms of party identification at the end of the Period of Economic Crisis both parties started about even: in 1940 some 42 per cent of the population said they were Democrats, 38 per cent Republicans, and 20 per cent claimed to be Independents. By July 1964, just prior to the nomination of Barry Goldwater, the count was 53 per cent Democrats, 25 per cent Republicans, and 22 per cent Independents. And the shift seemed to be accelerating: between 1960 and 1964 all major groups became more Democratic, with the business and professional group moving a little faster than average (7 per cent shift compared to an average of 6 per cent) and thus becoming more Democratic than Republican for the first time.[29] Thus, as far as party identification goes, all groups have Democratic pluralities, and although proportions differ between social classes, majorities tend to agree.

The difference between the kind of situation where majorities of all major social groups (business and professional, farmers, manual workers, etc.) agree, compared to a situation where the majority of one group is for one party and the majority of an opposing group is for another, is illustrated by the 1964 election.

---

[26] The 1944–1956 changes are documented in Converse, *ibid.*; these, and the 1936, 1940 and 1960 data are reported in the most extensive available study of "class voting," Robert R. Alford's *Party and Society* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 103, 352–53. The 1964 figures are based upon AIPO release, December 13, 1964.

[27] See Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), pp. 210–11.

[28] See Alford, *Party and Society*, pp. 225–31.

[29] AIPO releases, Feb. 21, 1960 and July 5, 1964.

In such an election business and union spokesmen (like Henry Ford and Walter Reuther), support the same candidate; the candidate of the dominant coalition assumes a moderating "national unity" tone and his opponent sounds "shrill"; references to class-linked slogans such as "union bosses," and "economic royalists" are muted in the dominant party. In short, the shifting "pivot" of class allegiance implies a very different kind of "democratic class conflict"—even though the index of unlikeness or of "class voting" may remain constant. Within the dominant party, the politics of consensus takes over, while the minority party occasionally reverts to the older politics of economic crisis.

V. RELIGION

(d) *In the Age of Affluence, religious institutions* slowly *lose their influence over men's thought and behavior; religious prejudices and hostilities decline; but the influence of religious identification upon partisan political choice is among the slowest influences to change.*

It may be argued that class divisions in politics, and the influence of status upon social and political opinion, are "healthier" for a society than are religious divisions and influences. They are less likely to be "moralized," therefore less likely to be intransigent; conflicts are more easily solved by economic growth and economic change; compromise is easier because the stakes are often divisible and allocable by small units; the controversies are increasingly subject to empirical proof, referring, as they do, to cause and effect in *this* world. Therefore, whatever one's feelings about religion in its own sphere, a declining influence of dogmatic religion (as contrasted to some Judeo-Christian ethics) on social thought, and of religious affiliation on political choice, might be seen as a step toward a more healthy polity.

Since the space is brief, let us, for the record, summarize some evidence pointing generally, with some exceptions, in this direction. The basic facts on religious affiliation and church attendance are these: the proportion of the population with some kind of religious affiliation increased in the 1920s, remained constant in the 1930s, increased substantially in the 1940s, increased very moderately in the 1950s, and from 1959 to 1962 (the latest date on which I have figures) increased not at all. Church attendance (as contrasted to affiliation) increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s to a peak average attendance of 49 per cent in 1958, and from that time decreased slowly but steadily to 45 per cent in 1964, with Protestants and Catholics moving in the same direction.[30] Since affiliation and church attendance have been higher among while collar than blue collar, and among better educated than less well educated groups, this levelling off and decline are, so to speak, "bucking" the educational and occupational trend. Some perception of this tendency seems to have entered the public consciousness. Asked whether religion is "increasing or losing its influence on American life," the proportion seeing religion losing its influence has recently grown: 1957: 14 per cent; 1962: 31 per cent; 1965: 45 per cent.[31] These changes are late in the Age of Affluence; their political and ideological effects would not be expected to appear for some time.

Such observations refer to the theological or institutional aspects of religion, but the community effect, the identification with co-religionists, is something else.[32] This can take a variety of forms, but, briefly, identification with co-religionists in recent years seems to include a declining element of suspicion and declining ideological component. The evidence for this is partly in the changes among Catholics (but not so much among Protestants) indicating greater hope for *rapprochement* of the Christian religions—ecumenicism.[33] Among Protestants, on the other hand, there is increasing support for federal aid to religious schools, thus almost eliminating one of the major bones of contention between communicants of the two religions. National resistance to voting for "a well qualified man who happened to be a Catholic," decreasing over the years, collapsed with Kennedy's term in office (Table VII (a)). Attitudes toward Jews, as measured by the same question, willingness to vote for a "well qualified person who happens to be Jewish," have continuously been more accepting (Table VII (b)). And Jews themselves, a declining proportion of the population, indicate, in a brief series (1956, 1958, 1960) a modestly declining sense of greater "feelings of closeness" to other Jews, compared to closeness to non-Jews.[34] The evidence is strong that ideological divisions, suspicion, prejudice, and sense of difference, especially as these relate to political matters, are declining.

---

[30] The U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics*, give the basic data on affiliation; The American Institute of Public Opinion conducts surveys every year on church attendance. The percentages given above are averages based on several surveys a year. Erskine, *POQ*, Vol. 28 (1964), pp. 671–75.

[31] AIPO release, April 18, 1965.

[32] See, for example, Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, 1963).

[33] AIPO release, April 21, 1965.

[34] *Consortium Codebooks*; SRC data from election studies for years indicated.

But not, apparently, the influence of religious identification on political choice. Employing, once again, the "index of unlikeness" (per cent of Catholics voting Democratic, less the per cent of all Protestants so voting), the series is as follows: 1948: 19; 1952: 19; 1956: 14; 1960: 40; 1964: 21.[35] The decline of the relationship between religion and vote, predicted by Berelson on the basis of age-group differences in 1948, has not materialized, at least at this gross level.[36] But, as the above attitudinal evidence indicates, the meaning has changed; and as the above trends in affiliation and attendance portend, the institutional reinforcement is likely to decline.

VI. RACE

(e) *In an Age of Affluence, the struggle for equality by a deprived racial group will be facilitated by the expanding economy, the availability of governmental resources for special assistance, and the relative security of otherwise challenged and more hostile "opposition" groups. These conflicts will be expressed by the increased militance of the deprived minority group, and the vacillating, often reluctant, sometimes idealistic acceptance of these claims by the more affluent majority.*

Racial cleavage, strife and politics are different from class politics in the United States, and, indeed, everywhere. Mobility ("passing"), inter-marriage, ecological scattering, and inter-group communication are much more difficult across race (caste) lines than across class lines; the middle groups identifying now with one side, now with the other are smaller; the role of property and relations of the different groups to the means of production are different; visibility and, hence, treatment by the dominant group are different. Changing group proportions are not induced by technology and the demand for new and different services; rather they are a matter of birth and mortality rates. And, most important, in the United States there are only 22 million Negroes, about half of them still in the South. As a consequence, there cannot be a Negro party and a white party, except in some Southern communities; but for a national or a state contest, current trends suggest a division between one party regarded as more friendly to the Negro, made up of Negroes *and whites* pitted against a predominantly all-white party. These trends rest in large measure on the wholesale northward migration of Negroes, stemming initially from wartime conditions of extreme manpower shortages and consequent job opportunities; and the repercussions of the migration in the South as well as the North. Under these circumstances, how have the Age of Affluence and the politics of consensus affected the situation?

In the first place, one needs to know whether or not the non-white population has shared in the affluent society. The answer, of course, is that they are still faring very badly, economically, educationally, and socially:

The median income of the non-white popula-

TABLE VII. INDICATIONS OF DECLINING RELIGIOUS HOSTILITY IN POLITICS

(a) "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President, and he happened to be a Catholic, would you vote for him?" (AIPO, Oct. 4, 1963)

Year	Yes	No	Undecided
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1940	62	31	7
1958	68	25	7
1959	69	20	11
1960	71	20	9
1961	82	13	5
1963	84	13	3

(b) "Would you vote for a Jew for President?" (AIPO, Feb. 8, 1937). "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President, and he happened to be a Jew, would you vote for him?" (AIPO, Oct. 23, 1963)

Year	Yes	No	No Opinion
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1937*	49	51	(excluded)
1958	62	28	10
1960	72	22	6
1963	77	17	6

* Data for this year are from Cantril and Strunk, *Public Opinion.*

---

[35] The 1948 data are computed from Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 71; the data for the other dates are based on AIPO release, Dec. 13, 1964.

[36] See Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 70. On the cognate matter of ethnic influences, see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," in this issue of this REVIEW, below, pp. 896–908.

tion is about half the median income of the white population (1962).

The median school years completed for non-whites is 8.2; for whites it is 10.9 (1960). This understates the difference, for the caliber of education in most non-white schools is notoriously poorer.

The proportion of non-whites in white collar jobs is 17.7 per cent; for whites it is 46.9 per cent (1963).

When, however, we turn to recent rates of change, the picture is a little better, for the Negro rate of increase in median income is about half again as high as for whites in recent years (1959–1962) and also in the war period. Similarly, in the past decade and a half, the proportion of workers in white collar jobs has increased about three and a half times as fast among Negroes as among whites. But in terms of education, there is little difference in rate of change; indeed, most recently it seems the white rate of increase has been greater than the Negro rate. On balance, the Negro has participated increasingly in some of the rewarding aspects of affluence, but for him the term "affluence," comparatively speaking, is anomalous: aspirations are running much beyond achievement, and the current *level* seems to belie the hopes for full equality.

I know of no available series of questions asked of Negroes over time to indicate whether or not they experience a greater or lesser sense of deprivation today compared to some previous time; whether their anger at the white community is greater or less; whether the frustration expressed in recent riots is greater or less than it was when anger and frustration may have been differently expressed; whether a sense of special community among Negroes is growing or declining and whether or not whites are more easily embraced in this community than they once were.[37] But, perhaps these are straws in the wind:

(1) Electoral participation in the South has been increasing for the past 15 years and will now (1965 and 1966) increase dramatically in certain places with federal voting registrars. It has always been high (education and income held constant) in the Northern cities. Where non-voting indicates coercion, the lifting of this coercive force may remove some sources of hostility; where it indicates apathy and withdrawal, the change may mean a decline of these symptoms.

(2) In 1960 a set of extended interviews (by a Negro) of working class Negroes in New Haven revealed, in the midst of hostility and frustration, a kind of non-alienated faith in "Washington" as a reliable (indeed, almost omnipotent) source of help.

(3) Two AIPO surveys in August 1963 and May 1965 revealed in the South (but not in the North) an increase of about 20 percentage points in the Negro group believing that Negroes were treated "the same as whites."[38]

I put little stock in these indicators. I suspect the fact that about the same proportion of Negroes in 1946 and 1965 (roughly 70 per cent) believed that the Negro was "unfairly treated" or "treated less well than whites" in his community is a better measure of resentment.[39] At the same time, I would expect a substantial change in the quality of this resentment: fear, apathy, self-hatred, and latent hostility in the 1940s and earlier; disappointment, frustration, manifest hostility, ambivalence, and qualified hope, in the later period. One indication of this last quality, hope, lies in the growing support among Southern Negroes for integrated schools, and the high proportion (70 per cent in 1956) of Southern Negroes who believe that "the day will come in the South when whites and Negroes will be going to the same schools, eating in the same restaurants, and generally sharing the same public accommodations."[40]

The survey evidence is substantial that for the white community, nationally, there is a growing sense that integration in schools (without bussing), residential neighborhoods, and in public accommodations is inevitable, socially desirable, and, with many reservations, personally acceptable. These data are presented in Table VIII. The rate of change is slow, and there are setbacks, now and then; but the series reveals a growing willingness to accommodate to the demands for change of a deprived group. At the same time, variable tensions emerge over the actual implementation of these demands by governmental action (or, probably, over any action by any agency). Thus, when asked "Do you think the Kennedy (Johnson)

---

[37] Some of these data are available and are increasingly accessible both at the Roper Center, Williamstown, Mass., and Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Further exploration of these data is needed.

[38] AIPO release, May 5, 1965.

[39] NORC, May 1946, reported in Erskine, *POQ*, Vol. 26 (1962), p. 139; AIPO release, May 5, 1965.

[40] AIPO release, March 1, 1956.

TABLE VIII. CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION

(a) "Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are colored? Where half of the children are colored?" (AIPO)

Per Cent "Yes"

	Where a few Children are Colored		Where Half of Children are Colored	
	Outside South	South	Outside South	South
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1958	13	72	39	81
1959	7	72	34	83
1963 (June)	10	61	33	78
1965 (May)	7	37	28	68

(b) "Do you think the day will ever come in the South when whites and Negroes will be going to the same schools, eating in the same restaurants, and generally sharing the same public accommodations?" (AIPO)

South Only

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1957 (August)	45	33	22
1958 (October)	53	31	16
1961 (January)	76	19	5
1963 (July)	83	13	4

Sources: Erskine, *POQ*, Vol. 26 (1962), pp. 138, 141; AIPO releases, July 19, 1963 and May 23, 1965.

administration is pushing integration too fast, or not fast enough?" from 36 to 50 per cent have said "too fast." This is a measure of resistance to change, a measure of the lack of strength or salience of the ideal and of the discrepancy between verbal and behavioral support. Perhaps, too, it indicates a response to style or manner of "pushing"—consensual or argumentative and coercive; Johson has fared better than Kennedy in this respect. In any event, this apparent ambivalence and reluctant acceptance indicates exactly those attitudes which, in an insecure, depression-ridden, stagnant society might easily become violent hostility and implacable opposition. The lower income and less well educated people are more resistant than others to integration. What would their responses be if they were fearful of unemployment, less hopeful of the future, more suspicious of people generally and feeling victimized by fate; if, in short, they had the attitudes which we saw had changed with growing affluence in recent years?

How then has the Age of Affluence, shaped for the Negro by a partially sympathetic dominant white majority, affected his politics? In one sense "consensus" describes two aspects of the situation. First, Negroes have, ever since the New Deal, become partisan advocates of welfare state policies. Ideologically, in this sense, they are in tune with the dominant political theme of the times. Second, their partisan party preference has gradually, and with some reversals of direction in the 1950s, shifted toward the Democratic camp so that they are now more partisan than any other major group. In 1964, only 6 per cent voted Republican; nine months later only 9 per cent identified with the Republican party.[41] Since there are about twice as many Democrats as Republicans in the United States, again, it seems, the Negro community has adopted the "in" party; in this respect they are in agreement with majorities in almost all other major demographic groups.

On the other hand, this dramatic increase (and it might be viewed with caution since, in the past, the Negro vote has been more volatile than others—more volatile than the manual worker vote, for example), has meant, according to the index of unlikeness, an increase in racial voting and partisanship, at least in 1964 and 1965. In one sense, this *is* a measure of hostile cleavage, since it reflects the partisan politics and policies of recent years. Moreover, the Republican party, having lost almost all of its Negro following, may come to believe that it is in its interest to stress "states rights," "law and order in the streets," and "voluntarism in school assignments," and other themes with barely disguised white racial appeal; in which case there will be a re-sorting, not of the Negroes, but of some village traditionalists, many Southerners, and some alienated and marginal Northern and Western urban dwellers. The Goldwater trial run for these themes was not encouraging in the North, but feelings on such matters run deep for an uncertain number of people, and the search for a winning theme may lead the Republican leadership in this direction. Then, racial voting, unlike class voting, will take on a new intensity and move away from the politics of consensus.

---

[41] AIPO releases, Dec. 13, 1964 and Aug. 15, 1965.

But, probably, for most white people, neither the Negro's problem nor the "threat" of integration in their own communities (and certainly not elsewhere), is sufficiently important to determine partisan choice. The politics of consensus can go on around this "American dilemma," within sound of the battle but relatively undisturbed by it.

VII. POLITICAL ALIENATION

(f) *In the Age of Affluence, there will be a rapprochement between men and their government and a decline in political alienation.*

It is easier to make the argument that political alienation should decline than to find the evidence to support this view. The argument, again, is simple: the declining intensity of partisanship implies a decline in hostility toward government on the part of the "out" group—with, perhaps, a reverse effect and embitterment on the "far out" right. Politics, then, deals less with moral absolutes and becomes more a discussion of means than ends;—its ideological component declines. Since everyone is "doing better" year by year, though with different rates of improvement, the stakes are not so much in terms of gain or loss, but in terms of size of gain—giving government more clearly the image of a rewarding rather than a punishing instrument. Taxes, while primarily the instrument for financing government, now also may be seen as instruments for maintaining prosperity and financing benefits for all rather than for redistributing income.

The difficulty with the use of some evidence supporting this is that I seem to have adopted a "heads I win, tails you lose" strategy with respect to the main source of recent data, the 1964 surveys. If these data show a decline in symptoms of alienation, they seem to support the argument that historical trends are thus revealing themselves. If they show an increase in alienation symptoms, they support the argument that the 1964 election was a regression to the politics of crisis. If we had a long enough time series, this dilemma of ambivalence could be avoided by showing a decline in alienation symptoms up to 1964, with a rise at that time.

In one series we do have exactly this pattern. Figure 1 shows a decline from 1952 to 1960 and then a rise in the proportion of (1) people who feel that public officials are indifferent to what "people like me think," and (2) those who believe "people like me don't have any say about what the government does," and (3) those for whom politics and government are "too complicated" to understand. The trouble is that I can see no very plausible reason why the themes or personalities of the 1964 election should occasion these particular changes. That particular election might well have increased the crisis atmosphere; it might (and apparently did) increase the salience of "corruption in politics" themes;[42] it might have created new cleavages



FIGURE 1. Decline and Rise of Political Alienation

Q. 1. "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

Q. 2. "I don't think public officials care what people like me think."

Q. 3. "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

Source: SRC questions in election studies of years indicated, reported in *Consortium codebooks.*

---

[42] This evidence, based on a comparison between SRC 1958 and 1964 findings, runs contrary to my main argument regarding the increasingly favorable view of men toward government in the Age of Affluence, but supports the minor theme: 1964 as a return to the politics of crisis and alienation. Actually, I think it is a more or less ephemeral response to discussion about corruption in the Bobby Baker case and the Johnson administration more generally. Compare reasons for not wanting one's son to enter politics, reported below.

TABLE IX. RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN MEN AND POLITICS: POLITICS AS A CAREER, ELECTIONS AS A DUTY, AND TAXES AS A BURDEN

(a) "If you had a son just getting out of school would you like to see him go into politics as a life-work?" (NORC, Nov. '43, Nov. '45). "If you had a son would you like to see him go into politics as a life's work when he gets out of school?" (AIPO, Dec. 28, 1944). "If you had a son, would you like to see him go into politics as a life's work?" (AIPO, July 20, 1953; March 5, 1955; March 3, 1965)[a]

	Yes	No	No Opinion
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1943 (Nov.)	18	69	13
1944 (Dec.)	21	68	11
1945 (Nov.)	24	65	11
1953 (July)	20	70	10
1955 (March)	27	60	13
1965 (March)	36	54	10

(b) The duty to vote in elections: 1952, 1956, 1960.[b]

	Per Cent Agree		
	1952	1956	1960
	(%)	(%)	(%)
"If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it."	53	45	43
"A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with."	17	13	12
"It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win."	11	9	7
"So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter to me whether I vote or not."	12	10	8
No. of cases	(1799)	(1762)	(1954)

(c) "Do you consider the amount of income tax which you (your husband) (had, have) to pay as too high, too low, or about right?" (AIPO)[c]

	Per Cent Saying "Too High"			
Year	Prof. & Bus.	White Collar	Farmers	Manual Workers
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1952 (March 12)	74	73	63	72
1953 (March 8)	61	61	55	59
1957 (April 24)	63	69	51	62*
1959 (April 15)	50	51	51	51*
1961 (March 8)	42	50	47	49
1962 (March 11)	50	49	36	51

* Skilled workers only; in 1957 unskilled workers were 65%, in 1959, 58% saying "too high."

[a] Cantril and Strunk, *Public Opinion*, p. 534; AIPO releases as indicated for 1953, 1955, 1965.

[b] *Consortium codebooks;* SRC election studies, October or November of years indicated. These questions were not asked in 1964.

[c] Erskine, *POQ*, Vol. 28 (1964), p. 161.

in society and thus have disrupted the politics of consensus. But why this campaign, at least compared to 1956 and 1960, should encourage a sense of ineffectiveness and lack of responsiveness in government, is obscure. Therefore, in spite of the appearance of a confirming pattern, we must leave this evidence as anomalous.

Nevertheless, as may be seen in Table IX, some evidence exists for believing that in certain ways there has been a *rapprochement* between men and their government and a decline in political alienation. In the first place, the increase in the proportion of the public who would like to see their sons (if they had any) enter politics as a career, is, I think symptomatic of a growing attitude that political life is both rewarding and honorable. One reason for interpreting this series in this way is the sharp decline in the proportion of arguments against such a career which refer to corruption: from 30 per cent in 1946 to 17 per cent in 1965.[43]

On the other side of politics, the voter side, note the marked increase in the sense that one "ought" to vote under various more or less discouraging circumstances. These items, taken together, have been called a "citizen duty" scale and one may interpret these data as indicating a reinforced or growing belief that good citizenship means a politically more active citizen. From 1952 to 1960, in the eight possible comparisons over time in Table IX(b), each shows a growth of the sense of citizen duty.

In the argument set forth above, I suggested that attitudes toward taxation should change. The AIPO question, "Do you consider the amount of income tax which you (your husband) (had, have) to pay as too high, too low, or about right?" has been asked many times since 1947. The earlier years are non-comparable for several reasons, and show great variability, but we have data from 1952 to 1962 not only by national totals, but also by major occupational groups (Table IX(c)). The data reveal two things, especially: first, the lack of any substantial association between occupational status and attitudes toward taxation. We have known for some time that working class attitudes toward taxation did not fit into conventional concepts of "liberalism" (high taxes and high welfare payments); this is only further illumination of that point. And second—the point to be made here—is the general decline in a sense of taxation as too burdensome. (These findings, it will be observed, do not include the period of great discussion and final legislative action on tax reduction to improve the state of the economy.) Since opposition to "tax-eaters" and the burdens of taxation have traditionally been symptomatic of alienation from government, I think we may quite appropriately see this set of changing attitudes as a part of the *rapprochement* between men and their governments.

In spite of certain anomalies associated with 1964 data, including a constant state of "trust in government" from 1958 to 1964,[44] I am persuaded that there has been a growing state of confidence between men and government, perhaps especially men and politics, during the Age of Affluence. This argument takes on weight when it is placed against the increased life satisfactions and self-confidence examined earlier, the decline in sense of crisis in elections, the changed meaning of class cleavages, the slow drift toward religious harmony, and even the reluctant yielding to the demands for racial equality. The headlines will not show this consensus, nor will the demonstrations at city hall or on the campus, but the ordinary man in the Age of Affluence is beginning to find some greater sense of hope and peace and self-assurance expressed in a less acrimonious political style.

---

[43] AIPO release, March 3, 1965.

[44] The SRC 1958 and 1964 election studies asked, "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time." Proportions in each category are nearly constant. I interpret this as a long run increase in trust equalized by an election which stirred up (short term) doubts on the matter. But perhaps it is better to leave it uninterpreted for now.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC VOTING*

RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER
Stanford University

Mass immigration ended fifty years ago, but national origins continue to be a salient dimension in many people's perceptions of themselves and of others.[1] Where this salience is widespread, ethnicity plays a major role in politics.[2] Ethnicity is often an important independent variable in voting behavior. "Ethnic voting," as I shall call it, has two manifestations. (1) Members of an ethnic group show an affinity for one party or the other which cannot be explained solely as a result of other demographic characteristics. Voters of Irish descent, to take a familiar example, are more likely than other voters of similar economic status to be Democrats. (2) Members of an ethnic group will cross party lines to vote for—or against—a candidate belonging to a particular ethnic group.[3]

This article deals with the development and persistence of ethnic voting. The customary theory holds that ethnic voting is strongest during an ethnic group's earliest residence in this country and subsequently declines from this peak as the group's members make their way out of the working class.[4] This might be called an "assimilation theory." It sees a direct relationship between the proportion of a nationality group in the working class and that group's political homogeneity. As more and more of the group join the middle class, its political unity is progressively eroded. Along with middle-class status, these group members are said to acquire different political interests and to identify more with the majority society and less with their nationality group: in short, they become assimilated. Presumably the end of the process is reached when group members are as occupationally differentiated as the whole population. At this point they are politically indistinguishable from the general population, or from a control group with similar non-ethnic characteristics, and ethnicity is no longer a factor in their voting behavior.[5]

This is a plausible argument, but it is not consistent with voting patterns in New Haven, Connecticut.[6] People of Italian descent there

---

* This article is part of a paper delivered at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Excelsior Springs, Missouri. I am indebted to Martha Derthick, Heinz Eulau, Joan Heifetz, and my wife, Barbara Kaye Wolfinger, for help in formulating my argument, and to more friends than I can mention for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

[1] For a recent statement of this theme see Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, MIT Press and Harvard University Press, 1963). "Ethnic consciousness" or "ethnic salience" exists when: (1) many people think of themselves, and are regarded by others, as members of a particular nationality group; and (2) such classification is salient. The two aspects of ethnic consciousness reinforce each other.

[2] Conflict among ethnic groups is a central topic in descriptions of politics in the Northeast; see, for example, Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959). For treatments of ethnicity in personnel appointments see Theodore J. Lowi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor* (New York, 1964); and Daniel Patrick Moynihan and James Q. Wilson, "Patronage in New York State, 1955–1959," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (June, 1964), pp. 296–301. For a discussion of the social and political consequences of ethnic politics see Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Politics," in Harmon Zeigler and Kent Jennings, eds., *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966).

[3] A good deal of data to support these propositions will be found in this article. For additional evidence see Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, 1954), pp. 77–79; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 230–231; and Lucy S. Davidowicz and Leon J. Goldstein, *Politics in a Pluralist Democracy* (New York, Institute of Human Relations Press, 1963). Ethnicity is only one variable in voting behavior. This article concerns secular trends in its importance. Many short-term influences on voting decisions that also affect its importance are not discussed here; this omission should not be interpreted as an implicit assertion that these short-range factors are not relevant.

[4] I will use the terms "ethnic group" and "nationality group" interchangeably to refer to individuals whose national origins set them apart from the predominantly Protestant old American society.

[5] The assimilation theory is most clearly and explicitly stated in Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 34–36.

[6] Data on New Haven are from an intensive study of that city's politics conducted primarily by Dahl, William H. Flanigan, Nelson W. Polsby,

comprise about one-third of the city's population. Although the Italians are the poorest segment of the white population, they are also one of the strongest Republican voting blocs. If the assimilation theory held in New Haven, this Italian Republicanism would have been strongest some generations ago when Italians first settled there in numbers, and would have declined with the passage of time. But the overwhelming support that New Haven Italians give to the Republican party is a development of the past 25 years. It began when the first New Haven Italian candidate for a major city office won the Republican mayoralty nomination. Since then Italians have been the mainstay of Republican voting strength in New Haven, even in elections with no Italian candidates.

These events may not be as anomalous as they seem. They can be explained by a theory that may also be pertinent to many other places. I will discuss this alternate theory after a detailed description of the development of ethnic voting in New Haven. Finally, I will consider available evidence on the persistence of ethnic voting.

I. THE CONDITIONS OF ETHNIC POLITICS

The history of nationality group relations in New Haven is from all accounts typical of many industrial cities in the Northeastern states. In the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries the descendants of New Haven's original Anglo-Saxon Protestant settlers were outnumbered by waves of immigrants from Ireland and later from Southern and Eastern Europe. By 1910, according to the census data, two-thirds of the population were first- or second-generation Americans; in 1960 some 42 per cent of the population were in these categories. More detailed information on the ethnic composition of the population comes from a sample survey of 525 registered voters conducted in the summer of 1959.[7] White Protestants comprised less than 20 per cent of this sample; 31 per cent of the respondents were born in Italy or were in the second or third generation of Italian immigrants. Eleven per cent were of similarly recent Irish origin,[8] 9 per cent were Negroes; and 15 per cent were Jews.

Beginning with the first mass Irish immigration the old settlers met the non-Protestant newcomers with hostility, economic exploitation, and religious discrimination. The immigrants were usually penniless and could get only the least desirable jobs. The affronts of everyday life enhanced their ethnic consciousness; so did the obvious gap in well-being between them and the old settlers.

In addition to Yankee hostility, other forces tended to maintain ethnic solidarity. For European peasants trying to live in an American city, a familiar language, religion and culture were comforting when so much else was different. Members of any given nationality group usually settled in the same neighborhoods, lived together and married among their kind and not with Yankees or other immigrants, formed nationality associations, and worshipped in national churches.

Needless to say, the ethnics often responded to the Yankees with a hatred that has not yet vanished, while many Yankees continue to look down on the ethnics. Members of each of the major ethnic groups still regard the others with varying amounts of good will, of jealousy and suspicion. As the years have passed, the immigrants and their descendants have moved, in varying numbers, into the middle class. This economic mobility did not result in equivalent geographical dispersion, in part because some of the new prosperity came from neighborhood enterprises such as groceries and mortuaries, in part because of the continuing comforts of ethnic proximity.

One consequence of this history is a persistent emphasis on ethnic differences, which continue to be a major organizing principle in the city's social structure. There are, for example, no less than six Junior Leagues in New Haven, including one each for the not very numerous local young ladies of Swedish and Danish extraction. There are also Jewish organizations with similar functions but different names.[9] The

---

and Raymond E. Wolfinger. It is reported *ibid.*; and in Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963), ch. 4; and Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress* (New Haven, Yale University Press, forthcoming).

[7] The sample was randomly chosen from voting lists. Sampling procedures are described in greater detail in Dahl, pp. 338–339. The survey was directed by William H. Flanigan.

[8] This figure undoubtedly underrepresents the number of Irish in New Haven, since 83% of all Irish immigrants came to the United States before 1900; see U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1955* (Washington, 1955), p. 95.

[9] August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness* (New York, 1958), pp. 64–65. These authors report that ethnic identification divides New Haven's social structure "horizontally" just as economic distinctions organize it "vertically."

major Catholic ethnic groups have their own national churches.

Ethnic consciousness is an important and pronounced regional characteristic. It is difficult to suggest an objective measure for comparing ethnic salience, much less to find data on this subject, but on the basis of impressionistic evidence it appears that concern with national origins is much greater in the Northeast than in some other parts of the country. The reasons for this regional difference are not immediately apparent. The numerical prevalence of ethnics does not account for it, for the major cities of the West Coast have sizable ethnic populations.[10] San Francisco has about the same proportion of first- and second-generation Americans as New Haven (43 as against 42 per cent) but there is no comparison between the two cities with respect to ethnic salience.[11]

This regional difference may be due to the fact that in the Northeast the non-British immigrants came to settled communities with relatively stable class structures and systems of status ascription. Only menial jobs were open to them. The distribution of economic rewards and opportunities reinforced the unambiguous class system. On the other hand, immigrants came to the West at the same time as the Yankees, or on their heels. "The Forty-Niners came from all parts of the world, and foreign accents were as common in the mining camps as American ones."[12] The two groups shared the same pioneering experiences[13] and lived in communities with wildly fluctuating economies and unsettled social systems. Economic advantage was not so closely associated with ethnicity, and class distinctions were not so rigid.

The immigrants in New England were equal to the older settlers in only one relevant respect: they could vote. Little in their previous experience suggested that their opinions had much to do with government, and so their votes had no abstract value to them. But these votes mattered to American politicians, who solicited them with advice, favors, petty gifts, and jobs.

Two typical loci of immigrant politicization were the bosses of casual labor gangs on public works, who owed their positions to their ability to deliver their gangs' votes and their vote-delivering ability to their command of jobs; and the leaders of nationality associations, usually men who were the first to achieve some economic success.[14] Such relationships set the pattern for ethnic politics. Each nationality group in a city had leaders who bargained with politicians, trading their followers' votes for money, favors, and jobs.[15] For their part the politicians found it convenient and efficient to classify the electorate by ethnicity and to dispense rewards on this basis.

The tangible political rewards were limited. Not everyone could be given a job or a Christmas basket. Nor did everyone want such things; or need to get a son out of jail, or a relative into the United States, or a pushcart license from City Hall. But when one Italian was appointed to a public position his success was enjoyed vicariously by other Italians; it was "recognition" of the worth of the Italians. Ethnic solidarity let politicians economize on the indulgences they bestowed. It was unnecessary to do a favor for every individual to win his vote. Rewards given to the few were appreciated by the many. Money or jobs given to a few leaders

---

[10] This table, taken from Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 39, shows the proportion of first- and second-generation Americans in cities with more than 500,000 population in 1960:

Rank	City	%	Rank	City	%
1	New York	48.6	12	Philadelphia	29.1
2	Boston	45.5	13	San Antonio	24.0
3	San Francisco	43.5	14	San Diego	21.5
4	Chicago	35.9	15	Baltimore	14.8
5	Buffalo	35.4	16	St. Louis	14.1
6	Los Angeles	32.6	17	Washington	12.6
7	Detroit	32.2	18	Cincinnati	12.0
8	Seattle	31.4	19	Houston	9.7
9	Cleveland	30.9	20	New Orleans	8.6
10	Pittsburgh	30.3	21	Dallas	6.9
11	Milwaukee	30.0			

There are some regional differences in the national origins of these ethnic populations; the Western cities tend to have more Scandinavians, for example. On the other hand, San Francisco, for one, has sizable Irish and Italian groups.

[11] For similar observations about regional differences see Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 250. They mention an alternate explanation: residents of western cities moved there after living in the East, hence they are less conscious of their European origins.

This point about regional differences applies only to concern about national origins among whites and does not deal with racial prejudice.

[12] Louis Berg, "Peddlers in Eldorado," *Commentary*, July, 1965, p. 64.

[13] This shared experience is thought to be the reason for the inclusion of Jews in San Francisco high society: "the early Jews in the West could boast that they were pioneers among pioneers" (*ibid.*, p. 65).

[14] For a description of these social patterns see Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston, 1952), chs. 7, 8.

[15] An excellent description of ethnic politics that expresses the style and flavor of these negotiations may be found in William F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society*, enlarged edition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955).

earned political returns in two ways: (1) through the votes that the recipient could deliver directly; and (2) through appreciation of the "recognition" he had earned. Public office was much the most effective such reward, for it was most visible and hence conveyed most glory.[16]

Certain of New Haven's other political characteristics were (and are) conducive to ethnic politics. In particular, the city's wards were small enough to be ethnically homogeneous. Politicians need schemes for classifying voters and they tend to look for such taxonomies in election returns. In New Haven the ward is the politicians' unit of electoral analysis, which facilitates explaining the outcome of elections on the basis of ethnic preferences.[17] Since results were understood in ethnic terms, strategies were developed in the same terms. Politicians appealed to the electorate on the basis of ethnic rather than class differences. Moreover, many local political issues concerned the allocation of governmental services and facilities among different neighborhoods, and so contests for these rewards could also be interpreted as competition among ethnic groups.

For many years the urban immigrants were mostly Irish and the "outside" politicians were Yankees. In addition to minor rewards for many people, politics offered a few immigrants a path to real wealth and power, a path that was all the more important because prejudice and lack of education drastically narrowed the chances of a lucrative career in legitimate business or the professions. By the time later waves of immigrants arrived, the Irish had attained considerable political influence, largely in the Democratic party. Where this happened they replaced or joined the "outside" politicians with whom the leaders of newer ethnic groups bargained.

II. ETHNIC POLITICS IN NEW HAVEN

The first Irishman was elected to the New Haven Board of Aldermen in 1857. Henceforth Irishmen and other ethnics held municipal office in increasing numbers. Democratic mayoralty candidates continued for a while to be Yankee businessmen, demographically indistinguishable from their Republican opponents. The election of 1899 marked the end of Yankee dominance in local politics. Cornelius Driscoll, born in County Cork, was elected mayor on the Democratic ticket. As the Irish subsequently strengthened their hold on the party, some Yankee Democrats defected to the Republicans.

The Irish were not reluctant to take the spoils of victory. In the early 1930s first- and second-generation Irishmen comprised 13 per cent of a sample of 1600 family heads in New Haven, but they accounted for 49 per cent of all governmental jobs. The Italians suffered most of all from Irish chauvinism: there were *no* government employees among the 27 per cent of the sample who were Italian.[18] These survey data exaggerate the Italians' exclusion from political rewards, but not by very much. In 1930 the proportion of Italians in low-paying municipal jobs was only a quarter of the proportion of Italians in the total population, and the ratio for better city jobs was much lower. By 1940 the Italians had attained half their "quota" of the poorer positions, and only about a fifth in white collar posts.[19] Subsequently

As these findings suggest, there are impediments to a rational strategy of ethnic politics. (1) Party leaders may refrain from cultivating ethnic groups out of prejudice. In much of the East Coast the exclusiveness of Yankee Republican politicians aided the Democrats' proselytizing of immigrants. (2) Party leaders may be reluctant to share political spoils with "outsiders." This seems to have been true of many Irish Democrats. Until a very few years ago, one Democratic ward organization in a New Haven Irish neighborhood would not let Italians participate in any form of campaign activity. (3) There may be principled objections to making appointments on the basis of their representation in both appointive and elective positions has increased enormously.[20]

---

[16] Lowi suggests that, unlike success in other fields, political eminence has a strong impact on ethnic perspectives: "Success in economic fields is highly individualized; . . . there is relatively little group symbolization of success. In contrast, political success, particularly in the big cities, is symbolized very highly in group terms" (*op. cit.*, p. 46).

[17] The present Mayor of New Haven was one of the first politicians to make use of professional sample surveys of the electorate. Data from the surveys he commissions are analyzed by ethnic group, rather than income, occupation, or education.

[18] John W. McConnell, *The Evolution of Social Class* (Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 214. The data are from the Sample Family Survey conducted by the Yale Institute of Human Relations in 1931–33.

[19] Jerome K. Myers, "Assimilation in the Political Community," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 35 (1951), pp. 175–182. Myers estimated the number of Italians in various categories of municipal jobs from the names in city directories and manuals. The Republicans lost control of City Hall in 1932 to John W. Murphy, a Democrat of the old school. Murphy, who stayed in office until 1946, usually carried the Italian wards, but by somewhat smaller margins than he received in other working-class neighborhoods.

The explanation of the New Haven Italians' Republicanism may then be thought to lie here: shut out of the Democratic party, they had no place to go but to the Republicans. This argument has two crippling limitations. (1) The Italians became more Republican during the period when they finally came closer to getting their "fair share" of municipal jobs. (2) Irish control of the local Democratic party is common in Northeastern industrial cities, but the level of Italian Republicanism found in New Haven is not. Allegations about the Republican inclinations of Italians abound in scholarly and journalistic literature, but concrete and systematic evidence for this general proposition is hard to find. Some Italians will split their ballots to vote for an Italian Republican, but the same is true for an Italian Democratic candidate. The best present source of data on this subject is the series of national election studies conducted over the past dozen years by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. I have compared the party identification of the Italian and Irish respondents in the 1952, 1956 and 1958 studies who lived in the New England and Middle Altantic states. As Table I shows, the Italians are a little more inclined than the Irish to consider themselves Democrats.[21]

TABLE I. PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF ITALIANS AND IRISH IN THE NORTHEAST, 1952, 1956, AND 1958

Party Identification	Irish	Italian
	(%)	(%)
Democratic	51	57
Independent	18	13
Republican	32	30
	101[a]	100
N	152	143

[a] Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Source: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. I am indebted to Ralph Bisco and Richard T. Lane of the Consortium staff for their assistance.

Since the level of Italian Republicanism found in New Haven is not common in the Northeast, local history is more likely to provide an explanation than are more widespread political events. Two such local causes can be identified. The first was the determined courting of the Italian vote by Louis and Isaac Ullman, the leaders of the New Haven Republican party in the first part of the 20th century. The Ullman brothers realized that the large and hitherto passive Italian population was an untapped source of potential Republicans. They set out to capture the Italians, using the familar techniques of ethnic politics. They helped them take out citizenship papers, registered them as voters, found them jobs, used their considerable political influence to smooth over administrative and legal difficulties, subsidized Italian-American fraternal and political clubs, and so on.

It is not too much to say that the Ullman brothers' foresight and political skill kept the Republican party competitive in New Haven. Although the Italians were the poorest part of the population, they were, in the thirty years after 1910, less favorable to Democratic candidates than any other immigrant group, except perhaps the Jews.[22] In the 10th Ward, with the city's heaviest concentration of Italians, the Democratic share of the presidential and mayoralty vote fluctuated around 50 per

---

ethnicity rather than other forms of merit. For examples of this attitude see James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 283–288. It is quite possible, however, that such scruples are forgotten when the men who hold them actually attain power. Moynihan and Wilson describe the appointment policy followed by the young, liberal, intellectual staff of the newly elected New York Governor Averell Harriman: ". . . great efforts were extended to 'recognize' certain groups and careful records were kept of the racial and religious identity of the appointees" (*op. cit.*, p. 296).

[20] See Myers; and Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–44. In the 1950s, during a period of Democratic success, Italians held slightly more than their share of municipal elective offices.

[21] For other data casting doubt on the notion of Italian Republicanism see Lockard, *op. cit.*, pp. 210, 305–319; Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), pp. 225–226; Davidowicz and Goldstein, pp. 11–12, 30–32; Bernard R. Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 62; and J. Joseph Huthmacher, *Massachusetts People and Politics 1919–1932* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 173, 179–184, 252, 260–261.

[22] Jews in New Haven, like those elsewhere, tended to vote Republican until the New Deal; see, *e.g.*, Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*, pp. 168–169.

cent. In fact, the 10th voted much like the city as a whole, a remarkable similarity in view of its residents' modest economic position.[23] The other wards in which Italians predominated were also less wholeheartedly Democratic than one would expect from their low income levels. It seems likely that this situation was due largely to the extent and intensity of the Ullmans' proselytizing.

III. CRITICAL ELECTIONS

The Ullman brothers' efforts gave the Republicans a certain advantage with Italian voters. Yet for some thirty years the result was no more than a stand-off; the Italians split their votes more or less evenly between the two parties until the end of the 1930s. Since then they have been very strongly Republican. The big shift in Italian voting habits came when William C. Celentano, a self-made mortician and son of a fruit peddler, won the Republican nomination for mayor in 1939. Celentano was the first New Haven Italian to win either party's nomination for a major city office. He cut 10,000 votes from the enormous majority that the incumbent Democrat, John W. Murphy, had won two years earlier, and came close to winning the election. The Second World War kept Celentano from getting the nomination again until 1945, for the city's Republican leaders did not think it prudent to nominate an Italian while Italy was fighting against the United States. But in that year he defeated Murphy by 6,000 votes.

Celentano's candidacy brought thousands of Italians into the Republican party, as the voting history of the heavily Italian 10th Ward illustrates. In 1937 Murphy received 52 per cent of the Tenth's vote. Two years later, running against Celentano for the first time, he got 22 per cent and fared almost as badly in other Italian neighborhoods.[24] Matters improved somewhat for the Democrats during the war, but Celentano's second candidacy produced an even greater Republican swing; in 1945 Murphy won only 17 per cent of the 10th Ward's vote.

In 1947 the Democrats tried to match Celentano's appeal by giving the mayoralty nomination to an obscure Italian dentist. Thereby they recouped most of their losses in Italian neighborhoods—their share of the 10th Ward vote rose from 17 to 42 per cent and was about this high in the other Italian wards—but lost heavily elsewhere in the city. Furthermore, a Socialist candidate won a sixth of the total vote and made his best showing in middle-class neighborhoods. Since this was several times greater than any third-party vote in a generation, anti-Italian sentiment may have motivated many of these Socialist votes.[25] The 1947 election was the only one in the city's history in which both major party candidates were Italians.

In every mayoralty election since 1947 the Democratic candidate has been Richard C. Lee, a Catholic of mixed English, Scottish, and Irish descent who, for obvious reasons, emphasizes his Irish side. Lee unseated Celentano in 1953 after two unsuccessful attempts. Celentano did not run for mayor again, preferring to bide his time until Lee left the scene. Since then Lee has defeated a series of Republican candidates, usually by sizable margins.

Although Celentano has not run for office for more than ten years, his impact on the political allegiance of New Haven's Italians appears to have been enduring. In a well known article some years ago the late V. O. Key suggested "the existence of a category of elections . . . in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate. Moreover, . . . the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding elections."[26] Key called such contests "critical elections." As the following data show, Celentano's several mayoralty campaigns were critical elections with respect to the voting behavior of at least the Italians in New Haven.

Since 1947 the Italian wards have been the

---

[23] Except for the 1928 election, when the 10th was 18% ahead of the city in its support of Al Smith, and the 1932 and 1936 elections, when Roosevelt ran about 10% ahead of the city-wide vote there. In other mayoralty and presidential elections prior to 1939, differences were generally minor; see Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–50.

[24] President Roosevelt's 1940 "stab-in-the back" speech and World War II are supposed to have cost him some Italian votes in 1940 and 1944. Whatever the extent of this loss, it seems to have been recouped in the 1948 election; see Lubell, *op. cit.*, 225–226. For differing assessments of the impact of Roosevelt's speech, see Whyte, *op. cit.*, pp. 230–231; and V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1961), pp. 271–272.

[25] The success of the Socialist party in nearby Bridgeport was due to different causes. Capitalizing on public revulsion at corrupt "double machine" collusion between the two major parties, the Socialist leader, Jasper McLevy, won the mayoralty there in 1933 and stayed in office for 24 years.

[26] V. O. Key, Jr. "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17 (February, 1955), p. 4.

TABLE II. DEVIATIONS FROM NEW HAVEN CITY-WIDE DEMOCRATIC VOTE BY SELECTED WARDS WITH CONCENTRATIONS OF VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS—MAYORALTY ELECTIONS, 1949–61

Year and ethnicity of Republican mayoralty candidate[a]	City-wide Democratic vote[b]	10th & 11th Wards (Italian)[c]	16th & 17th Wards (Irish)[d]	19th Ward (Negro)[e]
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1949—Italian	46.6	−21.9	8.5	7.9
1951—Italian	49.9	−24.3	8.0	4.3
1953—Italian	51.9	−27.3	9.0	8.3
1955—Italian	65.3	−21.3	8.1	13.4
1957—Yankee	64.8	−14.4	11.5	14.2
1959—Italian	61.8	−20.2	11.0	16.3
1961—Yankee	53.5	−10.7	15.9	24.3
1950 median family income	$3301	$2660 $2318	$3174 $3280	$2117

[a] In all these elections the Democratic candidate was Richard C. Lee.

[b] Percentages are of the total vote cast for mayor.

[c] In 1960 population shifts caused by an urban renewal project began to change the composition of the 10th and 11th Wards. By 1963 a substantial fraction of the old residents had been replaced by newcomers, most of whom were neither Italians nor Republicans.

[d] Since about 1958 these wards have had an influx of Negroes.

[e] Negroes comprised 72% of the 19th Ward in 1950. Increasing Democratic majorities there may be due *in part* to continued growth of the ward's Negro population.

Sources: Voting returns for 1949–57 are from official sources; for 1959–61, from newspapers. Choice of wards was based on a combination of Census data and political lore. (Census tracts do not coincide with wards. The 1950 Census data were matched with wards, but this was an expensive process and was not repeated for the 1960 Census.) One of the three wards with the highest proportion of Italian-born residents, the 12th, has a dissident Democratic organization and was excluded for this reason. Since the first sizable numbers of Irish came to New Haven 120 years ago, Census data on the birthplace of present ward residents are an unreliable index of Irish predominance. I have followed the advice of New Haven politicians in choosing the 16th and 17th as the most Irish wards.

TABLE III. DEMOCRATIC VOTE FOR STATE AND NATIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEW HAVEN AND IN SELECTED WARDS

Year and Election	City-wide Vote	10th Ward (Italian)	17th Ward (Irish)
1956 Presidential	45%	34%	51%
1958 Gubernatorial[a]	69	52	75
1962 Senatorial[b]	65	52	75

[a] The candidates were the incumbent Democrat, Abraham A. Ribicoff, and Fred Zeller.

[b] The candidates were Ribicoff and Horace Seely-Brown.

Source: Official voting returns.

TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE IN WORKING CLASS OCCUPATIONS AND PERCENTAGE DEMOCRATS OF A SAMPLE OF NEW HAVEN VOTERS, BY ETHNIC GROUPS, 1959

Number in Sample		Manual Workers		Democratic	
		Per cent	Rank	Per cent	Rank
47	Negroes	76	1	57	2
157	Italian Catholics	61	2	37	5
53	European Catholics	58	3	48	4
56	European Protestants	35	4	16	6
34	American Protestants[a]	27	5	9	7
53	Irish Catholics	20	6	64	1
74	European Jews	15	7	52	3

[a] "American" here means parents and grandparents born in the U. S.

Source: The table is based on 474 persons (of an original sample of 525 voters) who could be identified by religion and by place of birth of themselves, parents, or grandparents. The percentages Democratic are those who identified themselves as Democrats in response to the question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or what?"

most Republican ones in the city. Table II shows the city-wide Democratic percentage of the vote in mayoralty elections from 1949 through 1961 and the deviations from this percentage of wards with the heaviest concentrations of Italians, Irish, and Negroes, respectively. As the table indicates, even a Yankee Republican will make his best showing in the Italian wards. In fact, the Tenth is the only ward that Lee has never carried. Since the Italian wards are among the poorest in town, their marked Republican inclinations can be attributed to ethnic voting.

Italian support for Republican candidates has been so lopsided that the customary relationship between Democratic voting and foreign birth is reversed in New Haven. The ward-by-ward correlation coefficient (Pearson's *r*) between percentage of foreign-born residents and percentage of the vote for Democratic mayoralty candidates has been *negative* for most elections since 1937.[27]

While Italian Republicanism is a product of local politics, it is also expressed in state and national elections. The ethnic voting that resulted from Italian solidarity in New Haven is now manifested in elections where "recognition" of Italians is not an issue. As Table III shows, the 10th Ward (for example) has been considerably more Republican than the city as a whole in elections where neither candidate was Irish or Italian. For instance, ex-Governor Ribicoff barely carried the Tenth in 1958, while in the Irish 17th Ward, where the median family income was more than $600 higher, he won by a three-to-one ratio.

---

[27] Except for the 1941 and 1943 elections, when Celentano was not a candidate, and 1947, when both candidates were Italians.

Most Italians not only vote for Republican candidates, but consider themselves Republicans. Their party identification was changed and fixed by Celentano's several campaigns. Table IV shows the percentages of blue-collar workers and of Democrats in various ethnic groups. Little more than a third of the Italians are Democrats, although they are second only to Negroes in proportion of manual workers.

These tables show why New Haven politicians customarily explain the outcome of elections in terms of nationality groups rather than social classes: the most important lines of division in the electorate are ethnic rather than economic. In fact, ethnic cleavages wash out the usual relationships between socio-economic status and partisan preference. When New Haven wards are correlated by median income and Republican vote in the 1959 mayoralty election, the coefficient is $-.02$.[28] Similarly, there is no relationship between the proportion of manual workers in an ethnic group and the percentage of the group's members who consider themselves Democrats, as Table IV shows. The salience of ethnicity explains the apparent anomaly that the Republican party's stronghold is in the poorest parts of town, while the Democrats draw their strongest support from middle-class Jews and Irishmen, as well as low-income Negroes.[29] Since the two best examples of ethnic voting are the Republican inclinations of working-class Italians and the Democratic affiliation of middle-class Irishmen, the political correlates of ethnicity do not merely represent underlying economic differences.

Plainly, the assimilation theory does not fit the development of Italian bloc voting in New Haven. The New Haven case can be explained by a different view of ethnic voting that I will call a "mobilization theory." I will introduce it by reexamining in greater detail the assumptions of the assimilation theory.

IV. THE MOBILIZATION OF ETHNIC POLITICAL RESOURCES

The assimilation theory is based on the assumption that the strength of ethnic voting depends on the intensity of the individual's identification with his ethnic group.[30] The theory supposes that this identification is never stronger than in the early years of residence in this country[31] and declines thereafter as the immigrants gain some measure of well being. There is another prerequisite to ethnic voting that the assimilation theory overlooks: no matter how salient an individual's ethnic identification may be, it will not influence his voting behavior unless he sees a connection between this identity and the choice he makes on election day.[32] How does the Irishman know which candidate (if any) is friendlier to the Irish? The implications of this problem are worth further exploration.

Established politicians appealed to immigrants with tangible rewards and recognition. While one party may have been more vigorous in its efforts, both parties usually made some attempt to win their votes. These campaign efforts posed a twofold communication problem of pervasiveness and persuasion: how could the party get its message to every ethnic voter, and how could it make the message credible? Only some ethnics would get a job or favor, and only some would know of the recognition given by one party or the other; or, confusingly, by both. How did the ethnic know which party was friendlier to his people?

---

[28] The 1st Ward was excluded because most of its residents are Yale students.

[29] Dahl has an interesting table comparing the Negro 19th Ward to the Italian 11th. The two wards have similarly low occupational, income and educational levels, yet the 19th is overwhelmingly Democratic and the 11th is very Republican. This is the reverse of their partisan affinities in 1930 (Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. 57).

[30] *Cf.* Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–72; and Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), ch. 12.

[31] This may be a dubious assumption, although it is not crucial to my argument. There are indications that the previous identification of many immigrants was not with the old nation, but the old village or old province. In this view, it was not until the immigrants saw that Americans classified them by nationality that they themselves developed some sense of belonging to a nationality group.

One could also argue that, whatever the locale of his previous identity, the immigrant's first impulse was to forget this old identity and become an American, but that he was forced back into ethnic consciousness by old-settler prejudice. Recurring nativist phenomena like Know-Nothingism, the Ku Klux Klan, Prohibition, and the end of mass immigration probably increased many ethnics' self-consciousness. See, *e.g.*, Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955), p. 297.

[32] *Cf.* the discussion of "political proximity" in Campbell *et al.*: "Groups as perceived objects may be located according to their proximity to the world of politics . . . at the individual level: as *perception of proximity between the group and the world of politics becomes clearer, the susceptibility of the individual member to group influence in political affairs increases*" (*op. cit.*, p. 311; emphasis in original).

Precinct workers who talk directly to the individual voter are the most effective means of electioneering.[33] There are no systematic data on precinct workers' activity at the peak of the immigrant era. Contemporary accounts indicate that, in at least some cities, few prospective voters could escape the attention of the political organizations.[34] At present the level of precinct work is much lower. In northern cities with over 100,000 population less than 20 per cent of the adults reported contact with a party worker in a single presidential election.[35] In New Haven, where both parties have very strong and active campaign organizations, 40 per cent of the registered voters have *never* been reached by a precinct worker.[36]

Let us assume that precinct organizations were able to contact almost every potential voter fifty years ago. What if both parties sent workers around? What if both parties had won—or bought—the support of some ethnic leaders?[37] No matter how fervently the ethnic might identify with his group, the appropriate political expression of this identification might not be clear to him.

First-generation ethnic groups seldom had many political resources aside from their votes. Many of their members were illiterate; except for the Irish, many could not speak English. At this stage it was easiest for the parties to compete for ethnic votes, for the enticements least in demand by party activists were most suitable for the immigrants. As time passed children went to school, men prospered, and the ethnic group produced representatives with the organizational and communications skills necessary for political leadership. There were greater demands on both parties for recognition and the men making the demands were more skilled at pressing their claims. Such demands raised the level of bidding between the parties, for now the ethnics were asking for rewards that were both scarcer and more highly prized by the people already established in the party organizations. The ethnics' ambitions were resisted by those who would be displaced. Because of this resistance and the time it took to develop political skills, a generation or more went by before members of the new nationality group found their way into positions of any visibility and influence.[38]

Sooner or later some ethnics will occupy party positions. One party will nominate an ethnic for a minor office. Such positions are unimportant, and if the bid seems to pull votes the other party will soon match the offer.[39] Most ethnic voters still have the problem of figuring out the "right" ticket to vote for, since it is still not evident which party is friendlier. The ethnic group may be given some unity if it has an unquestioned leader who can deliver its vote to the party with which he has made a deal, but this does not appear to have been a common phenomenon. Customarily, ethnic groups were fragmented, with several leaders, each telling his constituents about his exclusive inside track to the political bigwigs.[40]

The day will come when an ethnic will win a party nomination for a major elective office.[41] When this happens the problems of pervasiveness and persuasion will be solved for many of his fellow ethnics. They will all see his name on the ballot, and many will take this as proof that the party that nominated him is the right party for them because it has given the most recognition to their group. The bigotry that often accompanies a "first" candidacy is likely to enhance the political relevance of ethnicity for the members of the candidate's group.

---

[33] *Cf.* Handlin, "The immigrant might sometimes read an article on such a matter in his newspaper but was less likely to be persuaded by any intrinsic ideas on the subject than by the character of the persuader" (*op. cit.*, p. 211). Such persuaders included, in addition to overt party workers, priests and the types of immigrant leaders discussed earlier.

[34] See, *e.g.*, Robert A. Woods, *Americans in Process* (Boston, 1903), pp. 155–156.

[35] Source: data from the 1956 SRC study reported in Fred I. Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics," *The Annals*, Vol. 353 (May, 1964), pp. 8–9.

[36] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 27 (Fall, 1963), pp. 387–398.

[37] Whyte's discussion of bribery indicates that cash can have a powerful, if temporary, distracting effect on ethnic loyalties.

[38] *Cf.* Lowi, "The representation of a new minority in places of power occurs long after it has reached considerable size in the population and electorate" (*op. cit.*, p. 39). Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. reports that in Providence, Rhode Island, "Members of a new group are not likely to appear as ward committeemen at all until some three decades after their first arrival in substantial numbers"; see his "Party Absorption of Ethnic Groups: The Case of Providence, Rhode Island," *Social Forces*, Vol. 38 (March, 1960), p. 208.

See also Lubell: "The key to the political progress of any minority element in this country would seem to lie in just this success in developing its own middle class" (*op. cit.*, p. 79). Lubell does not discuss specifically the importance of candidacy for major office, which is the key point in any group's mobilization.

[39] Huthmacher has an interesting description of this competitive bidding process in Massachusetts (*op. cit.*, pp. 119–126). His discussion makes clear the dangers of such strategies because of the jealousies aroused when newer groups are recognized.

[40] Prior to Celentano's nomination the Italian community in New Haven was reported to be fragmented; see McConnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 159–160.

It seems plausible that an ethnic group will get such a major nomination when adversity forces one party or the other to appeal to new sources of support. This seems to have been the case with Celentano's nomination. In the late 1930s the New Haven Republicans were in dire straits. Some of the state party's leading figures had been implicated in the spectacular "Waterbury scandals." In 1937 the local party had suffered its most crushing loss in any mayoralty election in a century. Coming on the heels of Roosevelt's overwhelming re-election victory, Murphy's 1937 landslide must have suggested the need for a new campaign strategy to the city's Republicans; they had little more to lose. It was in this desperate situation that a member of New Haven's most numerous voting bloc was first nominated for mayor.

Celentano was chosen for the 1939 nomination by leaders of the Republican organization. In 1941 and 1943 the party had come close to beating Murphy with non-Italian candidates and by the summer of 1945 the city administration had suffered such a decline in popularity that Republican leaders were confident of winning the election that fall. They did not then want to give the nomination to Celentano, preferring a non-Italian who would be more dependent on their support. Celentano had to wage a hard fight in ward primaries to win the nomination.

The Democrats had nominated Driscoll, their first Irish mayoralty candidate, under similar circumstances a half century earlier. The great controversy over free coinage of silver had split the party and given the 1897 mayoralty election to the Republicans. The defection of Gold Democrats may well have driven the Democratic leaders of that day to adopt a strategy of maximizing their party's appeal to the Irish.[42]

The mobilization theory of ethnic voting states that: *The strength of ethnic voting depends on both the intensity of ethnic identification and the level of ethnic relevance in the election. The most powerful and visible sign of ethnic political relevance is a fellow-ethnic's name at the head of the ticket, evident to everyone who enters the voting booth. Middle-class status is a virtual prerequisite for candidacy for major office; an ethnic group's development of sufficient political skill and influence to secure such a nomination also requires the development of a middle class. Therefore ethnic voting will be greatest when the ethnic group has produced a middle class, i.e., in the second and third generations, not in the first. Furthermore, the shifts in party identification resulting from this first major candidacy will persist beyond the election in which they occurred.*

This is not to say that the growth of a middle class past the point of mobilization will necessarily produce increasing ethnic voting. Nor does the theory state that the resulting alignment is impervious to other political and social developments, or that more than one such shift cannot take place. But it does say that, in a given political arena and for a given nationality group, the development of voting solidarity is a product of leadership; that such leadership requires a middle class; and that such alignments are more durable than the political candidacies that produce them.

The mobilization theory seems to be more useful than the assimilation theory in explaining ethnic voting at the national level. Most members of ethnic groups in big cities are, by and large, strongly Democratic. It is often forgotten that this is a rather recent development. In the early part of the 20th century, when the foreign population of many big cities was predominantly first and second generation, these cities were carried by Republican presidential candidates as often as not. In 1920, shortly after the ending of unrestricted immigration, the Republicans carried most cities with big immigrant populations. Harding swept New York, Cleveland, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Detroit by an aggregate plurality of 1,330,000 votes. The Republicans did almost as well in 1924. But in 1928 the aggregate Democratic margin in these seven cities was 307,000, and since then they have gone Democratic in every election, usually by substantial margins.[43]

---

[41] For present purposes "major office" may be loosely but serviceably defined as any public elective office which is the central prize in a political system: mayor, governor, perhaps U. S. senator, and, of course, the presidency. Candidacy for minor office does not seem to produce so much ethnic impact, at least where candidates for such positions appear on the ballot below more important ones. This is particularly true in states like Connecticut where one can vote for an entire party slate with one choice. Such arrangements discourage split-ticket voting; see Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 275–276.

[42] Lowi, who has analyzed top-level mayoral appointments in New York City from 1898 to 1958, reports similar findings: "It has been the role of the minority party in New York to provide a channel of mobility for new ethnic groups. . . . The dominant Democratic organizations of the twentieth century have made efforts to attract the immigrants, but the minority Republicans made greater use of top patronage for these purposes" (*op. cit.*, pp. 37–39).

Smith's candidacy seems to have been particularly important in its impact on partisan alignments in Southern New England. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, with the highest ethnic populations in the country, were also, until 1928, stoutly Republican in state and national elections. Since then they have been in the Democratic column as often as not. Key's article on critical elections demonstrates this point more precisely. Cities which underwent a sharp and durable pro-Democratic change in 1928 had large Catholic, foreign-born populations; cities which reacted in the opposite way were largely Protestant and native-born. In short, the ethnic population of Southern New England has become more Democratic as the duration of its residence in this country has increased.

V. THE PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC VOTING

I have argued that the importance of ethnicity in voting decisions does not steadily diminish from an initial peak, but instead increases during at least the first two generations. What next? While the assimilation theory may be inadequate for the first development of ethnic voting, what about succeeding generations? Does the importance of ethnicity diminish rapidly with more general acculturation and occupational differentiation?[44] Or does it persist as a major independent variable, although perhaps declining somewhat in importance? It is commonly thought that the first alternative is more correct. I shall argue here for the second proposition and suggest some factors that seem to be associated with the persistence of ethnic voting.

Useful trend data on this subject are scarce. Data on Catholic voting patterns are suggestive since Catholicism is analogous to ethnicity as a variable in voting behavior. Catholics, too, tend to be more Democratic then Protestants, and this difference persists when income, occupation, or education is controlled—it is not simply an artifact of Protestants' higher status.[45]

The passage of time by itself does not reduce ethnic salience: witness Quebec. Nationality groups seem to vary in their rates of assimilation. Few Irishmen have ancestors who came to the United States after the turn of the century, yet from all indications there are many places where Irish self-consciousness is still very strong—notably in New York City, for instance. But the Germans, who immigrated there in considerable numbers at about the same time as the Irish, no longer seem to be a self-conscious nationality group.[46] Catholic preference for the Democratic party does not seem to be a result of the disproportionately heavy representation of Catholics among more recent arrivals to this country. When generation of American residence is controlled, Catholic-Protestant differences do not disappear nor even diminish significantly.[47]

The passage of time is thought to be associated with weakening ethnic consciousness not just through attenuation of immigrant memories, but because members of any given ethnic group will get better jobs and, after two or three generations, be represented among all occupational levels, more or less in proportion to their numbers.[48] Occupational mobility is believed to reduce the importance of ethnicity in voting decisions for two reasons: (1) it will produce economic interests inconsistent with ethnic voting; and (2) the mobile individuals will come into contact with a broader, socially heterogeneous environment that will dilute ethnic salience.[49]

---

[43] Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Party Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920: A Study of Twelve Cities," this REVIEW, Vol. 43 (December, 1949), p. 1196.

[44] For a statement of this point of view see Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–36, 59–62.

[45] Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–71; Campbell, Gurin and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 71; Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, ch. 12; and Scott Greer, "Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (Winter, 1961), pp. 611–625. Berelson's study found that Catholicism was a stronger independent variable than socio-economic status in voting behavior. Like ethnicity, its importance is subject to much short-term variation. For example, Catholicism was much more important in the 1960 presidential election than in 1956; see Philip E. Converse *et al.*, "Stability and Change in 1960; a Reinstating Election," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 269–280.

[46] On the "disappearance" of the Germans see Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*, p. 311; and Moynihan and Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 299–300.

[47] Greer, *op. cit.*, p. 621; and Campbell, Gurin and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 79. The latter study found that the partisan difference between Catholics and Protestants was as great in the fourth generation as in the first.

[48] All ethnic groups are not, of course, equally represented in various occupations; see, *e. g.*, Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*, pp. 317–324.

The extent to which social mobility alters the political expression of ethnic feelings undoubtedly varies with a number of other circumstances. The voting behavior of the New Haven Irish seems to have been relatively impervious to their changed social status. Although they are almost all in the middle class, their support of the Democratic party is so pronounced that it could not have declined very much as they went from manual labor to white collar jobs. Even when mobility does produce changes in political perspectives, these changes do not obliterate all hitherto existing predispositions. Social change begins from a "base point" of previous habits. Occupational mobility will change the politics of many of the immigrants' children, but it will do the same for old Americans. The net political difference between the two groups may be as great in the middle class as in the working class. This proposition is supported by the Elmira study, which found that differences between Catholics and Protestants in their support of the Republican presidential candidate were actually greater in the middle and upper than in the lower class.[50] If anything, social mobility had heightened the importance of religion as an independent variable.

Upward-mobile members of the middle class have political characteristics intermediate between those typical of their old and their new status positions. While more Republican than their parents, they are considerably more likely to be Democrats than are status-stable members of their class.[51] The voting behavior studies have established that as many as four-fifths of all voters identify with the same party as their parents.[52] This is not just a reflection of similar life conditions; the authors of *Voting* report that most of their respondents whose vote was "inconsistent" with their social class were following parental political preferences.[53]

The data in Table II indicate that ethnic voting has not declined in New Haven in the postwar period. Deviation from the city-wide vote by Italian and Irish wards was as great in 1959 as in the 1940s. The smaller Italian deviation in 1961 may be a sign of declining ethnic salience, but it may also reflect Italian coolness to a Yankee Republican candidate, or the first wave of population changes resulting from the Wooster Square Renewal Project. At least in New Haven, all the social changes of the 1940s and 1950s do not seem to have reduced the political importance of national origins.

One contemporary trend that may be relevant to ethnic voting has not been mentioned. Most of the data in this paper describe only those ethnics who have chosen to remain in the old core cities. Their neighborhoods tend to be ethnically homogeneous but economically diverse, with working-class and middle-class families intermingled. It is plausible that those ethnics who have decided to stay in such neighborhoods despite their financial ability to move to the suburbs have stronger ethnic identifications, whether as a consequence or as a cause of continued proximity. What about the ethnics who have moved to the suburbs? They should be less ethnically conscious. Suburbs tend to be economically homogeneous and ethnically diverse; in these respects they are the reverse of the old city neighborhoods. It seems likely that these new suburbanites break off the interpersonal and institutional relationships that sustain and transmit ethnic consciousness. Since group solidarity is maintained by personal contact,[54] it is probable that geographical disper-

---

[49] This assumes that the direction of ethnic influences will favor the Democratic party. When ethnic pressures are pro-Republican, as in the case of New Haven Italians, the problem of predicting the political consequences of social mobility becomes more complicated.

[50] Berelson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[51] James A. Barber, Jr., "Social Mobility and Political Behavior," unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, 1965. See also Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 89; Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[53] Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 90. For discussion of the varying strength and characteristics of the relationships between social class and voting behavior, see Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, ch. 13; and Heinz Eulau, *Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years* (New York, 1962). As these books make clear, associations between class and party are mediated by a number of other personal and historical variables. One such is the difference between social class as measured by objective indicators like income, and subjective class, *i.e.*, what the individual considers his class position to be. When middle-class people identify with the working class their political attitudes and behavior tend to resemble those of members of the working class. Possibly middle-class ethnics are more likely to consider themselves working class than are middle-class Yankees. This suggests one mechanism that would modify the political impact of social mobility.

[54] This proposition is stated in Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 74; and is supported by data in their ch. 6.

Ethnic groups may differ in their willingness to move from old urban habitats. Glazer and Moynihan report that Italians in New York, unlike some other groups, seem to remain, generation sion will dilute ethnic salience. At the same time, however, it will help to maintain the solidarity of the urban survivors by draining off those with the weakest ethnic identifications.[55]

There are not many data relevant to these speculations. *The American Voter*'s discussion of suburbanization is tentative and inconclusive, while an earlier analysis of some of the same data produced findings consistent with the line of argument in the preceding paragraph.[56] The most useful evidence comes from Scott Greer's study of Catholic voting behavior in and around St. Louis. He found that, with education and generation of American residence controlled, suburban Catholics were more likely than urban Catholics to defect to the Republicans.[57]

Several political circumstances are also associated with the strength of ethnic voting. In general, it appears that ethnicity will be more important in the absence of other plain cues to guide voters' decisions. It is likely to play a greater role in non-partisan elections, where voters cannot rely on the party label.[58] But, while party identification may impede the free play of ethnic salience, it also stabilizes and prolongs ethnic voting by providing a vehicle for continuing perception of ethnic relevance. Celentano's candidacy won Italian support not only for him, but also for the Republican party in subsequent elections because his association with the party led Italians to think that it gave them more recognition. Ethnic voting also seems to be less important when some great issue dominates political perspectives, as the Depression did in the 1930s.[59] This may explain the unusually pro-Democratic voting of New Haven Italians in the 1932 and 1936 presidential elections.

The major proposition of this section is that ethnicity is still an important factor in voting behavior and is not eliminated by changes in the economic characteristics of the individuals affected. This is not to say that perspectives formed in the first generations of American residence will persist forever. Ethnic consciousness is fading; it is already faint in some parts of the country and for some ethnic groups. Continuing increases in education, geographical dispersion, intermarriage and inter-group contacts are all likely to reduce ethnic consciousness.

Even when ethnic salience has faded, however, its political effects will remain. One of the most remarkable tendencies in political behavior is the persistence of partisan affiliations for generations after the reasons for their formation have become irrelevant to contemporary society. Key and Munger's article on county voting patterns in Indiana is one of the best-known demonstrations of this proposition. Some Indiana counties were consistently Democratic while others, apparently identical in demographic characteristics, were consistently Republican. The roots of these variations seemed to be the origins of the counties' first settlers—New England or the South: "If one plots on the map of Indiana clusters of underground railroad stations and points at which Union authorities had difficulties in drafting troops, he separates, on the whole, Republican and Democratic counties."[60] Key and Munger conclude that for many voters elections are merely "a reaffirmation of past decisions." It seems plausible that this will be the legacy of ethnic politics: when national origins are forgotten, the political allegiances formed in the old days of ethnic salience will be reflected in the partisan choices of totally assimilated descendants of the old immigrants.

---

after generation, in the same areas where they first settled. The areas of Italian concentration in 1920 and 1960 are substantially the same except where land clearance has displaced people (*op. cit.*, pp. 186–187).

[55] Immigration continues to provide a diminished but by no means negligible fresh supply of ethnics. Most of the 2,500,000 people who entered the United States as immigrants from 1950 to 1959 probably settled in neighborhoods inhabited by earlier arrivals from their respective countries.

[56] Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 457–460; Fred I. Greenstein and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Suburbs and Shifting Party Loyalties," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (Winter, 1958), pp. 473–482).

[57] Greer, *op. cit.* p. 621. Even in the suburbs, however, Catholicism is a potent independent variable in voting behavior.

[58] *Cf.* James Q. Wilson, *Negro Politics* (New York, 1960), p. 43.

[59] See Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–51.

[60] V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 281–299, at p. 457 n. Similar findings for Ohio are reported in V. O. Key, Jr., "Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio," this REVIEW, Vol. 47 (June, 1953), pp. 529–531; and Thomas A. Flinn, "The Outline of Ohio Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 13 (September, 1960), pp. 702–721.

A METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING ISSUES AND FACTIONS FROM LEGISLATIVE VOTES*

DUNCAN MACRAE, JR.
University of Chicago

Roll-call votes are being used increasingly to throw light on various aspects of the legislative process. As long as these votes are neither simply unanimous nor cast purely on party lines, they contain information that can often be rendered more intelligible by the simplification or condensation of many votes into fewer variables or dimensions. The researcher interested in a particular legislative decision can thus profit by seeing whether it exemplifies a more general and repeated type of occurrence. The techniques of analysis used in studying legislative votes are broadly applicable to collegial bodies of many sorts, including municipal, state, and national legislative bodies; party congresses and conventions; the U.S. Supreme Court; and the United Nations General Assembly.[1]

Two major questions have been asked which lead to the search for different kinds of simplifying variables in this analysis. One concerns the *issues* that divide a given group of legislators at a given time, *i.e.*, what general matters are being argued about? The second concerns the *subgroups* of legislators within the group selected for study: what are the blocs, factions, cliques, and the like, whose more persistent existence is reflected by the division on a given vote?

These two questions are closely related. In factor or cluster analysis, they correspond to the analysis of roll calls and of legislators,[2] respectively, with the aim of finding clusters of related roll calls or of legislators who vote similarly. Alternatively, they correspond to the study of factor loadings of roll calls as opposed to the factor scores of legislators. The Beyle-Rice bloc analysis of legislative votes, more recently used by Truman,[3] is one approach to the second question. In cumulative (Guttman) scaling, the end-product is a simultaneous ordering of roll calls and of legislators; roll calls constitute cutting points between ordered categories, and legislators are distinguished by their placement in these categories.

The purpose of this paper is to present a method of analysis that throws light on both these questions. This method starts from cumulative scaling, but modifies it so as to make its results less dependent on preliminary hypotheses and more comparable with those of factor and cluster analysis. Other modifications of conventional scaling procedures are then introduced to reveal certain types of blocs or factions more clearly. Illustrative data are presented to show the types of inference that can be made.

Let us first reconsider the aims of roll-call analysis. To say that we are looking for issue dimensions, or for subgroups of legislators, does not specify the task accurately enough. It is crucial, in the first place, that the issue dimensions not be forced to be orthogonal, *i.e.*, independent of one another. A central problem in the delineation of issue dimensions is that of comparing one issue-structure with another. These comparisons rest partly on the discovery of different issues in roll calls that took place at different times; but they also depend in an important degree on our opportunity to observe

---

* The research on which this paper is based was supported by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. The computer programs used were designed under a prior grant from the National Science Foundation. The writer is also grateful to the Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, for its hospitality during the period of the research, and to Leo M. Snowiss for helpful suggestions.

[1] Representative articles are S. C. Patterson, "Legislative Leadership and Political Ideology," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 27 (1963), pp. 399–410; L. N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939–1958," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (1964), pp. 577–588; G. R. Schubert, "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court—A Psychological Analysis," *ibid.*, Vol. 56 (1962), pp. 90–107; H. R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *ibid.*, Vol. 58 (1964), pp. 642–657; F. Munger and J. Blackhurst, "Factionalism in the National Conventions, 1940–1964; An Analysis of Ideological Consistency in State Delegation Voting," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 27 (1965), pp. 375–394.

[2] The term "roll call" will be used to refer to any division of legislators into two opposing groups on a political issue—including, for example, whip polls and discharge petitions. "Legislators" will refer to members of bodies (or groupings such as state delegations) analyzable in the ways proposed.

[3] H. C. Beyle, *Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster Blocs* (Chicago, 1931); S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), ch. 16; D. B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959).

differences in the degree of association of given issues with one another, in contrast with that between either different subgroups (*e.g.*, parties) or different times. Thus the increasing use of computer programs for principal component analysis and orthogonal rotation of factors, though it has some advantages, has the great disadvantage of obscuring these contrasts.[4] Oblique rotation of factors, when it becomes more generally available to political scientists, will avoid this particular problem; but the method proposed here is a simpler means to the same end.

To say that we are looking for blocs is also an insufficient statement of the problem. Blocs may vote together on particular issues, *e.g.*, the "farm bloc." There are of course general divisions within legislatures, such as inter-party divisions, or within parties, such as the North-South split in the Democratic party; but not all blocs or factions have this character. To avoid prejudging this question, and to reveal issue-oriented blocs more clearly, we propose to identify the sets of roll calls on which similar divisions occur, and only *then* to look for blocs as they may exist on each such set.[5] This procedure also makes the resulting picture less dependent on the number of roll calls that take place on a given issue; for if a given division is repeated many times (*e.g.*, in tactical struggles over civil rights), the apparent bloc structure may give undue weight to this division if all roll calls are counted alike.

I. CUMULATIVE SCALING AND COEFFICIENTS OF ASSOCIATION

We begin with procedures for cumulative scaling, which have been used extensively for the analysis of legislative votes.[6] This method was originally developed by Guttman for the analysis of answers to attitude questions designed by the researcher.[7] Compared with factor analysis, it has the advantage of making fewer assumptions about linearity, cardinality, and (as we shall use it) the homogeneity of attitude continua; its underlying logic can be explained in non-quantitative terms.

The cumulative scaling model we shall use may be described first in the "perfect scale" case. For this initial exposition, we make the following simplifying assumptions and definitions:

1. On every roll call, all legislators of the group being studied cast votes in which they choose between two alternatives.[8] Unanimous votes of the group are omitted from the analysis.
2. On each roll call, votes are classified as "+" or "−" in such a way that "+" on every roll call is positively associated with "+" on every other.
3. The proportion of "+" votes on a given roll call, among all "+" and "−" votes on that roll call, will be called p_+.
4. We arrange the roll calls in descending sequence of p_+ and assume that there are no ties. Each legislator's "response pattern" is defined as his sequence of votes, classified as "+" or "−" and ordered in this sequence of roll calls.
5. A perfect scale pattern may then be defined as a response pattern in which no "−" response is ever followed by a "+". A perfect scale is a set of items for which the legislators under study all have perfect scale patterns.

For example, if four roll calls formed a perfect scale, then every response pattern would fall into one of five types: − − − −, + − − −, + + − −, + + + −, or + + + +. These response patterns may be designated by the "scale scores" 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, corresponding to their numbers of "+" votes. If the legislators who vote in these five patterns are placed in five categories in the order shown, the divisions ("cutting points") between the categories are the four roll calls, in descending order of p_+. Thus the scale ranks roll calls and legislators together. The value of p_+ for each roll call gives the proportion of all legislators who are to the right of that roll call.

---

[4] Most analyses of political data published so far, using analytic rotation by computers, to the author's knowledge, have used orthogonal rotation. Schubert's study (*op. cit.*, pp. 96–97) is an important exception; he rotates to oblique axes based on Guttman scales, and avoids orthogonal rotation on grounds similar to those presented here. Another exception is J. G. Grumm, "A Factor Analysis of Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7 (1963), pp. 336–356.

[5] In so doing, we no longer assume that such a set of roll calls must be restricted to a single issue. This meets to some extent the criticism of A. Lijphart in "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," this Review, Vol. 57 (1963), pp. 904–905.

[6] For a recent example, see Rieselbach, *op. cit.*; for a more detailed exposition of reasoning and procedures, see D. MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting*, University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol. 1 #3 (1958), pp. 203–333.

[7] L. Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," ch. 3 in S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, 1950).

[8] Voting systems with three alternatives (*e.g.*, abstention) may often be analyzed by converting a trichotomy into two dichotomies. Votes for a multiplicity of unordered alternatives (as in a Presidential nominating convention) are less easily treated in this way.

So far we have said nothing about absences, "error" votes, or the meaning of the votes and scales in conceptual terms. These questions will be dealt with next.

We first consider certain limited problems of missing data and "errors," to illustrate ways in which cumulative scaling differs from other types of multivariate analysis, particularly factor analysis. When missing data (*e.g.*, absences) occur in what otherwise would be a perfect scale type, and when they do not introduce ambiguity into the decision as to what that scale type would be, they may be replaced by hypothetical votes that "would have been cast"; for example, the response pattern +−○○○ (○ = non-response) would become +−−−− and ○○○+− would become ++++−. And when a response (+ or −) differing from that in a perfect scale type could be altered in only one way to produce a perfect scale type, this change is conventionally made; if the response pattern was −+++, this would become ++++, and if it was −−−+ this would become −−−−.

These observations show that in the treatment of departures from perfect scale types, cumulative scaling does not treat all responses as interchangeable. A "+" vote on a roll call on which the +'s are a small minority (one with low p_+) is not treated the same as a "+" vote when they are a large majority. This distinction between items in different places on the scale will be important to us in interpreting scales.[9]

The fact that not all roll calls need be treated alike is further illustrated by a finding that sometimes occurs in the scale analysis of legislative votes: the issue involved in roll calls at one end of the continuum is sometimes recognizably different from that at the other. For example, a "liberalism-conservatism" scale for the Democrats in the 81st Congress had several roll calls at one end (on which only a small liberal minority dissented), dealing with communism and civil liberties; items of this sort did not appear elsewhere on the scale.[10] This sort of divergence in content between roll calls in different ranges of p_+ can reveal the fusion of special issues into more general ones, the legislative tactics and strategy of the period being studied, or the relations among blocs or groups.

This possible heterogeneity of content within a scale points to a modification of conventional scaling procedures that will make them more appropriate to legislative analysis. Guttman scaling was initially devised to weed out badly chosen items in a set of attitude questions designed by an investigator to reflect a single underlying continuum or concept. The set of "all possible questions of the same content" that might exemplify this concept, was designated by Guttman as the "universe of attributes."[11] When cumulative scaling has been applied to legislative votes, the procedure has usually begun with the selection of a set of roll calls judged to deal with a given general issue. Scaling has been viewed as a procedure for selecting within this set. But the investigator is more liable to errors of judgment with roll calls than with questionnaire items; he may fail to group issues as the legislators did, or even ignore certain issues. Moreover, in searching for issues or attitudes he may overlook certain bloc divisions that were not easily identifiable by common issue content, but which could nevertheless be revealed by the same procedures.

The method proposed here—to search for clusters of similar votes regardless of content—is therefore more empirical and less dependent on preliminary hypotheses or conceptual considerations than Guttman's approach. In making this change, we contend that the structure of legislative votes is a datum for the investigator to discover, not to create. Differences in content of scales at different values of p_+ are important legislative facts that should not be be obscured by method.

Our empiricism cannot be unbounded, however; otherwise it might lead to such absurdities as the selection of an arbitrary group of legislators simply in order to eliminate "error" votes, or the assemblage of a meaningless collection of roll calls for which the legislators in question had scalable votes. The aim of our research is to make general statements about legislative processes. These statements involve concepts and relations between them. Concepts acquire sig-

---

[9] In factor analysis it is conventional to form factor scores by adding the weighted contributions of items loaded on a given factor; this procedure treats items as interchangeable, in the sense considered here. Schubert, in assigning scores on cumulative scales, also uses an additive procedure (*op. cit.*); this may be appropriate for matching scales with factors, but it is not the procedure that we propose here.

[10] MacRae, *Dimensions . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

[11] Guttman, *op. cit.*, pp. 80ff.

		Roll call #1		
		+	−	Totals for #2
Roll call #2	+	a	b	a+b
	−	c	d	c+d
Totals for #1		a+c	b+d	a+b+c+d=N (total legislators voting on #1 and #2)

FIG. 1. Fourfold Table

nificance by virtue of entering into multiple relations or multiple, empirically concordant, definitions.[12] Thus the reduction of a concept to a single operational definition would negate our central aim.

For this reason one must provide additional definitions of "issue" and "bloc," to test whether an empirical cluster of roll calls, or the divisions of legislators on it, represents either of these concepts. Issues will be recognized here from the content of the roll calls involved; a cluster of roll calls may include more than one issue, and an issue may appear in more than one cluster. Blocs will be recognized from characteristics of the groups of legislators separated by a cluster of roll calls—in this paper, chiefly the state and region of their districts. Either of these definitions could easily be extended, while remaining consistent with the concept in question, if other types of information were included in the study.

If bases of legislative division are to be sought through empirical search of a heterogeneous collection of roll calls, the study of overall response patterns (long sequences of +'s and −'s) is an inefficient way to do this. It is easier to compare each roll call with each other. This procedure was presented (for questionnaire items) by Toby and Toby.[13] Each item is considered as a dichotomy, and each pair of items yields a fourfold table, such as that in Figure 1. When the two roll calls in question have the relationship of two items in a perfect scale, one cell of the fourfold table will be empty. Suppose that, in Figure 1, roll call #1 has the higher value of p_+. It will then precede roll call #2 in the sequence of descending p_+ described above. But from the definition of a perfect scale pattern, given above, no "−" is ever followed by a "+". Therefore no "−" on roll call #1 will be followed by a "+" on roll call #2, and cell *b* of the table will be empty. This cell is conventionally known as the "zero box."

We then examine all the fourfold tables generated by comparing each roll call under study with each other. As long as the scale criterion is met perfectly, only the presence of zeroes in the appropriate cells need be noted; but in actuality, some degree of "error" or departure from the scale model is usually considered acceptable. We then use some criterion to assess the adequacy or scalability of each fourfold table, and define a scale cluster as a set of roll calls, all pairs of which meet this criterion. This procedure was followed by Toby and Toby, with the criterion that the proportion of cases (legislators) in the "zero box" not exceed ten per cent of the total number of cases in the table.[14] This criterion was consistent with the original rationale of error assessment in Guttman scaling, according to which each "error", or vote which departed from the scale model, was to be counted equally in assessing the adequacy of the scale. This notion has been embodied in the coefficient of reproducibility and in other proposed indices for measuring the adequacy of scales.[15]

One may argue, however, that "errors" between two items far apart in p_+ should be given particular weight; these would correspond to a legislator's voting first with a group at one extreme, and then with one on the opposite extreme. One would then wish to substitute for the equal counting of errors an unequal counting, depending on the distance between the items $(c-b)/N$.[16] The author has previously done this by means of an exponential model based on latent-structure analysis.[17]

---

[12] For further treatment of the last two points see A. Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco, 1964), pp. 41, 50.

[13] J. Toby and M. L. Toby, "A Method of Selecting Dichotomous Items by Cross-Tabulation," ch. 15 in M. W. Riley, J. W. Riley, Jr., and J. Toby, *Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis* (New Brunswick, 1954).

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 343. It was also required that the numbers of cases in cells *a* and *d* each be at least twice that in the "zero box."

[15] See, for example, H. Menzel, "A New Coefficient for Scale Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (1953), pp. 268–280; E. F. Borgatta, "An Error Ratio for Scalogram Analysis," *ibid.*, Vol. 19 (1955), pp. 96–100.

This unequal counting, as well as other advantages, can be obtained by the use of Yule's Q-coefficient.[18] For a fourfold table as shown in Figure 1, Q = (ad − bc)/(ad + bc). This coefficient has several desirable properties:

a. For a perfect scale relationship between the two items in question, it attains the value +1.0.
b. If the two categories (+ and −) of one of the items are reversed, Q changes only its sign.
c. As the table departs from a perfect scale relationship, the error is effectively measured by the product *bc*. The use of Q weights the number of errors, *b*, in approximate proportion to the difference in values of p_+ between the two items, (c − b)/N,[19] in relation to the product *ad*.
d. The use of Q does not presuppose quantitative attitude continua, either manifest or latent, but can be justified in terms of pairwise rankings of legislators and the probability that these rankings will be consistent between two items.[20]

Each fourfold table may then be classified as "scalable" or not "scalable," depending on whether the corresponding value of Q attains a specified minimum value. This classification is analogous to similar procedures based on the proportion of cases in the zero box, or on a constant in the exponential model. A dichotomous set of relations of this kind can then be examined for clusters, such that within each cluster all pairs of items are mutually scalable, and no further items can be added.[21] The task of searching for such clusters is greatly simplified if they are required to be mutually exclusive; this also avoids some artifactual relations between clusters. The particular procedures used will be described in the next section.

The procedure described so far does not depend on the minimum value of Q which is chosen as necessary for scalability. But because we are interested in placing legislators in relation to response patterns that fit the cumulative-scale model, we normally set a relatively high threshold value. If the incidence of error is too high, the assignment of scale scores to response patterns becomes difficult. The simplest way to realize the advantages of the scale model is to consider only data that have relatively little error. This choice concentrates our attention on certain types of roll calls at the expense of others; in factor-analytic terms, we concentrate on those with pure loadings on the oblique rotated axes, and with high communalities.[22] It is of course possible (though not conventional) to set one value of the error threshold in identifying bases of division, and another in choosing subsets of roll calls for placing legislators on scales.

---

[16] It can be seen from Figure 1 that for roll call #1, $p_+ = (a+c)/N$, and for roll call #2, $p_+ = (a+b)/N$. The difference is (c − b)/N. If roll call #1 has the higher p_+, this difference will be positive.

[17] See D. MacRae, Jr., "An Exponential Model for Assessing Fourfold Tables," *Sociometry*, Vol. 19 (1956), pp. 84–94. This method was used in *Dimensions . . . , op. cit.*

[18] See G. U. Yule, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (London, 1911), p. 38.

[19] This approximation is good as long as *c* is much larger than *b*.

[20] See L. A. Goodman and W. H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 49 (1954), pp. 723–764. An alternative line of reasoning which leads to similar formulations is put forward in M. G. Kendall, *Rank Correlation Methods* (London, 3d ed., 1962), pp. 3–5. In comparing two rankings, Kendall counts the number of pairs of elements that are ranked consistently, and the number ranked inconsistently, out of all possible such pairs. With either of these approaches, it would be possible to assess a fourfold table not only in terms of the proportional consistency of the rankings it provides (as measured by Q), but also in terms of the proportion of rankings about which a judgment of consistency may be made. If this latter proportion is low (*i.e.*, the proportion of ties is high), as in tables with extreme values of p_+, the table may be given less emphasis in interpretation.

[21] Computer programs for carrying out this operation are discussed in R. E. Bonner, "On Some Clustering Techniques," *IBM Journal of Research and Development*, Vol. 8 (1964), pp. 22–32. A related program was written by F. K. Bamberger for the Univac I, and used in exploratory research by the author. A similar program was written for the IBM 7094 at Chicago by R. Axelrod. These programs were costly in computer time, however; the clusters reported here therefore were obtained from the Q-matrix by paper-and-pencil methods, which are believed reliable up to a matrix size of about 150 items.

[22] In the House of Representatives, the votes ignored by this choice tend to include a disproportionate number of questions affecting particular areas of the country, such as the appointment of judges for a particular district, the movement of an Army installation from one place to another, or the treatment of an industry whose production and markets are highly localized.

TABLE I. Q-MATRIX FOR REPUBLICANS, U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 84TH CONGRESS*

		1955:																					1956:								
CQ. no.		6	7	8	9	10	15	22	23	24	27	28	29	30	43	47	50	52†	57	59	60	72	76	13	14	16	23	29	32	52	64	65
1955:	6	x	9	9	9	9									10		8															
	7		x	9	8	9									9		8															
	8		*3*	x	9	9									10		9															
	9				x	10									10		8															
	10					x									10		9															
	15					*1*	x								9	8	8	10	9	9	9								8	8		
	22							x	10	10			10	10				10				8	8								8	8
	23							*4*	x	9			9	9																		
	24									x			9	9																		
	27										x	10												10	10	9	10	10				
	28										*2*	x												10	10	9	10	10				
	29												x	10									8									
	30												*4*	x									8									
	43													*3*	x		9		8	8	8								8	8		
	47														*1*	x	8	8	9	9	9								9	9		
	50															*3*	x															
	52†																	x	9	9	9								9	8	10	10
	57																		x	10	9								9	9		
	59																		*1*	x	9								9	9		
	60																				x								9	9		
	72																					x	9								8	8
	76																					*5*	x								8	8
1956:	13																							x	10	9	10	10				
	14																								x	10	10	10				
	16																								*2*	x	10	10				
	23																										x	9				
	29																											x				
	32																												x	9		
	52																												*1*	x		
	64																														x	9
	65																														*5*	x

* Of the 102 roll calls on which the party had at least 7 per cent dissidence, this table retains only the 31 that were members of scale clusters at $Q_{\min} = .8$. Italicized numbers to left of main diagonal identify scale clusters.

† The conservative (+) vote for the Republicans is the opposite of that chosen from the association of vote with party.

II. LOCATING CLUSTERS IN THE Q-MATRIX

The basic tool for this analysis is a matrix of Q-coefficients between pairs of roll calls, produced by a computer program.[23] Because we are concerned only with values of Q that exceed a specified minimum value, we omit from the matrix all lower values, and thus facilitate the visual search for clusters. Table I shows an illustrative Q-matrix for Republicans in the House of Representatives in the 84th Congress (1955-56).

Each row, and the corresponding column, corresponds to a roll call, identified by the year (1955 or 1956) and the sequence number used by the *Congressional Quarterly*.[24] Originally all the 102 roll calls on which the Republicans had at least seven per cent dissidence were analyzed in this fashion; but for reasons of space, only the 31 that fell into scale clusters are shown in Table I.[25] Values of Q in the table are multiplied by 10. The "positive" vote on each roll call was provisionally chosen as that vote associated with the Republican party, as contrasted with the Democrats; the one roll call in the table for which this polarity was reversed is marked with a dagger (†). The threshold value of Q chosen for this study is 0.8; this value was chosen as high enough to separate distinct issues, but low enough to include a sufficient number of roll calls in the scale clusters to permit inferences about them.

We define a scalable cluster as a set of roll calls, all of whose pairs have associations of at least .8. Such clusters may be found in the matrix by search for symmetrical patterns such as those shown in Table I. When such a cluster exists, the roll calls in it may be indicated by enclosing their diagonal elements in boxes which mark the corresponding rows and columns. Wherever one of these rows intersects another column belonging to the same cluster, the value of Q at the intersection must be at least .8; these intersections are also enclosed in rectangular boxes in Table I. Since the matrix is symmetrical, we need examine only the upper triangular part. The largest cluster in Table I is marked "*1*"; of the eight items in the cluster, seven dealt with foreign aid and one with the debt limit. The debate on the last item included reference to foreign aid.

After the identification of the first cluster, two general procedures are available for finding further distinct clusters. One is to proceed as in factor analysis, and to compute residual associations before repeating the procedure; this method has been used in a set of computer programs designed by Tryon.[26] A second procedure involves treating each association in the matrix simply as a dichotomous variable; a special case of this type, which is the procedure used here, involves deleting the roll calls in the first cluster from the matrix, and repeating the procedure on the reduced matrix.[27] This decision assigns each roll call to no more than one cluster. It also insures that the actual votes, rather than some mathematical function of them, will meet the same tests for scalability in all clusters and thus permit comparable placements of legislators.

The two next largest clusters among the remaining roll calls in Table I (including seven each) are labeled *2* and *3*. All the roll calls in cluster 2 dealt with agricultural issues. Cluster 3 dealt with reciprocal trade; one item in the group (5-43)[28] almost entered cluster 1, but 5-52 was preferred to it as completing an eight-item cluster with higher average Q. Cluster 4 (5 items) dealt with the pay of postal employees. Cluster 5 included four items dealing with housing and atomic power. Item 5-22 could have entered cluster 5 as well as 4, but the five-item cluster 4 as shown had higher average Q and was preferred on this basis. We terminate the search for clusters with groups of four roll calls.[29]

---

[23] See D. MacRae, Jr., "IBM 1401 Q-Matrix and Editing Programs for Legislative Votes," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 10 (1965), p. 324. For each pair of roll calls, only those legislators voting on both are counted in the calculation.

[24] These numbers are used to identify the roll calls in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vols. 11, 12 (Washington, 1955, 1956).

[25] The actual computer printout also indicates the value of p_+, and the provisional "positive" vote (yea or nay), on each roll call. This preserves all the information in the individual fourfold tables except for the distribution of non-voting.

[26] See R. C. Tryon and D. E. Bailey, *Cluster and Factor Analysis* (in preparation). Reference is made to this method in D. MacRae, Jr., "Cluster Analysis of Congressional Votes with the BC TRY System," *Western Political Quarterly* (in press). See also Tryon and Bailey, "The BC TRY Computer System of Cluster and Factor Analysis," *Multivariate Behavioral Research* (in press).

[27] More elaborate procedures of the second type are presented in Bonner, *op. cit.* In the procedure used here, ties between clusters of equal size are resolved in favor of the cluster with highest average Q.

[28] To designate roll calls by number, we precede the *Congressional Quarterly* number by the last digit of the year (5 or 6).

[29] In general, we terminate after the first six

Of these clusters, numbers 1–4 dealt with clearly recognizable issues, of greater or lesser generality. Cluster 5 may have dealt with the more general "welfare state" issue. None, according to criteria we shall specify below, corresponded to a major bloc division in the Republican party.

Clusters enable us to identify recurrent bases of division in a legislature, and to list the legislators who occupied particular places in such divisions. In looking for clusters we ask general questions and get general answers. The method of cluster analysis that we have described sometimes leads to close decisions in allocating roll calls to clusters. But the identification of the basis of division, and the placement of legislators, are not usually greatly altered by moving a few roll calls into or out of a major cluster.

If we wish to trace roll calls on particular bills and to find what more general divisions they exemplify, another approach is available. We may build initial scales from roll calls related to the bills in question. These scales, or individual roll calls of interest, may then be examined in relation to the more general scales, or to other roll calls in the Q-matrix. In this way the particular bills may be placed in a wider context.

III. THE PLACEMENT OF LEGISLATORS ON SCALES

Once a cluster of roll calls is found, the legislators under study may be located according to their relative favorableness or unfavorableness to the positions considered positive on those roll calls. They may be assigned scores in terms of the conformity of their response patterns with perfect scale patterns. These scores give further information about the meanings of the scales, by identifying extreme legislators on a single scale or deviants in the relation between two scales. Distinctions between bases of division may then be studied with the aid of these legislators' views, as expressed in debates, other communications, or (for contemporary studies) interviews. Legislators' positions on scales may also be related to other relevant variables, such as constituency or career characteristics.

We shall sketch the procedure for placement of legislators briefly, since their positions will be used here only to clarify the relations between scales. It is assumed that positive polarities have been chosen consistently for the roll calls in the cluster. The next step in the procedure is to arrange the roll calls in the cluster in descending order of p_+, and to group them into sets marking off approximately equal intervals in the range of p_+ from 1 to 0. Not every roll call will become a separate cutting point on the scale, since we permit considerable non-scale response between two items with values of p_+ close together. Instead, we use "contrived items," each consisting of two or more actual roll calls; the legislator's "vote" on such an item is considered to correspond to the preponderant vote on the component roll calls.[30] An objective procedure is followed for assigning each roll call to a contrived (or ordinary) scale item.[31] Legislators' response patterns on these contrived items are then assigned scale scores in terms of their resemblance to perfect scale patterns.[32]

The associations between legislators' scores on pairs of scales measure the associations between the scales. From the Q-matrix one can estimate these associations by noting whether there are many high Q's between roll calls in one cluster and those in another. But a more precise answer to this question is possible in terms of the associations between legislators' positions on pairs of scales. The index of association we shall use is Goodman and Kruskal's gamma.[33] This index includes Q as a special case, if applied to a fourfold table. Gamma (or Q) measures the probability that a pair of individuals in the table will be ranked consistently on the two variables. In a fourfold table, for example, each dichotomy (horizontal or vertical) may be considered as a ranking of all legislators, though with a great many ties. The only pairs of legislators about whom we can clearly say that the information in the two

---

scales and ties, if all possible scales containing as few as six roll calls have been found.

[30] This procedure was proposed in S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, "A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (1952), pp. 273–291.

[31] In the descending sequence of values of p_+, any interval of .10 or greater is first marked off as a division point. Then each sequence of values of p_+ between these division points, or at the end of the overall sequence, is further divided if it spans a range of p_+ greater than .15. This division is made by specifying further division points, equally spaced, with intervals as near to .10 as possible. The roll calls falling between each pair of division points then constitute a contrived (or if only one, an ordinary) item. This procedure, while useful for placing legislators, discards information provided by the distribution of p_+.

[32] The detailed procedures are essentially the same as those specified in MacRae, *Dimensions . . .*, pp. 321–322.

[33] Goodman and Kruskal, *op. cit.*, pp. 749–751.

rankings is consistent or inconsistent, are those who occupy different rows and different columns in the table. If their places in the table are to the upper left and lower right, respectively, these two rankings are consistent; the number of ways in which such a pair might be drawn (in the fourfold table in Figure 1) is *ad*. If their places are on the upper right and lower left relative to one another, their rankings are inconsistent, and the number of possible inconsistent pairs is *bc*. Thus the coefficient $Q = (ad-bc)/(ad+bc)$ measures the number of consistent pairs minus inconsistent pairs divided by the total number of pairs about which a judgment of consistency might be made. The same expression may be obtained by reasoning in probability terms.

The index gamma is obtained by a straightforward extension of this reasoning to any larger table comparing two sets of ranked categories. The terms in gamma corresponding to *ad* and *bc* are simply the sums of a number of such products of cell entries.[34]

The associations between scale positions for Republicans in the 84th Congress, corresponding to the scales discussed above, will be shown below in Table III. It will be seen there that foreign and domestic issues arrayed the Republicans quite differently at that time, and that agricultural issues were separate from both.

IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF SCALE CLUSTERS

The example we have presented involves a set of relatively clear and distinct issues, easily recognizable from inspection of the substance of the legislation involved in the corresponding roll calls. Not all sets of clusters are quite so clear, however, and additional principles of interpretation must be introduced before we can proceed to compare the divisions of the two parties in various Congresses.

Our aim in interpreting clusters, as suggested above, is to center attention on bases of legislative division that can each be recognized by a variety of approaches—whether by various statistical methods, classification of issues or blocs by informed observers, or relations with outside variables. The procedure that we propose for defining clusters can in fact yield two clusters that deal with much the same issue, or it can combine two apparently different issues in the same cluster. The ways in which this can happen, and procedures for interpretation, may be indicated by reference to a previous analysis of the 81st Congress.[35]

This previous analysis differed from the present one in three principal respects: it started from conceptual definition of issue clusters, rather than purely empirical definition; it used a different model for assessing the scalability of a pair of items from the corresponding fourfold table; and it set a more stringent error threshold for accepting a pair of items as mutually scalable. In spite of these differences, the broad lines of interpretation resulting from that study are sustained by re-analysis following the method proposed here. Table II presents the relations between the scales identified in the former study and those found in the re-analysis.

The main similarity between the results of the two analyses is that certain issues are represented by very similar scales, completely distinct from others, in both studies. Foreign aid is completely distinct from domestic issues for both Republicans and Democrats; no roll call that appeared in a foreign-aid scale in one analysis appeared in a domestic scale in the other. For the Republicans the re-analysis produces two foreign-aid scales (columns 3 and 7) rather than one, apparently involving a distinction between economic and military aid. For the Democrats there is only a single foreign-aid scale. Agricultural issues also form a completely distinct scale for the Republicans in both analyses (though they do not, in the re-analysis, for the Democrats[36]). This distinctness of issues is thus a clear and consistent finding with respect to variations of method, if not (as we shall see) with respect to time.

A second similarity is that for the Republicans, domestic issues other than agriculture tend to be divided into two types, which we shall call urban and non-urban. Urban issues are those with a special appeal, on the liberal side, to representatives with urban constituencies—primarily housing and civil rights. Non-urban issues are ones on which a Republican might experience district pressure to vote on the liberal side without representing an urban district; principal examples are labor relations, social security, taxation, natural resources, and civil servants' pay.[37]

---

[34] For an elementary discussion of gamma, how to calculate it, and its relation to Q, see M. Zelditch, *A Basic Course in Sociological Statistics* (New York, 1959), pp. 180–186.

[35] MacRae, *Dimensions . . . , op. cit.*

[36] This finding is consistent with the high associations between the former agriculture scale and the former welfare-state and race-relations scales ($\gamma = +.70$, $+.79$ resp.).

[37] This distinction was shown to be related to the rural or urban character of constituencies in *Dimensions . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 266–268.

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF FORMER SCALES AND NEW SCALES, 81ST CONGRESS

A. Republicans
Distribution of Roll Calls in Old and New Scales

New Scale No. and Subject

	1 Urban	2 Non-urban	3 Foreign aid	4 (Patronage)	5 Urban	6 Agriculture	7 Foreign aid	8 D.C. revenue	None	Total
Old Scale										
Welfare state	5	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	6	14
Race relations	9	4	—	—	2	—	—	—	6	21
Labor relations	1	7	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	11
Foreign aid	—	—	8	—	—	—	3	—	3	14
Cotton-peanuts	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	1	5
Parity-oleo	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4
None	7	6	1	6	4	3	3	6		
Total†	22	17	9	8	8	7	6	6		

Associations (γ) Between Old and New Scales*

	1 Urban	2 Non-urban	3 Foreign aid	4 (Patronage)	5 Urban	6 Agriculture	7 Foreign aid	8 D.C. revenue
Welfare state	*77*	*77*	54	46	*81*	−12	47	52
Race relations	*80*	*71*	41	40	*83*	−08	35	56
Labor relations	59	*83*	10	59	57	18	08	69
Foreign aid	61	31	*97*	10	51	19	*82*	09
Cotton-peanuts	06	11	15	07	09	*89*	12	−16
Parity-oleo	37	09	63	20	38	44	38	02

B. Democrats
Distribution of Roll Calls in Old and New Scales

New Scale No. and Subject

	1 Domestic	2 Foreign aid	3 (Communism)	4 (Rural)	5 Pricing	6 Housing	None	Total
Old Scale								
Welfare state	23	—	3	—	—	3	5	34
Race relations	24	—	1	1	—	1	3	30
Foreign aid	—	9	—	—	—	—	2	11
Agriculture	2	—	1	1	—	—	3	7
Oleo	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3
None	23	5	4	6	5	1		
Total†	70	14	9	8	5	5		

Associations (γ) Between Old and New Scales*

	1 Domestic	2 Foreign aid	3 (Communism)	4 (Rural)	5 Pricing	6 Housing
Welfare state	*89*	56	*84*	*70*	39	*80*
Race relations	*95*	57	*86*	*75*	32	*83*
Foreign aid	48	*96*	44	36	24	33
Agriculture	*85*	*71*	*83*	*79*	27	*70*
Oleo	−19	19	19	11	41	14

† Including a few roll calls assigned to more than one scale in the previous study (*op. cit.*, pp. 324–331).
* With polarity of former scales reversed. Decimal point is omitted.

In analyzing this distinction, however, we observe that the scales in question are no longer perfectly separate in the two analyses. Among the roll calls in the "welfare state" scale of the earlier analysis, five fell in new scale 1, none in new 2; and for the earlier "labor relations" scale, almost the converse was true (one and seven respectively). But roll calls from the former "race relations" scale fell more evenly in both. Moreover, roll calls in these three old scales were also found in new scales 4 and 5. We must therefore reconcile disparities between conceptual and empirical definition of clusters.

For the Republicans, Scale 5 ranked the members of the party in a way that was associated highly with that of Scale 1 ($\gamma = +.86$; see Table III). Moreover, seven of its eight roll calls dealt with bills that were also involved (at other legislative stages) in Scale 1.[38] In addition, its associations with other scales of the former analysis (Table II) and of the re-analysis (Table III) were nearly identical with those of Scale 1. We therefore regard Scale 5 as an artifact of the method of clustering used, and not distinct in issue content from Scale 1. We shall refer to such a scale as a "shadow" scale. This is not to deny the possibility of discovering meaningful (though small) differences in legislators' rankings on the two scales, by detailed analysis; but since we have not discovered them, we consider these scales to measure essentially the same thing. A similar problem also arises for the two foreign-aid scales (3 and 7) found for the Republicans in the re-analysis.

---

[38] Further evidence of this overlap arose in the process of cluster identification. A number of roll

The converse problem arises for the Democrats: two conceptually distinct areas of legislation, corresponding to the "welfare state" (Fair Deal) and "race relations" scales, merge in one dominant scale in the re-analysis. This new combined scale ("domestic") is highly associated with both old scales ($\gamma = +.89$ and $+.95$, Table III). The two former scales were highly associated with one another as well ($\gamma = +.84$)[39] and had similar patterns of association with the other new scales. One might ask, then, whether these two areas of legislation should be considered the same or different for the Democrats at that time. This question may be answered in two ways. First, the *issues* are clearly distinct, and it should be regarded as an empirical statement, not a definition of a new "issue," that they elicited similar voting patterns in that Congress. If they did not do so at other times (and this sort of change did occur for foreign aid), then we need not change our definitions of issues from one period to another in order to describe this change. For this purpose, conceptual definition clearly assumes primacy.[40]

On the other hand, it is equally clear that similar groups of Democratic congressmen were opposing one another on the Fair Deal and on civil rights or race relations.[41] Basic to this opposition was the North-South split in the party. For analysis of blocs or factions, then, we must recognize that these two major issues were in a sense "the same." This reasoning will be elaborated below when we discuss the relations between scales and factions.

In spite of the problems that result from the application of rigid statistical rules for cluster identification, these rules have definite advantages. In the first place, an empirical search reveals issues that might not have been hypothesized by the researchers. Not only are unexpected issues seen (*e.g.*, clusters have been found dealing with veterans' affairs, with public power in the West, and with public lands), but different bases of division are found for different parties and periods. Some of these issues could have been found, to be sure, by empirical search within narrower "preliminary universes of content," such as that of domestic nationwide issues. But the conceptual procedure risks a lack of objectivity in relation to various investigators' notions of how issues should be classified. This may bias any conclusions reached about the change of issues over time, if the researcher identifies the issues at each period on the basis of a preliminary subjective selection of roll calls.

A second advantage of empirical search is that it is well suited to discovery of bases of legislative division that are *not* centered about issues. One such example is the distinction between divisions, in a parliamentary system, that center about issues and those that center about the fate of the cabinet.[42] Another such example is the use of clusters of roll calls to delineate blocs and factions.

V. POSTWAR ISSUES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

We may now apply the method to a substantive problem: the tracing of issues in the House of Representatives in the two postwar decades. We choose for analysis five Congresses, involving four combinations of party control of the Presidency and Congress: the 80th (D,R control respectively), the 81st (D,D), the 83d (R,R), the 84th (R,D), and the 87th (D,D). The 87th Congress (D,D) is added to permit examination of temporal trends. Associations between the scales found in these Congresses, for each party separately, are shown in Table III.

Consider first the table of associations for the Republicans in the 84th Congress (next to last table in the left-hand column). The five scales

---

calls in Scale 1 could equally well have been placed in Cluster 5; they were simply assigned to Cluster 1 by the preference which our rules give to larger clusters. Moreover, a change in the minimum Q also transferred items from one cluster to another.

[39] This was also pointed out in *Dimensions . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 251–252.

[40] This position was taken by Guttman when he introduced the scaling technique. See *Measurement and Prediction*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 84, 85.

[41] The two issues were *not* similar in this sense for the two parties combined, however; the Republicans were generally more favorable to civil rights than the Democrats.

[42] See D. MacRae, Jr., "Intraparty Divisions and Cabinet Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 5 (1963), pp. 164–211.

TABLE III. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SCALES IN FIVE CONGRESSES*

80th		Republicans						
		4	1	6	5	2	7	3
Foreign aid	4	x	86	56	60	04	−42	−49
Foreign aid	1		x	73	67	01	−42	−45
Draft	6			x	56	−29	−58	−52
Housing	5				x	−30	−50	−55
Public lands	2					x	61	42
Rural	7						x	70
Agriculture	3							x

		Democrats					
		4	6	2	1	5	3
(Draft)	4	x	71	−38	−65	−64	−64
Foreign aid	6		x	37	36	38	22
Taxes	2			x	55	56	62
Domestic	1				x	79	77
Public lands	5					x	73
Rural & communism	3						x

81st		3	7	1	5	2	8	6	4
Foreign aid	3	x	83	64	52	27	05	−16	−09
Foreign aid	7		x	58	47	24	11	−21	00
Urban	1			x	86	72	48	−05	−41
Urban	5				x	77	52	−14	−41
Non-urban	2					x	84	18	−60
DC revenue	8						x	17	−42
Agriculture	6							x	17
(Patronage)	4								x

		2	1	3	6	5	4
Foreign aid	2	x	63	56	42	13	−48
Domestic	1		x	87	88	35	−81
(Communism)	3			x	82	38	−77
Housing	6				x	52	−77
Pricing	5					x	24
(Rural)	4						x

83d		1	3	2	5	4
Foreign aid	1	x	60	26	−34	−70
Urban	3		x	82	−04	−79
Non-urban	2			x	13	−33
Rural	5				x	24
(Immigration)	4					x

		2	1	7	5	3	6	4	8
Foreign aid	2	x	78	62	49	49	14	−11	−76
General	1		x	81	68	70	32	05	−83
(Border probs.)	7			x	59	57	22	11	−70
Domestic	5				x	56	32	21	−65
Domestic	3					x	44	01	−63
Fiscal	6						x	12	−12
Foreign trade	4							x	06
Domestic	8								x

84th		Republicans				
		3	1	5	4	2
Foreign trade	3	x	57	−12	−18	−03
Foreign aid	1		x	32	06	−28
(Urban)	5			x	62	−01
Postal pay	4				x	−05
Agriculture	2					x

		Democrats					
		1	3	5	6	4	2
General	1	x	86	79	73	19	−40
Domestic	3		x	74	61	22	−23
Contracts	5			x	59	16	−17
Regional	6				x	00	−70
Foreign trade	4					x	−22
Agriculture	2						x

for which associations are shown in Table III are the same ones that were identified in the Q-matrix of Table I. Scale 1, dealing with foreign aid, has relatively low associations with all the other scales except that for foreign trade (Scale 3); this association was foreshadowed by several high values of Q between roll calls in the two scales in Table I. The two other scales that form a separate grouping deal with domestic matters: Scales 4 (postal pay) and 5 (welfare state; here classed as "urban"). Scale 2 (agriculture) is relatively independent of the other four.

The table of associations we have just discussed illustrates several general principles of presentation in Table III. First, groups of scales, all of which have values of gamma of at least .5 with one another, are enclosed in rectangles to indicate their membership in "higher-order clusters." Second, the "positive" votes chosen for each scale are those on which the Republicans proportionally exceeded the Democrats in the majority of the roll calls in the scale in question.[43] Thus the "agriculture" scale for the Republicans in the 84th Congress has small negative associations with all the other scales, because the segment of the party voting with the Democrats (in favor of price supports) tended to be the most conservative (*i.e.*, to oppose the Democrats most) on other issues. Third, the various scales (rows and columns) are arranged in such an order as to bring their highest positive associations near the diagonal, rather than according to size of cluster (which their serial numbers indicate).

These last two principles throw into relief four scales on which inter-party alignments—often relating to the President's position—were reversed in relation to intra-party divisions. In each case the reversal is revealed by a set of high negative associations between the scale in question and others, placing the scale in a higher-order cluster. First is the Democrats' scale on the draft in the 80th Congress (#4), which we shall discuss below. Second was their "rural" scale in the 81st Congress (#4), on which urban liberals joined Republicans to oppose the Southerners' acreage allotments for

TABLE III (*Continued*)

87th

		3	1	6	4	2	5
General	3	x	74	63	56	47	−02
Foreign aid	1		x	61	69	55	00
(Procedural)	6			x	53	63	00
Domestic	4				x	83	11
Domestic	2					x	06
Agriculture	5						x

		1	3	2	7	4	5	6
General	1	x	86	85	55	41	65	15
Kennedy projects	3		x	90	59	56	55	−10
(Bureaucracy)	2			x	57	70	62	06
(Patronage)	7				x	38	54	27
Hanford	4					x	30	−45
Agriculture	5						x	58
Sugar	6							x

* Associations are gammas with decimal point omitted. "General" scales include both foreign and domestic issues; "domestic" include both urban and non-urban. Parentheses enclosing a title indicate that fewer than 80% of the items in the scale in question conform to the title category.

---

[43] The principal exception to this rule concerns votes on civil rights, on which the Democrats generally voted more conservatively. The polarities on civil rights roll calls were reversed before application of the rule. Scale #5 for the Republicans in the 80th Congress was assigned a polarity consistent with its higher-order cluster; the two of its four roll calls whose polarities were thus reversed were on Republican bills opposed by Democrats and conservative Republicans.

cotton and peanuts, as well as the Truman Administration's cutback in postal services. This latter economy move by the Administration also led to polarity reversal on the Republicans' scale #4, though with lower negative associations.[44] In the 83d Congress two more reversals occurred, as one such scale appeared for each party (#4 for the Republicans and #8 for the Democrats) when the Eisenhower administration took liberal stands backed by most of the Republicans, drawing liberal support but conservative opposition.

By placing closely associated scales near one another in each table, we arrange issues in a sequence that is broadly similar across parties and Congresses. The issue of foreign aid can usually be placed at one end of such a sequence, and we place it first (top row and left column) where possible. The first scale in nearly every case either deals primarily with foreign aid or combines foreign and domestic issues ("general"). At the other end of the sequence is usually a scale dealing with agriculture or agricultural interests. Between are scales dealing with a variety of domestic issues. When the issue of foreign trade appears, it is sometimes quite independent of the rest, as for Democrats under Eisenhower; sometimes closely related to foreign aid, as for the Republicans in the 84th Congress; and sometimes merged in a general scale, as for the Republicans in the 87th Congress.

In every table for the Republicans, two or more scales involving domestic issues can be found that differ in their degree of association with both foreign aid and agricultural or rural issues; domestic issues more closely associated with foreign aid tend to be less closely associated with aid to agriculture. In most cases, the former scales are recognizably concentrated on urban issues and the latter on non-urban issues (as defined above). Thus the diversity of division we observed for the Republicans in the 81st Congress is a more general characteristic of that Congressional party.

Throughout the Congresses studied, the Democrats in the House tended to be divided in a more unitary way than the Republicans.[45] Agricultural issues never merged with others in the principal higher-order cluster for the Republicans, while they merged for the Democrats in the 80th and 87th Congresses, and were so closely related to other domestic issues in the 81st and 83d Congresses that no separate agriculture scale appeared. Similarly, foreign aid twice failed by wide margins to fit into a domestic higher-order cluster for the Republicans (81st and 84th Congresses), while for the Democrats the two failures (81st and 83d Congresses) were by much narrower margins. Finally, the proportion of roll calls in the Q-matrix which entered the leading scale cluster was always higher for the Democrats than for the Republicans, as will be shown in Table IV below.

Comparing Congresses, we can see evidence of a greater consistency of division within the Democratic party on various issues in the 87th Congress than in the previous ones. Among the Democrats there was a steady trend toward consistency, which can be traced in the relation between foreign and domestic issues. In retrospect, the voting patterns of the 80th Congress appear particularly inconsistent. At that time American foreign policy was taking a new direction, as exemplified by Truman's program of aid to Greece and Turkey, and the continuation of the draft in peace time; the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was being reversed. Support for Truman's policy was stronger, proportionately, from his own party than from the Republicans; yet, within the Democratic party, factional alignments were reversed. The small group of Democrats who opposed these policies tended to come from the left of the political spectrum, while the Republicans who opposed were from the right. This alignment explains the fact that for the Democrats at that time, all the associations of the "draft" scale (#4; including the vote on passage of Greek-Turkish aid) with domestic issues were negative. This scale did enter into a higher-order cluster that reflected an underlying constancy of division within the party; but it was not consistent with the other scales in relation to inter-party alignments, or to the President's position. The associations between foreign aid and domestic issues were also low.[46]

This state of affairs did not last long. Foreign

---

[44] The polarity of Scales #4 for the Republicans and #4 for the Democrats is reversed in Table III relative to Table II. This is because in the previous study, polarities were chosen for intra-party consistency, while they are chosen here to show the relations between internal divisions and inter-party differences.

[45] For domestic issues, this difference between the parties has also been observed in another study of this period: David R. Mayhew, "Democrats and Republicans in the U. S. House of Representatives: A Study of Intra-Party Coalition Patterns in the Postwar Period," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1963, esp. ch. 6.

[46] This low association is partly due to the inclusion of Marcantonio and Isacson (ALP, NY) together with the Democrats; on Scale 6, they joined a small group of conservatives in opposing foreign aid.

TABLE IV. INCLUSIVENESS OF LEADING SCALE CLUSTERS

	Republicans			Democrats		
Congress	Subject of first cluster	Per cent of all roll calls in this cluster	Total roll calls in matrix	Subject of first cluster	Per cent of all roll calls in this cluster	Total roll calls in matrix
		(%)			(%)	
79	Domestic	10	136	Domestic	36	139
80	Foreign aid	14	73	Domestic	29	103
81	Urban	12	181	Domestic	38	176
82	Domestic	26	138	Domestic	28	139
83	Foreign aid	14	77	General	19	104
84	Foreign aid	8	102	General	22	85
85	Non-urban	11	144	Domestic	32	136
86	Domestic	13	130	Domestic	37	127
87	Foreign aid	12	159	General	41	150
88	General	13	150	General	51	144

aid was still distinct from domestic issues in the 81st Congress, but the left wings of both parties then tended to support it more consistently. And with the succeeding years, the convergence between the alignments on foreign and domestic issues became such that by the 87th Congress the Democrats revealed a "general" scale, combining foreign and domestic issues. The Republicans had such a scale as well, but it was less dominant and the coalescence of issues over time was less pronounced for them.

In this transition, party control of Presidency and Congress does not seem to have played the dominant role. The particular policies that Presidents urged on Congress, from Greek-Turkish aid to trade and agricultural policies, may well account for important changes in the configuration of issues. But the *general* degree of organization of issues seems to have been more a constant difference between the legislative parties in the House, and for the Democrats to have shown a trend over time toward consistency, than to have been altered and reversed by changes in party control. The differences shown in Table III do not easily fit the latter hypothesis.

VI. THE VOTING PATTERNS OF BLOCS AND PARTIES

In addition to the identification of issues, our procedure can also aid in the identification of certain types of blocs or factions. The Q-matrix provides two sorts of relevant evidence: the allocation of roll calls among clusters and the distribution of p_+ in these clusters. While a uniform distribution of p_+ was considered best in Guttman's initial procedure, the actual non-uniform distributions observed in legislative analysis provide useful information about bloc divisions. If a group of legislators is regularly divided into two opposing blocs, this will be revealed by a corresponding scale cluster in which the cutting points (p_+) are concentrated in a narrow range. The same phenomenon will result if a minority bloc repeatedly splits off from the remainder of the larger group; in this case the values of p_+ will be concentrated nearer the extremes (0 or 1), and we shall be more likely to say that a single "bloc" was involved than that there were two opposing blocs. If two mutually exclusive minority blocs (*e.g.*, small left and right wings) split repeatedly from the main segment of a party, but not at the same time, this fact will be revealed by a single scale cluster with two concentrations of values of p_+ near the two extremes.

If concentrations of p_+ of this kind are observed in scale clusters that are general in content, we infer that if blocs exist they are effective over a wide range of legislative subject-matter; if they are observed in clusters that are narrowly restricted in subject matter, we infer that the blocs are issue-specific. Clearly this distinction is one that should be allowed to arise out of the data, rather than being imposed by restrictive assumptions or models. Presumably the deepest cleavages within a party, or the divisions between parties that tend to set one whole party against another, will be characterized *both* by very general scale clusters (containing roll calls on a great variety of topics), and by a narrow concentration of cutting points (p_+).

In the House of Representatives in recent years, a bloc division of this sort has been more prevalent among the Democrats than among the Republicans. One way to show this is to compute the proportion of all roll calls in a Q-matrix which enter the first or largest cluster; Table IV shows this proportion for each party in ten recent Congresses. In every case the proportion is higher for the Democrats than for the Republicans. The subjects of the leading clusters also help to explain the difference between the parties; in four Congresses the leading cluster for the Republicans concerned foreign aid, while the leading cluster for the Democrats always included domestic issues. This difference in subject-matter is due to the greater diversity of cleavages in the Republican party, not to its being divided on fewer domestic issues. Not only were various domestic issues, including agricultural issues, more distinct for the Republicans in terms of relations among scales; but, as another manifestation of the same variety of division, roll calls were less concentrated in any particular cluster.

Some effects of party control of the presidency and congress can be seen in Table IV, for the Democrats but not for the Republicans. The Democrats' most inclusive leading scale clusters were observed in the 88th, 87th, 81st, 86th, and 79th Congresses, and their least in the 83d, 84th, 82d, 80th, and 85th. Of the first five, four were Congresses in which the Democrats controlled both congress and the presidency; of the last five, the lowest (83d) was the one instance in which the Republicans controlled both, while three others involved "truncated majorities" in which the party controlling congress did not control the presidency. Thus Democratic control of both branches seems to have made the Democrats' divisions more consistent. The two exceptions can also be explained plausibly. The 86th Congress was the third of a series of truncated Democratic majorities, and one preceding a presidential election which the Democrats had hopes of winning; the Democratic leadership in congress was putting forward its own policies and not merely opposing the president. Conversely, in the 82d Congress, in spite of nominal Democratic control, the coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had asserted its control from the opening of the first session[47]; of all the Congresses in this series with nominal Democratic control, this was the one with least Democratic strength. Moreover, a presidential election was approaching and Republican prospects seemed favorable. Some Democratic congressmen may have decided to vote in terms of the particular appeals of legislation for their districts, rather than the general appeals of President Truman, who was having difficulty with his programs. In this sense the political configuration of the 82d Congress may have resembled that of the 80th.

The proportion of roll calls in the leading scale for the Republicans shows far less clear association with party control. The unusually high figure for the 82d Congress may be attributed to repeated divisions of the party on a series of roll calls on amendments to the Defense Production Act, which constituted nearly half of the roll calls in their leading scale. Bills on this subject were introduced in 1951 and 1952, each time with an open rule permitting numerous amendments. These amendments were used to embarrass the Truman Administration; and possibly the prospects of electoral victory in 1952 induced most Republicans to join forces in support of the diverse amendments opposing governmental controls.

The dominant scales found for the Democrats are such as might have resulted from division of the party into blocs; and their greater dominance, when the Northern Democrats controlled the legislative program, suggests that the bloc division within the party was heightened at those times. But before reaching such a conclusion, we must ask whether the division was a deep one or merely set off a few dissidents at one extreme. For this reason, as well as others, we must study the distribution of p_+ among the roll calls in each leading scale cluster.

The distribution of p_+ within a scale is a useful datum concerning the repeated divisions of the set of legislators being studied. The Democrats' leading scales do show the concentration of values of p_+ that might have resulted from division of the party into two blocs; the dispersion of p_+ in these scales (semi-interquartile range) varied from .07 to .12 in the ten Congresses studied. If cutting points had been uniformly distributed over the permitted range (from .07 to .93), the corresponding dispersion would have been .22, about twice as great.

Not surprisingly, the Democrats' dominant scale invariably arrayed Northern urban congressmen at one end and Southerners at the other. But the median value of p_+ did not always divide the party precisely into Northern and Southern wings; for while the proportion of Southerners[48] varied between .36 and .55 over the period studied (86th and 80th Congresses respectively), the median value of p_+ varied from .18 to .68. When the South was proportionally strong within the party, it tended to gain the votes of some middle-of-the-road Democrats as well; while in recent Congresses (85th through 88th) the South was not only proportionally weaker but also tended to lose votes from within its own group. Whether this change corresponds to a change in the boundaries of social groupings in the party—*i.e.*, of blocs as revealed by evidence other than similarity of voting—requires further testing. If our identification of blocs is correct, we should expect Border-state Democrats, and some Southerners, to have interacted more in recent years with their Northern party colleagues. It is also possible, however, that the inclusion of foreign aid in the dominant scale in recent years has moved the dividing point farther toward the conservative, or Southern, end.

---

[47] See F. M. Riddick, "The Eighty-Second Congress: First Session," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (1952), pp. 106, 108; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 8 (Washington, 1952), pp. 58–59.

[48] Representatives from the eleven former Confederate states.

While the Republicans' leading scales were less dominant than the Democrats', they too showed concentrations of p_+. Most often their divisions tended to set off a small liberal faction, as the Democrats' set off a conservative minority. But in the 79th and 81st Congresses the Republicans' leading scale revealed minority factions at both extremes.[49] The properties of the Republicans' leading scales are harder to describe with assurance, however, because for that party one or more scale clusters were often close rivals of the largest; and depending on whether domestic or foreign issues were involved, the distributions of p_+ were quite different.

The observed concentrations of p_+ might be thought to result from legislative strategists' decisions to bring certain bills to the floor, or the willingness of committees to allow them to come up, or the insistence of interested minorities on the yeas and nays. But these factors still permit minorities at either extreme of a party to vote separately on roll calls; votes on passage and on conference reports characteristically set off small minorities of the opposition, and in the 79th, 80th, and 81st Congresses, minorities on the side controlling the House were also frequently set off on roll calls. Until further analysis yields alternative explanations for the observed concentrations of p_+, we shall regard them as reflecting actual social groupings within the parties, *i.e.*, blocs.

The division between the parties themselves also constitutes a useful test of our method of bloc identification. If the same procedure we have described is applied to the entire membership of the House, the proportion of roll calls in the leading cluster is higher than for either party alone in the 83d Congress, but lower in the 87th.[50] Thus in a legislature where the parties have relatively weak internal discipline, as they do in the United States Congress, the divisions within the parties can be considered as apparently comparable with the divisions between them. If we wish to speak of a "multiparty system" in Congress, we should make the necessary quantitative distinctions between the "parties."

It is also possible, conversely, for a deep legislative cleavage to cut across party lines. This possibility is illustrated in the votes of the French Radicals from 1956 to 1958. By late 1956, after the fall of the Mollet cabinet and the investiture of Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, a deep split had developed in the parlimentary party, centering about support for, and opposition to, Pierre Mendès-France. This division existed in the UDSR as well. When these two parties were scaled together, the main cluster reflected this division.[51] Of 22 roll calls under the Mollet cabinet, only one fell in the main cluster; of those under the subsequent cabinets, 58 per cent did. Within this cluster, the semi-interquartile range of p_+ was only .10. Thus this division into two blocs, while it crossed party lines and was not itself reflected in a formal division between parties, was deeper and more consistent than that between the two major parties in the U. S. House of Representatives.

We can now evaluate the propriety of scaling two or more parties together. If the investigator wishes to reveal a major bi-factional cleavage, he should study the votes of both factions together and examine the major scale cluster as an indication of the cleavage. If more than two factions combine in shifting patterns of coalition, like those of the Fourth French Republic, this method will best reveal cleavages if only two major factions or parties are studied at one time. On the other hand, if one wishes to reveal the diversity of issues that divide a legislative body, there may be advantages in studying the individual factions separately and examining their internal divisions. This might entail separate studies of individual parties or of major factions within a party. The method we have presented may make it possible to identify such factions empirically without the need of assumptions such as a geographical or historical definition of the "South."[52]

---

[49] Bloc analysis of the parties in the 81st Congress also showed the Republicans to be divided into more and smaller subgroups than the Democrats. See D. B. Truman, *The Congressional Party*, *op. cit.*

[50] The proportions of roll calls in the leading scale, if the parties are combined and the same procedures followed as for a single party, are .27 for the 83d Congress and .35 for the 87th. The division between the parties at the median p_+ appears, however, only when the dominant scale is a domestic one.

[51] Details of sampling are reported in MacRae, "Intraparty Divisions . . .," *op. cit.* The results given here differ from those in that reference in that a minimum level of $Q = .8$ was used for comparability with the Congressional data presented here.

VII. SUMMARY

The method proposed here for identifying issues and factions modifies the customary procedures of cumulative (Guttman) scaling in several ways:

(1) It searches for clusters of similar roll calls by empirical examination of pairwise relationships.

(2) Each possible pair of roll calls is evaluated for scalability in relation to a threshold value of Yule's Q-coefficient, and "errors" or departures from the scale model are thus weighted unequally. Because Q is a coefficient of association, the results are more comparable with those of factor and cluster analysis.

(3) It is no longer assumed that each scale need correspond to a single issue-continuum. Instead, the possibility of combination of issues by factional opposition is considered, and variations of issues among different ranges of p_+ may be interpreted.

(4) A non-uniform distribution of p_+ in a scale cluster is taken as a useful datum revealing factional structure, rather than simply an inconvenience in the selection of scale items.

These modifications, though not altering the scaling procedure fundamentally, serve an important purpose: to adapt it to the particular needs of legislative analysis, as against questionnaire analysis. Modification (2), which relates scale analysis more closely to other methods, may also have value in other applications.

Results from this relatively empirical method agree fairly well with those of a previous study of the 81st Congress based on an initial conceptual grouping of roll calls.

Substantive results for postwar issues in the U. S. House of Representatives, and other selected data, are presented to illustrate the utility of the method. During this period the Democratic party in the House was more consistently divided than the Republican. The degree of organization of the internal cleavages of the Democratic party increased from the 80th to the 87th Congress. Party control of the presidency and congress was related to the degree of dominance of the Democrats' major scale, but not to the Republicans', and not clearly to the general degree of organization of intra-party divisions. Particular legislative programs of individual presidents did, however, find their counterparts in the relations between scales.

In terms of the dominance of a major scale cluster, the degree of bi-factional division of a legislative body, a group of parties, or a single party may be regarded as a continuous variable. Inter-party divisions find their place on this continuum. In the House of Representatives, the inter-party division is not always dominant, as the North-South cleavage among the Democrats approaches it in degree of dominance. The division within the French Radical party and UDSR in 1956–58, however, was more completely dominant in the votes of that period than the division between the parties in the U. S. House of Representatives.

Although this empirical method gives rise to artifactual "shadow" scales duplicating others in content, additional information permits the identification of such scales. In particular, all scales or higher-order clusters found in this study, which have associations (γ) no greater than .5 with outside scales, have clearly recognizable and distinct issue content.

The Q-matrix can be analyzed without resort to the particular clustering techniques presented here. The data it contains are very close to the fourfold tables themselves. The relation between individual roll calls of interest to the investigator and major issues or bloc divisions can thus be revealed, and those that have little such relation can be studied separately.

This method has the great advantage of simplicity. It requires little more for its understanding than a knowledge of the properties of Q and γ. No knowledge of matrix algebra or multidimensional geometry is required. The method uses computers, but it is relatively easy for the user to understand completely the operations that the computer performs on the data. Some of the disadavantages of the method could undoubtedly be reduced by greater technical sophistication; however, it is presented as a useful step toward the fuller exploitation of legislative voting records.

---

[52] This is of course an aim of the Beyle-Rice method, as pointed out by D. B. Truman, *op. cit.*

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE*

JOHN F. MANLEY
Syracuse University

The House Committee on Ways and Means, according to its members, is assigned the responsibility of resolving some of the most partisan issues coming before Congress: questions of taxation, social welfare legislation, foreign trade policy, and management of a national debt which exceeds $300 billion.[1] Yet members of the Committee also contend, at the same time, that they handle most of these problems in a "responsible" way. A Republican member of Ways and Means echoed the views of his fellow Committee members when he said "it's the issues that are partisan, not the members." A Democratic member went so far as to claim that Ways and Means is "as bipartisan a committee as you have in the House." And a Treasury Department official who has worked closely with Ways and Means for several years believes that it is a

> partisan committee in the sense that you get a lot of partisan voting. But while you get a lot of party votes the members discuss the bills in a nonpartisan way. It's a very *harmonious* committee, the members work very well and harmoniously together. Sure there is partisanship but they discuss the issues in a nonpartisan way.

The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe and analyze some of the factors which affect the Ways and Means Committee's ability to process, in a bipartisan manner, political demands which its members regard as highly partisan issues. Ways and Means is neither racked by partisanship nor dominated by nonpartisanship; conflict and consensus coexist within the Committee and the balance between them varies chiefly with the nature and intensity of the external demands which are made on the Committee. Second, an attempt is made to contribute to the development of an analytical framework, based on Fenno's study of the House Appropriations Committee, which may prove useful for the comparative analysis of congressional committees generally.[2]

For analytical purposes, the Ways and Means Committee is here conceived as a political subsystem of the House of Representatives, charged by the House with a number of tasks, but in the normal course of events enjoying a high degree of operational autonomy.[3] Its primary task *vis-à-vis* the House is the resolution of political demands, many of which involve high stakes in money, power or dogma. To perform this function the Committee must solve certain problems of internal organization and interaction, and these internal problems are inextricably linked to the nature of the environmental demands which the Committee is set up to process. The Ways and Means Committee, in other words, receives from its environment, and it generates internally, demands with which it must cope if it is to maintain itself as a viable subsystem of the House.

---

* I want to thank several scholars who commented on an early version of this paper: H. Douglas Price, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Randall B. Ripley, Robert L. Peabody, Nelson W. Polsby, Frederic N. Cleaveland, James D. Barber, Leo Snowiss, Charles O. Jones, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr. I owe a special debt to David W. West, a perceptive friend and adviser who recently left the Committee's staff.

[1] This article is based on interviews conducted during 1964 with twenty of the twenty-five members of the Committee. The average interview ran 80 minutes. Questions were open-ended, no notes were taken during the interview, and all quotations are derived from notes made immediately after each interview. In addition, staff members, lobbyists, and executive department personnel were interviewed, some at great length. As a 1963–1964 Congressional Fellow I worked with Congressmen Thomas B. Curtis (R., Mo.) and Dante B. Fascell (D., Fla.), and was able to observe the Committee directly.

[2] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), pp. 310–24. Fenno's approach has been applied to two other committees. See Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Congressional Subcommittee," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 6 (November, 1962), pp. 327–44; Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, *Government of the Atom* (New York, 1963), ch. 2. Other committee studies which may serve as a basis for comparisons include Charles O. Jones, "Representation in Congress: The Case of The House Agriculture Committee," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 358–67; Robert L. Peabody, "The Enlarged Rules Committee," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., (Chicago, 1963), pp. 129–64; James A. Robinson, *The House Rules Committee* (Indianapolis, 1963); George Goodwin, "Subcommittees: The Miniature Legislatures of Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (September, 1962), pp. 596–604; Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study" this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June, 1954), pp. 340–65. See also Fenno's forthcoming book on the House Appropriations Committee, and his study of the House Education and Labor Committee, in Frank J. Munger and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *National Politics and Federal Aid to Education* (Syracuse, 1962), ch. 5.

These internal and external demands give rise to a set of decision-making norms and roles which govern intra-Committee behavior and regularize its relations with outside actors. Committee norms and roles enable it to manage three distinct but related problems: (1) problems associated with tasks (instrumental interaction); (2) problems of personal gratifications and interpersonal relations (affective interaction); and (3) problems of integration.[4] All three are affected by the type of subject matter and the external demands placed on the Committee; the internal operations of the Committee cannot be fully understood apart from the tasks which the Committee is expected to perform for the House.

The need for internal organization of a heterogeneous group poses integrative problems for the Way and Means Committee. Integration, as defined by Fenno, is

> the degree to which there is a working together or a meshing together or mutual support among roles and subgroups. Conversely, it is also defined as the degree to which a committee is able to minimize conflict among its roles and its subgroups, by heading off or resolving the conflicts that arise.[5]

Put in a somewhat different way, as Parsons notes,[6] the integration of roles depends on motivating *individual personalities* in the requisite ways. In order to stimulate the members of a group to contribute to the group's well-being and to the realization of its goals, they must be induced to share certain values and to behave in prescribed ways, either through the distribution of incentives or the application of sanctions, or both.[7] Members must, in a word, be socialized if the group is to be well integrated, and in congressional committees socialization depends on inducements.

Part I, below, deals with three interrelated variables and their relationship to Committee integration: the norm of restrained partisanship, the nature of the subject matter, and the external demands of the House. Part II considers the role of the chairman as an independent variable, describes how Chairman Mills directs the Ways and Means Committee, and offers some reasons why he operates as he does. Part III discusses the socialization process—the Committee's attractiveness, which predisposes the members to respond to socialization, and its ability to satisfy members' personal and political needs. The integration of four key roles, chairman-ranking minority member and newcomer-experienced member, is considered in Part IV. A final section offers some suggestions for comparative committee studies.

I

Minority reports by Republican members of the Ways and Means Committee and motions to recommit on the House floor frequently accompany the major bills reported by the Committee.[8] In addition, the Committee members are clearly split along general ideological lines: the Democrats now overrepresent and the Republicans underrepresent their party's support for a larger federal role.[9] These indices of partisanship do not, however, reflect a critical integrative norm which governs the behavior of members in executive session: *the norm of restrained partisanship.* In the words of one experienced staff member,

---

[3] For the general theory behind this paper see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (New York, 1962), pp. 3–44, 190–233; Talcott Parsons, "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action," in Roland Young, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, (Evanston, 1958), pp. 282–301; and Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (rev. ed., Glencoe, 1957), pp. 19–84. For discussions of functionalism see Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (December, 1959), pp. 757–72; Irving Louis Horowitz, "Sociology and Politics: The Myth of Functionalism Revisited," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 248–64; Don Martindale, ed., *Functionalism in the Social Sciences* (Philadelphia, 1965).

[4] Parsons and Shils, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–09. These problems are also dealt with in the literature on small groups. See Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 117–43; Josephine Klein, *The Study of Groups* (London, 1956), pp. 115–33; George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), pp. 319–20; Michael S. Olmstead, *The Small Group* (New York, 1959), chs. 4, 5, 6; Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, *A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making* (New York, 1964), chs. 3, 10; Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Evanston, 1953); A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, eds., *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction* (New York, 1955).

[5] Fenno, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

[6] Parsons and Shils, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 24–25.

[7] Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 139–60. Frank J. Sorauf has recently analyzed political parties from an inducement-contribution perspective;

> I think you will find that Ways and Means is a partisan committee, there are usually minority views. But partisanship is not that high when they discuss the bill and legislate. About 95 percent of the time the members deliberate the bill in a nonpartisan way, discussing the facts calmly. Then toward the end Byrnes [the ranking Republican] and the Republicans may go partisan. The things the Committee deals with are big Administration issues, so you are bound to get minority views and partisanship. But Byrnes likes to take a nonpartisan attitude toward things and it gets partisan only toward the end. On some votes they go party line but on others they don't. It all depends on the issue.

A couple of Committee members feel that Ways and Means decides most issues on a partisan basis, but the preponderant view is that of a Democrat who declared that "most of the time we go along up to a certain point and then a sharp party vote will come. On the tax bill [Revenue Act of 1964] we went along for a long time without party votes, working very well, then the Republicans lined up at the end against it. There's very little partisanship up to a point, when the political factors come in, and then a partisan vote comes."[10] Or a Republican who said "we try to write the best legislation we can in a nonpartisan way—more so than any other committee. We work in a nonpartisan way. Sure there are philosophical differences but they never become the partisan legislative fighting that they do on other committees."

The norm of restrained partisanship means that members should not allow partisanship to interfere with a thorough study and complete understanding of the technical complexities of the bills they consider. Members have a bipartisan responsibility to the House and to the nation to write sound legislation. They may disagree over what decisions the Committee ought finally to make but there is a firmly rooted consensus on *how* they ought to go about making them. Several variables affect the norm of restrained partisanship but two of them are of prime importance: (1) the nature of the Committee's subject matter; (2) the relationship between the House and the Committee.

(1) Working in a "responsible" way is valued highly by members of the Ways and Means Committee, and by "responsible" they mean being "conscientious," "thorough," "careful," and "studious." They emphasize the extreme complexity and national significance of the Committee's subject matter and this realiza-

---

see his *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston, 1964), pp. 81–97.

[8] *E.g.*, U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. No. 1761, *Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958*, pp. 55–87. *Congressional Record*, June 11, 1958, Vol. 104, pp. 10881–82. Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. No. 1818, *Trade Expansion Act of 1962*, pp. 83–104. *Congressional Record*, June 28, 1962, Vol. 108, pp. 12089–90. Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. No. 1447, *Revenue Act of* 1962, pp. B1–B28. *Congressional Record*, March 29, 1962, Vol. 108, pp. 5431–32. Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. No. 749, *Revenue Act of 1963*, pp. C1–C28. *Congressional Record*, September 25, 1963, Vol. 109, pp. 18118–19.

[9] During the 87th Congress the Democratic members of the Committee averaged 81 percent on Congressional Quarterly's index of support for a larger federal role; the Republicans averaged 17 percent. A comparable disparity, 85 percent to 27 percent, shows up during the 88th Congress. Moreover, in both congresses the Democrats and Republicans on Ways and Means now appear to be more "liberal" and less "liberal," respectively, than the rest of their party colleagues. Data compiled from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, December 28, 1962, pp. 2290–95; October 23, 1964, pp. 2549–53. This may not have been true in earlier years.

[10] This was confirmed by the Committee's ranking Republican member, John Byrnes, in the debate over the 1964 Revenue Act: "We tried to come up with as good a bill as we could. And I say to the Speaker it was not done on a partisan basis —and that has been confirmed by the chairman. It was done on a bipartisan basis, up until the last few days. When they had almost all the drafting completed and perfected, then they said, 'Now we don't need your help any more, boys; we will put the steamroller to work.' But up until then it was on a bipartisan basis." *Congressional Record*, September 25, 1963, Vol. 109, p. 18113. Contrast this with E. E. Schattschneider's account, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York, 1935), of the making of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1929–30.

tion inclines them to constrain partisanship. "We deal with the most complicated, technical subject in the Congress, in the country for that matter, we have to be thorough on Ways and Means," according to a Democrat; a Republican said simply "you just don't mess around with taxes, it can create millionaires or paupers." All the members realize that they have to be responsible, another Democrat contended, and "this means that we don't do things on the basis of partisan or political advantage. We can reach a general consensus. Sometimes what a Republican will offer will be accepted by unanimous consent." A Republican who described the ideal GOP member in terms which made him certain to be in conflict with the Democratic members of the Committee paradoxically added that "partisanship is not too high on Ways and Means—taxes, trade, and social security should not be settled on a partisan basis."

Both partisan and nonpartisan tendencies permeate the Ways and Means Committee and are reflected in the Committee's operating style.

Those members who attend the protracted meetings go through a laborious process of illuminating the implications of arcane tax, tariff, debt and social security proposals. They are assisted by experts from the executive agencies, the House Legislative Counsel's Office, the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, and at times by employees of the Library of Congress. Legislation is pondered line by line. When the Committee makes a decision it is translated into technical language by the experts ("technicians") and brought back to the Committee for final approval. The decision-making style varies somewhat from issue to issue but in general it is marked by caution, methodical repetition, and, most important, restrained partisanship.[11] "We get together and go through things as twenty five Americans all trying to do what's for the public good. It's even rare for a bill to be reported out by a 15-10 vote."

But the internal relations of the Ways and Means Committee are not devoid of partisan political or personal disputes. Restrained partisanship is the widely accepted norm governing the Committee's day-to-day operations and it does dampen partisanship and promote integration. It also, on occasion, breaks down. Not all Committee decisions are made in the full Committee meetings. Republican members frequently caucus in order to develop a united front on key pieces of legislation and party line splits are not as rare as some members imply.[12] The norm of restrained partisanship does not stifle all dissension. A Democrat, for example, complained that the "Republicans sit there in Committee, vote for things, let things go by without saying anything, and then come out on the floor with motions to recommit, simply to surprise the Democrats." Personal feuds also erupt from time to time. On the whole, however, the Committee feels that the complex political demands which it must settle are of national importance and should be handled so far as possible on their merits.[13]

(2) Virtually all the major bills reported to the House by the Ways and Means Committee are considered under a closed rule which precludes all floor amendments unless they are first accepted by the Committee. There is no lack of protest against this so-called "gag" rule but many members of the Committee and of the House argue that it saves the members from themselves.[14] Tax and tariff bills are so

---

[11] Protests about the Committee's procedure are quite rare, but see the minority views on a 1955 bill extending corporate and excise tax rates in which the Republicans complained about the way a tax credit was "rammed" through the Committee. Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. No. 69, *Revenue Act of 1955*, pp. 36–38.

[12] For a discussion of recent party battles fought on the floor over Ways and Means bills see Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (September, 1964), pp. 570–74.

[13] The subject matter of Ways and Means appears to be essentially different from that of the House Education and Labor Committee, at least during recent years. Education and Labor must resolve basic ideological issues whose emotional content has been higher than the issues coming before Ways and Means. For a discussion of the influence of jurisdiction on Education and Labor, see Munger and Fenno, *op. cit.*, pp. 109–12.

[14] From 1955–1965, forty-seven bills were debated under closed rules, nine under open or modified open rules, and the rest (over 350 bills) under unanimous consent or suspension of the rules. A typical statement was made by Representative Howard W. Smith in the 1955 fight over a closed rule for the Trade Act: "Mr. Speaker, I recognize the difficulty of many Members of the House on this bill; we all have our own problems in our own districts, but this is a question that affects the whole country. . . . It has been recognized ever since I have been on the Rules Committee that bills of this type should be

"sensitive" and "complex" that the House insulates itself from the demands of pressure groups by channeling the pressure into the committee stage of the process. On the few occasions when Ways and Means bills have been considered under open rules, one veteran Democrat claimed, "you had chaos."[15]

Members of the Ways and Means Committee are induced to follow the norm of restrained partisanship when they mark up a bill because of the autonomy which the closed rule gives to the Committee. A Republican, for example, expressed the common view that,

> On our Committee we have a responsibility to the House, we have to do the best job we can... The closed rule prevents amendments and changes so we have to perfect the bill. Other committees can bring a bill to the floor with provisions in it they know will be taken out on the floor. Ways and Means doesn't do this, we can't do this.

One Committee member explained that "there are congressmen who have been here for years and can't understand social security. The average congressman can't understand what we deal with and you just can't open it up on the floor. We try to report well-rounded packages of legislation, the best bills we can. We compromise a lot to get a good bill we can report out. You don't report controversies just for the sake of controversy."

A House vote on whether or not to debate Ways and Means bills under a closed rule is in a sense a vote of confidence in the Committee. The Committee is widely thought to be the master of its esoteric subject matter and almost every member has a stake in maintaining this reputation. The House expects the Committee to polish its bills to near perfection technically and, perhaps more important, to make a satisfactory adjustment of the competing demands which surround Ways and Means bills. This expectation partly explains why Ways and Means is noted for time-consuming diligence, and it also buttresses the Committee's adherence to the norm of restrained partisanship. The distinctiveness of Ways and Means was expressed by one member when he said "the House is jealous of the Committee. Many members say our bills can't be amended because we know it all, we're the experts. They are jealous." One of his colleagues sounded the same note when he observed that "the House says here are a bunch of smart guys, we won't tamper too much with what they do. The Ways and Means Committee has a reputation of being a well-balanced, level-headed group and the House respects this. . . . You just can't open a tax bill on the floor. The House knows we won't pull any fast ones."

II

If the Ways and Means Committee has been able to manage internal partisan conflict more successfully than the House Education and Labor Committee—and apparently it has—this is due in no small way to the leadership style of the chairman, Wilbur D. Mills (D., Ark.).[16] With the exception of one member who denied that there is a leadership structure within Ways and Means (it is, he claimed, an "amalgamated mess"), members agree that Mills runs the Committee and runs it well.

---

considered, as a practical matter, under a closed rule. The original bill setting up this program, as I recall, and the extensions in 1953 and 1954 were considered under closed rules. Nobody seemed to object at that time; as a matter of fact, both the majority and minority members of the Ways and Means Committee came before the Rules Committee and joined in the usual request that that committee makes of the Rules Committee for a closed rule." *Congressional Record*, February 17, 1955, Vol. 101, p. 1676. On this occasion the closed rule was almost defeated; it was adopted by one vote only after Rayburn took the floor and told his colleagues that "the House on this last vote has done a most unusual and under the circumstances a very dangerous thing. . . . Only once in the history of the House in 42 years in my memory has a bill of this kind and character been considered except under a closed rule. How long it is going to take, how far afield you will go, I do not know. . . . So as an old friend to all of you, as a lover of the House of Representatives and its procedures, I ask you to vote down this amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown]." p. 1678.

[15] Closed rules do not mean that the House has no influence over the substance of bills reported by Ways and Means. Chairman Mills has a reputation for keeping his ear close to the ground and for gauging House sentiment. House demands, if they are strong enough to attract wide support, are reflected in Ways and Means bills even though no floor amendments are allowed. In order to ease passage of the 1962 Revenue Act, for example, Mills reduced the amount of the controversial investment credit from 8 percent to 7 percent. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* March 30, 1962, p. 492.

[16] Compare this description of Mills with that of Graham Barden (D., N.C.), former chairman of Education and Labor, whose leadership tended to create rather than resolve internal conflicts. Munger and Fenno, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–24.

Mills's fellow Democrats consider him "powerful," "prestigeful," "quite a guy," "clever," "fine," "subtle," "smart," "patient," "expert," "best mind on the Committee," "leader," "key man." Perhaps of greater significance for purposes of integration is that these views are shared by the Republican members. They say Mills is "very effective," "a good synthesizer," "leader," "real student," "master of tax affairs," "fair," "calm," "intelligent," "impartial," "able," "well educated," and "not arbitrary."

Mills promotes integration by treating everyone fairly. He is careful to protect the rights of the Republican members and he gives the Republicans, a former staff member claimed, "pride of authorship" in bills even though the minority members may ultimately oppose them on the floor. Constraints on participation, both in public hearings and in executive sessions, are very loose.[17] One high ranking Republican said of Mills,

> We deal with things on which Republicans and Democrats are in basic, fundamental disagreement and when you have something like this you are bound to get disagreement and minority reports. I think the major reason things don't disintegrate is Mills. Chairman Mills is very fair and reasonable. I can visualize disintegration and bickering if some of the members now ever become chairman, quite frankly, but all the time I've been on the Committee the chairmen have been reasonable men.

Mills recalls that as a boy he used to hear his father talk about the Ways and Means Committee with William A. Oldfield, an Arkansas congressman who was a member of the Committee during the 64th–70th congresses. When Mills was elected to the House he knew that Ways and Means was a choice assignment and he made an early attempt to get on it. His first try failed largely because he did not lay the proper foundation with the House leadership, but he tried again and with the leadership's support succeeded. Mills's attitude toward the Committee helps explain why he leads it as he does, always sensitive to threats to the Committee's status and prestige; but it is also a source of pride for some of the members. "You hear some criticism of Wilbur," said a Republican, "but he has a high regard for the Committee. *He takes care of it, respects it, and acts to insure its effectiveness on the floor.*" This commitment to the good of the Committee is a subtle factor in Committee integration but its presence is undeniable, even if there is no precise way to measure its importance.

For Mills, the Committee's reputation is dependent upon House acceptance of its bills. He does not like to lose and he usually avoids becoming so committed to an issue that he risks losing a bill on the floor.[18] After waiting sixteen years to become chairman he lost part of the first major bill he brought to the floor; because of his bargaining skill and willingness to compromise, members feel, he has been beaten only once since then on a bill of any consequence.[19]

Part of the reason why Mills tries to accommodate different and sometimes conflicting political demands is the internal composition of the Committee. Two or three of the Democratic members are more conservative than the rest and—before the Committee's party ratio was changed from 15–10 to 17–8 they could determine outcomes by voting with a solid Republican bloc. Conversely, one or two Republicans have been known to "go off the reservation" and vote with the Democrats.[20] Depending on the issue, Mills may have to contain Democratic defections or lure a Republican vote. His base on the Democratic side is large and firm on most issues; even if some Democrats do not attend he can get their proxies. Neither party, however, is completely monolithic on all issues. Levels of commitment vary and in a delicately balanced situation Mills proceeds cautiously to make sure that he has the votes when he needs them. Two staff members commented: "Mills really likes to get a consensus if he can and this is one of the reasons partisanship is relatively low. He lets things settle and tries for agreement. He's just like that." "It's surprising how much Mills gets his own way. He'll sit back very quiet and let the boys thrash it out, let them go at it with their paper swords. Then he'll say we ought to do this and usually that's the way it's done." Committee integration may be positively or negatively affected by the style, ability and personality of committee chairmen.

---

[17] During the hearings on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, for example, Keogh (D., N. Y.) complained about the amount of time consumed by Curtis (R., Mo.). Mills replied that the Committee would sit until Curtis was through with his interrogation. Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d sess., *Hearings on H.R. 9900, Trade Expansion Act of 1962*, II, 740. On another occasion, Mills moderated an interchange between Representative Bruce Alger (R., Texas) and James B. Carey of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. over whether or not Carey had implied that Ways and Means, by failing to pass the King-Anderson health care bill, was responsible for the death or discomfort of the aged. Mills ruled that Carey did not have to answer Alger's question but he defended Alger's right to propound such a query. Alger took pride in Mills's defense of his rights. Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 2d sess., *Hearings on H.R. 3920, Medical Care for the Aged*, IV, 1880–83.

[18] The most dramatic recent example of how a committee's subject matter can affect its behavior and success in the House was the issue of federal aid to education. See H. Douglas Price, "Schools, Scholarships, and Congressmen: The Kennedy Aid-to-Education Program," *The Centers of Power*, ed. Alan F. Westin (New York, 1964), pp. 53–105.

[19] The first bill Mills lost was a temporary unemployment compensation measure. *Congressional Record*, May 1, 1958, Vol. 104, pp. 7910–11. The second was a conference report to carry out the International Coffee Agreement, *Congressional Record*, August 18, 1964 (daily edition), pp. 19501–07.

The influence of the chairman on integration may also vary with committee structure. For example, the chairman may be a crucial factor in a committee, such as Ways and Means, that does its work in full committee rather than in subcommittees; but he may be less important or have different effects in a committee that operates through relatively autonomous subcommittees (Appropriations).

III

Political socialization is a dynamic and continuous process by which a group perpetuates its norms, values and roles.[21] It is dynamic in that the content of what is passed on changes with new problems and demands; it is continuous in that it affects both newcomers and experienced members. To the new member socialization involves exposure to and inculcation with the norms of the group. To the experienced member it consists of the maintenance of his conformity to group norms or, if he resists, tension between his values and behavior and those of the group.

Socialization depends upon the attractiveness of the group and upon its ability to regulate behavior through the allocation of positive and negative incentives.[22] Objectively measured, Ways and Means is the most attractive committee assignment in the House. John C. Eberhart compared House committees from 1914 to 1941 and found that Ways and Means had the highest prestige.[23] Similarly, Warren Miller has compared committee assignments between the 80th and 88th Congresses and Ways and Means places first.[24]

Members are attracted to Ways and Means for a variety of reasons. Most frequently mentioned are its power and prestige. Ways and Means is "tops," "the guts of government," a "real blue-ribbon committee," a "choice one." One member, who was neither especially attracted to Ways and Means nor happy with the detailed nature of the Committee's work, said you just don't leave a "blue-ribbon" committee like Ways and Means. "You just go up from Ways and Means," a Democrat said, "you don't go to another committee—Appropriations, Rules, or Interstate. You go to Senator, Governor, that sort of thing. It's a springboard and many members have gone on from it." When asked if he ever tried to shift to a different committee another Democrat replied, "are you kidding! Why leave heaven to go to hell? There's no committee in Congress, including Appropriations, that's as important as Ways and Means. Why step downward once you have reached the top?"

Group identification is high on the Ways and Means Committee and the members usually refrain from behavior that is likely to weaken the Committee's position in the House. The Committee's attractiveness buttresses the norm that outlaws such behavior. Members may disagree and they may even quarrel among themselves but, as one Democrat said, "we fight our battles in executive session and not in public." A conservative Republican member who almost never agreed with anything supported by the Democrats declared that "we keep personal things to ourselves and we stick together when someone attacks the Committee." The Committee has been criticized by its own members but this happens very rarely.[25] Every member derives satisfaction from the Committee's reputation; they are predisposed by the Committee's attractiveness to follow the ground rules of partisan battle which place rigid constraints on the ways in which disagreement is manifested.

---

[20] See the votes reported in Elizabeth J. Brenner, *The Trade Expansion Act of 1962*, Congressional Quarterly Special Report, pp. 29–30; also the close votes on key sections of the Revenue Act of 1964, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, August 23, 1963, pp. 1473–83.

[21] Compare this definition with that of Gabriel Almond who says by political socialization "we mean that all political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, and that they do this mainly by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures through which the young of the society pass in the processs of maturation. . . . Political socialization is the process of induction into the political culture." Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), p. 27.

[22] Barnard, *op. cit.*

[23] Cited in George B. Galloway, *Congress at the Crossroads* (New York, 1946), p. 90. For some critical comments on Eberhart's methodology see James A. Robinson, "Organizational and Constituency Backgrounds of the House Rules Committee," *The American Political Arena*, ed. Joseph R. Fiszman (Boston, 1962), p. 214.

[24] Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes in a forthcoming volume on representation and Congress, to be published by Prentice-Hall in 1966.

Socialization is also affected by the group's ability to offer the members positive incentives in return for approved modes of behavior. The Ways and Means Committee serves as the source of positive incentives in at least three important ways:[26] (1) affective relations inside the Committee, (2) influence in the House; and (3) relations with constituents.

(1) Unlike most other congressional committees (Senate Finance is another example), the Ways and Means Committee functions in executive sessions of the full committee, and not through subcommittees. Members meet in direct face-to-face contact for weeks at a time and this style of deliberation is accompanied by a fairly well defined set of interpersonal norms. Committee meetings are not supposed to be partisan battles; some acrimony does develop but on the whole the members feel that to be effective they must maintain decorum and act in a gentlemanly way. Bitter personal disputes erupt infrequently and even public conflicts which appear to be disruptive of interpersonal relations are often played out in a benign spirit. A Republican who found it difficult to follow these norms was "talked to" by a senior Republican and told that he was losing his effectiveness by being so adamant. If a member starts to berate another member his colleagues will try to restrain him. You "don't attack one man continually" on Ways and Means; "we spar a lot but it never gets serious." "We don't have knock-outs, maybe we are a little more clubby, more closely knit than others." Members believe that they are "responsible" men who "respect the other fellow" and who "get along pretty well with others."

These attitudes and norms help make the Committee a satisfying group to belong to. A Republican said,

> Relations with the Democrats are usually harmonious. It's like a fraternity where you have different clubs with different symbols and minor disagreements. There's a spirit of *camaraderie* that prevails. Oh, we have our differences now and then, and we jab back and forth, but it never really gets too serious. We are all concerned with how the Committee looks to outsiders and if there's a lot of bickering the Committee doesn't look good. Take Banking and Currency for example after Patman took over. He's arbitrary and the Committee's prestige has sunk way down. We know that to be an effective committee we must be reasonable.

In the words of a Democrat "everyone's a moderate . . . they screen out those members who would play for publicity and make a lot of noise. . . . " Two Democrats attributed their appointments to Ways and Means to personal characteristics of their rivals as aspirants, One of these "went off half-cocked," was "controversial" and not "well-liked"; the other was "compulsive" and he would not be right for Ways and Means where members have to "contain" themselves. Another member said plainly, "we don't want any screwballs and since I've been a member we haven't had any screwballs. These men are pretty carefully selected, you know, so you don't get radicals."[27] "Comparing Ways and Means with my former committees, and with other committees I know of, there is a spirit of cooperation between Republicans and Democrats. We are members of the 'club' now."

---

[25] The Committee was reluctantly criticized by a Republican member in 1955 for rushing through H.R. 1, the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act, without giving the members time to study it or propose amendments. *Congressional Record*, February 18, 1955, Vol. 101, pp. 1743–44.

[26] March and Simon contend that the stronger the individual's identification with a group, the more likely his goals will conform to his perception of group norms. They identify five factors which affect group identification: (1) prestige; (2) perception of shared goals; (3) satisfaction of individual needs; (4) frequency of interaction; and (5) degree of competition between group and individual. In this paper I deal with the first three of these. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1958), pp. 65–66.

[27] The same man, a Democrat, explained his election to Ways and Means in these words: "No one wanted to go much farther north . . . for fear of running into a radical liberal, and no one wanted to go much further south for fear of running into an extreme conservative, so they picked me. They wanted a moderate liberal and a liberal moderate and I fit the bill."

Personal traits are not the only consideration in the recruitment process to Ways and Means. Seniority, region, and policy orientation are important and, in many cases, decisive. When these criteria are not of overriding importance, or when more than one contestant meets them, a popular man who is "responsible" has an edge over someone who has made enemies, especially on the Democratic side where Ways and Means members are elected by a vote of all Democratic members of the House; and objective reasons can usually be found to rationalize affective predilections. These informal recruitment criteria and norms of behavior combine with the Committee's attractiveness to produce men who are inclined to follow group norms, to value harmony, and to promote integration. Members prefer to disagree amicably if they can; they feel more comfortable in a low-tension environment and they realize that to protect the Committee's status as the "queen committee" they must manage partisan dissension in a non-destructive way.

As indicated above, partisan considerations and policy orientation are important factors in determining contests over seats on the Ways and Means Committee. In 1963, for example, Phil Landrum of Georgia was denied a seat on Ways and Means largely because he was considered to be too conservative by his Democratic colleagues in the House. Landrum was elected to Ways and Means in 1965 after demonstrating more liberal inclinations by, among other things, guiding the poverty bill through the House.[28] Republicans, on the other hand, want men on Ways and Means who "all fall within pretty much the same general philosophical area" and who will "go down the line" for the party.

(2) Membership on the Ways and Means Commitee makes one a member of the House elite. Ways and Means members share in the Committee's prestige and, at a more practical level, they are in a good position to accumulate political credits with their colleagues. All congressmen, at one time or another, are concerned with problems that relate to taxes, social security or trade. On swapping favors one Committee member explained,

> Hell, I'm always being approached by members. It's important, you know. I might go to a member of Public Works once in ten years but they seek my assistance all of the time. Same with all the members of Ways and Means. . . . When I need a favor I can always call on Republicans whom I have helped on Ways and Means bills.

Democrats on Ways and Means have a unique source of influence because of their control over assignments to other committees.[29] Committee assignments in a political system whose life revolves around committees are of major concern to every member of the House. The Ways and Means members normally enjoy—with the exception of assignments to the Rules Committee, which are of special interest to party leaders—a high degree of influence in making appointments. The committee-on-committees function increases their contacts with members from their zone. Newly elected congressmen are indebted to them from the first day they arrive and, as a member moves up the committee hierarchy, he is continually dependent on his representative on Ways and Means.[30] "They call you 'Mr.' and 'Sir' when you are on the committee on committees," one member said. House members "look up to me"; a third member said "*they* come to you and that's very important. Members are always coming to me for things and when I go to them, boy they remember."

In short, the members of Ways and Means stand above many of their peers in the House and they associate this preeminence with the Committee. They are, therefore, induced to follow the norms which insure the continuation of the Committee's stature: restrained partisanship, responsible law making, and reasonable behavior.

---

[28] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 18, 1963, p. 46. Landrum's growing liberal tendencies are reflected in his scores on the federal role index: 86th Congress, 33 percent support for a larger role; 87th Congress, 61 percent; 88th Congress, 80 percent. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, XVI, 1960, p. 136; footnote 9, *supra*.

[29] On the Committee on Committees see Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (Washington, 1963), pp. 183–212; also Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 345–57.

[30] A "latent function" of the Committee on Committees was evident on the 1963 tax bill, when Mills used the 15 members to help get the bill through the House. Ripley, *op. cit.*, p. 570. Members sometimes take soundings for Mills and act as an informal whip system of their own. As one member remarked, "If I can support it in Committee and on the floor then they [members from his zone] can support it too." When asked what he could do if they did not vote as he did on a Ways and Means bill he added, "Well, I suppose if it were [a senior member] I couldn't do very much, but if it were some new member who didn't have a prime committee yet I could do something."

(3) Most members of the Ways and Means Committee find the Committee a good place from which to satisfy constituent demands. Not every member believes that he can serve his constituents better from Ways and Means than he could from any other House committee, but several do. Moreover, no member's district is so intimately dependent on a committee other than Ways and Means that he risks electoral defeat simply because of his committee assignment.[31] Few members would disagree with a newly appointed member, Dan Rostenkowski (D., Ill.), who told his constituents in a newsletter,

> This has been a wonderful year for me. In May I was selected to fill a vacancy on the House Ways and Means Committee. As this is the Committee on Committees, appointment must be made by a vote of the Democratic members of the House, and I am proud to say that I was unanimously chosen by my colleagues. . . . This is the most important committee in the House. . . . It is a most interesting assignment, but more important, it places me in a position whereby I can be more effective in assisting you with your needs, both personal and legislative.[32]

Intensive bargaining surrounds the myriad parts of a major Ways and Means bill and it is often possible for a member to promote or protect constituent interests by letting it be known that he will support a position unfavorable to the Administration. Executive department representatives may even try to lure Republican support, as evidenced by the late Howard Baker's success in getting one of his favorite proposals included in the Revenue Act of 1964.[33] "You know, you can really do things for your constituents on the Committee. Boy, if you are a horse-trader you can really move. Exports, imports, that sort of thing."

Major legislation is not the only opportunity for serving one's constituents and friends. Ways and Means also processes so-called "members' bills," which are perhaps the best examples of bipartisan cooperation on the Committee. A member's bill is supposed to be a minor piece of legislation that ameliorates the impact of some small feature in the tax laws or makes some "technical" improvement in other laws that come under the Committee's jurisdiction; it is regarded as a "little" thing, of no special interest to anyone other than the Committee member who introduced it.[34]

From time to time during the course of a Congress, Committee members are asked to list in the order of their preference (or chance of passage) those bills which they would like the Committee to consider during "members' bill time." Every member is given the opportunity to call up a bill or bills, depending on how many times they go around the table. If he can get the unanimous consent of his colleagues, his bill will be reported to the House, called up on the House floor by unanimous consent or suspension of the rules, and usually passed without objection.

On April 30, 1964, Chairman Mills stood on the floor of the House and asked unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of twelve members' bills.[35] Eleven of these bills were passed by voice vote and one, H.R. 4198 introduced by Representative Shelley (D., Calif.), was defeated when another non-Ways and Means member, Matsunaga (D., Hawaii), objected. H.R. 4198 provided for the free importation of soluble and instant coffee and Matsunaga thought that before it was passed the Hawaiian coffee industry should be consulted. Mills had also intended to call up a bill introduced by Hale Boggs (D., La.), the third ranking Democrat on Ways and Means, but another member of the Committee, Thomas B. Curtis (R., Mo.), prevented it by indicating to Mills that he would object.

---

[31] Joel Broyhill, appointed to the Committee in 1964, was thought to be running a grave risk in leaving the District of Columbia Committee and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee because many of his Virginia constituents are government employees who work in the District. Broyhill met the issue head-on by stressing the importance and prestige of Ways and Means and he was re-elected, albeit with a somewhat smaller percentage of the vote than he received in 1962. *Washington Post*, October 3, 1964, p. B2. He was reappointed to the District Committee in 1965 without having to yield his seat on Ways and Means, notwithstanding the general rule that membership on the latter is "exclusive."

[32] Dan Rostenkowski, "Washington Report," July 20, 1964, p. 2. Congressman George M. Rhodes (D., Pa.), shortly after he was elected to Ways and Means, could take credit for two amendments to a social security bill which were of interest to his constituents. "A Report from Congressman George M. Rhodes," July 16, 1964, p. 1.

[33] For an explanation of this provision see Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. No. 749, *Revenue Act of 1963*, pp. 45–47. It allowed the exclusion from gross income of a limited amount of capital gain received from the sale or exchange of a personal residence by a person 65 years old or over.

[34] Typical members' bills alter the tariff on brooms made of broom corn, provide a credit or refund of self-employment taxes in certain cases, allow the free importation of spectrometers for universities, provide tax-exempt status for non-profit nurses' professional registries, continue the suspension of duties for metal scrap, etc.

[35] *Congressional Record*, April 30, 1964 (daily ed.), pp. 9397–9410. Mills also tried to get S. Con. Res. 19 which expressed the sense of Congress that bourbon whiskey is a distinctive product of the United States and that no imported whiskey

Of the eleven bills passed at this time, four were introduced by non-members of Ways and Means. The Committee reported these bills as favors to them. Two of the remaining seven were introduced by Republican members of Ways and Means, and five by Democratic members.[36] All twelve were reported unanimously by the Committee and most were supported actively on the floor by the ranking Republican member, John Byrnes (Wis.).

A member's bill may be killed by another member of the Committee, as in the case of the Boggs bill, or it may be killed or postponed by other members of the House, as illustrated by Matsunaga's objection to H.R. 4198. Not every member's bill becomes law. But many do. If influence in the House is defined as the ability to accumulate credits and dispense them with skill then the members of the Ways and Means Committee, if they stick together, are in a good position to exert influence and satisfy the demands of their constituents and friends.[37] Favors that are "little" in the sum total of things are often large to individual congressmen, and when small favors like these are dispensed over a period of years they amount to a considerable fund of credit on which the Committee (and its Chairman) may draw if the need arises. Ways and Means reports and passes a relative handful of major bills; it processes dozens of noncontroversial members' bills. When the Committee "cashes in its chips" to pass a major bill the chips are members' bills and other favors which it performs for members of the House.

Members' bills are important benefits which members of both parties enjoy by virtue of their membership on the Committee. They help satisfy the members' need to meet some of demands of their constituents; and they induce the members to cooperate with one another to this end. The continued success of members' bills depends on the Committee's relations with the House. Members' bills are positive incentives which emanate from the Committee and by helping to promote the members' interests they promote integration.

IV

Committee integration is also affected by the hierarchy of status and role which exists within the group. Members of the Ways and Means Committee play different roles and if the Committee is to be well integrated these roles must be legitimized and ordered.[38] Two sets of roles are of special significance: chairman and ranking minority member, and experienced member-newcomer.

The relationship between the chairman and the ranking minority member is a potential source of conflict in the Committee. Mills, who was elected to the Committee in 1942, has been chairman since 1958. John Byrnes of Wisconsin has 18 years' experience on Ways and Means and has been the ranking Republican member since 1963.[39] Their roles set limits to the degree of cooperation between them and they frequently oppose one another on key policy matters, both within the Committee and on the House floor. There is, however, a good deal of cooperation and mutual respect between them.

---

should be labeled "bourbon" passed at this time, but John Lindsay (R., N.Y.) objected on behalf of two female constituents whose income came from a small distillery in Mexico. Sober heads prevailed and the resolution passed the House later.

[36] On December 18, 1963, the Committee similarly announced its intention to report 32 members' bills. Seven of them were introduced by non-members, 17 by Democratic members, and 8 by Republican members.

[37] For discussions of bargaining see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1963), chs. 12, 13; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *People and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, 1962), pp. 53–58; Robert L. Peabody, "Organization Theory and Legislative Behavior: Bargaining, Hierarchy and Change in the U. S. House of Representatives," a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 4–7, 1963.

[38] Parsons and Shils, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 203; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962), pp. 7–28.

[39] Several people associated with the Committee stated that Mills and Byrnes played prominent leadership roles even before they formally became chairman and ranking minority member.

Both men realize that their positions may be reversed some day and they therefore cooperate on most procedural and some substantive matters.

When the Ways and Means Committee comes to the House floor with a major bill it is often the quintessence of party conflict in the House. But the easy fraternization between Mills and Byrnes even at the height of floor battles is indicative of the spirit within which the Committee has performed its day-to-day labors.

Mills and Byrnes have jointly sponsored legislation which is referred to Ways and Means and they have collaborated on certain kinds of bills on the floor.[40] One staff member described the two men in these words,

> Mills calls the shots, he runs the show. If a member would like a Committee meeting next Monday, for example, he'd have to get Mills to call it. Every once in a while Mills is questioned about hearings and witnesses but he's very good about it. He discusses these things with Byrnes. The hearings last fall [1963] on beer concentrate were Byrnes's doing. He wanted them, so he and Mills arranged a date. It's quite informal. Mills and Byrnes are good friends. *In many ways they are very similar. Both are dedicated and have no outside life—no hobbies, never take vacations. The Committee is their life. They take work home. They remind me of guys working in a factory who punch in and out, go home and wait for the next work day to begin.*

Members of both parties are "safe" on critical issues and they are, therefore, bound to be opposed on some things. The disintegrative effect of this built-in partisanship is tempered, however, by the tendency of newly elected partisans to accept subordinate roles within the Committee until they become familiar with the subject matter and are accustomed to Committee procedure.

The apprentice role is firmly established on Ways and Means and the new member who wants to be effective does not (even if he could) try to match wits with his more experienced colleagues. This is due in part to the Committee's complex subject matter. One veteran member said that "when I first went on the Committee I used to leave the meetings with a headache, truly a headache! The stuff was just over my head. I just kept plugging along and gradually you catch on. The things we deal with are so complex!" "Detail and technical, oh there's so much detail and it's so technical! You have to take work home and study. Everything is complicated now. Social security has become complicated, tax and tariff too." A junior Democrat added,

> Leadership is pretty constant. The men who sit at the head of the table naturally lead the Committee. They are knowledgeable and have been around a long time. . . . Now that doesn't mean that if I have a question I can't get my oar in. There's no problem about that. But leadership is as you go up the ladder. Neither ———— nor I will ever be fire-balls on the Committee; we are too old.

Or a junior Republican,

> Byrnes and Curtis are real students, are experienced, and know more about it. They *should* lead the Committee. Yesterday, for example, I could have spoken on the Renegotiation Act but I am quite content to let Byrnes and Curtis handle it. They are the experts. I'd tell a new member to get familiar with the four or five major things the Committee deals with. To study hard.

"Jennings is a smart member and Martha Griffiths shows a lot of potential. But we are all learners and beginners, the older members are the ones we listen to." "You have to learn," a Republican said, "and I want to learn. It would be resented if I tried to talk too much or overdid it. . . . So keep your damn big mouth shut a while. If I tried to talk a lot it would be resented, while it wouldn't for an older member."

Newcomers to Ways and Means are expected to "attend religiously, study hard, and pay attention to what the experts are saying." And the "experts" are the experienced members. A new member may participate right away but it is a fundamentally different kind of activity from that of the senior members.[41] Junior members are neither muzzled nor immobilized; they exist in a state of animated quiescence until they have absorbed enough information to make meaningful contributions to the policy discussion.

Friendly and cooperative relations between the chairman and the ranking minority member, plus well established norms of deference governing the degree and kind of participation by senior and junior members, constitute a system of decision-making which is marked by restrained partisanship. During their apprentice period the behavior of new partisans is controlled by the impossiblity of rapidly accumulating expertise in the Committee's subject matter. They are exposed to the norms of the group; they soon detect the Committee's leaders; and they learn how to become effective members.

---

[40] See H.R. 12545 and 12546, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964. These bills concern the relative priority of federal tax liens over the interests of other creditors. In addition to their cooperation on members' bills see the debate on H.R. 11865, the 1964 Social Security Amendments, *Congressional Record*, July 29, 1964 (daily ed.), p. 16680.

[41] The role of apprentice on the Ways and Means Committee contrasts sharply with the Education and Labor Committee, where newcomers are expected to play a major part immediately. Munger and Fenno, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

The socialization process is not perfect on Ways and Means but in terms of its ability to negate the influence of divisive partisan factors it compares favorably in recent years[42] with some other committees, most notably the House Education and Labor Committee. It is doubtful if any amount of incentives derived from the Committee, or any number of years experience on the Committee, could result in the total integration of dedicated conservatives like James Utt or committed liberals like George Rhodes, but not even the most ideologically oriented members are immune from the group pressures to restrain partisanship, to articulate dissension in certain ways and not in others, and to contribute to the perpetuation of the Committee as the number one committee in the House.

* * *

The major differences in emphasis between Fenno's approach and the one adopted here are that I have stressed the influence of external House demands on the internal operations of the Committee, taken the role of chairman as an independent variable of prime importance to the Ways and Means Committee, considered socialization as a blend of attractiveness and inducements, and attempted a linkage between Parsons's focus on integration and Barnard's stress on inducements. Whatever the approach, it is clear that the inner life of congressional committees, a hitherto little explored part of of the workings of Congress, deserves the attention of political scientists as a way of increasing our knowledge about legislative behavior and explaining why Congress accepts or rejects the recommendations of its "little legislatures."

---

[42] The importance of time and chairmen becomes clear when one compares the conflict-ridden way the Committee handled the excess profits tax in 1950 with its relatively pacific handling of both the 1962 and 1964 Revenue Acts. For the 1950 bill see Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel, *Congress at Work* (New York, 1952), pp. 350–52.

JACKSON'S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: AN EXPLORATION IN VALUE ANALYSIS*

GLENDON SCHUBERT
Michigan State University

Robert H. Jackson died more than a decade ago, and his departure from the Supreme Court marked the end of an era in American judicial politics, since he left behind as a minority those remaining of the colleagues who had joined with him to compose the so-called Roosevelt Court.[1] He was still very much alive when I interviewed him shortly after the *Steel Seizure* decision in 1952, and subsequently when the initial stages of the present research were designed and carried out. His unanticipated and fatal heart attack had two incidental consequences that are relevant here: it fixed an unavoidable natural closure for the data—his activities–that I was studying, and at the same time imposed an insurmountable foreclosure upon one of my research ambitions. For the best way to validate generalizations about a man's attitudinal predispositions and belief systems is to check them as predictions against his future behavior; social scientists understandably repose lesser confidence in findings about hypotheses that can be validated only statistically, and then only by retrospective testing. Perhaps it was an error, therefore, not to have switched from Jackson to some other justice as a subject; but even one who chose a younger justice (such as Arthur Goldberg) might have guessed wrongly about his tenure, and Jackson's career did offer several unusual advantages—for reasons that will be explained shortly—which it seemed important to exploit. This is a sector of political research in which relatively little has been done, and it is possible that the theory and methods employed here may be useful to others in the study of political values. The substantive findings are confined to a single individual; but nothing in the theory and methodology bears any unique relationship to Jackson—or to judges, for that matter. They can be used to analyze the attitudes of other types of political decision-makers who make observable choices with which are associated verbal rationales that are or can be systematically recorded in a reproducible form.

The data for this study include all the three-hundred-odd opinions that Robert Jackson wrote as a Supreme Court justice, and all his votes in the more than a thousand formal non-unanimous decisions in which he participated. His opinions have been classified by type and analyzed for their value content, using correlational, cluster, and factorial methods; and his votes studied by cumulative scaling. These materials, so analyzed, make it possible to test several hypotheses, primarily by intercorrelating his values, and by correlating his values with his votes and the types of opinions in which they were articulated.

There is no dearth of what evidently is impressionistic literature on the subject of judicial attitudes. The law reviews, and to a lesser extent the political science journals, frequently carry discussions of the imputed attitudes of individual judges—and especially, of justices of the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, these discussions customarily are based upon an analysis of judicial opinions; and Jackson has not been neglected by the legal commentators or the judicial biographers.[2] Some of

---

* This research has been assisted by the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society; the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; the Institute of Advanced Projects of the East-West Center, and the Computer Center, both of the University of Hawaii; and especially by various research facilities of Michigan State University. Individuals to whom special acknowledgment is due include Frank A. Pinner, Frank Sim, and Norman Luttbeg, all formerly associated with the Bureau for Social and Political Research; George Kantrowitz, Steighton J. Watts, and James E. Holton, all formerly graduate students in political science at Michigan State University; and David Danelski of Yale University, who read and commented on the paper.

[1] C. Herman Pritchett, *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947* (New York, 1948).

[2] *E.g.*, Vincent L. Barnett, "Mr. Justice Jackson and the Supreme Court," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 1 (1948), pp. 233–242; Charles Fairman, "Robert H. Jackson: Associate Justice of the Supreme Court," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 55 (1955), pp. 445–487; Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Jackson," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 68 (1955), pp. 937–939; Eugene C. Gerhart, "A Decade of Mr. Justice Jackson," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 28 (1953), pp. 927–974, and *America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1958); Louis L. Jaffe, "Mr.

them—notably Jaffe and Nielson—have purported to discuss the essence of Jackson's philosophy as a judge; but the essences they find are not in agreement. The typical conclusion has been that it is futile to attempt to discover any systematic structuring of attitudes for Jackson. Weidner, for instance, warns:

> The most striking feature of Justice Jackson's judicial philosophy is that it can only with great difficulty be made to conform to any of the neat and currently-popular classifications of Supreme Court justices. . . . The way out is to abandon attempts to squeeze the justices into these deceptively precise categories. . . . The classification of Supreme Court justices as advocates of either judicial activism or judicial restraint, and the use of statistical devices to facilitate the process, can be a helpful approach to some problems of constitutional law. But it is inadequate to the task of determining the judicial philosophy of a particular justice. Jackson, for one, cannot be so readily pigeonholed.[3]

In similar although less dogmatic vein, Barnett remarks that "in striving to associate Jackson's views with some doctrine or set of doctrines which will neatly explain them all, one is beset with difficulties."[4] And even Pritchett—whom Weidner evidently had in mind as the only previous commentator who attempted to make some use of quantification in guiding his appraisal of Jackson—concludes that his own "figures, however, average out a certain unpredictability in Jackson's votes."[5] In a subsequent attempt at a summing up, Pritchett adds that "the rather erratic nature of his opinions ma[kes] it difficult to catalogue him. . . . The unpredictability of Jackson's performance leads one to question whether he has developed any systematic theories about civil liberties or the judicial function."[6]

In this state of our knowledge, Jackson appears to be a particularly appropriate subject for a study by behavioral methods. Perhaps at least in this instance any substantive findings that emerge will not be open to the usual rhetorical charge that all the elaborate paraphernalia serve only to confirm what already is known by prudent men of common sense.

I. THE DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

Jackson participated in the decisions of the Supreme Court for a total of twelve terms: 1941–44 and 1946–53.[7] During this period, he wrote 138 institutional opinions (for the Court), 51 concurring opinions, and 113 dissenting opinions. He also wrote 4 opinions, consisting either of jurisdictional dissents, or of memorandum opinions in his *ex officio* capacity of supervising Justice for the Second Circuit, that are included for some purposes in the analysis below. In addition, he wrote 16 opinions that are here scored as nulls, since his discussion is limited to statements of facts without value-preferences indicated. Eight other opinions were jointly written by Jackson and various other justices. These 24 opinions have been excluded completely from analysis in the present study.[8] My principal data for present purposes consist, therefore, of the decisions in the cases to which 306 opinions authored by Jackson relate;[9] and my primary focus is upon his opinions and votes in these decisions.

The Variables. The data were analyzed in terms of four sets of variables, which I shall call "content variables," "opinion variables," "voting variables," and "chronological variables."

The identification of the content variables[10]

Justice Jackson," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 68 (1955), pp. 940–948; James A. Nielson, "Robert H. Jackson: the Middle Ground," *Louisiana Law Review*, Vol. 6 (1945), pp. 381–405; Robert J. Steamer, *The Constitutional Doctrines of Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson* (Cornell University, Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science, 1954; University Microfilms No. 9802); Symposium, "Justice Robert H. Jackson," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 8 (1955), pp. 1–59; and Paul A. Weidner, "Justice Jackson and the Judicial Function," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 53 (1955), pp. 567–594.

[3] Weidner, *op. cit.*, pp. 593–594.

[4] Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

[5] Pritchett, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

[6] C. Herman Pritchett, *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 18, 228–229.

[7] Jackson was on leave of absence from the Court throughout the 1945 Term, acting in the role of United States Chief Counsel in the Nuremberg war crimes trials. See Whitney R. Harris, *Tyranny on Trial* (Dallas, Tex., Southern Methodist University, 1954). Only six months before his death, in his introduction to this book, Jackson wrote that "the hard months at Nuremberg were well spent in the most important, enduring and constructive work of my life."

[8] For a list of Jackson's opinions, which contains some omissions and duplications but which corresponds closely to the independently compiled list used in the present study, see the *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 8 (1955), pp. 60–71.

[9] Jackson wrote both the majority opinion and a separate concurring opinion in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 574 (1949).

[10] For other recent discussions and examples of

was based on an analysis of all of Jackson's opinions. A panel of three judges—two graduate students and myself—read and scored independently each opinion for the presence of any of a set of 33 substantive categories. I had first constructed a code which defined these content categories on the basis of a preliminary examination of about 20 per cent of the total of Jackson's opinions. This code was to some extent modified in the process of analyzing the complete array of cases—which required, of course, reevaluation of some opinions. Any instances of disagreement in scoring were discussed among the panel of judges until a consensual judgment was reached. Subsequent research in political attitudes and ideologies[11] indicates that the attitudinal dimensions relevant to Supreme Court behavior are considerably broader and more heterogeneous—and consequently fewer in number—than I had assumed at the time the present project was begun.

Conceptually, each of these variables represented a continuous attitudinal dimension for Jackson, but the method of classifying the data had the effect of treating each variable as though it were dichotomous. Each variable was directionally defined, and Jackson might make a statement either in affirmation or in negation of the variable; henceforth I shall use the term "value" to refer to either of the two directional meanings (positive or negative) that are associated with each variable.[12] The coding rules required that such statements be in normative form, and not merely factual assertions. (For example, if Jackson said that a defendant in a state criminal case had confessed during a period of extended interrogation while he was being held *incommunicado* by the police, the content analyst left such a remark unscored, as a factual assertion; but if Jackson said that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to convict a defendant on the basis of a coerced confession—and irrespective of whether he thought that this had happened on the facts in that particular case—such a statement was scored as agreement with the positive value of the second variable: "freedom from state restraint of civil liberty." It was also possible, and not uncommon, for Jackson to agree with both the affirmative and the negative value of the same variable in a single opinion; in such cases, the variable was scored as ambivalent for that opinion.) Since most variables were not discussed (at least, normatively) in most opinions, scoring as "absent" was most common. It is the joint occurrence of content values (scored as either affirmative or negative) that is of interest in the analysis below.

Some of the initial set of 33 content categories turned out to be univalued, and therefore of little help in making correlational analyses; others appeared to have neither a logical nor a psychological bearing upon Jackson's voting behavior. An example of one of the original categories which was both univalued (in effect, with marginals of 67 pro and 4 con) and nonfunctional (in relationship to voting) was judicial CANDOR, a subject upon which Jackson often exhorted his colleagues in normative terms and criticized them in factual propositions of which the following are typical:

> Justice "X" [frequently Murphy or Black] is not (but should be) candid; the majority in this case are not candid; etc.
>
> The Supreme Court should not overrule precedents *sub silentio,* but should come right out and say what it is doing.
>
> The Supreme Court should not proceed by indirection.
>
> The Supreme Court should not indulge in legal fictions; the Court ought not to sponsor myths concerning judicial behavior.
>
> Supreme Court justices should articulate their major premises; the Court should practice what it preaches.
>
> The Court has [deliberately] sublimated the conflict underlying the instant case.
>
> The lower court in this case was more candid than is the Supreme Court [by pointing out that ghost writing flourishes in official circles in Washington].

Accordingly, the original list of 33 categories was later reduced to 13, in part by eliminating from further consideration the merely verbal (as I came to deem them) ones such as candor.

---

content analysis, see Robert C. North *et al.*, *Content Analysis* (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1963); and Fred Kort, "Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law," and Glendon Schubert, "Civilian Control and Stare Decisis in the Warren Court," both in G. Schubert, ed., *Judicial Decision-Making* (New York, 1963), pp. 133–197, and 55–77.

[11] *E.g.*, Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 27–45; Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York, 1962); Glendon Schubert, *The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963* (Evanston, Ill., 1965).

[12] "Variable" denotes the content category; the name (or symbol, or short title) of the variable in apposition with a valence symbol (+ or −) or phrase ("positive value" or "negative value") denotes the affective meaning of a particular stimulus or response set.

Other categories were combined; for example, among the six initial categories ultimately combined to form the variable "Supreme Court policy-making," is STARE DECISIS, which for Jackson was markedly bivalent. The positive value characteristically would take this form of utterance:

> A justice should follow a precedent with which he disagrees until a majority of the Court will forthrightly agree to overrule it.
>
> The Supreme Court does not appear to (but should) follow its precedents.
>
> The Court should give "full faith and credit" to its own prior decisions.
>
> The Court should follow *stare decisis*, even when it leads to a wrong result, when Congress has acquiesced in the decision.
>
> The Court should follow *stare decisis*, except when the proposed new policy *clearly* is preferable to the old one.
>
> The Court should not make new constitutional law unless the old law is unsound and "works badly in our present day and society."

Jackson affirmed his belief in *stare decisis* in 74 opinions. On the other hand, in 22 other opinions he expressed quite opposing views:

> Throughout its history, the Court has been required from time to time to reconsider a precedent decision (and should do so now.)
>
> The Court should not follow precedents that clearly are blunders.
>
> The Court should not follow precedents that are not acceptable to a majority of the sitting Court.
>
> The Court should not follow *stare decisis* when to do so would lead to a wrong decision.
>
> It is better to create confusion by overruling a precedent than for the Court to adhere to a rule that it cannot and will not respect in application.

The reduced set of content variables consists of the following:

1. National restraint of political (civil) liberty.
2. State restraint of political (civil) liberty.
3. National restraint of economic liberty.
4. State restraint of economic liberty.
5. Monopolistic control of enterprise.
6. Federal (national-state) relationships.
7. Executive or congressional policy-making, or both.
8. Lower court policy-making.
9. Lawyers.
10. Litigants.
11. The public interest.
12. Colleagues (other Supreme Court justices).
13. Supreme Court policy-making.

The opinion variables fell into four categories: institutional, concurring, dissenting, and jurisdictional or memorandum.

There are only two voting variables: C (political liberalism/conservatism, *née* civil liberty) and E (economic liberalism/conservatism). Most of the data for these variables are available in the recent report of another research project, which analyzes the votes of all justices of the Supreme Court in all decisions on the merits for the period of the 1946–1962 Terms, on the basis of the political and economic policy variables.[13] The coding of Jackson's votes for the cases in which he wrote opinions, beginning with the 1946 Term, was taken directly from this larger pool of voting data. In order to include similar voting data for his first four terms, the relevant decisions of this earlier period were evaluated in relation to the political and economic variables. Each decision was scored as an outcome for the set of participating justices in that case, and Jackson's vote was then scored (just as that of each other justice) in relationship thereto. This voting analysis of the 1941–44 Terms was carried out half a dozen years after the content analysis of opinions was completed, which no doubt tended to minimize further the possibility of analyst bias, and to confirm the independence of the two sets of observations.

Like the content variables, the two voting variables were scored dichotomously, but with the differences that no ambivalent category was recognized for either, and the two voting variables could not jointly occur in the same decision. Although Jackson might (and often did) discuss many values in an opinion, or the same value more than once (and perhaps inconsistently), he could vote only once, and in only one way, in any single decision. Consequently, his vote in each decision was coded in one of the following five categories: (a) politically liberal (C+); (b) politically conservative (C−); (c) economically liberal (E+); (d) economically conservative (E−); or (e) other.

The major chronological variable was derived by partitioning all Jackson's opinions (and their associated votes) into three equal periods of time: the 1941–44, 1946–49, and 1950–53 Terms. In order to test certain of my hypotheses it was also necessary to compare the first period with the latter two combined; or, the last period with the first two combined; and in one instance to use a slightly different breakdown, in order to compare the 1941–44 and 1946–48 with the 1949–53 Terms.

---

[13] *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, esp. ch. 5, "Liberalism, Political and Economic."

The primary method of analysis consists of a cross-tabulation of the joint occurrences of variables within and between the four sets. Generally speaking, four-fold tables, phi coefficients, and chi squares (or Fisher's exact probability test) were computed for each cross-tabulation of a pair of variables.

The Reduced Content Matrix. In order to define the political and economic content variables consistently with the two corresponding voting variables, the set of content variables was further reduced by combining the first and second variables "freedom from national restraint of civil liberty" and "freedom from state restraint of civil liberty" into paravariable #14 (political liberalism/conservatism); and by combining the third, fourth, and fifth variables, "freedom from national restraint of economic liberty" and "freedom from state restraint of economic liberty" and "monopolistic control of enterprise" all *with reversed polarity*,[14] into paravariable #15 (economic liberalism/conservatism). At one time I planned to study the phi correlation matrix for this revised set of ten variables (#6–15), using cluster and factor analysis in order to isolate the more fundamental latent dimensions of Jackson's attitudes as a judge. For technical reasons, however, it was necessary to eliminate three more variables from the correlation matrix before undertaking these further analyses. The frequency for the ninth variable (lawyers) was so low (18), and the marginal distributions for variables #11 (public interest) and #12 (colleagues) were so extreme (56-1 and 7-154) that useful correlations between these three and the remaining variables could not be obtained. Therefore, the cluster and factor analyses were based upon a seven-variable matrix. Henceforth, short titles for particular values, or symbols as indicated, will be used instead of numbers to designate these variables: N (#6), A (#7), J (#8), X (#10), P (#13), C (#14), and E (#15).

The correlation matrix for the content variables was cluster analyzed by the elementary linkage, hierarchical syndrome, and rank-order typal methods.[15] It was factor analyzed by the principal axes method, followed by varimax rotation.[16] The phi coefficients and associated chi squares, and the factor analysis and rotation, were calculated on computers.

II. THE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

The hypotheses to be tested will be stated, together with the supporting considerations for each.

1. *The values articulated by Jackson in his opinions correlate in clusters that correspond to meaningful attitudinal concepts.*

Particularly during the period since Jackson's death, a body of cumulative knowledge about the social psychology of judicial attitudes has begun to be developed. I assume that my cluster findings ought to articulate with these data; but the clusters of content values will not necessarily coincide with the impressions that a reader sophisticated in the general subject-matter field—*viz.*, the traditionally trained constitutional law scholar—might gain from having read all or a substantial portion of Jackson's opinions. Findings based on the cluster analysis should be more valid, more reliable, and more precise than those based upon purely qualitative opinion analysis. For few subjective opinion-analysts attempt to base their findings upon a reading of all of a judge's opinions; and fewer still could claim to make consistent observations, and retain adequate recall to keep them in mind and to make the millions of associations and comparisons involved, when the universe of data comprises over three hundred opinions, many of which are dozens of pages in length. For such a task, computers have inherent advantages, whatever their other limitations. From a statistical point of view, the cluster analysis findings might be thought of as the mean, from which subjective opinion-analyses could be expected to deviate.

The clusters ought also to be "meaningful" in the sense that we should not expect to find patent inconsistency in the relationships denoted. The training of a lawyer and the vocation of a writer of judicial opinions are to articulate arguments characterized by at least *prima facie* rationality.

---

[14] Sign reversals were necessary for the economic variables, in order to maintain continuity with other recently published research in judicial attitudes toward economic policy. See *idem;* and Harold J. Spaeth, "An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes in the Labor Relations Decisions of the Warren Court," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 25 (1963), pp. 290–311, and "Warren Court Attitudes toward Business: The 'B' Scale," in *Judicial Decision-Making, op. cit.* fn. 10, *supra*, pp. 79–108.

[15] Louis L. McQuitty, "Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 17 (1957), pp. 207–229; McQuitty, "Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis," *ibid.*, Vol. 20 (1960), pp. 293–304; and McQuitty, "Rank-Order Typal Analysis," *ibid.*, Vol. 23 (1963), pp. 55–61.

[16] Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 154–191, 301–308.

The test by which we shall measure this hypothesis is whether the cluster analysis findings: (a) define attitudes which are consistent with other behavioral research findings about judicial attitudes; and (b) are internally consistent.

2. *The latent attitudinal dimensions revealed by factor analysis of Jackson's opinions will correspond to the latent attitudinal dimensions attributed to the Court as a whole, during the same period, on the basis of scaling and factor analysis of voting data.*

Since cluster analysis deals only with the manifest or surface relationships of the correlation matrix, the attitudinal dimensions yielded by factor analysis can be expected to uncover more complex and subtle interrelationships. The requirement that Jackson's attitudinal factors correspond to those that previous research has identified as common to the decision-making group of which Jackson was a member is premised upon two assumptions: (a) that opinion writing and voting are alternative behavioral modes of response, both of which are determined by a judge's attitudes toward the stimuli presented by cases for decision; and (b) that the variables that Jackson recognized as most important in his judicial decisions—not necessarily his valuation of those variables—did not significantly differ from the consensus of his colleagues concerning which were the most relevant and important content variables. Black and Jackson, for instance, might agree that the political liberalism/conservatism variable (*viz.*, a civil liberties issue) represented the most important question for decision in a case relating to a Communist's claim of the violation of his constitutional right to freedom of speech; but their respective valuations might be very different: Black might argue in his opinion and vote in favor of political liberalism, while Jackson might affirm the negative value of political conservatism.

The confirmation of this hypothesis will depend upon a comparison of the findings from the factor analysis of the content-variable correlation matrix, with findings from scaling and factor analysis of voting data for the whole Court.

3. *Jackson's votes, in relation to the political liberalism value, will correlate positively and significantly with his affirmations of the same value in his opinions; a similar proposition is asserted to obtain between his votes for and against economic liberalism, and the economic liberalism content-value.*

The assumption here is the same as the first advanced in support of Hypothesis 2, above: that opinion writing and voting are alternative behavioral modes of response, both of which are determined by a judge's attitudes toward the stimuli presented by cases for decision. If this is true, then Jackson should affirm the political liberalism value in opinions which he wrote to justify pro-civil liberty votes, and he ought consistently to affirm the political liberalism value more than any other content-value in such cases; moreover, there should be few (if any) cases in which his opinion negates the civil liberty value although he votes in favor of it. Of course, this assumption is in accordance with intuitive expectations premised upon the presumed relatively high degree of rationality in judicial behavior; but so far as I have been able to discover, no one thus far has attempted to design an experiment which might make possible either proof or disproof of this basic assumption about judicial decision-making.

The test of this hypothesis will be statistical: the stipulated correlation must be positive and significant, at a level of confidence of not less than .05 (one-tailed).

4. *There are no significant differences between Jackson's value assertions in concurring, and in dissenting opinions; but there are significant differences between his value assertions in institutional opinions, and in either concurring or dissenting opinions, or both.*

It is usually assumed that there are differences between the values a judge asserts when he speaks for the Court, and what he says in dissent. As Cardozo put it:

> Comparatively speaking at least, the dissenter is irresponsible. The spokesman of the court is cautious, timid, fearful of the vivid word, the heightened phrase. He dreams of an unworthy brood of scions, the spawn of careless *dicta*, disowned by the *ratio decidendi*, to which all legitimate offspring must be able to trace their lineage. The result is to cramp and paralyze. One fears to say anything when the peril of misunderstanding puts a warning finger to the lips. Not so, however, the dissenter. . . . For the moment he is the gladiator making a last stand against the lions. The poor man must be forgiven a freedom of expression, tinged at rare moments with a touch of bitterness, which magnanimity as well as caution would reject for one triumphant.[17]

Little or no consideration appears to have been given, however, to the content-value relationship between concurring and other opinions. One might reasonably speculate that a concurring justice should feel no greater sense of responsibility than a dissenting justice. Therefore, one ought to expect to find significant differences between institutional and separate (concurring or dissenting) opinions, but *not* between concurring and dissenting opinions.

---

[17] Benjamin N. Cardozo, "Law and Literature," *Yale Review*, Vol. 14 (1925), p. 715.

A supporting argument might be drawn from small group theory. Since four justices constitute the minimum number necessary to support an institutional opinion,[18] while it is the maximum for either a concurring or a dissenting opinion, Jackson clearly had to compromise his views with a much larger group when he wrote for the Court than otherwise. The extent to which a judicial opinion represents the personal views and language of the author presumably varies inversely with the size of the group which accepts the opinion; and so institutional opinions should tend to be more depersonalized than concurring or dissenting opinions. On both psychological and sociological grounds, therefore, we should expect that if any significant differences in the value-content of opinions emerge, they will be in accord with the stated hypothesis, which can be verified statistically in the same manner as Hypothesis 3, except that the test for Hypothesis 4 is two-tailed.

5. *There were significant changes, reflecting certain critical events that occurred on and off the Court, in both Jackson's opinion and voting behavior.*

Let us examine this hypothesis by testing a set of more specific but independent sub-hypotheses:

5.1. *The longer Jackson remained on the Court, the more conservative he became.*

It frequently has been assumed that judges (like other people) become more conservative as they grow older, and remain longer on the bench. Certainly this assumption was the explicit premise of President Roosevelt's charges against the Court, in the "Court-packing" episode of 1937; and evidently, Jackson himself agreed with it.[19] In order to test this hypothesis, we can compare the marginal totals for the voting and content-variables of civil liberty and economic policy, for the three four-year periods. In order to accept this hypothesis, it is required that changes occur in the stipulated direction, that these changes be progressive from period to period, and that they should be statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence (one-tailed).

5.2. *There was a significant increase in Jackson's dissenting behavior after his failure to succeed Stone as Chief Justice.*

Jackson's presidential ambitions had been cut short by Roosevelt's third-term decision; and his apparently good chance of succeeding Chief Justice Hughes was foreclosed by the outbreak of World War II.[20] Evidently, despite Roosevelt's death in 1945, he then had expected to return from his triumph at Nuremberg and assume the center chair on the Supreme Court bench in place of Stone, who died on April 22, 1946 as the war crimes tribunal's work drew to a close. Soon afterward Jackson was told that Hugo Black was lobbying with Truman against his promotion; the upshot was Jackson's long cable from Germany to the judiciary committees of both houses of Congress,[21] exposing to public view (in confirmation of long-standing Washington gossip) his version of the "feud" between Black and himself which had split the Court.[22] Since Truman already had submitted Fred Vinson's name to the Senate for confirmation, the almost certain effect of Jackson's pronunciamento would be to serve as an epitaph to his political ambitions.

If it is true that Jackson returned to the Court in 1946, bitterly disappointed at the frustration of his ambition to achieve an honor that he (and many others) thought he had earned and deserved—and more specifically, a frustration due to the political chicanery (as he saw it) of his colleague Black, the leader of a "bloc of libertarian judicial activists"[23] with whom Jackson differed in a struggle for leadership on the Court—then we might reasonably expect Jackson to articulate his disappointment and disagreement by writing more dissenting opinions than he had felt to be necessary or appropriate during his first four terms on the Court. Such behavior would provide an appropriate *dénouement* for the act of political suicide he had committed at Nuremberg; and Jackson was by no means insensitive to the implications of an increase in a judge's propensity to dissent, for he wrote in his valedictory, the undelivered and posthumously published Godkin Lectures,[24] that:

---

[18] In the relatively rare occasion (for the Court) when only six or seven justices participate in a decision.

[19] Robert H. Jackson, *The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy* (New York, 1941), pp. 184–188.

[20] "Robert H. Jackson," *Fortune*, Vol. 26 (March, 1938), pp. 78–80; Marquis W. Childs, "The Man Who Has Always Been a New Dealer," *Forum*, Vol. 103 (March, 1940), pp. 148–154; Herbert Corey, "A Man with a Flexible Future," *Nation's Business*, Vol. 25 (September, 1937), pp. 75–76, 78, 119; Wesley McCune, *The Nine Young Men* (New York, 1947), pp. 180–181, 186; Gerhart, *America's Advocate, op. cit.* fn. 2, *supra*, pp. 229–231.

[21] *The New York Times*, June 11, 1946, p. 2, col. 3–6; *United States News*, Vol. 20 (June 21, 1946), pp. 81–82.

[22] Gerhart, *America's Advocate, op. cit.* fn. 2, *supra*, pp. 258–265; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Supreme Court: 1947," *Fortune*, Vol. 35 (January, 1947), pp. 73–79, 201–212. Gerhart's pro-Jackson account should be compared with John P. Frank, *Mr. Justice Black: The Man and His Opinions* (New York, 1949), pp. 124–131, which offers a countervailing bias.

[23] Robert H. Jackson, *The Supreme Court in the American System of Government* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 57.

> . . . there is nothing good, for either the Court or the dissenter, in dissenting *per se*. Each dissenting opinion is a confession of failure to convince the writer's colleagues, and the true test of a judge is his influence in leading, not in opposing, his court.

A statistical test of this hypothesis would consist of a comparison of the totals for Jackson's majority and dissenting opinions, for the periods before and after his absence from the Court during the 1945 Term. Since an increase in the proportion of Jackson's dissents is predicted, the test will be one-tailed, and as before the confidence level of .05 is posited as the criterion for acceptance or rejection.

5.3. *After his return from his experience as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, Jackson became more conservative toward civil liberty, in both his opinion and voting behavior.*

A subjective reading of Jackson's opinions which discuss civil liberty issues leaves one with the impression that his intimate familiarity with the rise of the Nazi movement under the Weimar Republic—a subject which he frequently found occasion to discuss in his extra-judicial writings subsequent to 1946—had convinced him that it was suicidal for a democracy to permit conspiratorial, revolutionary groups to organize, to advocate openly their seditious doctrines, and to contest with rival groups for the control of the streets. Many persons, including many judges, would agree with such a position, without having had the very exceptional sensitization to the threat of fascism that Jackson must have experienced in his role as chief prosecutor. But the hypothesis here is that Jackson's attitude toward "ordered liberty" became more conservative as a consequence of his having had the unique experience that Nuremberg afforded; and that this change in his attitude had a significant effect upon his subsequent behavior as a judge.

A statistical test of this hypothesis is provided by comparing the marginals for the political liberalism/conservatism content and voting variables, for the periods before and after his absence from the Court during the 1945 Term. The test should be one-tailed, since the direction of change is predicted; and the .05 level of confidence is the criterion for decision.

5.4. *After the end of World War II, Jackson became more conservative toward economic policy, in both his opinion and his voting behavior.*

This hypothesis rests upon the assumption that Jackson's fundamental economic orientation was that of a conservative: he was a self-made man and the leading lawyer in a small city, located in an area where traditional and business values were decidedly dominant; and his life-long friend and early client was the head of a local utility corporation.[25] Jackson liked and lived the life of the upper middle-class gentleman; and most of his friends enjoyed similar socio-economic status. The fact that he himself was a Democrat, while the community in which he lived and most of his friends (during the first four decades of his life) were staunchly Republican, presents no real contradiction; to the contrary, the traditional basis for Jackson's choice of party is in strict accord with the findings of many investigations of political socialization.[26] His great-grandfather, Elijah Jackson, was described as a "stiff Democrat" and was identified with a group who "were generally intense partisans of General Andrew Jackson"; his grandfather, Robert R. Jackson, "was a Democrat throughout his life, [who] boasted to young Robert of having voted for Franklin Pierce and for every Democratic candidate for President from that time down to Woodrow Wilson"; and his father, William Eldred Jackson, "remained an outspoken Democrat," in "a community that was intensely and sometimes bitterly Republican."[27]

Jackson's conversion to the economic liberalism of the New Deal was a necessary function of his career in national politics, but there is no need to assume that his enthusiastic support of the New Deal's economic programs was not perfectly "sincere." Similarly, his attack upon the economic conservatism of the Hughes Court[28] is in the style, and has all of the ear-marks, of the partisan advocacy of a brief filed by the President's counsel before the bar of public opinion, Jackson's disclaimer of "dispassionate. . . . consider[ation]"[29] to the contrary notwithstanding. Both the necessity of preserving the image of a "typical New Dealer"—as he was called by journalists in the late 1930s—so long as hope of the Chief Justiceship (or even of the Presidency) remained, and the pressures to uphold the successful prosecution of World War II, provide reinforcing explanations for the assumption that Jackson would write and vote as an economic liberal during his first four terms on the Court. None of these considerations survived after Jackson returned to the Court in 1946, and we might well expect that his acceptance of the end of his political career would be accompanied by an apparent shift to the right that would bring his decision-making behavior in regard to economic issues in closer accord with his personal ideology.

---

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[25] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 1, 94, 100; McClosky, *op. cit.*

[26] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 74; Eleanor E. Maccoby *et al.*, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (1954–55), pp. 23–29.

[27] Gerhart, *America's Advocate*, *op. cit.* fn. 2, *supra*, pp. 26–28.

[28] *Op. cit.* fn. 19, *supra*, *passim.*

This hypothesis, it should be noted, is not the same as Hypothesis 5.1, to which it might be thought to bear some superficial resemblance. To test it we require that there be a sharp differentiation between the periods before and after the 1945 Term, and—to the contrary of what we stipulated for 5.1—that there be no significant difference between the second and third periods (*i.e.*, 1946–49 and 1950–53). Moreover, 5.4 applies only to the economic conservatism value, while 5.1 requires conjoint change for political conservatism as well. Our test for 5.4 will be: (a) that a change takes place in the direction of Jackson's support for both the content and the voting economic variables, from liberalism to conservatism; and (b) that the difference between the sets of marginals be statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence (one-tailed).

5.5. *Jackson's decision-making behavior became more liberal after Murphy and Rutledge left the Court.*

Both Murphy and Rutledge, who frequently voted with Black and Douglas in support of liberal values,[30] died during the summer vacation between the end of the 1948 Term and the opening of the 1949 Term. I have demonstrated elsewhere the influence that a bloc of four justices can have in forcing the consideration of an issue by the rest of the Court, under the Court's rule that jurisdictional decisions can be made by a minority of four justices.[31] I have also shown that the effect of the reduction in size of the libertarian bloc to two justices—actually, to only one justice during the 1949 Term, in view of Douglas's absence during most of this term due to a horseback-riding injury—was a drastic change in the character of the stimuli to which the justices were expected to respond, with an almost total elimination of the more extreme libertarian claims that Murphy and Rutledge frequently favored having the Court consider and decide in behalf of the claimants.[32] From a psychological point of view, then, Jackson's responses ought to appear to be relatively more liberal during a period when he was asked to uphold less extreme libertarian claims —claims that he could more readily accept; or, as Guttman might put it, when he was being asked "easier questions."

We require, under this hypothesis, that Jackson give proportionately greater support to the liberal values in both his voting and opinion-writing during the later period. The test will be to compare the marginals for the content and voting variables for both the political and economic variables, for the terms before and after the summer of 1949. The direction of change is predicted, so a one-tailed chi square test at a confidence level of .05 provides an appropriate criterion.

III. A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FINDINGS

The voting and content variables can be initially described, in a general way, by the observation of their marginal frequencies.[33] For the political variable, Jackson voted 45–40 and for the economic variable 46–71. The slight positive leaning in his civil liberties votes is of course not statistically significant, but his voting preference for economic conservatism is significant at the .03 level.[34] The joint total for both voting variables, 202, indicates that two-thirds of our 306 cases involved what were for the Court decisions relating to these two major attitudinal variables. Analysis of the much larger sample (1643) of all non-unanimous decisions on the merits during the seventeen terms 1946–62 shows that a third of these decisions (572) involved the political variable and another third (551) the economic variable.[35] Comparison of these two samples suggests that although the present sample is quite typical of the period in which Jackson was a member of the Court, in the relative importance of liberalism and conservatism to other attitudinal dimensions, Jackson showed a marked affinity for writing opinions in cases raising the economic issue: the difference between the total of 85 political votes and 117 economic votes is significant at the .001 level.

---

[29] *Ibid.*, p. v.

[30] *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, pp. 103–105, 129–131.

[31] "Policy without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 14 (1962), pp. 284–327.

[32] *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, p. 226.

[33] In the discussion that follows, the first of each pair of frequencies will be that for the positive value and the second will be for the negative; for the content variables, the frequency for ambivalent scores appears in parentheses between the marginals.

[34] This and the subsequent findings in the text at this point are based on the chi square one-sample test (two-tailed).

His verbal behavior is in sharp contrast to his voting behavior, however. He favored the liberal political value significantly 35-(30)-16, while apportioning his support for the economic content variable with seeming impartiality 42-(24)-38. One might well conclude that Jackson gave verbal support to civil liberty while giving his voting support to economic conservatism.

For Jackson it made a difference, however, whether the civil liberties claimant opposed the national or a state government. The overall marginals for the political content variable disguise the fact that his support for civil liberty claims against the national government, 30-(13)-7, was accompanied by a negative deference toward state civil liberty claimants, 6-(20)-11. If the 2:1 ratio of national to state cases had been reversed, Jackson's verbal support for political liberalism might have appeared to be just as impartial as his support for the economic content variable. In regard to economic content, however, the differences in his support of national [19-(6)-10] and of state [21-(14)-5] regulation of business seem less important—although the latter is statistically significant and the former is not—than the opposite direction of his remarks concerning the anti-monopoly component of the economic variable: Jackson favored the *negative* value (pro-monopoly) 14-(7)-30, and some of the most incisive language in his opinions upholds the virtues of free enterprise and denounces the vices of organized labor. So the fact that the most proximate prelude to his Nuremberg manifesto was his thinly veiled public attack upon Black in a labor relations case is doubtless no accident.[36] And the seeming balance of Jackson's verbal support regarding the economic content variable results from the admixture of his generally liberal remarks about both national and state government regulation of business, and his generally conservative views toward labor-management relationships.

On issues of federalism, Jackson tended to favor states rights (decentralization: N −), but not significantly so, 23-(9)-30. In regard to the three variables which involve the Court's participation in policy-making, however, he gave quite one-sided and significant verbal support to the negative values, favoring restraint in Supreme Court policy-making (P −) 33-(80)-117; deference to lower-court policy-making (J −) 19-(38)-80; and deference to policy-making by the Executive and Congress (A −) 18-(16)-35. He also manifested significantly negative deference toward litigants (X −) 39-(15)-65.

The remaining three variables could not be included in the correlational analysis, for the technical reasons mentioned earlier. Although most of his remarks about lawyers and their role were favorable 13-(2)-5, he discussed this subject so infrequently that the difference between his favorable and unfavorable statements is of only marginal statistical significance. His sympathy for the public interest 56-(1)-1 and his antipathy for his colleagues 7-(6)-154, to the contrary, are both highly significant statistically. Indeed, the extremity of the division of the marginals for the public interest variable suggests that the phrase "the public interest" had no substantive attitudinal content for Jackson, and that, instead, he employed it as a benediction or malediction for any other subject about which he wanted to speak with favor or disfavor.[37] This view finds support in an examination of the four-fold tables for the public interest and other variables, which reveals that his most frequent affirmations of the public interest occurred in opinions in which he urged judicial restraint or was deferential to lower court judges, or nondeferential to litigants or to his colleagues. His zeal for the public interest was most articulate in relationship to his discussion of ideas that he favored and of the behavior of other people with whom he disagreed: ideas that he approved were identified with the public interest, and persons whom he criticized were stigmatized as behaving contrary to the public interest.

Jackson's favorite subjects for discussion in all of his opinions were judicial restraint and his colleagues. This is hardly surprising; we might well expect Supreme Court justices to be introspective about their role, and sensitive to their inter-personal relationships, especially in the context of essays whose function is to establish the rectitude of one's own ideas and the erroneous thinking of one's associates. However, it is customary, for this very reason, for Supreme Court justices (like congressmen) to bend over backwards to observe the formal marks of courtesy; the usual form of address of a justice who is about to impale a colleague is to refer to him as "brother," and to express extreme respect for his views. Jackson rarely bothered to observe such amenities. As we noted earlier, he was a very candid man; and indeed, "candor" and "rationality" were the words he mentioned most frequently when showing negative deference to his colleagues. He combined remarks critical of his colleagues with advocacy of policy restraint in over a fourth of his opinions; this was the highest association for any pair of variables. He also frequently associated anti-colleague remarks with affirmations of the public interest and with deference to lower courts.

---

[35] *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, p. 148.

[36] Jewell Ridge Coal Co. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U. S. 897–898 (June 18, 1945); Gerhart, *America's Advocate*, *op. cit.* fn. 2, *supra*, pp. 247–253.

[37] *Cf.* Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (New York, 1960).

The Correlation Matrix. Table I shows the four-fold tables and the correlation matrix for the content variables. One weakness that is probably inherent in the use of the method of content analysis, at least with this type of data, is evident in the four-fold tables: the size of the observed frequencies often is small (the numbers in the cells are low), notwithstanding the fact that the observations were based upon a set of over three hundred opinions. This reflects, of course, the circumstance that judicial opinions are written selectively, and the issues raised by discrete cases are so delimited by the screening processes of lower appellate court review and Supreme Court jurisdictional decision-making that no justice finds it necessary or appropriate to discuss all of his attitudes in all of his opinions. In effect, each opinion of a justice defines a subset which includes a sample drawn from the universal set of all his attitudes.

As already noted, the marginal distributions for the variables show that Jackson favored the negative (or deference) value for all except the political and economic variables. Hence it might seem convenient to identify these other five variables by short titles which would emphasize their negative values. It happens, however, that almost all of their intercorrelations are negative or zero—of course, the correlation between (A−, J−) is identical to that between (A+, J+)—and the correlation between (C+, E+) also is negative. It seems more important, therefore, to maximize (as Table II does) the positive correlations in the matrix in order to facilitate the cluster analysis. That is best accomplished by reversing the polarity of E and N only. And questions of format aside,

TABLE I. FOUR-FOLD TABLES AND PHI CORRELATION MATRIX

Variable	Number	6	7		8		10		13		14		15	
	Symbol	N+	A+		J+		X+		P+		C+		E+	
Name														
			−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+
Federal Centralization	N+	+	3	0	4	3	3	0	11	2	2	0	1	5
		−	3	3	7	5	7	5	8	3	2	4	2	4
Judicial Review	A+	−.50		+	7	0	6	5	3	0	1	5	2	4
				−	7	0	11	4	13	0	3	3	4	6
Judicial Centralization	J+	.01	.00			+	3	3	8	1	0	2	1	2
						−	21	6	27	9	3	3	9	7
Pro Litigants	X+	−.35	.20		.24			+	20	4	1	7	7	2
								−	21	5	8	6	4	9
Judicial Activism	P+	−.15	.00		−.13		−.03			+	1	4	4	3
										−	7	16	16	15
Political Liberalism	C+	−.58	.35		.45		.44		.09			+	3	1
												−	0	4
Economic Liberalism	E+	.19	.07		.17		−.46		−.04		−.78			

TABLE II. THE TRANSFORMED CORRELATION MATRIX

Value	Short titles	JUDCEN	PROLIT	ECONS	POLIB	FEDECEN	JUDREV	JUDACT
Name	Symbol	J+	X+	E−	C+	N−	A+	P+
Judicial Centralization	J+		.24	−.17	.45	*	*	*
Pro Litigants	X+	.24		.46	.44	.35	.20	*
Economic Conservatism	E−	−.17	.46		.78	.19	*	*
Political Liberalism	C+	.45	.44	.78		.58	.35	*
Federal Decentralization	N−	*	.35	.19	.58		.50	*
Judicial Review	A+	*	.20	*	.35	.50		*
Judicial Activism	P+	*	*	*	*	*	*	

* ≤ ±.15

all the statistical relationships remain unaffected by such a transformation.

The relationships shown by the correlation coefficients are quite compatible with intuitive expectations. Using the short titles given in Table II, JUDCEN, for instance, is associated with POLIB (support for civil liberties) and PROLIT (sympathy for litigants)—in the latter instance, for the perfectly sensible reason that in most opinions in which he discussed both subjects, Jackson combined deference to the lower court with remarks hostile to the litigant who was seeking to upset its decision. The zero correlation between JUDCEN and JUDREV demonstrates that Jackson's attitude toward judicial review of the decision-making of lower courts was perfectly independent of his attitude toward judicial review of the decision-making of Congress and the Administration. Similarly, his attitude toward federalism was independent of his attitude toward lower courts, which shows that he discriminated sharply between what were for him the disparate policy issues of centralization in the government generally, and within the judicial hierarchy; otherwise, we should expect to find a high positive correlation between J+ and N+.

Table II shows that the other two content values most closely related to judicial policy-making (A+ and P+) are independent of each other and (like J+) not very closely associated with the remaining four variables, among which intercorrelation tends to be highest. We might well infer from this that Jackson's attitude toward activism and restraint in policy-making by the Supreme Court, although often articulated with intensity and fervor, had very little to do with his attitudes toward the other content variables. This inference suggests that the Supreme Court policy-making variable functioned for him like the public interest and colleagues variables: all of these were useful as verbal symbols that he could manipulate in support of other values to which he attached greater substantive significance, and which were probably much more important in shaping his decision-making.

JUDREV has its highest correlations with FEDECEN and POLIB. Both of these are intuitively sensible relationships. Jackson never argued in favor of judicial review of presiden-



FIGURE 1. Primary and secondary elementary linkage among content values

tial or congressional action (or spoke favorably of a litigant) in an opinion in which he also defended centralization of governmental power; and in the civil liberties cases, he urged judicial review most often when upholding the rights of claimants. His attitude toward the constitutional autonomy of the other two branches was substantially independent of his views on economic policy, however, and the very low or zero correlations with the remaining variables suggest that for Jackson the only legitimate justifications for judicial supremacy were in defense of states' rights and civil liberties. POLIB itself correlates at .35 or better with all except one of the other variables; while the economic variable correlates as highly as this *only* with one other variable (PROLIT) besides POLIB.

The Cluster Analysis. Various methods of cluster analysis confirm what seems obvious from an examination of the face of the correlation matrix.[38] The simplest of these methods, which focuses upon the primary and secondary levels of interrelationships, is McQuitty's Elementary Linkage Analysis.[39] ELA shows, for each variable, which other is most highly correlated with it, as signified by a solid directional arrow in the paradigm above; second highest relationships are depicted by broken directional arrows: and reciprocal relationships are portrayed by pairs of apposite half-arrows.

FIGURE 1 shows that the closest association is between POLIB and ECONS; and that PROLIT is most closely related to ECONS, JUDCEN with POLIB; while JUDREV and JUDACT both are functions of FEDECEN, which in turn is most closely related to POLIB.

Observation of the secondary linkages brings out more clearly the principal cluster relationships. There are three important and interlocking clusters: (X+, E−, C+), (E−, C+, N−), and (C+, N−, A+). PROLIT and JUDREV are linked through the (E−, C+) and (C+, N−) pairs, respectively; and the (E−, C+, N−) triple is the central element in the structure. All the other values have either primary or secondary links with POLIB, which serves as the cornerstone. The two least well integrated values are J+ and P+; judicial review of lower courts is advocated most frequently in conjunction with support for civil liberty and litigant deference, while JUDACT is oriented toward POLIB and FEDECEN.

What the above analysis fails adequately to emphasize is the low level of association between economic conservatism and federal decentralization, which is, however, made quite evident by the alternative methods of Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis (HSA) and Rank Order Typal Analysis (ROTA).[40] HSA defines

---

[38] See Edgar F. Borgatta, "On Analyzing Correlation Matrices: Some New Emphases," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (1958–59), pp. 516–528.

[39] See fn. 15, *supra*.

[40] *Idem.*

TABLE III. PRINCIPAL AXES AND VARIMAX FACTORS

Factors Values	I*	II	III*	IV*	I′*	II′
JUDCEN	.28	−.56	.63	.47	.00	.00
PROLIT	.69	−.24	.00	−.11	.26	.09
ECONS	.68	−.27	−.66	−.18	.97	−.10
POLIB	.94	−.17	−.03	.14	.82	.24
FEDECEN	.71	.49	.15	−.04	.17	.27
JUDREV	.47	.58	.48	−.23	.01	.97
JUDACT	.10	.47	−.38	.77	.03	−.01

(X+, E−, C+, N−) as the only important quadruple.

ROTA, which is the method most sensitive to intransitivity of relationships, suggests first the (E−, C+) double; next the (X+, E−, C+) triple; and then the (X+, E−, C+, N−) quadruple. The only intransitivity for the triple is a function of the trivial difference between POLIB's correlation of .45 with J+, as compared to its .44 correlation with X+; the only other intransitivity is the previously mentioned low .19 between E− and N−. ROTA confirms that the three policy-making values (J+, A+, and P+) are poorly associated, either with the cluster of four or with each other.

Cluster analysis directs attention to the integrative role of political liberalism in the structure of Jackson's attitudes. The most general finding would be that there is one primary cluster, composed of litigant deference, economic conservatism, political liberalism, and federal decentralization. There are also two overlapping subclusters: JUDREV with POLIB and FEDECEN; and JUDCEN with POLIB and PROLIT. ECONS has important associations *only* with POLIB and PROLIT. The intercorrelations among E−, C+, and X+ are the only ones statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence.

The Factor Analysis. I have assumed that factor analysis might reveal certain latent relationships among the content variables, but that the latent structure ought, of course, to be consistent with the manifest structure developed by cluster analysis. Six factors were extracted, and 85 per cent of the variance was accounted for by the first four axes. Varimax rotation loaded most of the variance on the first two rotated axes, and upon a sixth factor which emphasized the same three variables as did the second. In Table III the four principal axes are designated by roman numerals, and the two rotated factors by roman numerals with prime (′) marks; reversed factors are designated by asterisks.

Table III shows the first principal axis to be clearly one of political liberalism, and the third to be predominately one of economic conservatism joined with deference to lower courts. The second and fourth axes focus more upon the policy-making values: the second pairs judicial review with judicial decentralization, and federal decentralization with judicial activism; while the fourth is mostly concerned with judicial activism and judicial centralization. None of these relationships appear to be illogical or inconsistent. Jackson's attitude toward civil liberty appears strongly related to his states' rights sentiments, his attitude toward civil liberties claimants, and his economic conservatism; the three policy-making values are much less important to his political liberalism. Certainly, as the third axis suggests, it is sensible that at the time when Jackson was on the Court, he should associate economic conservatism with deference to lower court decision-making. Similarly, it is plausible for the third axis to associate judicial review of executive-legislative policy-making with both judicial activism and the decentralization of judicial policy-making (since the lower federal and state courts then were probably more conservative than the Supreme Court); but of course judicial centralization is also a sensible adjunct to activism in Supreme Court policy-making.

Only two relationships worth mentioning are shown by the fifth and sixth axes (which are not reproduced here). PROLIT correlates −.67, and POLIB .33, with V*, indicating that Jackson by no means sympathized with all claimants even when he wrote and voted in support of their civil liberty claims—and names such as Rosenberg, Beauharnais, and Guy W. Ballard ("alias Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King") come readily to mind as examples. On VI, FEDECEN is .49 and JUDREV −.40, suggesting that Jackson frequently advocated judicial restraint toward *state* executive-legislative policy-making.

The varimax factors denote the same two

clusters of triples that we observed through cluster analysis: the first (X+, E−, C+) on I′, and the second (C+, N−, A+) on II′. Factor I′ shows that Jackson's extremely high degree of economic conservatism was associated with a favorable attitude toward civil liberty, a moderate amount of sympathy for litigants, and a lesser degree of states' rights sentiment. Stated otherwise, his liberal attitude toward personal rights was in contradiction to his conservative attitude toward property rights. The inconsistency may lie, however, in contemporary notions of liberalism rather than in Jackson's thinking. To favor civil liberty means to *oppose* governmental control of personal rights, while to favor economic liberalism means to *support* governmental control of property rights. Jackson, therefore, was consistent in his support of both the personal and the property rights of the individual, in opposition to governmental control. He was, in short, more a classic Nineteenth Century than a modern Twentieth Century liberal.[41]

It may seem surprising, at least at first blush, to discover that the author of a book entitled *The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy*,[42] in which he vigorously attacked his immediate predecessors on the Court for *their* economic conservatism and defense of an out-moded ideology, should become a judge whose most pronounced attitude was one of empathy with John Stuart Mill rather than with John Maynard Keynes. But Jackson the judge did not hesitate to dissociate himself from what he once characterized as "earlier partisan advocacy"; as he remarked in the *Steel Seizure Case*, *à propos* a policy statement he had issued as Attorney General, "a judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested parties [*i.e.*, the previous, not the then occupant of the office of President of the United States] as authority in answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself."[43] Of course, the correctness of this appraisal rests upon the assumption that Jackson *did* change, in his official behavior, from an economic liberal to an economic conservative, a proposition that we shall test below.

The close correspondence between the cluster and factorial findings is further demonstrated by Figure 2, which depicts the three most important planes in which we can observe the relationships among the content values and between their major clusters.

In the liberalism plane, the first cluster is a prominent substructure in the configuration; and although this cluster includes what clearly appear to be a majority of the values that were most important to him, these are not the values that Jackson seems to emphasize in his valedictory, the Godkin Lectures.[44] There Jackson advocates, instead, primarily political liberalism and the three values aligned with it in the first quadrant of the liberalism plane: federal decentralization, judicial review, and judicial centralization.

Judicial activism is the most extremely positioned value in the policy-making plane, in which the second cluster appears prominently. If JUDCEN were replaced by the negative value for that variable, it (JUDECEN) would appear in the fourth quadrant of the plane, immediately below JUDREV, confirming our earlier observation that in deferring to states rights, Jackson argued that judicial review of state policy-making should be left to the lower courts. But both major clusters are centered around and not far from the origin of the space, which confirms graphically our previous observation that Jackson's advocacy of judicial activism—or restraint—was virtually independent of the crux of his system of values.

In the plane defined by the two rotated factors, both major clusters appear in the first quadrant, with the first cluster loaded primarily on the first rotated axis, and the second cluster loaded primarily on the second axis. Here, judicial review is independent of economic conservatism, and political liberalism is the most important correlate for both of them. From this perspective, neither judicial centralization nor judicial activism has any bearing upon the values in the two clusters.

It was anticipated that factor analysis would reveal latent relationships more subtle than those made manifest by cluster analysis. Clearly, the factorial analysis confirms very strongly the cluster findings, while at the same time adding detail, depth, and clarity to the perception of the interrelationships among the values. One additional finding, that cluster analysis did not denote, is most apparent in Figure 2. FEDECEN and PROLIT appear closely associated with each other, as well as with POLIB, in both liberalism planes; and this is also true of the policy-making plane, but with the difference that in the latter perspective, they constitute (with ECONS) the values that are least associated with the function of judicial policy-making.

VI. THE TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES

We turn now to an examination of the sub-

---

[41] *Cf. The Judicial Mind, op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, p. 201.

[42] *Op. cit.* fn. 19, *supra*.

[43] Concurring in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 647 (1952).

[44] *Op. cit.* fn. 23, *supra*.


III*+
JUDCEN
JUDREV
2
FEDECEN
PROLIT
I*—
I*+
POLIB
I
JUDACT
ECONS
III*—
IV*+
JUDACT
JUDCEN
POLIB
II—
FEDECEN
II+
I
PROLIT
2
ECONS
JUDREV
IV*—
II'+
JUDREV
2
FEDECEN
POLIB
PROLIT
I'*—
I
I'*+
JUDCEN
JUDACT
ECONS
II'—

The Liberalism Plane

The Policy-Making Plane

The Varimax Rotation:
Liberalism and Judicial Review

FIGURE 2. Three perspectives of the value configuration

stantive findings in relation to the set of hypotheses stated earlier.

(1) The cluster analysis findings denoted two overlapping clusters: (X+, E−, C+) and (C+, N−, A+). Other research in Supreme Court voting behavior has identified attitudes toward C and E as the two most basic attitudinal dimensions for the justices as a group.[45] Voting data for the Court as a whole, collected by terms, do not provide sufficient depth to make possible cumulative scaling of all the content variables discussed in the present study, based as it is upon the pooling of opinion data for a dozen terms. However, other evidence suggests that N, A, and J are scalable variables.[46] The only cluster element that shows up more importantly in Jackson's opinion-writing behavior than in the voting of the justices as a group is the litigant variable.

There is nothing irrational or illogical about the cluster associations. Traditional scholarship discusses and finds much ambiguity in Jackson's views on issues of economic policy, civil liberty, and centralization; but traditional scholarship has little to say about Jackson's views toward judicial review of lower courts, since the usual concern is with "substantive" rather than jurisdictional decision-making; and it has nothing whatever to say about Jackson's attitudes toward litigants, since there is no relevant legal category to encompass this ("bias" means something quite different, in legal parlance)—the fiction being that judges' decisions are not affected by their attitudes toward the parties litigant. Our clusters, therefore, seem meaningful; they are internally consistent; and they reveal relationships that transcend the accepted lore about Jackson's "philosophy as a judge." No basis appears for rejecting Hypothesis 1.

(2) Hypothesis 2 states that the latent attitudinal dimensions revealed by factor analysis will correspond to the scaling and factorial attitudinal dimensions that independent research has identified as common for the Court during the period in which Jackson served. The scaling and factor research in the attitudes of the whole Court covers the period of the 1946–62 Terms, which includes the last eight terms of Jackson's tenure. These data show that Jackson's average rank was between fourth and fifth on C and between eighth and ninth on E.[47] In relation to the seventeen other justices who were on the Court during the period 1946–63, Jackson ranked 10th on political liberalism, and 17th on economic liberalism.[48] Evidently he was a political moderate but an economic conservative in his attitudes, as one would infer from his voting behavior in relation to his colleagues. Moreover, in that behavior and during that period, Jackson was a moderate on a Court that became more conservative, as a group, toward civil liberty; and he was a conservative on a Court that became more liberal, as a group, toward economic policy.

The political and the economic variables were the two most important attitudinal scales for the justices as a group, throughout the 1946–63 period. Many justices are liberals, and some are conservatives, on both scales; but it is precisely because other justices are (like Jackson) more liberal toward political than economic issues—or, like Tom Clark, politically conservative but economically moderate—that two scales are necessary in order adequately to measure the similarities and differences among the justices with regard to the major components of modern liberalism.

Once comparisons are made between his voting in the political and economic cases in which he wrote opinions, and his rank position on the general C and E voting scales, it becomes relevant to inquire whether the votes with opinions constitute a representative sample of the universes of political and economic voting data. Although, as we noted earlier, the sample is representative to the extent that it includes the same ratio of C and E votes, to total votes, as does the universe of voting data, this finding does not inform us concerning the correspondence between the *direction* of those votes, in the sample and in the universe.[49] For the political variables, the ratios of liberal to total votes are .67 for the sample and .34 for the universe, during the period before the 1945 Term; and .50 (sample) and .34 (universe) thereafter. The ratios for the entire period of twelve terms are .53 and .34. For the economic variable, the corresponding ratios are .57 and .43 (before the 1945 Term), .26 and .13 (afterward), and .39 and .26 (overall). Taking into consideration the different frequency sums to which these ratios relate, and using a two-tailed test, the difference is significant (at $< .05$) between all pairs of ratios except for economic voting during the earlier subperiod—and even that difference is significant, if we compare Jackson's voting in cases with opinion with his voting in cases in which he wrote no opinion. Evidently, Jackson voted consistently more liberally on both political and economic issues, in the cases in which he wrote opinions, than when he voted without opinion. This (one might infer) may have been for the very good reason that he chose to write separate opinions, or was assigned the opinion of the Court, in those cases in which he was prepared to take what was for him a relatively liberal position.[50] But we must likewise conclude that in his overall decisional behavior, Jackson was even more conservative than he appears to be on the basis of the present analysis of the cases in which he wrote opinions. Jackson also tended to be more liberal in his opinion-writing than in his voting toward either C or E, although these differences are only marginally significant at about .10 (two-tailed). The data are suggestive, therefore, of a consistent scalar relationship for both variables: that Jackson was most liberal in his opinions; that he was relatively moderate in his voting in cases in which he wrote opinions, and that he was most conservative in his voting in the cases in which he wrote no opinions.

---

[45] *The Judicial Mind, op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, ch. 5.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 146–157.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 104–107, 130–133.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 145.

[49] The data for voting in decisions with opinion are reported in Table V; for the marginal distributions for all Jackson's votes in decisions on the merits of the political and economic scale variables, see fn. 56 and 57. A comparison of these two sources shows that for those (non-sample) cases in which he wrote no opinion, the voting marginals (before and after the 1945 Term) are: for C, 11–36 and 37–104; and for E, 40–66 and 8–127.

Since Jackson's verbal support for civil liberty was *more* extreme than his voting support, while his verbal support for economic conservatism was *less* extreme than his voting support, we should interpret Factor I of Table III as indicating for Jackson a more favorable attitude to political liberalism, and a less extreme attitude of economic conservatism, than are suggested by scaling and factor analysis based on observations of his voting behavior. There is certainly nothing inconsistent, however, between the two sets of data; to the contrary they reinforce each other strongly, and the more so once we recognize the apparently consistent differentials between his verbal and his voting behavior.

Both factors I and I′ show Jackson's political and economic attitudes to be functions of a single factor of liberalism. Factor analysis of voting data for the Court shows precisely the same thing, with the difference that observations for a set of nine justices make it possible to relate cumulative scales, representing the C and E variables, to the reference axes in factorial space. Typically, the C and E scales are highly correlated with the first centroid axis, which appears as the mean between the scales.[51] As noted above, Jackson in relation to his colleagues was a moderate on civil liberties but the most extreme conservative on the Court on economic issues (although Whittaker, who joined the Court after Jackson's death, was even more extreme in economic conservatism). This attitudinal combination of political moderation and economic conservatism has been identified with the ideological type Pragmatic Conservatism; and among the eighteen justices who served during the seventeen-term period 1946–1963, Jackson ranked 13th on liberalism but second on the pragmatism dimension—on which he was exceeded only by Goldberg (for whom only the data of a single term were available).[52] Pragmatism was there defined as a function of the component ideologies of individualism and libertarianism; and on the individualism factor, Jackson typically ranked very high—in five of the eight terms, 1946–1953, he ranked first.[53]

Jackson can best be characterized, on the basis of his voting in relationship to his colleagues, as ideologically a pragmatic, individualistic conservative; and attitudinally as a political moderate and economic conservative. Nothing revealed by the present study is inconsistent with calling him a conservative judge with a high regard for individualism and pragmatism. These are all qualities which have been stressed as typical of him, by previous commentators upon his philosophy. Barnett concludes that "His general position has been individualistic, pragmatic, hard to predict, middle-of-the-road, and, on balance, conservative."[54] Weidner characterizes his approach to civil liberties as "pragmatic." Jackson himself, incidentally, cited William James in a pro civil liberty opinion[55]—and James is hardly an authority frequently invoked by Supreme Court justices.

It is true that the latent voting-factor ideologies are different from the second, third, and fourth opinion-content factors, which relate to manifest attitudes. On the other hand, we have found significant differences between his verbal behavior and his voting behavior in general; and this destroys any empirical basis for the assumption (underlying Hypothesis 2) that the attitudes revealed by Jackson's opinions necessarily would correspond to the attitudes inferred from his general voting behavior. The manifest opinion factors are a function of the means he employed to proffer a formal rationalization for a small portion of his total votes, and frequently, in direct relationship with small groups (and often, with none) of his colleagues; the latent voting factors are a function of his conjoint relaship with all his colleagues. Neither the strategies nor the tactics nor the processes that govern opinion-writing and voting are the same. The opinion-factors tell us what was most common in the relationships among Jackson's manifest attitudes in what he chose to write "for the record"; while the voting factors inform us what was most common among the latent ideologies of all the justices—Jackson plus eight colleagues. What we ought reasonably to have expected, in comparing two such sets of factors, was not congruence, but the absence of inconsistency.

---

[50] *Cf.* Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941) [concurring opinion]; and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). [opinion of the Court]

[51] *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, pp. 209–217.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 262, 266, 271.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 204, 224.

[54] Barnett, *op. cit.* fn. 2, *supra*, p. 241. *Cf.* the works, all there cited, of the following authors: Fairman at p. 487; Gerhart, "A Decade of Mr. Justice Jackson," at pp. 969, 971; Jaffe at pp. 992–993; Nielson at pp. 384, 401–403; and Weidner at p. 593.

[55] United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 93 (1944).

The first factor—liberalism—is the same for both sets. The subsequent opinion factors represent attitudes that were important for Jackson in the cases in which he wrote opinions, and which were fundamental components of his personal system of values; but these were not values accepted as the most important criteria for decision by enough of his colleagues, so as to appear as important components of the first three (at least) factors common to the justices as a group in their voting over the period of the past two decades.

We conclude that there is certainly no basis for the complete rejection of Hypothesis 2. It cannot be confirmed in its entirety in the form stated, but the reason lies in the ineptitude of our formulation of the hypothesis rather than in any basic inconsistency in the two sets of factor data. Hypothesis 2 must therefore be partially rejected, but our test of it has not been unfruitful. The present intensive study of the opinions of a single justice, and the related extensive studies of the voting behavior of the Court as a group differ in many respects methodologically; yet, to the extent that they may appropriately be compared, they are in very substantial agreement.

TABLE IV. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG VALUES AND VOTES FOR THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES

			Values			
			E		*C*	
			−	+	−	+
Votes	*C*	+	3	2	2	23
		−	0	3	10	4
		$\phi =$	−.600		.659	
		$X^2 =$			16.95	
		p			<.005	
	E	+	1	23	1	1
		−	23	6	1	1
		$\phi =$	.751		.000	
		$X^2 =$	29.92		[Fisher's]	
		p	<.0005		=.833	

(3) Hypothesis 3 assumes a significantly high positive correlation between Jackson's opinions and votes, in support of the political and the economic content-variables. Table IV shows that the correlation between values and votes (1) for political liberalism is positive and moderately high, and (2) for economic liberalism also is positive and slightly higher. Conversely, the cross correlation between political values and economic votes is zero, and between economic values and political votes it is negative and moderately high.

These correlations were calculated from only that part of the complete data in which the voting and the content variables were observed to occur together in the same decisions. Table V reports the sets of marginals for all votes and content-values for both C and E, for each of the three major time periods.

On the basis of the demonstrated relationships between content-values and votes, for

TABLE V. MARGINAL FREQUENCIES OF VALUES AND VOTES FOR THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES, BY MAJOR PERIODS

	1941–44				1946–49				1950–53			
	C		E		C		E		C		E	
	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−
Values	5	2	19	10	13	6	11	14	17	8	12	14
Votes	10	5	28	21	13	15	8	25	22	20	10	25

TABLE VI. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CONTENT AND OPINION VARIABLES

Content	N		A		J		X		P		C		E		E(3) (National)		E(4) (State)		E(5) (Monopoly)	
Opinion	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−
Institutional	12	13	5	14	8	44	13	34	17	48	9	7	25	8	10	0	13	0	10	9
Concurring	6	3	2	7	4	12	2	8	7	14	10	5	4	2	3	2	1	0	0	0
Dissenting	5	14	10	13	7	23	23	21	8	54	15	4	13	28	6	8	7	5	4	21

both variables, I conclude that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.

(4) Hypothesis 4 supposes no significant differences between Jackson's content-values as articulated in concurring and in dissenting opinions, but expects them as between institutional and separate opinions. For purposes of the analysis below, "majority opinions" include both institutional and concurring opinions; "separate opinions" include both concurring and dissenting opinions; and institutional opinions continue to mean opinions for the Court. The data to be discussed are reported in Table VI.

We shall also examine an alternative Hypothesis 4′, which states the orthodox view: that there will be significant differences between majority and dissenting opinions (and, by implication, not otherwise).

In general, the first part of Hypothesis 4—that concurring and dissenting opinions will show no significant differences in content-values—cannot be disproved statistically by our data. None of the differences is significant at the .05 level of confidence. For content-variable N, the significance level is only slightly greater than .10 (two-tailed), and for P, it is less than .10 but greater than .05; these differences might be considered marginally significant. Jackson distinctly tended to argue for decentralization when he dissented. The difference for P is even more pronounced, however, when majority and dissenting opinions are compared; so the latter interpretation seems the more important one. For none of the variables, then, are differences between concurring and dissenting opinions statistically significant; and one of the two marginal contrasts is less important than another relationship to be considered below.

It is much easier, of course, to *fail* to find significant differences than to find them; so the test for the second part of the hypothesis is much the more important of the two tests. None of the differences between institutional opinions and concurrences is significant. There are significant differences between institutional opinions and dissents for E (and its component subvariables) and for X, and there are marginally significant differences for P; but most of these differences are even greater when majority opinions are compared with dissents, so as before I shall assume that the latter interpretation should be preferred.

Institutional opinions were also compared with separate opinions, but nothing new was revealed by this examination. The frequencies for concurrences are so much lower than for dissents that practically all of the differences that appear must be attributed to the effect of the latter variable; and the differences observed are of the same order as those discussed immediately above. I find no significant differences that properly can be construed as appertaining to a comparison of institutional opinions with concurring or dissenting opinions, let alone both. Consequently, Hypothesis 4 must be rejected.

Significant differences emerge, however, between majority and dissenting opinions, for economic liberalism and each of its three component variables (freedom from national restraint of economic liberty, freedom from state restraint of economic liberty, and pro business monopoly), at confidence levels ranging from less than .05 to less than .001, two-tailed.

Two other variables also show significant differences. Jackson was anti-litigant in his majority opinions, and ambivalent in dissent; and also significant is his tendency to argue for policy activism in majority more than in dissenting opinions. Thus, almost half of the variables show important differences in Jackson's opinion behavior when he voted with the majority as compared to when he dissented. I conclude that alternative Hypothesis 4′ is partially confirmed by these data; to the extent that significant differences appear in Jackson's opinion behavior, they support the traditional view that a dissenting judge articulates his attitudes more outspokenly than one who votes with the majority. My own hypothesis, which was inferred from socio-psychological theory, is not supported by the evidence of this study.

(5) Hypothesis 5 consists of a set of more specific hypotheses about changes in Jackson's opinion and voting behavior, in response to

what are assumed to have been critical events in his career.

5.1. This hypothesis states that Jackson became increasingly more conservative the longer he remained on the Court; and we have stipulated that, in order to confirm it, the data must provide evidence of progressive change through each of three major time periods. The data to test this hypothesis are contained in Table V, *supra*. Our present interest is in a comparison of the marginal distributions, between periods, for each of the four variables (political content-values, political votes, economic content-values, and economic votes).

For political content-values, no significant differences are evident between periods; while for political votes and economic content-values change occurs, and in the predicted direction, but only between the first and second periods, and even then it is not significant. For economic votes also, change occurs in the predicted direction between the first and second periods, and it is significant at less than .005; but no significant difference is discernible between the second and third periods. Therefore, the data for none of these four variables confirm the hypothesis; if Jackson became more conservative we must seek some other explanation than aging in office to account for it.

5.2. Was there a significant increase in Jackson's dissenting behavior after his failure to obtain the Chief Justiceship? Before the 1946 Term, the ratio of Jackson's majority to dissenting opinions was 69:24; thereafter it was 120:89. The difference between the ratios for the two periods is significant at $<.005$ (using X^2 and a one-tailed test). The percentage of his dissents was 26 in the earlier period, and 43 in the later one. Jackson's rate of dissent increased by two-thirds after the 1945 Term, but was quite stable thereafter: 44 per cent for the period of the 1946–1949 Terms, and 42 per cent thereafter. Of course, the causal relationship implied by this hypothesis rests upon inference only; it will be no more persuasive than the reasons adduced to support it. The data confirm the descriptive portion of the hypothesis, however, and we cannot reject the hypothesis on the basis of these findings.

5.3. Did Jackson become more conservative in his attitude toward civil liberties, after his experience as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg? Evidently not: when the data for the 1946–49 and 1950–53 periods (Table V) are combined, the direction of change is right for both content-values and votes, but X^2 is only 0.03 and 1.38, respectively, and neither of these is significant even for a one-tailed test. This hypothesis is not confirmed by these data.[56]

5.4. Did Jackson become more conservative in his attitude toward economic issues after the end of World War II? Again, Table V provides the relevant data. The change is in the right direction, for both the content value and voting and it is significant at $<.05$ in both instances—for voting, indeed, $p < .0005$.[57] The relative frequency of his expressions of economic conservatism increased by about two-thirds after the 1945 Term: by 62 per cent (from 34 per cent to 55 per cent) for the content value and by 72 per cent (from 43 per cent to 74 per cent) for voting. The percentages of economic conservatism for the second and third periods are 56 and 54 per cent for the content values, and 76 and 71 per cent for voting. This shows that both his opinion and his voting behavior were highly stable, in regard to this variable, after his return to the Court in 1946. Since the direction of both his verbal and his voting support was E+ during the first period and was E− thereafter, it seems warranted to infer that Jackson was an economic liberal during his first four terms on the Court, and an economic conservative thereafter. As in the case of Hypothesis 5.2, the causal portion of the present hypothesis rests upon inference from biographical data but the objective fact of a significant

TABLE VII. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES, BEFORE AND AFTER THE END OF THE 1948 TERM

Period	C				E			
	Values		Votes		Values		Votes	
	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−
1941–44, 1946–48	14	7	20	16	27	19	32	37
1949–53	21	9	25	24	15	19	14	34

---

[56] For all Jackson's votes on the merits (including decisions in which he wrote no opinions), the marginals for the political variable are 21–41 for the period before the 1945 Term, and 72–139 thereafter. X^2 for these two ratios is 0.013, which indicates that the goodness of fit is significant at $>.95$. Certainly these data confirm the refutation of this hypothesis.

[57] For all Jackson's votes (including decisions in which he wrote no opinions), the marginals for the economic variable are 68–87 for the period before the 1945 Term, and 26–177 thereafter. X^2 for these two ratios is 32.5, which indicates that the increase in the conservatism of his voting on economic issues is significant at $<.0005$, irrespective of whether or not he wrote opinions to rationalize his votes.

shift in Jackson's official behavior in relation to economic policy, which coincided with the World War II period and its aftermath, seems indisputable. The hypothesis cannot be rejected on the basis of these data and findings.

5.5. Our final hypothesis is obviously in contradiction with the preceding hypotheses 5.1, 5.3, and 5.4, each of which assumed that Jackson became more *conservative* in his attitudes toward either civil liberty or economic issues, or both, during the period following his return to the Court from a year's leave of absence. Hypothesis 5.5 states that Jackson became more *liberal*, in regard to both civil liberty and economic issues, after the deaths of Murphy and Rutledge. The test for this hypothesis requires the partitioning of the data into two sets: the 1941–44, 1946–48 Terms; and the 1949–53 Terms.

Only the political content-value changes in the predicted direction; and this change is so minimal that the *goodness of fit* of the two marginal distributions is significant at $>.97$ (with X^2 $<.003$)! Not only are the changes for the other three variables in the wrong direction; economic voting is significantly more conservative although, as we have seen, this change began earlier, as demonstrated by the even higher X^2 for change toward economic conservatism after the 1944 Term. But the fact that this hypothesis must so clearly be rejected is not without interest. Jackson's rank in voting in support of civil liberty shifted abruptly from sixth to fourth, after Murphy and Rutledge left the Court.[58] It would be possible for an analyst working only with the C scale data to interpret this shift in rank as evidence that he changed in his attitude, toward increasing sympathy for civil liberty, during his last five terms on the Court. The present data demonstrate the danger of attempting to make anything other than *relational* inferences, when one is working with ordinal data, for which the underlying metric is unknown and indeed, in terms of such data, incapable of being determined. The appropriate inference from Jackson's rise in scale rank after 1948 would be that, in relation to a different (and generally, more conservative) set of colleagues, Jackson *appeared* to be more favorable to civil liberty than a majority of his colleagues. But Table VII indicates that his own attitude toward civil liberty did not become more favorable; to the contrary, the changes in his opinion and voting behavior toward civil liberty were quite insignificant, and his voting trend was toward greater conservatism.

TABLE VIII. SUMMARY OF TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis	Subject	Decision
1	Clusters	+
2	Factors	0
3	Equivalence of liberalism content-values and votes	+
4	Institutional opinions and separate opinions	−
4′	Majority and dissenting opinions	0
5.1	Increasing conservatism	−
5.2	Increasing dissent after 1945 Term	+
5.3	Increasing C − after 1945 Term	−
5.4	Increasing E − after 1945 Term	+
5.5	Increasing liberalism after 1948 Term	−

(6) Table VIII summarizes the decisions that were reached for each of the hypotheses in the tests discussed above.

TABLE IX. ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM IN MAJORITY AND DISSENTING OPINIONS, BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1945 TERM

Period	1941–44				1946–53			
E Variable	Values		Votes		Values		Votes	
	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+
Opinions								
Majority	3	15	12	28	7	14	23	15
Dissenting	7	4	9	0	21	9	27	3
$\phi =$	.480		.548		.363		.332	
X^2	4.75		11.98		5.31		6.05	
p <	.025		.0005		.025		.01	

---

[58] *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.* fn. 11, *supra*, pp. 105, 113–115.

An examination of Table VIII suggests an additional hypothesis not formulated in advance of the general analysis of the data. The confirmation of Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.4 suggests the question of the relationship between Jackson's economic conservatism and his dissenting behavior. We now know that both his tendency to dissent and his conservatism toward economic policy increased significantly after his return to the Court in 1946; and Tables IV and V both show that his increased economic conservatism during the later period was manifested in both his opinions and his votes. Jackson, in other words, behaved primarily as an economic liberal during the earlier period, and primarily as an economic conservative during the later period; and his switch to conservatism was accompanied by an increasing tendency to dissent. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to infer Hypothesis 6: that there was a significantly high and positive correlation between the economic content-variable and the opinion-variable differences, in that Jackson supported the liberal position in the majority and the conservative position in dissent. To test this hypothesis, let us specify that the stipulated correlation must be observed with both the content and the voting variables during both periods. Thus, the hypothesis would test the relationship between the opinion variable and both the content and voting variables, for Jackson's period of economic liberalism and also for his period of economic conservatism. Confirmation would also establish that the relationship was independent of the *direction* of his support of the economic variable.

It is clear from viewing Table IX that Hypothesis 6 cannot be rejected. The correlations for both the content value and voting are quite stable, notwithstanding Jackson's metamorphosis from a liberal to a conservative position.[59] Of particular interest are the minor diagonals of the four-fold tables, which show that Jackson *argued* in support of economic liberalism in dissenting opinions just as often—indeed, a bit more often—than he supported economic conservatism in majority opinions. In his voting, however, he frequently upheld the conservative position in the majority, while dissenting only thrice in support of economic liberalism during his entire period of service on the Court.[60] The importance of this finding will be apparent presently.

One thing is obvious: the causal parts of Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.4, which were accepted tentatively, must be reconsidered. If Jackson's increasing dissenting behavior and economic conservatism are so highly and consistently correlated, we cannot remain satisfied with independent explanations for each: that his dissenting should be attributed to his disappointment over his failure to become Chief Justice, while his economic conservatism is attributed to the end of the need for judicial support for the war effort, as well as to the collapse of his political ambitions. In the light of Table IX, it seems preferable to rely upon the broader explanation for both his increasing dissidence and his switch to economic conservatism. "Switch" is probably a very poorly chosen word to describe Jackson's behavior, however, if our interest goes beyond the manifest facts to the latent factors.

As we noted above, Jackson was no more prepared to dissent in behalf of economic liberalism in his "liberal" period than during his "conservative" period. Given his own sophisticated sensitivity to the political implications of dissenting behavior, consider that he was unwilling ever to dissent, *even once*, in support of the position that we can assume would have furthered his political ambitions, during the time when such a display of conspicuous economic liberalism might have done him the most good, politically speaking. I attribute his failure so to behave, with such rationality, to a consistency with his own most strongly rooted attitude; and the evidence of the present study strongly indicates that this was economic conservatism. Therefore, Jackson's change in his opinions to greater support for economic conservatism, and his reinforcing dissenting behavior, reflected not a conversion to a new view of political economy, but rather a reversion—at least, at the behavioral level—to the beliefs of his forefathers, his youth, and his manhood prior to his entry into political office.

V. CONCLUSION

A significant positive correlation exists between Jackson's verbal and voting support for political liberalism, although his overall voting record manifested less sympathy for civil libertarianism than did his opinions; in relation to his colleagues, Jackson consistently was a moderate in his voting on civil liberty issues. He showed a slight but not significant tendency toward greater political conservatism after the end of World War II, which apparently was quite independent of the swings of his colleagues toward greater (1946–48 Terms) and toward lesser (1949–1953 Terms) political liberalism.

---

[59] The corresponding correlations between political liberalism/conservatism (in either content-values or voting) and majority/dissenting opinions, are negative, low, and insignificant. Of course for the entire period of twelve terms, the correlations for the economic variables necessarily are positive and significant: .475 between content-values and opinions, and .458 between voting and opinions.

[60] All three economically liberal dissents came in the 1952 Term.

The issue to which Jackson was most deeply attached was economic policy, and a very high and significant correlation shows up between his opinion and voting behavior in this regard. Renowned as an economic liberal at the time of his appointment to the Court, he maintained this image, in both his opinions and his voting, only during his first four terms. After the war, his behavior changed sharply and significantly to strong and consistent support of economic conservatism; and throughout his last eight terms on the Court, he vied with Frankfurter for the bottom position in the cumulative scales of voting in support of economic liberalism. His rate of dissent in behalf of economic conservatism doubled during this later period.

His espousal of economic liberalism and relatively low rate of dissent during the war years were generalized characteristics of his official behavior, in addition to being specifically related to each other. The same was true of his economic conservatism and much higher rate of dissent after the war. My conclusion is that Jackson's economic liberalism was a necessary function of his political career; and that the collapse of his political ambitions for the Chief Justiceship and even the presidency best explains his reversion to economic conservatism and his increasing dissidence. With life tenure as an associate justice, he had nothing more to lose; and so he wrote and voted in support of the value that was most fundamentally related to his way of life and his career before he went into politics.

CONFINING CONDITIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY BREAKTHROUGHS*

Otto Kirchheimer†
Columbia University

I want to try to connect the course of several regimes with what, for want of a better name, I shall call "confining conditions"—the particular social and intellectual conditions present at the births of these regimes. Do I prejudice the case by calling the sum total of the prerevolutionary situation confining conditions rather than calling them more neutrally, as Val Lorwin suggested to me, simply antecedent conditions? Yet every situation which a new regime finds at its inception is an antecedent one. I am concerned specifically—and only—with the conditions that have to be overcome if the new regime is to continue. How the new regime may accomplish this, or may fail to, is the subject of this paper. Therefore I consider the nature of the confining conditions, chiefly those of social structure; the nature of the new regime; and the nature of the methods available to it, as well as those it adopts to overcome the confining conditions.

In discussing political action, we often ask the question: did the man or the group have to act the way he, or they, did? What other options were open, *e.g.*, to Stalin in the late 1920s? Not being satisfied with the answer that, given the character of Stalin, the eventual course of action was really to be expected all along, we might profitably shift the question to a different level. To what extent do the circumstances attendant upon the rise of a new regime determine its subsequent actions? The late Franz Neumann raised such questions in regard to the course of the National Socialist regime. His *Behemoth* was an impressive attempt to show how the confining conditions under which the regime worked—especially the fact that it came to power with the help of leaders of German heavy industry—not only switched the track for the National Socialists, but explained many of their patterns of actions long after their regime was firmly established.

Yet Neumann's account of the German state organization and its supersession by the movement-type party already foreshadows the problems which increasingly preoccupied his thoughts (although only in fragmentary publications) in his later years. To what extent can a revolutionary power structure move away from the specific constellation of forces which presided over its origin, and move off in a different direction of its own?

I

Neumann had little difficulty with the negative test. Whoever fails to put his hands on the switch—either because of a lack of the social prerequisites (France in 1848) or because of a lack of will power (Germany in 1918)—cannot deflect the current into new circuits. Neither the leaders of the incipient French labor and Socialist movement of 1848, nor the leaders of the numerically strong but unimaginative organizations of the German Socialists in 1918, ever tried to put their hands on the switches. Crowded from the center of power, they soon could not even hold to the position of initiating incremental changes. Even the modest role of setting into motion long-range changes, with all due anticipatory consideration of other power-holders' reactions, escapes the group which fails to make a political breakthrough. Such a group becomes an object, rather than a subject, of the political process.

The capacity to compress thoroughgoing or revolutionary change—as distinct from incremental change—into a minimum of time, according to the new power-holders' own timetable, is the test of revolutionary victory. What are the possible dimensions, and what are the limits, of such capacity for change? In his later publications, and on the basis of Soviet experience, Neumann held that political power could make itself supreme and thereby make itself the font of economic power.[1]

II

But what does this supremacy amount to? Let us first look at Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. By the 1930s Germany had become a highly industrialized country. Yet its style of inter-group relations, in spite of formal

---

* Work on this article, first prepared as a paper for the 1965 APSA meeting in Washington, D.C., was made possible by a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

† Deceased November 22, 1965.

[1] See esp. ch. 1, "Approaches to the study of political power," and ch. 10, "Economics and Politics in the 20th century," in Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, 1957).

constitutional change, still reflected the mood and conditions of a bygone era. Perhaps scaling down the politically and economically expensive position of Eastern agrarian elements might have eliminated enough of the anachronism to allow the restructuring of class relations on a more modern, cooperative basis.

Instead of opting for that sort of program, Germany started a course of imperialist conquests in the heart of Europe, with the new political elite lording it over both the domestic scene and the subject countries. This course entailed extraordinary risks, which only a revolutionary group, able to ride roughshod over all opposition, would take.

To put it another way, the industrialists were a specialized functional elite falling in with the deliberate option of a revolutionary political group. Whatever the apparent short-term risks and the factors of long-range instability in this choice, the conquest of Europe, western and eastern, represented one way of producing an entirely new realignment of internal forces, superseding the need to rearrange internal group relations in a manner more common in Western Europe.

Inter-group relations had changed as a consequence of the economic crisis and were certainly overripe for restructuring. The degree of their restructuring was an open question, but not its direction. That restructuring had to take into account the loss of power suffered by the labor groups as a consequence of the economic crisis and of their own continuing fratricidal cleavages.

The brutal imperialism on a neo-populist basis, with its efficient mixture of revolutionary political organization and industrial-society elements, had its roots in the ideological and material conditions of German society. But this imperialism was at most the contingent, not the necessary outcome. Within the context of an advanced industrial society, an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime that might have tried to overcome the political disequilibrium with the support or incorporation of some sections of a crisis-inflated mass movement, was as much a possibility as the total seizure of power by a revolutionary mass movement itself. In fact, when the Nazis took over power, they operated for some months in a manner intended to leave the population in the dark as to whether their practices would correspond to or amalgamate with the bureaucratic-authoritarian solution. This tactic facilitated the undisturbed take-over of power by the mass movement.[2] Between the conditioning factors of its inception and the reality of the Third Reich, were the intervening visions, the organizing genius and the perseverance of the revolutionary political group.

Let us turn to the case of the Soviet Union. In order to obtain a measure of initial acceptance, the leaders of the Petrograd Revolution had to put their stamp of approval on the seizure of the gentry's land by the peasantry. However, this policy aggravated the age-old difficulties which had beset the Russian polity and which Stolypin's dissolution of the *Obshina* had only started to tackle: the need of accelerating transformation to an industrial society by simultaneously shifting population to the cities and modernizing agricultural methods. Stalin's forced collectivization was an answer to the difficulties caused by the lower rate of industrial growth and reagrarianization of the country in the 1920s, which coincided with the considerable rural exodus to the cities.[3] Having at his disposal a strong enough administrative apparatus to reverse the process of Kulakization under the NEP and to collectivize agriculture, Stalin had a range of choices in regard to the methods of collectivization. If he wanted to industrialize rapidly, however, he probably had little choice about the principle of collectivization. Left alone, the peasants would have dictated both the pace and the direction of industrialization by consuming more and delivering less food to the rest of the country.

What matters in this context is the interrelation between socio-economic conditioning and the discretionary element left to the decision of the regime. The setting up of larger agricultural units and the shifting of agricultural surplus population to industrial life were bound to take place under almost any regime. The revolutionary approval of land seizure by the peasantry, plus the conditions of the NEP period, had aggravated the regime's difficulties by creating an important new proprietary interest at a time when the regime was unable to offer enough industrial goods to entice the peasants to part voluntarily with their produce. Yet, at the same time, a coercive apparatus was at hand to collectivize the land, and collect food surpluses. The general problem of the relations between the agricultural sector and the industrial sectors of a modernizing society was given, irrespective of whether the country was to be governed by an autocracy, a bourgeois democracy, or the Communist Party. What the supremacy of a revolutionary group entailed was a much wider choice of means and strategies to carry out the transformation. The "whole-hog Stalin"[4] was not necessary, and Stalin's methods were counterproductive, if measured by the yard-stick of what more gradual, part-cooperative collectivization could have obtained in both good will and direct production results. Yet given the need for accelerating the transformation as a condition for survival of the revolutionary group, the internal leadership struggle resulted in the decision that the gain in time would outweigh the costs of forced collectivization. Zigzagging in the course of the great industrialization debate, Stalin used changes in his own position to eliminate actual and potential rivals, and then used his ensuing supremacy over the dominant political group to enforce the most ruthless of the available options. But the need for industrialization created fundamental claims on any regime, as it had even on the Tsarist regime.

---

[2] The various expectations during the transition period in 1933 can now be followed in Bracher-Sauer Schulz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung* (Westdeutscher Verlag, Koeln-Opladen, 1960).

[3] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 119–151.

The social and economic frame of the particular society, then, lays down a conditioning perimeter within which the original choice has to be made and solutions have to be sought. Hitler, for example, could not—as some of his loyal adherents had dreamt—do for the German retailers and craftsmen what he could afford to do for the German peasant: he could not convert small shops into hereditary entailed estates, protected against hopeless competitive odds.[5] The very progress of accelerated rearmament and the preparations for foreign conquest necessitated the most efficient industrial production units, leaving the small independent with the option of becoming a dependent factory hand. In realigning his norms and expectations with those of the new powerholders, the doomed independent could at least adopt as his own the choice of the regime, perilous and adventurous though it might be. In this way the very exercise of the regime's option might change the social preconditions of his existence, releasing new psychic energies before the regime's long-term options bore visible results. Thus the socio-economic perimeter itself might seem expandable. Was it?

What we might call "expansion of the perimeter" is the alteration of the social structure or economic basis of society or—more slowly, but still visibly, by the processes of modern communications and education—the alteration of intellectual habits by the new masters of the polity. For the new rulers by then have arrived at a stage, which may come very quickly after a revolution, when they are working out the details of their options. They have arrested the acceleration of chaos, as in Soviet Russia, or mastered their new tasks of propaganda and control, as in Nazi Germany. In these cases the rulers were not crushed by what might be called "societal due dates."

Among these societal "due dates," one repeats itself so often as to become a major confining condition: foreign intervention in national revolutions. Usually we would think of confining conditions as factors embedded in the social structure out of which revolutions originate. But the shrinking of the world, both physically and intellectually, the attendant and anticipated impact of revolutionary upheaval on other countries, and the power increments expected from successful intervention, or the power losses feared from the emergence of a new recruit to revolutionary causes—all these have caused a succession of foreign interventions.

---

[4] Alex Nove, *Economic Rationality in Soviet Politics* (New York, 1964), p. 32. *Cf.* M. Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialisation Debate 1924–1928* (Harvard University Press, 1960): "A policy of moderate tempos would strengthen the position of the upper strata of the villages and would make the adroit balancing between them and the unruly radicals of the cities a necessity which could be adopted only as a temporary expedient. Had such a course been pursued over a long period of time the regime would have stood to lose not only from its possible failures but also from its successes. The alternative to such retreats and maneuvers leading to the gradual erosion of the dictatorial system was clearly a massive counterattack which would have broken once and for all the peasants' power over the basic decisions of economic policy. A high speed industrialisation with a strong emphasis on the capital goods sector which Stalin now favored provided the logical line for such a counterattack." (p. 174)

"The overhang of agricultural excess population permitted the manning of equipment which was physically usable with the surplus peasants of yesterday, which could be removed from the countryside without a notable detriment to agricultural output and be employed at a real wage barely exceeding their wretchedly lower consumption levels of the earlier status." (p. 184)

[5] Gurland, Kirchheimer, Neumann, *The Fate of Small Business in Nazi Germany*, 78th Cong., 1st sess., *Hearings*, Sen. Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, Comm. Print No. 14 (1943), p. 152.

The story and some figures can be found in Arthur Schweitzer, *Big Business in the Third Reich* (Bloomington, Ind., 1964), chs. 4 and 5.

Even with the present-day technique of fighting or forestalling revolution by stage-managing counter-insurgency, foreign intervention often carries its own antidote. It encourages the revolutionary forces to telescope changes into shorter periods and facilitates popular acceptance of those changes; it makes for a degree of unification and acceptance of a new national symbolism otherwise hard to obtain. But the possibility of overcoming this confining condition is aleatory; success or failure may depend on policy shifts in the intervening country, over which the influence of the revolutionary elite is far more limited than it is on domestic conditions.

In the face of all these difficulties, the political group may lose its momentum, return to the incremental pattern, or even cave in completely. Too many checks may have been drawn at the same time against the new regime's limited bank account, and the regime's very weakness may have accelerated the simultaneous presentation of demands. Yet, on the other hand, its interdependent supply of physical force and capital of community confidence may just allow it to scrape through, keeping some commanding positions fairly intact. In this latter case, we want to analyze what happens to the initial conditioning perimeter: have the original confining conditions been changed by a decisive breakthrough? Has the new political system really become supreme and able to develop systematic patterns of its own? If so, we then measure revolutionary change by the new system's ability to extricate itself from the confining conditions of the previous period. The old data may still be present, though absorbed in a new context and thereby deprived of their confining nature.

The leaders of the USSR have achieved such a breakthrough, transforming Russia into a major industrial system. While they still experience difficulties with agrarian organization, and these in turn delay the fulfillment of urgent consumer expectations, such problems can scarcely endanger the subsistence level. Most of the confining conditions have been removed, at whatever cost to those who lived through—or died during—the long decades it took to accomplish that feat.

The German National Socialist experience remained abortive, but no conclusions as to the impossibility of overcoming the initial confining conditions can be drawn from the collapse due to external defeat in a two-front war. Certainly the wholesale program of conquest of Eastern Europe would have allowed a more drastic restructuring of internal group relations in Germany than would a more limited program of hegemony over Western Europe. The existence of a large industrial working class with a tradition of self-organization (even if momentarily without any organization), and of a bureaucratic and officer group only superficially and conditionally loyal to the regime, made the program of maximal conquest of Eastern Europe more attractive to the new rulers than the more restricted takeover of Western Europe. For such a conquest might have led to the pulverizing of existing German social relations for the benefit of the Nazi rulers. A vast imperial apparatus with Germans from all walks of life lording it over the indigenous Eastern Europeans, while German industry expanded into vast new territories, might have accomplished an efficient restructuring of German society. Such an apparatus would have constituted a major guarantee against renewed efforts of surviving splinters of former social and political elites to make come-back attempts—which actually were made at every new turn in the fortunes of the regime as long as its conquests were not consolidated.

In both the Russian case and the German case, the experiment was part of a unique conjunction of circumstances: the disorganization and breakdown of an economic and political system in Russia, and the incapacity and disorganization, although not quite the breakdown, in Germany, and the simultaneous activity and availability for power of a revolutionary group. In Germany the revolutionary group actively promoted the breakdown; in Russia it exploited a pre-existent one. The breakdown thus had the effect of releasing revolutionary energies; it was in a certain sense a counterconfiguration of the confining conditions, and made action possible toward overcoming it. In the one case the group was more opportunistic; in the other more doctrinaire; but, at any rate, both were acting outside the frame of the traditional conceptual apparatus of politicians. They made only short-range compromises, which they revoked as soon as the slightest margin of safety allowed them to do so. In both cases we might ask how the action of the revolutionary group related to the sum-total of confining conditions.

Due to the intervening external conditions, the German case does not carry much probative value either way. As to the USSR, the argument that the major outcome—conversion into an industrial society—would have taken place in any event does not upset our conclusion. The fact is that a "premature" industrial revolution, compressing various stages of social development into an extremely limited time span determined by its political elite—moreover, with primitive accumulation by the state and not private owners, and with national sovereignty exalted in the process—did take place. This is highly relevant to our original question: here a revolutionary regime did move beyond the confining conditions under which it arose.

III

To illuminate another facet of the problem, I want to discuss the conditions of collaboration of various political forces under a revolutionary regime. Where lies the well-spring of common action? To what extent does the variation in composition and orientation of such forces determine the confines of their actions from the very outset?

I have in mind here the well known episode of the relations between Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety toward the Paris *sans-culottes* from autumn 1793 to early summer 1794. One might describe the situation after the autumn days of 1793 as an uneasy coalition between the committee and the Paris *sans-culottes,* ideologically represented and sometimes led by Hébert and Chaumette.[6] Neither group could have acted effectively without the other. Their presence served as a means for Robespierre to keep his hold over the Convention, as much as the Committee served as a means for the *sans-culottes* to push their political and economic demands. The common ground which provided both their dynamics and their larger justification was the unconditional pursuit of the revolutionary war. There was at best a partial meeting of minds and never a complete convergence on social and economic goals. In order to carry on the war and to avoid spiralling inflation, price and wage controls were indicated. Yet—apart from military procurement—farmers and merchants were frequently able to circumvent price controls. The Paris city administration, on the other hand, was lukewarm in enforcing wage controls. Such contradictions were partly solved by the trial and guillotining of Hébert and Chaumette. Although their execution was followed in *jeu de bascule* fashion within two weeks by the execution of Danton and Desmoulins, the victory of Fleurus in June 1794 lifted, to some extent, the radical mortgage on Robespierre and allowed the dismantling of price controls. The result was to do away with the often uncontrollable district clubs, and to restrict the more egalitarian policies, in an attempt at securing a steady flow of bread at the official price to the urban population. The pay-off came on the 9th of Thermidor when the National Guard did not come out for Robespierre, but went home; and when the district assemblies meeting that evening were split wide open between loyalty to the Convention or to the more radical politics of the *sans-culottes.*

But is this the only, or a sufficient, reason for the turn of events? First, a seemingly more accidental fact: on the decisive afternoon, when the National Guard was assembled on the Place de Grève with all its equipment, there was no leader resolute enough to make them march against the Convention. What about the less obvious links in the chain of causation? There was the matter of sheer physical fatigue of the Paris *militants,* who had been in the thick of the political struggle for the previous five years; and the fact that many of the younger ones had departed for the war fronts. There was the phenomenon which we now call the circulation of elites: the most vigorous and the most intelligent of them had meanwhile taken government jobs in the central administration and war machine, and had formed new and different bonds of allegiance. This brings us nearer to another, more Protean constellation: *sans-culottes* are a political, not a social, category. Their major ties were common political sympathies: hatred of the aristocracy and support of the new regime and the military program. This motley crew of unemployed, journeymen, artisans, shopkeepers, lawyers, teachers, government employees, and even a sprinkling of merchants, could scarcely have a unified *social* outlook. Some of them being independent producers and middlemen, and others being wage earners, they would scarcely see eye-to-eye on economic issues. They remained parcels of various occupational groups. They could join the revolutionary battle all the more easily because their social and occupational distinctions had not always jelled into class-consciousness. They remained accessible to a variety of sometimes contradictory appeals, guiding their behavior in speech and action.

---

[6] For literature on the episode see the general discussion in Georges Lefebvre, *La Révolution française,* 3d ed. (Paris, 1963), pp. 354–430, and most interesting in this context his remarks on pp. 407–409; two more specialized works by Daniel Guérin, *La Lutte de Classes sous la Première République, Bourgeois et "bras nus" (1793–1797),* 2 vols. (Paris, 1946), and Albert Soboul, *Les Sans-culottes Parisiens en l'an II, Mouvement Populaire et Gouvernement Révolutionnaire, 2 Juin, 1793—9 Thermidor an II* (Paris, 1958), esp. pp. 427–433, 503–504, 1025–1035. Guérin draws explicit conclusions as to the class content of the struggle between Robespierre and the *sans-culottes.* Soboul analyzes a wealth of hitherto unknown documents, among them papers of district assemblies and district clubs. His conclusions from the assembled material, though more shaded, are in line with those of Guérin as to the *sans-culottes*-Revolutionary Government relation. For the social composition of the *sans-culottes* see also G. Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (London, 1959), pp. 178–84.

Suppose that Robespierre had saved his neck on the 9th of Thermidor due to a fresh intervention of the National Guard. Could this coalition of the national revolutionary government and its advanced urban clientele have lasted? While trying to find its way through a bedlam of conflicting interests, the Committee of Public Safety was ideologically committed to uphold the sanctity of private property—with exceptions necessitated by the conduct of the war. Moreover, its policy toward the disposal of the agricultural properties of the *émigré* nobles and the church bears little evidence of a sustained interest in the cause of the small peasant and the landless farmhand. How would it have related itself in the long run to the interests not only of the merchants but of the upper echelons of the peasants? Even if we disregard the discordant interests among the *sans-culottes*—bound to come out more sharply after the most urgent war pressures had receded—could the Robespierre-*sans-culotte* combination have long outlasted the immediate danger period of the war?

Seventeen hundred ninety-three marks the definitive entry of the urban masses upon the French political scene. But, given the forces present at that particular historical juncture, the 1793–94 episode is a great precursor of problems yet to come. Whenever they were in a position to make their own political contribution in the decades ahead, the peasants would make short shrift of "prematurely" radical political ideas.

If we except exceedingly short periods in 1848 and 1871, and abortive movements remaining below the most provisional governmental level, the people at large did not move into the center of political decision. It is for this reason that the coalition of the Committee of Public Safety and the *sans-culottes* of 1793–94 still retains such a paradigmatic interest. For here we must raise the question, to what extent the possibility existed—which became so important in the Chinese and Russian revolutions of the 20th century—of jumping stages of societal development and compressing two revolutions into one? To what extent could the 1793–94 combination have possessed the organizational cohesion, the unity of purpose, and the technical means to overcome its confining conditions—*i.e.*, its being surrounded by a sea of peasantry and torn by the discordances between two constituent elements, the bourgeois-governmental wing and the popular Paris-street wing? The attitude of the governmental wing toward economic and social policy issues shows how alien the conscious reshaping of society by governmental fiat remained to them. They tried to keep the backdoor through which such measures entered—war-time necessity and the pressure of their Paris allies—as well guarded as they could under the circumstances of the day. The breakup of the combination and Robespierre's subsequent defeat without serious intervention by his erstwhile radical associates highlight the lack of cohesive social consciousness needed to take the revolution beyond its pristine bourgeois phase.

The heterogeneous nature of the short-lived coalition of the 1793–94 period of the Revolution was in itself the chief confining condition of that Revolution. The Paris *avant-garde,* with all its revolutionary fervor, was anything but unified and anything but uniformly proletarian (however we define "proletarian" in pre-industrial Paris). The National government, temporary coalition partner of the revolutionary Paris Commune, was riven by personal quarrels and conflicts among the various organs of government. Beyond that, and even more fundamental, the revolutionary government was unwilling to injure the interests of merchants and agricultural property owners beyond what the conduct of the war in its most desperate phase seemed to make necessary. Organizational centralization, the "maximum" for food prices, and the unfulfilled promise of the famous "Ventôse decrees": these were adopted to win the war, not to establish a social millennium or create the cadres to maintain the revolutionary regime.

IV

So far my attention has been directed toward the capacity of revolutionary groups to transcend the confining conditions which surrounded their coming to power. I now want to move on to a discussion of some facets of what Charles Beard called the "Second American Revolution," the Civil War. Must I first justify inclusion of the Civil War in this survey of relations of revolutionary outcomes to preëxistent social structures? The Civil War, one might assert, was not started by a revolutionary group intent on changing the social structure of society; it only settled a limited argument over permissible forms of national property relations. And yet, the way the conflict was settled indicates an obvious connection between the structure of southern *ante-bellum* society and the final outcome of the conflict. Should we say that the solution—which gave the Negro only the outward trappings of freedom—indicated the absence of such a revolutionary group, and let it go at that? The case is not improved if we amend this statement to read that no revolutionary group was in undisputed control of the state machinery, not even during the reconstruction period. For saying this much is enough to make us realize that, even in the 19th century, revolution and civil war, if not cohabiting in permanent fashion as they do in the 20th, kept close enough quarters to justify simultaneous discussion. What I am looking for here is a key to the peculiar mixture between recessive elements—the reprise of parcels of the *ante-bellum* structure—and supervening changes in southern society which marked the history of the conflict, of reunion and reaction.

Let me at the outset lay down some theses, mostly borrowed—with his kind permission—from an as-yet-unpublished manuscript of Barrington Moore concerning those features of the original conflict which might have had some bearing on the *post-bellum* development.[7]

(1) The two distinct forms of social organization—emergent eastern business society and southern slave-holding agrarian society—contained certain elements favoring coexistence.

(2) The political marriage of convenience between eastern iron and western grain, between higher tariffs and more land for the present and future farmers of the West, spared the eastern industrialists the need to search for accommodation with the southern planters.

(3) The outbreak of the war was facilitated by the absence of strong ties between the two sections, East and South, rather than by a head-on collision on economic issues.

(4) The weakness of the federal enforcement apparatus, tied to the uncertainty of the eventual orientation of the territories, loomed large in the causal chain leading to the war.

By the 1850s the East had become a manufacturing center, with both East and West becoming less dependent on the South and more complementary to each other. All the same, until the 1860s cotton had remained second in eastern manufacturing and the East continued to provide financial, transportation, and marketing services for the South. Eastern business and western farmers showed little animosity toward the "peculiar institution" of their southern trading partners. Eastern factory hands, fearing the competition of freed slaves, were lukewarm on the slave issue. While the South experienced some shortage in available new slave labor, its production system had not become unworkable from the viewpoint of either discipline or profit.[8] Points of conflict between the South and East seemed negotiable, with eastern tariff demands possibly to be compromised against southern wishes for consideration in the settlement of virgin western lands. Such considerations, however, have to be seen against some barriers hard to overcome. In the days before the gigantic public expenditures possible under endlessly expandable defense labels, the East could do little for the South except to buy its cotton, and such trade could not be expanded at will. The resumption of the slave trade remained a non-negotiable proposition; to that extent a moral issue was of direct political importance. England remained the most important customer of the South, a fact which nourished the expectation of a viable independent South. In the East, labor trouble which would make the industrial community run for aid to the southern planter was not yet on the horizon, leaving the moderates only narrow scope in their search for viable compromises.

In the presence of such weak links between the regions, strictly political factors, the impact of the battle over enforcement procedures for legislative compromises, loomed large. In a society with a simple authority structure, official powers rest largely on the willingness of the respective political clienteles to abide by the terms of the agreements their political representatives reached. The clienteles' unwillingness to do so, coupled with great weakness and irresoluteness of the central authority, spelt uncertainty of expectations and diminished the individual's reliance on official procedures to a vanishing point. In such a situation, legislative compromises predicated on semiautomatic enforceability—the Fugitive Slave Act—or, like the Kansas-Nebraska Act, needing the services of an impartial state power able and willing to see things through, must falter in implementation. But somehow the notion of the state power ordering the relations of its citizens by active intervention was something rather alien to the thinking of the West in the 19th century. (We shall come back to this point a little later.) It certainly found little room in the minds of the pre-Civil War generation looking on the respective presidents, judges and governors with their marshals and troops either as useful auxiliaries or as foes.[9]

---

[7] It goes without saying that the conclusions I draw from Moore's analysis are entirely my own.

[8] Conrad and Meyer, "The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South," in *The Economics of Slavery and Other Econometric Studies* (Chicago, 1964). What is argued in such accounts is the question of profitability of slavery then and there, rather than long term development prospects, which form the basis of Eugene D. Genovese's *The Political Economy of Slavery* (New York, 1965). See esp. p. 204.

The war thus appears as the product of uncertainty as to how to delineate authoritatively the various claims—especially over the status of slavery in the territories—of two societies resting on different social orders: an emergent democratic business society and an agricultural economy grounded on slave labor. The postwar peace could have had one of two meanings: it could have meant a change in the sum total of southern property relations, destroying the planter aristocracy by the use of northern military power and handing over agricultural property titles to the former slaves. Yet, "Lincoln's war" had not been conducted for that purpose.[10] Nor did eastern business society, balanced on the one hand by labor's capacity to move West and on the other by the inexhaustible replenishment of its labor force from Europe, have such wide-ranging intentions, which would have endangered the basis of all private property relations. Consequently, after the 1866–68 intermezzo, orchestrated by the radical congressional reconstructionists, the narrower peace goals gained ascendancy: only the property titles in slaves and in southern war bonds remained cancelled. The "Thermidor" of 1877 was the inevitable conclusion from the carpetbaggers' and the Negroes' inability to keep themselves going without the aid of the federal government, and from that government's unwillingness to go on supporting them. But it brought out in full all those recessive traits which had their origin in the *ante-bellum* southern society. It transformed the southern Negro from a sheltered slave into a formally free but unprotected sharecropper. In the same breath it deprived him of the possibility of exercising his political rights as an entrance wedge for full participation in the American society. "Henceforth," as Vann Woodward says, "the nation as a nation will have nothing to do with him."[11]

If the Negro's transfer from his slave to his sharecropper status—including his right to exchange his existence as a southern bondsman for that of an eastern or western unskilled factory hand or a migratory worker—had been the only difference in the social structure as a consequence of the war, we might well conclude that in this particular instance the recessive traits, mirroring the conditioning perimeter, the existence of a slaveholding aristocracy, did indeed prevail. But this is only part of the story.

The fact is that the second American Revolution did take place, and many of its effects did penetrate into the South. To what extent the second revolution as a whole was causally linked to the Civil War, to what extent the war even accelerated the progress of industrial society, is problematic;[12] assertions of causal relation have a *post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc* sound. And the system of enlarged corporate property protection, which came into constitutional interpretation by courtesy of the Fourteenth Amendment, would no doubt have found its way into court practice by some other route. The same may be true of the southern impact on congressional voting patterns, which would probably have established themselves anyhow whenever sufficiently important interests needed an alliance with the South. But the opening up of the South to the influx of eastern industry, accompanied as it was by an enlargement and shift of the social basis of the predominant group through the impoverishment of the planters and the rise of a mercantile southern middle class, is a feature directly resulting from the outcome of the Civil War. Opening the South bridged the separation between the two formerly distinct types of society and so worked toward establishing in the South a modified sub-type of American business society. In this sub-type, narrowed down since the Civil War to a limited district with no chance of enlargement, the Negro remains a disadvan-

---

[9] Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Nation*, vol. 2 (New York, 1941), ch. 2.

[10] J. G. Randall and D. Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 2d ed. (Boston, 1961), ch. 22. Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Era of Reconstruction* (New York, 1965), p. 44: "Indeed it may be said that if it was Lincoln's destiny to go down in history as the Great Emancipator, rarely has a man embraced his destiny with greater reluctance than he."

[11] C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction*, 2d ed. (New York, Anchor, 1956), p. 232.

[12] Thomas C. Cochran, "Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization?" in *The Inner Revolution* (Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 39–54.

taged sub-species of the least fortunate segment of the population.

The American case is most intriguing because here we have the juxtaposition of recessive conditions going back to the *ante-bellum* social structure and the general pattern of change taking place within American society in the second half of the 19th century. While the victory of the business society was a universal phenomenon, its particular democratic garb found an inhospitable territory in the South. Surviving in the transfigured form necessitated by the advance of the business society, the confining conditions, from which the war had arisen, left their imprint on southern society. The writ of the federal government and, much more firmly, the writ of business society ran across the whole country. But in the South, these writs were always modified by the survivals of the old caste structure; the political form of southern society remained ambiguously pre-democratic.

V

What separates the "Second Revolution" of mid-19th century America from the pronouncedly political revolutions of the 20th century is the subsidiary part that state power played in the transformation of 19th century society. In this respect there is a certain concordance between theory and practice. Nineteenth-century ideologists did not think of state power as something to be mobilized at will for the purpose of changing societal relations. Whatever the differences among Hegel's disciples, to this extent his panlogistic state concept had been drastically revised. His conservative disciple, Lorenz von Stein, built his doctrine on the juxtaposition of state and society. The fight for liberty and equality and the determination of the individual's position were to take place within society, with the state coming in only as a regulatory afterthought.[13] Stein's state amounted to a mixture of the *Rechtsstaat* principle—in itself a guarantee of regularity of proceedings rather than of active intervention—and his dreams of a social monarchy which would both assure the integrity of society and even out the inequalities emerging from society's struggle.[14]

Marx was more interested in discovering the laws governing the development of society. The reciprocal relations between state and society, which had fascinated his contemporary Stein, had few mysteries for him. He had little doubt about the place of law, state, and intellectual structures and assigned them their roots firmly in the material conditions of society. Interference with the modalities of the social process was rather in the nature of becoming conscious of its inexorable course, at best with a proletarian advance guard as a midwife, but at any rate with no need for an independent directing force.

Against the background of his French experience, Tocqueville took to analyzing the partly chaotic, partly creative political scene of the United States in the early 1830s. Could the political authorities attempt to direct the societal process—that is to say, would individuals acting singly or jointly accept such decisions? He left little doubt that, given the state of mind of the American community, the banding together of freely acting individuals for self-appointed tasks—whatever the degree of administrative efficiency of such a procedure—was the only politically feasible way to make meaningful decisions.[15]

The acceptance of a number of amendments, civil rights and enforcement statutes was one of the ways to mark the official victory of the Civil War. But once the battle over enactment was won the documents turned into a series of political propositions; they had to be absorbed and in this process were modified and even turned around by the various authoritative interpreters active in the constitutional system. Nineteenth-century America felt no need for a central organ in charge of transforming a battlefield victory into a system of political legitimacy of universal validity.

VI

Let us now look at the much more traditional western and central European society of the mid-19th century, the era of the Chartists and the repeal of the Corn Laws, Prussian pseudo-constitutionalism and the administrative system of Napoleon III. With all due consideration for differences in upbringing and societal outlook of their respective political elites—including for the European a somewhat greater distance between governing classes and the business community—the European ways of approaching political problems remained as circumscribed as those of their American counterparts. English conservatives might have a somewhat greater sense of urgency about what might be done for the submerged classes than their liberal brethren; the latter might be more confident in their ability to uphold what we now call civil liberties in the face of threatening lower-class agitation. Bismarck could make a show of demonstrating how a polity might be run, even if the bourgeoisie refrained from giving it budgetary support. But his was a conservative machine running it, scarcely given to innovation beyond the field of military techniques and bounties for promising business men. The differences appear to us today as nuances rather than qualitative distinctions. Neither was bent on pushing sudden social or political change, or remodelling the minds of men and the institutions of the country. Even the men of the Paris Commune, the most radical of the century's children ever to have acceded to government office, made few and cautious moves in the field of social policy.

---

[13] Lorenz von Stein, *Geschichte der Socialen Bewegung in Frankreich von 1789 bis auf unsere Tage*, vol. I, *Der Begriff der Gesellschaft*, ed. Dr. Gottfried Salomon (Muenchen, 1921).

[14] Lorenz von Stein, *Verwaltungslehre*, 2d ed. (1869), vol. I, p. 82 *et seq.*

[15] *De la Démocratie en Amerique*, 14th ed. (Paris, 1864), vol. I, p. 149.

The problem of diverse expectations based on the operation of free societal forces and the limited trust in the workings of the state machinery bring us nearer an explanation of why the Second American Revolution was accompanied by two seemingly discordant results. This revolution was carried out by independent social components of the polity, supported by, but not dependent on, the political machinery of the day. It succeeded well in transforming most of America; yet it allowed the political transformation of the South via the emancipation of the Negro to fizzle out for nearly a century. It is one thing to watch the destruction of property titles as an inevitable consequence of defeat in a rebellion. It is something entirely different to destroy them as part of a concerted plan to reorganize society by state fiat. Such a measure, though proposed, went beyond the horizon of the radical political leaders who thought in terms of advantageous political combinations rather than consciously engineered social revolutions.[16]

With the First World War as a watershed, we are able to see the decisive differences between 19th and 20th century revolutions. Masses had been brought together in the 19th century by political organizations on a semi-permanent basis; their minds had been exercised by expectations of economic benefit, social innovation, or patriotic or religious exaltation. But only the First World War showed how the public authorities, first with the joyous and later on the increasingly reluctant cooperation of the population, could mobilize huge masses of men and technical forces of hitherto unknown destructiveness and link them in huge organizations for official national goals.

While the official apparatus was everywhere quickly dismantled after the war, the experience was not lost on a new crop of political organizers. If such great results could be reached for the traditional goal of acting on the power structure of other societies, why not use similar methods on the domestic structure? The official state apparatus with its limited vistas, its simultaneous mixture of tradition-bound procedure and immersion in the particular interests of one group or another, with its hesitant and uneasy role of arbitration, was neither intellectually nor technically equipped for such a task. It is the merger of political movement and official state organization, the simultaneous unfolding of the mechanisms of change and the purveying of new loyalties, which mark the differences between the revolutionary dynamics of the 20th and the largely uncontrolled social and economic revolution of the 19th century. The 19th-century government concentrated the energies of its much more slender and haphazard apparatus on emergency periods.

The revolution of the 20th Century obliterates the distinction between emergency and normalcy. Movement plus state can organize the masses because: (a) the technical and intellectual equipment is now at hand to direct them toward major societal programs rather than simply liberating their energies from the bonds of tradition; (b) they have the means at hand to control people's livelihood by means of job assignments and graduated rewards unvailable under the largely agricultural and artisanal structure of the 1790s and still unavailable to the small enterprise and commission-merchant-type economy of the 1850s and 1860s; (c) they have fallen heir to endlessly and technically refined propaganda devices substituting for the uncertain leader-mass relations of the previous periods; and (d) they faced state organizations shaken up by war dislocation and economic crisis. Under these conditions Soviet Russia could carry through simultaneously the job of an economic and a political, a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois revolution in spite of the exceedingly narrow basis of its political elite. On the other hand, the premature revolutionary combination of 1793–94 not only dissolved quickly, but left its most advanced sector, the *sans-culottes*, with only the melancholy choice between desperate rioting—Germinal 1795—or falling back into a pre-organized stage of utter helplessness and agony.

---

[16] Stampp, *op. cit.*, note 10 above, p. 130: "In addition confiscation was an attack on property rights—so much so that it is really more surprising that some of the middle class radicals favored it, than that most did not."

Do I suggest that confining conditions had their place only in 19th century society, where people looked for autonomous development tendencies in society and when the state was restricted to merely secondary functions? Does that mean that the political and technical innovations of the 20th century have created a capacity for unlimited political change?

The antithesis between state and society is itself not as meaningful as it appeared to theorists of the 19th century.[17] If we substitute government for state, as we do as a matter of course in an Anglo-American climate, we perceive that we are looking into the same mirror, only from different angles. The technical equipment at the disposal of the present generation introduces social change as a normal expectation with only the composition of the group in charge of the change a matter of controversy. Yet the government's new equipment may only allow it to catch up with the pressing problems raised by the sheer multiplication of numbers. In this context we recall Marx's famous dictum that society does not raise more problems than it can solve at any given moment.

There is also the fact that those who are making major political decisions are not working from a *tabula rasa*, merely projecting the most technically feasible solutions. The starting point for their projections, more likely than not, is their own personal experience in their own society, whether in conformism or revolt. Without pushing confining conditions into the area of psychoanalytical interpretations in vogue a decade ago,[18] let us nevertheless look for a moment at the life experiences of the top leaders of the German National Socialist Party, the difficulties these leaders had in finding places in or accommodation with the German society of the 1920s. These difficulties help explain the twofold direction of their thrust. The leaders had to smash the leadership of the preexisting mass organizations to take power. But they also had a deep-seated desire—beyond rational considerations for the safeguarding of their future—to eradicate the very elements of the independent leadership cadres in the upper strata with which they had had to find accommodation during their initial period. These earlier leaders had committed the unforgiveable sin: they had been the ruling elite whilst their successors were still wandering in the dark.

In making this remark, however, do I enlarge the concept of confining conditions much too much? Do I elevate the shadow of the previous regime to the dignity of a confining condition, rather than restricting this concept, as in the case of the USSR, to those specific conditions whose elimination proved to be a *conditio sine qua non* for the survival of the revolutionary regime?

The wall between shadow and substance may, however, be thin, as the German case has amply shown. And shadows become substance when they affect people's minds. Thus shadows also belong to those pre-existent, given, and traditional circumstances from which human beings, according to the immortal introductory section of the 18th Brumaire, produce their own history. In this sense every revolution is both phenomenon and epiphenomenon; it is both concentrated reaction to yesterday's reality and a mere construct to live by until history turns another page and delivers us from the necessity of breathing yesterday's air, that air both fragrant and pestilential.

---

[17] The dubiousness of the state-society dichotomy is illuminated in Horst Ehmke, " 'Staat' und 'Gesellschaft' als Verfassungstheoretisches Problem," in *Staatsverfassung und Kirchenordnung*, Festgabe fuer Rudolf Smend (Tuebingen, 1962).

[18] Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, 1953).

THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION: THE DEMOCRATIC INCARNATION OF CASTE IN INDIA

LLOYD I. RUDOLPH
University of Chicago

Marx's century-old socio-political analysis of peasant nations and of India's traditional village and caste society, because it captures so much of contemporary social and political analysis, provides a convenient framework for critical discussion and evaluation of the relationship between traditional society and modern politics in India. Peasant nations such as mid-nineteenth century France, Marx observed in the *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon,* are formed "by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sackful of potatoes."[1] Objectively, peasants form a class; the mode of life, interests and culture which flow from their productive circumstances separate peasants from other classes and place their class in opposition to other classes. But subjectively and practically, peasants form a vast mass, "the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another." They are isolated from each other by their mode of production, poor communications and poverty. The small holding, because it cannot support division of labor or the application of science, lacks multiplicity of development, diversity of talents and a variety of social relationships. Peasant society consists of self-sufficient peasant families; " . . . a few score of these make up a village, and a few score villages a Department."[2]

Peasants do not form a class, Marx argued, because their relations are "strictly local." They know each other only parochially. Because the "identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization," they "cannot represent themselves, they must be represented." "Their representative," he continued, "must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against other classes and sends them the rain and the sunshine from above. The political influence of the small peasants, therefore," he concludes "finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself."[3]

Many contemporary social scientists would agree with Marx that in the early stages of economic development, social change and political modernization in peasant societies will produce popular authoritarian or revolutionary ideological regimes which subordinate society to themselves. The circumstances of mid-twentieth century India bring these possibilities into sharp focus and provide the basis for an assessment of Marx's view of the politics of peasant nations in the course of modernization.

At Independence, Indian society encompassed active but receding feudal classes; a growing, vigorous but divided bourgeoisie; a visible, important but still immature industrial economy; and a massive peasantry.[4] Despite

---

[1] Karl Marx, *Selected Works* (2 vols., New York, International Publishers, n.d.) II, 415.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 414–415.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] See Howard L. Erdman, "India's Swatantra Party," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 36 (Winter, 1963–64), pp. 394–410, for the political role of India's feudal classes. For its business classes see Helen B. Lamb, "Indian Business Communities and the Evolution of an Industrial Class," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 28 (June, 1955), pp. 101–116 and D. R. Gadgil, *Origins of the Modern Indian Business Class* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959). For India's social and political development see B. B. Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times* (London, Oxford University Press, 1961); Charles Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964) and Bruce T. McCully, *English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1940). For industrial development see Vera Anstey, *The Economic Development of India* (4th ed., London, Longmans, Green, 1952); H. Venkatasubbiah, *Indian Economy Since Independence* (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1961); and Charles A. Myers, *Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958). Myron Weiner's *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962), provides a useful analysis of interest groups in Indian politics.

See the Government of India, Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of the Indian Union, 1961* (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1961), for particulars on the distribution of national income among sectors of the economy. Agriculture, increasing fragmentation and debt, Indian peasants—like peasants elsewhere[5]—have not, as Marx thought they would, parted with their attachment to the small holding nor provided that "chorus without which the solo song [of the urban proletariat] in all peasant nations becomes a swan song."[6] Instead of surrendering themselves to a political master in the hope of protection and benefits or recognizing their "natural ally and leader" in the industrial proletariat, Indian peasants have found the means in traditional social arrangements to represent and rule themselves.

Indian peasants through self-transformation have begun to realize in their consciousness and organization a modern society and a democratic polity. In Britain, aristocracy saved itself by timely reform; in India, caste is doing so. The leading and most pervasive natural association of the old regime—caste—is transforming itself from below and within. From an expression of the hierarchy, privilege and moral parochialism of the old order, caste has become the means to level the order's inequalities by destroying its moral basis and social structure. In doing so, caste, in its new form, the caste association, has served to attach the peasantry to the ideas, processes and institutions of political democracy.

I

India's old regime was—and is—diffuse and decentralized, dominated by micro- rather than macro-institutions. The traditional society of villages, castes and families had been in considerable measure self-regulating; social integration and control were given form and substance by the high culture, by Hindu metaphysics, morals and social organization. But the high culture was widely varied in its practical expression and increasingly dilute as it approached the lower reaches of society and its little traditions.[7] The weakness and failure of revolution and reaction, the strength and persistence of traditional values and social forms and the fact that social and political change has come from within and below as well as from without and above—all are closely related to the relative weight of micro- as against macro-institutions in traditional Indian society. The predominance of micro-institutions deflected and contained the extremes of organized change through political action. India's traditional macro-institutions were difficult to attack or defend nationally: Hinduism had no church, no ecclesiastical hierarchy, no doctrinal orthodoxy; the nobility of the sword, like that of the robe, lacked institutional means to give it political standing or effectiveness as an estate of the realm; nor was India's third estate organized or represented as such.[8]

The strength and importance of macro-institutions in Indian society and government also affected the quality of imperial rule. Imperial rule, like that of a revolutionary ideological regime in a new nation, manufactures and induces change from outside and above.

Imperialism, at least as it was practiced in India, was not so sweeping in its concern to create a modern economy and to realize new values, nor so eager for quick results, nor so coercive and total in its methods as revolutionary ideological regimes like those in Russia or China. Yet it remains true that the imperialism of the British *raj* in its tasks of destruction and reconstruction was restrained and hindered by the strength and predominance in traditional society of diffuse and decentralized micro-institutions.

"England," Marx wrote in 1853, "*has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing.*"[9] It has, however, "a double mission to fulfill . . . one destructive, and the other regenerative—the annihilation of old Asiatic society [or despotism]—and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia."[10] It had begun the latter[11] by imposing political unity, now [1853] to be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph; by introducing the first free press in Asia, "a new

---

not including Forestry and Fishing, accounted for 46.8 per cent of National Income in 1959–60. See p. 21.

[5] See for example, David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism* (New York, Collier Books, 1961).

[6] Marx, II, "Brumaire," p. 419.

[7] For a discussion of the structures, processes and roles which link the society and culture of the locality in India with that of its civilization, see Milton Singer, "The Social Organization of Indian Civilization," *Diogenes*, 45 (Spring, 1964), pp. 84–119. It surveys and integrates the relevant monographic literature, particularly the work of Singer himself, M. N. Srinivas, Bernard S. Cohn and McKim Marriott.

[8] For India's modern constitutional history see Reginald Coupland, *The Indian Problem, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India* (London, Oxford University Press, 1944).

[9] Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, II, "The British Rule in India," p. 652 (underlining mine).

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 658.

[11] "The work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins," he observes. "Nevertheless it has begun." *Ibid.*

and powerful agent of reconstruction;" by creating private property in land; by educating Indians and thereby producing "a fresh class . . . endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science"; by connecting India through steam navigation with itself and the world, thereby breaking the isolation "which was the prime law of its stagnation"; and by gifting India "with the means of irrigation and of internal communication [railroads] which will, when completed, liberate her productive powers by revitalizing agriculture and enabling her to exchange what she produces."[12]

The railroads, along with the multiplication of roads, he predicted, would destroy village isolation and its accompanying "self-sufficient inertia" by supplying that intercourse with other villages without which "*the desires and efforts indispensable to social advance*" are absent. By introducing foreign and domestic manufactured goods, modern transportation and communication would "put the hereditary and stipendiary village artisanship of India to full proof of its capacity, and then supply its defects."[13] Because the railway system requires industrial processes for its support and because Indians had the aptitude and were getting the requisite training to man it, the railway system "will become the forerunner of modern industry." Modern industry in turn "will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labour, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress. . . . "[14] When the people have appropriated all the English bourgeoisie has created, they will be able to emancipate themselves and mend their social condition by using the material civilization it brought forth. For Marx, the India of tomorrow was both western and socialist.

England's mission of destruction, "the annihilation of old Asiatic society," was not yet complete in 1853. "We know," he wrote, "that the municipal organization [village and caste *panchayats* or councils] and the economical basis of the village communities have been broken up, but their worst feature, the dissolution of society into stereotype and disconnected atoms [*i.e.*, the India of villages and castes], has survived . . ."[15] the revolutionary impact of British imperialism. The *raj* did indeed undermine the "self-sufficient inertia" of village and caste, and release "the desires and efforts indispensable to social advance."[16] Improved communication, particularly the railroads, did further this process. But what form and purpose did these desires and efforts for social advance assume? Marx left this question unanswered because unnoticed, concentrating his attention instead on the development of the material bases for a modern economy and society which he expected would be appropriated by the people for their emancipation and well-being. Caste, that most pervasive and, for most students of Indian society—Marxian and non-Marxian alike—most retrograde of India's social institutions, has not only survived the impact of British imperialism but also transformed and transvalued itself. In doing so, it has helped dissolve what Marx called the "village system,"[17] including a caste-based social hierarchy, and contributed to the success of political democracy.[18] Change in India has come from within and below as well as from above and outside.

II

Kamaraj Nadar, formerly the Chief Minister of Madras State, now President of the ruling Congress Party and, along with Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the dominant figure in Indian public life after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, is the descendant of a caste whose recent history illustrates the process of social change and modernization from within and below. At the time Marx wrote, Shanans were toddy tappers, an occupation considered polluting by Brahmanical Hinduism. Over the past century, the caste has transformed itself by creating new units of consciousness, organization and action. Today, by successfully changing its caste culture and getting this change recognized by the state and by Madras society, it—like other castes which have participated in the same process[18a]—occupies a new and higher place in a changed social order.

---

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 658–660.

[13] Marx quoting Chapman, *The Cotton and Commerce of India, ibid.* at page 661 (underlining mine).

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 661–662.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 660.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 661.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 654–655.

[18] See Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 33 (March, 1960), pp. 5–22.

[18a] See below, section IV, for the Vanniyars. Although the Nadars and the Vanniyars are Madras (southern India) castes, developments similar to those detailed here can be found in other states and regions of India. Some indication of them in Gujarat (western India) is given in the discussion of the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha, also in section IV, below. Nirmal Kumar Bose deals with two

One of the first evidences of Shanan aspirations for greater equality and dignity is found in the homely story of the "bosom" controversy. Shanan women had for a generation clothed themselves above the waist even though caste custom dictated that dressing in such a manner was reserved for higher castes only. Threats and disturbances provoked by this practice culminated in the Travancore Riot of 1858. The question of whether Shanan women would or would not give ". . . up the practice of going about without an upper cloth"[19] had become sufficiently serious to require state intervention. The next year, Sir Charles Trevelyan, the Governor of Madras, granted them permission to wear a cloth over the breasts and shoulders; and the Maharaja of Travancore, in whose princely state the riot had occurred, found no objection to Shanan women putting on a jacket, tying themselves round with coarse cloth or "to their covering their bosoms in any manner whatever, but not like the women of higher castes."[20]

Soon after these events, pamphlets setting out the caste's claims to *kshatriya* (warrior-ruler) status appeared. Members began to claim the right to wear the sacred thread, symbol of the spiritually twice-born Brahman, Kshatriya and Vaisya *varnas*, and to be carried on palanquins at their wedding ceremonies—also a custom previously confined to the highest castes. "Kshatriya" academies, open to all, but designed particularly for the education of Shanan boys, were started, marriage rules tightened, Brahmans "of a less particular kind" induced to act as priests and "a sort of incomplete parody of the ceremony of investiture with the sacred thread" symbolizing twice-born status practiced.[21] "We humbly beg," a group of Shanan petitioners addressed the Census Commissioner in 1901, "that we are the descendants of the Pandya or Dravida Xatra race who . . . first disafforested and colonized this land of South India" and presented him with an historical volume entitled *Short Account of the . . . Tamil Xatras, the Original but Downtrodden Royal Race of Southern India*."[22] Shanans claimed that ancient coins called Shanans proved that they long ago had the authority to strike coinage and that the honorific, Nadar, by which leaders of the caste were addressed, proved they were *kshatriyas* because it meant ruler of a locality. In 1891 the Census Commissioner observed that the Shanans were ". . . usually placed a little above the Pallas and Paraiyans, and are considered to be one of the polluting castes, but of late many have put forward the claim to be considered Kshatriyas, and at least 24,000 of them appear [*i.e.*, gave their caste to the census enumerator] as Kshatriyas in the caste tables." To the learned commissioner, this was "of course, absurd as there is no such thing as a Dravidian Kshatriya" although he conceded that the Shanans may have been "at one time a war-like tribe. . . ."[23]

Leading Shanans saw matters differently; through a new associational life[24] which organized and gave expression to their changing

---

Bengali (eastern India) caste associations, of the Yogi and the Namasudra, in "Some Aspects of Caste in Bengal," in Milton Singer, ed., *Traditional India* (Philadelphia, 1959), pp. 199–200. William Rowe has explored the history of caste associations among two castes distributed throughout northern India, the Noniya and the Kayastha, in "The New Cauhans: A Caste Mobility Movement in North India," in J. Silverberg, ed., *Social Mobility in Caste in India* (forthcoming) and "Mobility in the Caste System," a paper delivered at the Conference on Social Structure and Social Change, University of Chicago, June 3–5, 1965. For social and cultural change at the local level among the Chamars, an extensive "untouchable" caste found primarily in Uttar Pradesh, see Bernard S. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste," in McKim Marriott ed., *Village India* (Chicago, 1955) and "Changing Traditions of a Low Caste," in Milton Singer, *op. cit.* above. Owen M. Lynch, "The Politics of Untouchable," another paper at the University of Chicago Conference, June 1965, above, describes the origin and changing ideology and functions of Chamar caste association in Uttar Pradesh. Robert J. Miller dealt with the Mahars, a numerous "untouchable" caste of Maharashtra (western India), in "Button, button . . . Great Tradition, Little Tradition, Whose Tradition," mimeo., University of Wisconsin, 1 March 1965.

Returning to the South, two well established and powerful caste associations represent the Nairs and the Ezhavas in Kerala, while in Mysore the Lingyats and the Okaligas are well organized and highly influential.

[19] Edgar Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* (7 vols., Madras, Government Press, 1909), VI, 365.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 365–366.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 367.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 369.

[24] There are two Nadar Caste Associations, the Nadar Maha Jana Sangam of Madurai and the Dakshina Mara Nadar Sangam of Tirunelveli. The Nadar Maha Jana Sangam, the larger and more influential of the two, has organized annual Nadar conferences since 1910.

consciousness, culture and identity, they pressed for recognition and legitimation from orthodox Hindu society. At its moral and ritual center lay religion and its most visible and accessible target, the temple. In 1874, the Shanans pressed unsuccessfully to establish their their right to enter the great Minakshi Temple at Madurai.[25] In the *Kamudi Temple* case of 1899[26] the Shanans through the legal system of the British Raj made a major effort to cross the pollution barrier of orthodox Hindu society and establish their claim within it to be a twice-born caste. They hoped to win through the legal processes and sanctions of the alien and secular political order what they had been denied by the religious macro-institutions of traditional society, sacred legitimacy for their claims to a greater measure of equality.

Their hopes were cruelly dashed by the courts. The District Court at Madura, and, on appeal, the High Court of Madras and the Privy Council agreed, in the face of Nadar claims that it was their immemorial right to enter the temple at Kamudi, that neither custom nor *sastras* (sacred texts) sanctioned their doing so.

"There is no sort of proof," the High Court held, "that even suggests a probability that the Shanans are descendants from Kshatriya or warrior castes of Hindus, or from Pandiya, Chola, or Chera race of kings." Nor did the honorific appellation Nadar entitle them to claim higher status or greater rights; it in no way changed their ritual status. From time immemorial, the Shanans had cultivated the Palmyra palm and collected and distilled its juice, an occupation that placed them in general social estimation "just above that of . . . Pariahs . . . who are on all hands regarded as unclean, prohibited from the use of Hindu temples and below that of the . . . Maravans [one of the caste directly concerned] and other classes admittedly free to worship in Hindu temples." Further, the court held, there were no grounds whatsoever for regarding them as of Aryan origin; their worship, said the court, was a form of demonology.

The Court was not unaware of the radical changes in Shanan circumstances:

> No doubt many Shanans have abandoned their hereditary occupation, and have won for themselves by education, industry and frugality respectable positions. . . . In the process of time, many Shanans took to cultivating, trade, and money lending, and today there is a numerous and prosperous body of Shanans who have no immediate concern with the immemorial calling of their caste. In many villages they own much of the land, and monopolize the bulk of trade and wealth.

The Court recognized that these *de facto* changes created difficulties: the Shanans have "not unnaturally sought for social recognition, and to be treated on an equal footing in religious matters." It was also "natural to feel sympathy for their efforts . . . but such sympathy," the court warned, "will not be increased by unreasonable and unfounded pretensions, and, in the effort to rise, the Shanans must not invade the *established rights* of other castes."

The Court invoked Brahman written and edited law and the testimony of Brahman witnesses concerning local custom to sustain its interpretation:

> According to the Agama Shastras which are received as authoritative by worshippers of Siva in the Madura district, entry into a temple, where the ritual prescribed by these Shastras is observed, is prohibited to all those whose profession is the manufacture of intoxicating liquor and the climbing of palmyra and cocoanut trees.

Plaintiffs' thirty-four witnesses were unanimous in testifying that Shanans did not enter the temple at Kamudi. "Most of them are Brahmans," the Court observed, "who, being in a position of acknowledged superiority to both contending parties, Shanans and Maravans, are less likely than others to be swayed by personal bias or self-interest."[27] Although some among the Shanans' twenty-eight witnesses were Brahmans, they were generally "men of much lower standing and respectability, and are to large extent in the pay or under the control of the Nadars . . . " The Court's allegations were confirmed but seemed to cut both ways when the Rajah of Ramnad, the trustee of the temple and the original plaintiff, agreed —after he had won the case in the district court —to "compromise" in the face of the Shanans' appeal to the High Court, by allowing them to enter the Kamudi temple and worship there.

---

[25] Thurston, *op. cit.*, VI, 355.

[26] Sankaralinga Nadan *v.* Rajeswara Dorai, Indian Law Reports, 31 Madras 236 (1908). The quotations below are all drawn from this report of the case.

[27] For a discussion of the critiques of the Madras High Court, particularly its Brahmanic bias, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Barristers and Brahmans; Legal Cultures and Social Change," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (December, 1965).

"A very sordid motive for this surrender," their Lordships of the Privy Council observed, "was specifically asserted and has not been disproved." When the High Court joined other plaintiffs to the original plaintiff so that the suit could be heard on appeal, the Rajah's confidence in the justice of his suit "convalesced."

In the Court's judgment, birth, not achievement, defined social identity. Rights were rooted in Brahmanically defined custom and Brahmanically edited sacred texts, not in treating equals equally or in "right reason." Only Aryans, not Dravidians, could be *kshatriyas;* the pollution of the fathers followed the sons into commerce, the professions and agriculture. The Court advised the Shanans, in phrases reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's doctrine in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* with respect to Negro claims to equality,[28] to be separate but equal by using their own temples. Shanans were "numerous and strong enough in wealth and education to rise along their own lines . . . without appropriating the institutions or infringing the rights of others."

A minor civil war in the form of the Tinnevelly Riots of 1899 followed close on the heels of the *Kamudi Temple* case. "The pretensions of the Shanans to a much higher position in the religio-social scale than the other castes are willing to allow," the Inspector-General of Police wrote in his *Administration Report* for that year, was the cause of extensive civil disorder and violence.[29] High on the list of Shanan "pretensions" was their claim to entry of temples. When the manager of the Visvanatheswara Temple at Sivakasi closed it rather than give in to the pressure of a massive Shanan agitation for entry—an act again reminiscent of American events in the struggle for integration—Shanans and their enemies agreed that they had gained at least a partial victory. Most opposed to Shanan mobility were the Maravans, their near neighbors in space and status. A "clean" caste, the Maravans could enter the temple at Sivakasi. To share it with the Shanans, a polluting caste according to the ritual definitions of traditional society, seemed intolerable. The Maravans struck back by organized attacks on Shanan villages and sections, burning, looting and sometimes killing. The Shanans violently resisted five thousand Maravans who marched on Sivakasi to enforce their demands. The police summed up the struggle in the following statistics: 23 murders; 102 robberies; many cases of arson; 1958 arrests; and 552 convictions; including seven death sentences.

By 1921, the Shanans had gained sufficient social esteem and political influence so that they alone, among the many castes making the attempt, succeeded in changing their name and shedding officially their traditional occupation. Their metamorphosis was wrought neither by the macro- or micro-institutions of traditional society nor by the legal system of the British state finding in the custom or the sacred texts of traditional society grounds to justify Shanan claims. Instead it was the Government of Madras, responding to the determined representations of the organized "Nadar" community, that did so. "The Shanar of 1911," Census Commissioner G. T. Boag wrote in 1921, "now appears as a Nadar; this is done under orders of the Government of Madras, that the word Shanar should cease to be used in official records."[30]

The Shanans' secular and official social transformation extended to occupation as well as name when the Government decided to list in the census actual rather than traditional ones. The Census Superintendent observed that neither common names nor common traditional occupations were "safe guides" to the definition of caste or the identification of a particular caste. The Nadars, for example, who were in earlier censuses shown as toddy-drawers, ". . . now claim that they are by tradition and inheritance lords of the soil and that toddy-drawing was the occupation only of comparatively few degenerate members of the caste." In deference to the wishes of the representatives of the Nadar community," he continues, "the Madras Government have decided on this occasion not to show traditional occupations in the census tables . . ."[31]

---

[28] 163 U. S. 537 (1896). "If one race," the Court observed, "be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them on the same plane." "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument [that by enforcing segregation between whites and negroes the states were denying the equal protection of the laws assured by the Fourteenth Amendment] to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." (p. 551).

[29] Thurston, *op. cit.*, VI, 364.

[30] Census of India, 1921, Vol. XIII, *Madras* (Part I) *Report* (Madras, Superintendent, Government Press, 1922), p. 153, note. The relevant Government Orders are: Government of Madras, Law (General) Department, G.O. No. 56, dated 8 April 1921 and G. O. 785, 7 July 1921. Circulars No. 4 and No. 5 of the Nadar Maha Jana Sangam contain the instructions of the caste association to its followers concerning the responses to be given to census enumerators. Census Commissioner Boag's description and analysis of changes in caste names generally on pp. 153–155 of Vol. XIII is particularly instructive for the shift from Shanan to Nadar. I wish to thank Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. for his help in obtaining the texts of the relevant G.O.s and the Sangams circulars and the Nadar Maha Jana Sangam for its courtesy in making its archives available to him.

Today only those relatively few who live in more remote villages and engage in toddy tapping know themselves and are known to others as Shanans; for a number of generations Shanans have increasingly shared the public identity, Nadar. The community has breached the polution barrier, changed its rank within traditional society and now occupies an important place in the modern society of Madras and India.[32]

The case of the Shanans who became Nadars seems to suggest that the study of caste ranking, like the study of social change generally, has not paid enough attention to middle sector analysis, which examines change as it occurs in the social space between village and *jati* on the one hand and society and *varna* on the other and takes several generations as its relevant time span. It is less (narrowly) behavioral and philosophical, more historical and sociological, in its ideas and methods.

How much and in what ways the Shanans' changing social standing was reflected over time in village consciousness and behavior is not yet entirely clear. Because their rise was accompanied by increasing wealth and education, decreasing pollution and the emulation and appropriation of high caste behavior and symbols, it seems reasonable to assume that locally the Shanans' change of name and status was in considerable measure recognized *over time* by appropriate changes in the evaluations and behavior of non-Shanans of all ranks and castes.

The story of the Shanans illustrates in some measure the general processes of social change and political modernization which have affected traditional Indian society. Castes, "the stereotype and disconnected units" which Marx, over a century ago, described as having survived the break-up of the village economy and government, but which were to be dissolved by the effects of industrialization, have not yet been so. Instead, they seem, in good Hindu fashion, to have been reincarnated in a modern form as the caste association.[33] This has become a vehicle for internal cultural reform and external social change. It enables middle and lower castes to establish self-esteem under circumstances in which they had begun to feel the inferiority rather than the inevitability of their condition and to win social esteem, first from the state, then from society at large and last and most slowly from the village and locality. A vehicle of consciousness and organization, it enabled lower castes to emulate twice-born castes' norms and practices, and by doing so to appropriate some of their charisma and prestige for themselves. The result has been to level the ritually based social hierarchy of the caste-ordered society. Uniting similar but dispersed and isolated *jatis* (subcastes) of village and locality in larger organizations with common identities, the caste association has contributed significantly to the success of political democracy by providing bases for communication, representation and leadership. It taught and enabled illiterate peasants to participate meaningfully and effectively in politics. Lower castes whose large numbers gave them an advantage in competitive democratic politics, gained influence, access and power in state and society. With these at their command, they have changed in their favor the allocation of resources, privilege and honor.

III

If India, a peasant nation, is not what Marx thought such nations must be—a "sackful of potatoes," the result of the "simple addition of homologous magnitudes," a society of stereotype and disconnected atoms—if it does not need a political master to which its peasants may subordinate themselves, as he thought they would, and has not developed revolutionary consciousness, it is because India's peasants can represent and rule themselves; and caste helps them to do so. This is not to underestimate the problems caste poses for the creation of a modern society and the realization of individuality but is to place caste in its incarnation as caste association in an analytic context and there assess its meaning.

---

[31] Census of India, 1921, Vol. XIII, *Madras*, p. 154.

[32] See *Man in India*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April–June 1959), particularly McKim Marriott's "Interactional and Attributional Theories of Caste Ranking," for discussions of the relationship between caste mobility and caste ranking. Marriott is critical of Srinivas for being too "attributional." For Srinivas' views see his *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays* (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1962). Milton Singer in his ". . . Indian Civilization . . . ," *Diogenes*, tries to accommodate both views but suggests that Marriott may have overstated the case against attributional ranking. See particularly the sections on "Sanskritization and Cultural Mobility," ". . . Attributes vs. Interactions in Caste Mobility" and "Westernization and Sanskritization," pp. 99–108.

[33] See L. Rudolph and S. H. Rudolph, "Caste Associations," *op. cit., passim.*

The caste association has contributed to the decompression and deparochialization of the *jati* and the locality, particularly the village, which is the *jati*'s historical and natural home. By reaching out toward the state and national legislative constituency, to the Community Development Block and District and their recently created parallel organs of local government, to legislative, administrative and executive arms of the State Government, and even to the government in Delhi and the politics of the nation, the caste association has educated and elevated caste consciousness, interest and purpose and given caste a voice in decisions at these levels. Doing so has helped inform the *jati*, aroused its imagination along with its ambition, and led it to larger and more inclusive identities and loyalties. As the block and district headquarters, the market town, local school and nearby cinema become increasingly relevant to village lives, as they energize and shape identities, they create alternative environments for prestige and self-esteem. The expansion of horizons and the growth of empathy have reduced the concentration of affect, power and economic dependence at the local level.[34] The caste association both independently and as the carrier of other forces and institutions contributes to the reduction of the affect and interest invested in the face-to-face communities of caste and village. A unit of consciousness and organization which transcends both, it leads its members to new symbols, models and reference groups and to contexts of action which are structurally less diffuse but affectively more so. The drift of power, profit and honor away from the locality has not yet made Indian villages into bedroom suburbs but it has broken their ancient monopoly on all aspects of life.

Membership in a caste association is based on both birth and choice. One must be born into a particular *jati* to qualify, but then one must choose to join the association. The ascriptive element strongly suggests that there is a natural limit to the caste association's capacity to approximate a wholly voluntary association. However far it may lead those who identify with it from the narrow confines of the traditional face-to-face community, it can not, so it is argued, lead them beyond ascriptive boundaries. The individual can never be fully free to define himself, to make his own destiny, and as a consequence he is unable to act politically in ways that are untainted by group parochialism and selfishness.

Several recent developments have challenged this view. First, in so far as it is possible in India to "leave" traditional and "join" modern society by, for example, being educated in the English medium and "western" ideas, being trained in a modern profession and practicing it, marrying out of caste, and associating with people who, at least ostensibly, do not take caste into account in their friendships—and this is possible up to a point in India today—the modernization of Indian society and politics through the transformation of caste becomes only one of two ways to achieve modernity. But the kind of westernization that Marx was talking about and the kind that Srinivas hypothesizes,[34a] that is, an alternative process of change that results in the formation of society in western terms, is more an analytic construct than a description of reality. Westernization has created a "shadow" society, like the opposition's cabinet in British politics, ready to take power but for the moment serving as a critic of those in power and an innovator or catalyst of change. Like a shadow cabinet, it can change the existing regime's direction without ever replacing it. Modernity has entered into Indian character and society but it has done so through assimilation not replacement.[35] The changes that now appear on the horizon with respect to the further evolution of the caste association and its transcendence of ascription have to do with internal differentiation (fission) and the operation of integrative institutions upon it and federation or consolidation of caste associations into larger groupings (fusion).

---

[34] The caste association can be viewed as both an independent and dependent variable in the processes of decompression and deparochialization. A few studies that highlight these processes are F. G. Bailey, who describes how the extension of the economic and political frontier (by which he means primarily the State administration) has liberated several castes, particularly the Boad Outcastes, from the social, cultural and governmental authority of the village of Bisipara: *Caste and the Economic Frontier* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1957); T. Scarlett Epstein, who shows how in the "dry" village of Dalena (but not in the wet one of Wangala) in Mysore, radical economic change led to its integration into the regional economy, undermined the principle on which its society was organized (p. 325) and displaced ritual by economic aspects of prestige (p. 334): *Economic Development and Social Change in South India* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1962); and William S. Rowe, who has shown how the Noniyas, an aggressively upward mobile caste of Senapur, loosened the hold of the village's dominant caste by building a school with tiles purchased outright from a potter's village adjacent to Banaras twenty-five miles away: "Changing Rural Class Structure and the Jajmani System," *Human Organization*, Vol. 22 (Spring, 1963.) For the concept of empathy, its role in modernization and its relation to communication, see Daniel Lerner, *Modernizing the Middle East; The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, 1958), esp. chs. 1 and 2.

[34a] M. N. Srinivas, *op. cit.*, chs. 1–3.

IV

In 1952, the Vanniyars, largest single caste in Madras state, capped a history of internal reform (Sanskritization) and organizational modernization not unlike that of the Nadars (formerly Shanans) by contesting the first General Election under the standards of the Tamil Nad Toilers (hereafter TNT) and Commonweal Party, the first strongest in South Arcot District but reaching into Salem and Tiruchirapalli Districts, and the second strongest in North Arcot. The two were virtually caste parties. The TNT captured nineteen and the Commonweal Party six seats in the Madras Assembly, or 13 per cent of the total. After S. S. Ramaswami Padayachi, head of the TNT, in 1954 joined N. A. Manickkavelu Naicker, leader of the Commonweal Party, in the reorganized Congress Government of Kamaraj Nadar, the Vanniyars, who represent ten per cent of the state's population, occupied two of the eight (25 per cent) cabinet seats. Their slogan in the 1952 election had been "Vanniyar Vottu Anniyarukku Illai" (Vanniyar votes are not for non-Vanniyars). In 1957, at the time of the second General Election, the Vanniyars, now solidly entrenched in Kamaraj's Congress Party, seemed to have perfected the technique of *caste* representation. Nominated in large numbers by the Congress, they helped it gain an impressive victory that year.

By 1962, however, radical changes had taken place in the Vanniyars' social and political circumstances. Internal differentiation along economic, cultural and social lines and personal ambition were articulated and reinforced outside the Vanniyar community by parties competing for support. The result shattered Vanniyar corporate power. They were subsumed to an even greater degree than had been the case when they had moved from their own parties into Congress by the leadership and policy of a voluntary association and integrative institution, the political party. This effect is most sharply etched in South Arcot District, over half of whose 2.5 million population are Vanniyars and where the TNT in 1952 had captured thirteen of the District's nineteen MLA seats.[36] In 1954, when that party's chief had led his followers into Kamaraj Nadar's Government and he had become a Minister, the first crack in Vanniyar solidarity had appeared. A splinter TNT group under A. Govindaswami, MLA, opposed the merger and joined what has come to be Madras's leading opposition party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation, hereafter DMK).[37]

In 1957, when the Congress Party gave tickets to (nominated) former TNT members in preference to old-time Congressmen, K. S. Venkatakrishna Reddiar, along with other higher caste landowning notables from his own (Reddiar), Naidu, Vellala and Mudaliar castes and with the support of dissident or still dependent sections of the Vanniyars, helped form the Congress Reform Committee (hereafter CRC; later the Indian National Democratic Congress, hereafter INDC). Despite the fact that the leadership of the CRC was drawn from a class which had been and in some measure still was the master and sometimes the oppressor and exploiter of its Vanniyar tenants and laborers, it was able to rally considerable numbers to its electoral cause and gain a modest electoral success. By 1962, however, the INDC, some members having made their peace with the Congress, others having joined the DMK or the Swatantra Party, had evaporated. In 1960, a year after the Swatantra Party was created, S. S. Ramaswami Padayachi, the creator and leader of the TNT, began to move in its direction; by 1961, he had joined it and become its head in South Arcot District.

---

[35] The burden of Edward Shils' argument in *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity; The Indian Case* (The Hague, Mouton, 1961), seems to me to be consistent with these thoughts.

[36] *Express* (Chittoor), March 7, 1962. I should like to acknowledge the very helpful extensive and detailed articles of the *Expresss*'s Special Correspondent, M. Mohan Ram, on the 1962 election in North Arcot, Salem, Tiruchirapalli, Tanjore and South Arcot Districts; see the *Express* (Chittoor) for March 7, 15, 17, 20 and 21, 1962, upon which much of the analysis below is based.

[37] For an analysis of it and Dravidian politics generally, see Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Urban Life and Populist Radicalism; Dravidian Politics in Madras," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 20 (May, 1961), pp. 283–297.

The once monolithic Vanniyar political front in 1962 was "divided into three contending groups—one supporting the Congress under Mr. Srinivasa Padayachi, the second owing allegiance to the DMK, led by Mr. Govindaswami, and the third under Swatantra influence, loyal to Mr. Ramaswami Padayachi."[38] The effect was to place all three major parties in South Arcot District under Vanniyar leadership. And of the District's fifteen non-reserved seats (four seats were reserved for Harijan candidates) in the 1962 General Election, thirteen were won by Vanniyars—eight as Congress and five as DMK candidates. S. S. Ramaswami Padayachi and a number of other Swatantra candidates lost, however, some by close margins.

The external boundaries of the caste association began to collapse under pressure from outside as the internal forces and strategic calculations which maintained the caste association's solidarity were weakened by differentiation, the absorption of more modern ideas, and political calculations designed to express both. A modern aggregative and integrative institution, the political party, by capitalizing on internal differences, destroyed its monolithic solidarity, further weakened caste's ascriptive and particularistic hold on social identity and behavior, divided and diffused the association's political power and brought it into closer approximation with the assumptions and behavior of modern society and democratic politics (*i.e.*, more universal and functionally specific norms).

The ascriptive and particularistic qualities of caste associations are being affected by higher levels of integration (fusion) as well as by disintegration (fission). The Kallan, Maravar and Agamudiar castes[39] of central and southern Madras have been defined and separated historically by ritual rank, social distance and endogamy. Recently their caste associations and leaders, under the interacting influences of democratic institutions and processes and those of traditional society,[40] have begun to create new and larger forms of consciousness, organization and action.[41] Experience in the Madras Assembly, the lessons of party and electoral politics, a growing sense of common purpose and the importance of numbers for realizing political objectives contributed to this result. The three castes have styled themselves Mukkulator (literally "three castes") and have begun to represent themselves in terms of this common name; and the organization and leadership which brought it into being contribute to its growing importance and strength. The basis of Mukkulator social and political identity remains that of an ascriptive social and cultural group with a given geographic location. But just as the caste association attenuated the importance of these factors by upgrading and extending the *jati*, so this federation of caste associations has further attenuated them by again diluting birth and particularism with choice. The self and public definition of the Mukkulators and their organization and political role approach even more closely than the caste association the qualities, form and functions of voluntary associations with political objectives. By further blurring the line between natural and voluntary association, the caste federation seems to break down the dichotomy between ascription and choice which helps to distinguish traditional from modern societies. What appeared to be an absolute division in theory if not in practice has become, in the Indian context, an increasingly relative one suggesting that a continuum which bridges the two rather than a dichotomy may be a more appropriate statement of both the practical and theoretical issues involved.

---

[38] *Express* (Chittoor), March 21, 1962.

[39] For the Parumali-nadu Kallans see Louis Dumont's *Une Sous-Caste de L'Inde du Sud; Organisation Sociale et Religieuse des Pramalai Kallar* (Paris, Mouton, 1957); for Kallans generally see Thurston, *Castes*, III, 53–91; for Maravans, Thurston, *Castes*, V, 22–48; and for the Agamudiar, Thurston, *Castes*, I, 5–16. The link among these castes is older than the present beginnings of political federation. They share common mythological ancestors (see Thurston, *Castes*, I, 7 for two versions of the Agamudiar creation myth) and a common mobility pattern in traditional society. "There is a Tamil proverb," Thurston writes, "to the effect that a Kallan may become a Maravan. By respectability he may develop into an Agamudiyan, and, by slow degrees, become a Vellala, from which he may rise to be a Mudaliar." *Ibid.* Vellala and Mudaliar are traditionally ranked above Agamudiyan.

[40] W. H. Morris-Jones' analysis of the "languages of politics" and of the "dialogue" between government and political forces have been very helpful for the formulation and statement of the argument here. See his *The Government and Politics of India* (London, 1964), ch. 2, "Politics and Society" and ch. 6, "The Ordering Framework" for these two ideas.

[41] The discussion below is based in part on an interview with Mr. Ramanchandran, MLA, Chief Whip of the Congress Party in the Madras Assembly. He is in no way responsible for my judgments.

A recent study by Rajni Kothari and R. M. Maru, "Caste and Secularism in India; A Case Study of the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha,"[42] confirms and deepens these observations. The Sabha is a federation of many economically depressed cultivators and landless laborers. Over time it has helped them to become "kshatriyas" in their own and society's eyes, by articulating their "common economic interests and a growing secular identity born partly out of past folk-lore but more out of common resentment against well-to-do castes. . . ."[43] The caste federation's break with the ascriptive and particularistic features of traditional society and its assumption of a modern social and politically democratic character is found, Kothari and Maru argue, in the motivation "that lies behind such a process of group assertion." Caste consciousness plays a part but it is no longer geared, they believe, to the preservation of caste traditions and customs but rather to "the acquisition of power and the transformation of traditional positions." This process, including its accompanying transformation of consciousness, the authors call "secularization." They relate it to the simultaneous sanskritization (the emulation of high caste norms and practice) of lower castes and the westernization (acculturation and social organization based on western values and forms) of higher;[44] sanskritization narrows the gap between lower and higher castes and westernization widens it. Secularization, however, joins lower and higher castes in a common experience of social levelling and articulation of group purposes. Although both higher and lower castes are concerned respectively to preserve or improve their status through political action, political considerations fuse them together: the upper castes need numerical strength to sustain their power and status, the lower need access to resources and opportunities which support from the higher can yield. Lower castes may agree to be led and even governed by upper castes but their agreement to do so is " . . . increasingly conditioned by norms of accountability and notions of 'interest' and 'right.'"[45]

V

Political man in democratic India has been wrought out of traditional materials; he is not a new man. Acting through caste associations and federations he is capable at various levels and contexts of the pursuit of countervailing power and the calculation of political advantage. Parties seeking to integrate group purposes while differentiating themselves from their competitors have in most instances harnessed and subsumed India's transformed associational life. The result has been to make representative democracy meaningful and effective in a peasant nation and caste society.

The role of caste in Indian politics has nevertheless been subjected to severe and often uncomprehending criticism. Its ascriptive and particularistic features and the parochial selfishness and chauvinism which they support deeply trouble those committed to the progressive realization of a liberal democratic or socialist society and state. The individual must precede the group in time and importance for the contractual civil society or the ideological collective to have meaning and validity. Yet the blurring of the line between natural and voluntary associations in India has placed her associational life in a situation not too different from that of modern western nations. Natural associations based on language, religion, ethnicity and locality have not been assimilated or dissolved and continue to play a crucial, sometimes decisive part, in their politics.[46] Nor is it true, despite the cross-cutting pressures of structural, economic and cultural pluralism in a democratic society and state, that formally voluntary associations are free from the characteristics and behavior attributed to natural associations.[47] Efforts to distinguish traditional from modern society, in terms of a natural versus a voluntary basis for their associational life, run the risk of confusing structure and formal requirements with a more indeterminate reality in which one blends into the other and is affected over time by contextual forces. Other ways may have to be found for distinguishing natural associations that find benign ways of merging the concerns for individuality and for achievement in modern society from those which are disruptive.

---

[42] *Journal of Asian Studies* (forthcoming). Myron Weiner's excellent study "Segmentation and Political Participation: Kaira District, which came into my hands too late to be taken into account in this text, also deals with the [Gujarat] Kshatriya Sabha. His analysis complements and sharpens that of Kothari and Maru.

[43] The new identity and organization brings within its fold a fairly broad social spectrum ranging "from *Rajputs* who are highest in the Kshatriya hierarchy to *Bhils* who are semi-tribal, with Bariyas middle on the way." Kothari and Maru, "Secularism," pp. 7–8.

[44] See Srinivas, *op cit.*, ch. 2, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization."

[45] Kothari and Maru, "Secularism," p. 55.

[46] For America, see Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Anchor, 1960); Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge, M.I.T. and Harvard University Press, 1963); and Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life; The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964).

Massive natural associations based on religion led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947; the tribal associations in Ruanda led the Watusi to bring charges of genocide against the Bahutu;[48] and tribal politics in the Congo fuelled chronic political instability and supported rebellion and civil war. When natural associations are too few, when they are socially and morally independent of each other, and when they lack a limited but critical identification with leaders, ideas and institutions capable of sustaining a national politics and modern state, they destroy the possibility or viability of a civil society that transcends them. Natural associations—including caste associations—in India in a few contexts such as Kerala, where society has become divided into five (Ezhavas, Harijans, Nairs, Christians and Muslims) large, roughly equal and relatively rigid groups, have contributed more to political instability than to political modernization. As the state's political parties have become increasingly congruent with these social differences, their integrative capacities have declined. Instead of subsuming, combining or disintegrating social differences based on birth, they have in considerable measure begun to re-enforce them. But the situation in Kerala is more the exception than the rule. The difficulties being experienced in Belgium, and Canada in recent years[49] derive from natural associations which have resisted or absorbed strong modern pluralistic forces, values antithetical to ascription and particularism, and integrative institutions, particularly the political party. The caste association has created less severe strains in modern Indian politics than have religion and language in these modern societies even while it has contributed to political socialization, modernization and meaningful participation in a society whose economic and social underdevelopment stands in marked contrast to these.[60]

---

[47] For a recent critical view of social pluralism as it has hardened and subordinated itself to bureaucratic leadership, see Henry Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961). Kariel is so concerned that he "would have us move . . . from the much celebrated ideal of Tocqueville toward the still unfashionable one of Rousseau."

Milton Gordon in *Assimilation in American Life* (New York, 1964), mounts an impressive case for the rigid compartmentalization of American communal life at the rank and file level. S. M. Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman in *Union Democracy; The Inside Politics of the International Typographical Union* (Glencoe, 1956), examine the rigidities and bureaucratic domination of union and professional associations by analysing the exceptional case. Everett C. Hughes in *Men and Their Work* (Glencoe, 1958), suggests how occupational associations in America, like castes in India, upgrade themselves by changing their names and histories and purify themselves and their rituals by emulating "higher" occupational groups in the matter of educational requirements, licensing standards and ceremonial niceties. John R. Murphy's "Professional and Occupational Licensing: A National Problem with State Control," a term paper in Government 155a, Government Regulation of Industry, Harvard University, 1959–60, along with Hughes' analyses, suggested these comparisons with caste mobility in India.

For social and political statements of the viability and benefits of social pluralism based on individuality, voluntarism and liberty, see William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960) and David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York, 1951).

Kariel and Lipset, Trow and Coleman emphasize the inability of members of formally voluntary associations, like peasants in Marx's analysis, to represent and rule themselves; therefore they fall victim to the executive power (the bureaucracy). William H. Whyte, Jr., in *The Organization Man* (New York, 1956), while not ignoring structural factors, emphasizes the ways in which formally voluntary organizations absorb and tend to monopolize the affective life and identities of their members and their families.

[48] See Jacques J. Maquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda* (London, Oxford University Press, 1961). For the genocide charge see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. 14 (1963–1964), pp. 20085–86.

[49] For Walloon-Flemish differences in Belgium see Ernest Mandel, "The Dialectic of Class and Region in Belgium," *New Left Review*, No. 20 (Summer, 1963), pp. 2–31; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. 13 (1961–1962), pp. 17968, 18391, 18623, and 18941 and Vol. 14 (1963–1964), p. 19601. For the differences in Canada between the French Catholics and English Protestants see the *Preliminary Report* of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, 1965). The Commission warned that Canada was undergoing "the greatest crisis in its history." (p. 13). See also Edmund Wilson, *O Canada* (New York, 1965).

Because caste in most instances continues to divide society horizontally and not (like religion and language) vertically, and because the horizontal divisions continue to be many rather than few, it remains primarily an instrument of political representation capable of being aggregated, integrated and led. Its closest functional equivalent now may be the ethnic and religious groups in American politics which, contrary to "official" ideology, retain great influence particularly at the local and state level.

If this is so or is proving to be so, the situation is paradoxical and ironical. Indians, unlike Americans, were not, as Tocqueville put it, born equal. They have had or will have to become so. In so far as they have achieved equality, they have done so by transforming the most rigidly hierarchical and compartmentalized system of social stratification, the caste system. The measure of equality that has been realized is in part the result of a marriage between the transplanted and assimilated liberalism of the British *raj* and traditional Indian culture. The offspring of this union is a political culture with characteristics that embrace not only political democracy and parliamentary government but also caste associations. It is a political culture that includes, in Morris-Jones' terms,[51] traditional, modern and "saintly" languages. Those who know and love one parent often ignore or reject the displeasing features of the other. Yet Indian political culture is surely a product of this union, a "genetic" fusion which some may think impossible, others immoral, but which by its vigor and viability over the years is hard to deny or ignore.

---

[60] See S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March, 1959) for a proposition and supporting evidence which strongly suggest that democracy should be an utter failure in India. On almost every statistical measure of the "requisites of democracy" (per capita income, literacy, industrialization and urbanization) India stands at or near the bottom, yet it is a democracy. Lipset derides those who use a deviant case to challenge the validity of the notion that there are "social conditions which are regularly associated with a given complex political system" (p. 70) such as democracy. Theoretical propositions "must be subject to test by a systematic comparison of *all* available cases . . . " A deviant case, according to Lipset, is properly treated as one out of many. Only woolly minded and unscientific political philosophers would argue that "a given situation clearly violates [a] thesis . . . " (p. 70). Yet Lipset, in selecting his cases on the basis of "whether a country had had a history of more or less free elections for most of the post-World War I period" (pp. 73–74) does not consider India, although she meets the test. It seems reasonable to question, therefore, whether *all* available cases have been considered. It also seems reasonable to inquire whether it is valid to treat this deviant case "as one case out of many." In the name of aggregative characteristics of systems and multivariate analysis of causality, we are asked to treat the experience of India's almost 500,000,000 people as equivalent to that of the smallest Latin American "nation."

Lipset himself, drawing upon Weber, suggests an alternative theory of cumulative causation (see below) to explain the existence and persistence of democracy, but unfortunately abandons it in favor of aggregative social characteristics, on the basis of what seems at best a marginal and at worst a meaningless distinction between the "social conditions" which "support" democracy and the "internal mechanisms" which "maintain" it. It would seem that both theories deserve a place in the sun: the theory of cumulative causation explains better the supports for and the continued existence of democracy in India, while the aggregative social conditions theory, which Lipset advances as a *general* theory, does not. This suggests that the Indian case may very well be a "universe" unto itself rather than "one case out of many." A general theory would then have to "explain" the Indian case *and* the cases with which Lipset deals. Instead, Lipset claims to deal with all cases but does not do so and treats, by implication, "universe" differences as "deviant" cases.

The theory of cumulative causation would explain the support and maintenance of democracy by proposing that " . . . unique events may account for *either* the persistence *or* the failure of democracy in any particular society . . . key historical events . . . set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another . . . once established, a democratic political system gathers momentum . . . " (p. 72). Lipset warns us, in the light of this line of analysis, not to "overstress" the high correlations he displays between democracy and his measures for requisites. He also allows that what he calls "premature" democracies which survive will do so by "facilitating the growth of conditions conducive to democracy . . . " But his choice of examples here, universal literacy and autonomous private associations—presumably not ones based on caste—highlight his bias toward certain "modern" aggregative social characteristics as the requisites of democracy. The Indian "universe" radically contradicts Lipset's view (as it does Marx's) but supports the abandoned theory of cumulative causation.

Changes in the internal arrangements and public function of caste and in political culture and structure are necessary but not sufficient if caste is to be made compatible with democracy. A profound change in the nature of human sensibility is also required but to a lesser extent realized. Tocqueville contrasted the state of human sensibility in aristocratic and democratic nations by observing that "real sympathy can exist only between those who are alike, and in aristocratic ages men acknowledge none but the members of their own caste to be like themselves. . . . When all the ranks of a community are nearly equal, as all men think and feel in nearly the same manner, each of them may judge in a moment of the sensations of all the others; he casts a rapid glance upon himself and that is enough."[52] Yet Indians have been profoundly separated by their traditional social arrangments. "The survival of the caste system," Edward Shils observes, " . . . cuts human beings off from each other. It inhibits the growth of sensibilities which are required for the perception of the moral quality of other human beings. . . . It is the caste system which helps deaden the imagination to the state of mind of other human beings."[53]

Democratic ideas and the equality of conditions, Tocqueville argues, turn superiors and inferiors into " . . . new beings and place them in new relative positions." In hierarchical societies as yet unaffected by these influences, inferiority does not degrade the character of those who are inferior because they neither know nor imagine any other self-definition.

> But while the transition from one social condition to another is going on, there is almost always a time when men's minds fluctuate between the aristocratic notion of subjection and the democratic notion of obedience. Obedience then loses its moral importance in the eyes of him who obeys . . . he does not yet view it under its purely human aspect; it has to him neither the character of sanctity or justice. The lines that divide authority from oppression, liberty from license, and right from might are . . . jumbled together and confused [so] that no one knows exactly what he is or what he may be or what he ought to be. Such a condition is not democracy but revolution.[54]

India may have been spared such a revolutionary situation by the transformation of caste over more than a century. But because it is still identified with ritual rank and sacred duty rather than social levelling and democratic representation, the degree to which Indians have put aside the aristocratic notion of subjection and accepted as moral and just the democratic one of obedience remains obscure.

Rajputs who ruled the former princely states which comprise contemporary Rajasthan, for example, saw their Congress opponents in the 1952 General Election as "no-account," no longer guided by duty and loyalty, trouble makers and riff-raff, not so much because they resented them as because their social circumstances prevented them from knowing or imagining what Congressmen were like as human beings. Ten years later their human and highly differentiated view of the Rajasthan Congress leadership was in part the result of the attention that power commands. Those Shanans a century ago who thought they were entitled to be known and treated as *Kshatriyas* (warrior-rulers) became in time Nadars; one of their descendents now sits on the Congress *gaddi* (royal cushion). What Edward Shils has called the democratization of charisma[55] has come about in part from the successful emulation of higher by lower castes and the greater homogeneity of society that it produced, in part through the use of caste in a secular form to achieve influence and power and through them self-esteem and public respect. The Nadar who sits on the Congress *gaddi* symbolizes a massive historical change. Castes no longer live as races apart, capable of fellow feeling for their caste brothers only. A deepening sense of universal citizenship and a broadly shared political culture may have made Indians, in Locke's phrase, "capable of a majority," and in

---

[51] Morris-Jones, *op cit.*, ch. 2.

[52] *Democracy in America* (Anchor ed.), II, 173, 175–6.

[53] *Op. cit.*, note 35 above, p. 70.

[54] *Democracy in America, ibid.*

[55] "Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma; Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," *World Politics*, Vol. 11 (October, 1958), pp. 1–19.

Aristotle's, of ruling and being ruled in turn. Tocqueville's tests for the transition from aristocratic subjection to democratic obedience—the capacity to be governed by authority rather than oppression, to practice liberty rather than license and to maintain order through right rather than might—may be passed successfully.[56]

---

[56] This is more apparent at the national and state than at the local level of government. The literature on village factionalism and the failures of *panchyati raj* suggest that oppression, license and might in some localities are stronger than authority, liberty and right. But much of this literature reflects an administrative not a political view. A recent study by Adrian C. Mayer sees the problem rather differently. He finds that "caste ties help a leader to gain power in the rural committee system; but that his allocation of development funds does not unduly favor supporters of his own caste. . . . His favours may stem from the influence he has with officials and politicians as a leader of the rural system; but the favours do not form part of that system, while his allocation of development funds does. Hence, the rural leader controls the committee system and the attached development allocation as much to attain the external benefits (for which the system provides the springboard) as to hold power within the system.

"Community development *is* therefore a factor in rural politics; but its role is part of a much wider process, in which rural leaders are asserting themselves in a changing balance of general political power. For rural leaders are using the influence which they are gaining as brokers outside the rural system to compete for power with the incumbent, mainly urban-oriented, politicians of the national parties." "Some Political Implications of Community Development in India," *Arch. Europ. Sociol.* Vol 4 (1963), p. 106.

This headline from the *Statesman* of June 19, 1961, CASTE HIERARCHY DECLINES, AS CASTEISM RISES, sums up some of the case for the modernity of tradition through the democratic incarnation of caste.

OBLIGATION AND CONSENT—I

HANNA PITKIN
University of Wisconsin

One might suppose that if political theorists are by now clear about anything at all, they should be clear about the problem of political obligation and the solution to it most commonly offered, the doctrine of consent. The greatest modern political theorists took up this problem and formulated this answer. The resulting theories are deeply imbedded in our American political tradition; as a consequence we are already taught a sort of rudimentary consent theory in high school. And yet I want to suggest that we are not even now clear on what "*the* problem of political obligation" is, what sorts of "answers" are appropriate to it, what the consent answer really says, or whether it is a satisfactory answer. This essay is designed to point up the extent of our confusion, to explore some of the ground anew as best it can, and to invite further effort by others. That such effort is worthwhile, that such political theory is still worth considering and that it can be made genuinely relevant to our world, are the assumptions on which this essay rests and the larger message it is meant to convey.

I. THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION

The difficulties begin with the formulation of the problem itself. What exactly is the "problem of political obligation"? It is characteristic that we take it for granted there is a single problem to be defined here, and that nevertheless a dozen different formulations clamor for our attention. The classical theorists on the subject have treated it in varying ways; and even within the writings of a Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau it is difficult to say what the theorist's "basic problem" is, or indeed whether he has one. We tend, I think, to suppose that it does not matter very much how you phrase the problem, that the different formulations boil down to the same thing. But my first point will be that this attitude of arbitrariness or indifference should not be trusted. It is not, in fact, true that any formulation of the problem is equivalent to any other. Rather, this supposed single problem is a whole cluster of different questions—questions of quite various kind and scope. And though their answers *may* turn out to be related, so that an answer to one provides answers to the others also, it is by no means obvious that this must be so. Specifically, I suggest that most of the familiar answers to the problem are satisfactory responses to some of its questions but not to others, and that the answer adopted depends a good deal on the question stressed.

For the purposes of this essay it will be useful to distinguish four questions, or rather, four clusters of questions, all of which are part of what bothers theorists about political obligation.[1] They range from a relatively concrete and practical political concern with what is to be done, through increasing theoretical abstractness, to a philosophical concern with the meanings of concepts and the paradoxes that arise out of them. Because we are used to treating them all as different versions of one problem, the reader may not at first see any significant differences among them; but the differences should emerge in the course of the discussion.

We are told often enough that the theorists of political obligation were not merely philosophers, but also practical men writing about the political needs of their times. They produced "not simply academic treatises, but essays in advocacy, adapted to the urgencies of a particular situation. Men rarely question the legitimacy of established authority when all is going well; the problem of political obligation is urgent when the state is sick, when someone is seriously contemplating disobedience or revolt on principle."[2] Thus we may begin with a cluster of questions centered around the *limits* of political obligation, the more or less practical concern with *when*, under what circumstances, resistance or revolution is justified. The theorist wants to promote or prevent a revolution, or he lives in a time when one is taking place, or he contemplates one in the recent past. So he seeks some fairly general, but still practically applicable principles to guide a man in deciding when (if ever) political obligation ends or ceases to bind. They must have a certain degree of generality in order to be principles rather than *ad hoc* considerations in one particular situation, in order to be recognized by us as *theory*. But they are also fairly directly tied to what Tussman has called the question "what should I do?"[3] They are guidelines to action.

---

[1] No doubt the problem encompasses more than these four questions, and could be divided up in a number of different ways. Indeed, some aspects of it not covered by these four questions will emerge in the course of this discussion.

[2] S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, *Social Principles and the Democratic State* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959), pp. 299–300.

At other times the same practical concern tends to take a slightly different form: "Whom am I obligated to obey? Which of the persons (or groups) claiming to command me actually has authority to do so?" Put this second way, the problem seems to be one of rival authorities, sometimes identified in political theory as the problem of the locus of sovereignty. The former question tends to arise in situations of potential civil disobedience or nascent revolution, where the individual is relatively alone in his confrontation of a government. The latter question is more likely to come up in situations of civil war or when a revolution is more advanced, when the individual is already confronted by two "sides" between which he must choose.

But as the theorist tries to formulate general principles to guide such a choice, he may be led to a more abstract version of his problem. He may be struck by the seeming arbitrariness or conventionality of human authority: how is it that some men have the right to command, and others are obligated to obey? And so the theorist looks for the general difference between legitimate authority on the one hand, and illegitimate, naked coercive force on the other. He begins to wonder whether there is really any difference in principle between a legitimate government and a highway robber, pirate, or slave-owner. He begins to suspect that terms like "legitimate," "authority," "obligation" may be parts of an elaborate social swindle, used to clothe those highway robbers who have the approval of society with a deceptive mantle of moralistic sanctity. Essentially, he begins to ask whether men are ever truly obligated to obey, or only coerced. "Strength is a physical attribute," says Rousseau, "and I fail to see how any moral sanction can attach to its effects. To yield to the strong is an act of necessity, not of will. At most it is the result of a dictate of prudence. How, then, can it become a duty?"[4] Such questions are no longer merely guides to action; they are attempts to describe and classify parts of the social world. Instead of focussing on the individual's "what should I do?" they focus outward, on the (real or alleged) authority: "what is legitimate authority like?"

Finally, behind even this more abstract question, lies what is essentially a philosophical problem, a cluster of questions centering around the *justification* of obligation: *why* are you obligated to obey even a legitimate government? Why is anyone ever obligated to obey any authority at all? How can such a thing be rationalized, explained, defended, justified? What can account for the binding nature of valid law and legitimate authority? I call these questions philosophical problems because they no longer seek distinctions or guides to action, but arise out of puzzlement over the nature of law, government, obligation as such. They are categorical questions to which the theorist is led, characteristically, after an extended abstract contemplation of the concepts he has been using. They are reminiscent of other philosophical puzzles, like "do we ever really know anything?" or "do other people really exist?"

We have, then, four clusters of questions, any or all of which are sometimes taken to define the problem of political obligation:

(1) The limits of obligation ("*When* are you obligated to obey, and when not?")
(2) The locus of sovereignty ("*Whom* are you obligated to obey?")
(3) The difference between legitimate authority and mere coercion ("Is there *really* any difference; are you ever *really* obligated?")
(4) The justification of obligation ("*Why* are you ever obligated to obey even a legitimate authority?")

Obviously the answers to these questions may be connected. If, for example, one answers question three in terms of the reductionist realism of a Thrasymachus or of vulgar Marxism: "there is no difference," then the other questions become essentially irrelevant. But we should not take it for granted that any answer to one of these questions will automatically provide consistent answers to the rest; we should look to see how familiar answers in fact perform. Our prime interest is, of course, the consent answer, but before examining it, we might look briefly at very abstract, ideal-typicalized versions of some of its major rivals. Their brief treatment here would not allow, and is not meant to be a balanced assessment of their merits. It is meant only to explore a little of the complexity of political obligation, and the difficulty of providing a consistent treatment of it.

Theories of Divine Right or the will of God, for example, seem much better designed to cope with some of our questions than with others. Saying, with St. Paul, that "the powers that be are ordained of God," seems a decisive answer (at least for a believer) to our question four. Granted only that there is a God (in the full sense of the word), the fact that he commands certain actions is surely a decisive justification for our obligation to perform them. But applied to our other questions the doctrine is ambiguous. Taken one way, it seems to imply that there is no difference between mere coercive force and legitimate authority, since all power comes from God. Then resistance is never justified, even against a heretical ruler who attacks religion. For times when power is in flux, as in cases of civil war, this version of the theory seems to provide very little guidance for action. Taking the doctrine a different way, some divine right theorists have wanted to argue that there is nevertheless a distinction to be made between divinely ordained power and illegitimate power, and that there are times when certain kinds of power must be resisted.

---

[3] Joseph Tussman, *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 12.

[4] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, in Sir Ernest Barker, ed., *The Social Contract* (New York, Oxford, 1960), Bk. I, iii.

Prescription, another familiar response to the problem of obligation, seems more directly designed to give an unequivocal answer to questions one and perhaps three. It teaches that old, established power is legitimate in every case, and there are no limits on our obligation to obey it. But this again is no guide in times of successful revolution; is it obedience or counterrevolution that is then required? And what of occasions when an old, established government begins to act in new and tyrannical ways? Even Burke was sympathetic to the American Revolution. Further, this doctrine has real difficulties with our question four; a government's age, and our habitual obedience to it, do not seem to *justify* an obligation to obey. At most the connection can only be made through a number of additional assumptions concerning human reason and the nature of society, and adding up to the thesis that old, accepted government is most likely to be good government.

A third, equally well known response to our problem, that of Utilitarianism, is perhaps an even better illustration of the complexities involved. The utilitarian theorist argues that you are obligated to obey if and only if the consequences of obedience will be best on the whole, in terms of a calculus of pains and pleasures. There are, of course, familiar difficulties over the manner of calculation and whether all pains and pleasures are to count equally. But even beyond these, there is a fundamental question left unclear, namely, *whose* pains and pleasures are to count: your own personal ones, or those of the (majority of) people in your society. Bentham himself says that it is

> allowable to, if not incumbent on every man . . . to enter into measures of resistance . . . when the probable mischiefs of resistance (speaking with respect to the community in general) appear less to him than the probable mischiefs of obedience.[5]

But the phrase in the parentheses is, of course, the crux of the matter. The Utilitarians are notoriously inconsistent on precisely this point, saying one thing when they speak of personal ethics and personal decision, and quite another on the subject of legislation and public policy. So it will be well for us to consider both possibilities.

First, there is what might be called individualistic utilitarianism. Such a theory argues that you are obligated when the consequences of obedience are best on the whole in terms of your personal pleasure and pain. As a response to our question four, this argument has a certain appeal: you are obligated *because* it is best for you in terms of your own pleasure and pain. But the implications for the other questions are more strange. For they are that each individual is obligated to obey only while it is best for him, and becomes obligated to resist when that would promote his personal welfare. Thus the same government will be a legitimate authority for some of its subjects but naked illegitimate power to others. And anyone is free to disobey or resist whenever it benefits him to do so; he can have no obligation to the contrary. Indeed, the sum total of such a doctrine is that you have no obligation at all, or none except the pursuit of your own welfare. If that happens at one point to entail obeying the law, you should do so; if not, not. And in precisely the same way, if it happens at one point to entail obeying a highway robber, you are "obligated" to do that. Thus, as an answer to question three, individualistic utilitarianism essentially denies the existence of authority altogether.

The second alternative is what we might call social utilitarianism. This position argues that you are obligated to obey if and only if the consequences of your doing so will be best on the whole, in terms of the pains and pleasures of the people in your society—in terms of the greatest good for the greatest number. Unlike individualistic utilitarianism, this seems a fairly reasonable, conventional answer to questions one and two. You must obey while that promotes the welfare of society, even if it hurts you; and you must resist when that is socially best, even if it hurts you. The answer to question three is less obvious but not, on the face of it, irrational. A legitimate government is one that promotes the greatest good for the greatest number; and if a highway robber does that, then he becomes thereby a legitimate authority entitled to your obedience. A selfish or (on the whole) harmful robber or government may or must be resisted. But as an answer to question four, social utilitarianism seems less successful. For it teaches that you are obligated *because* your obedience will promote the greatest good for the greatest number. But if you are bothered about political obligation, *that* is just the problem: why should that criterion mean anything to you? Why should it be any easier to accept *that* obligation than to accept the obligation to obey law and authority?

---

[5] Jeremy Bentham, *Fragment on Government*, ch. IV, par. 21.

Sometimes, of course, the utilitarians assume that there is no problem about individualistic *versus* social utilitarianism, that the two criteria are essentially the same because of the invisible hand, because individual welfare is (in sum) social welfare. When they write about economics, particularly, this solution tempts them. But in political life, concerning legislation or concerning political obligation, they are fairly well aware that this is not the case. Private interest must be *made* to coincide with public interest by wise legislation. And instructions to resist when it is best for society will often produce quite different results than instructions to resist when it is best for you personally. There are bound to be occasions when the public welfare requires serious sacrifices (perhaps even of life) by some individuals. To suppose otherwise seems incredibly unrealistic.

The theorist founding political obligation in consent responds to our four questions in this way: you are obligated to obey if and only if you have consented. Thus your consent defines the limits of your obligation as well as the person or persons to whom it is owed. Legitimate authority is distinguished from mere coercive power precisely by the consent of those subject to it. And the justification for your obligation to obey is your own consent to it; because you have agreed, it is right for you to have an obligation. But the seeming harmonious simplicity of these answers is deceptive; when consent theory is worked out in detail, its answers to some of our questions begin to interfere with its answers to others.

In the first place, there is the problem of exactly whose consent is to count. We have all known, at least since Hume—if it was not already obvious before him—that the historical origins of society are essentially irrelevant to the consent argument. The consent of our ancestors does not settle the problem about our obligation today. Or rather, someone who seriously argues that the consent of our ancestors does settle this problem, is arguing more from prescription than from consent, and is probably not very troubled about political obligation anyway.

But even if it is the consent of those now subject to power (or authority) that matters, there are still several alternatives: is it to be the individual's personal consent that determines his obligation, or the consent of all (or most) of those subject to the government? And is it to be his or their present consent, or consent given in the past? Let us consider the possibilities.

(1) You are obligated only insofar as you personally consent right now. Where your consenting ends, there ends also your obligation. What this presumably means is that as long as you accept the government it is wrong for you to disobey it, and right for it to punish any disobedience by you. But as soon as you withdraw your consent, you become free to disobey, and no attempt to punish you can be justified. This doctrine would have the peculiar consequence that you can never violate your obligation; for as soon as you decide the time has come for revolution (withdraw your consent), your obligation disappears. It also means that you can never be mistaken about your obligation, for what you think defines it. This answer comes to much the same thing as individualistic utilitarianism, except that it demands no rational calculation, looking to your will rather than to your welfare.

(2) You are obligated only insofar as you personally have *in the past* consented. This is closer to traditional contract theory. You gave your word, and so you are bound for the future, unless (of course) the government changes and becomes tyrannical. But this position seems to allow the possibility of becoming obligated to a tyrannical government, if you expressly consent to one that was already corrupt. One can avoid that problem by saying such promises are invalid, that you *cannot* expressly consent to become a slave; but then the argument is already moving away from a consent theory. Then your obligation is no longer merely a matter of your having consented (tried to consent, intended to consent).

Further, there seems to be a real problem about why and whether your past promise should bind you now. The classical contract theorists provide a law of nature to take care of this difficulty: it is a law of nature that promises oblige. But why should it seem so obvious and "natural" and self-evident that your promises oblige you, when it is so doubtful and problematic and un-"natural" that law and authority oblige you?

(3) You are obligated only insofar as your fellow-subjects consent. One consequence of

this position is that the matter is no longer left up to you; you can sometimes be obligated to obey even against your will and your private judgment, and without ever having consented or been consulted. But, if so, how many of your fellow-subjects must consent? All? That is surely impossible. A majority? But that implies that the way to decide whether you are obligated, or whether you should start a revolution, is to take a public opinion poll. And can majorities never be wrong? Are there no occasions in the history of mankind when it was right for a dedicated minority to begin agitating for a revolution, or even to lead or make a revolution? And finally, *why* should what the majority (or any other proportion) of your fellow-subjects think be binding on you? What justification is there for that? Why should that obligation seem more basic or natural or self-evident than the obligation to obey laws and authority? Because you have consented to majority rule? But then the whole cycle of difficulties begins again.

Besides the matter of whose consent is to count, consent theory is also much troubled by the difficulty of showing that you, or a majority of your fellow-citizens (as the case may be) have in fact consented. Most of us have not signed any contract with our government or our society or our fellow-citizens. There is no such contract for us to sign. And while we political theorists may be enlightened about our obligations, we realize that the largest proportion of our fellow-citizens has never contemplated this sort of question at all. If they have consented, it comes as news to most of them. Of course, these facts need not invalidate the consent argument. Perhaps most of us are not really obligated in modern, apathetic mass society; perhaps our government is not really legitimate. But such conclusions seem to fly in the face of common sense. Surely, one feels, if the present government of the United States is not a legitimate authority, no government has ever been. And surely it is absurd to adopt a theory according to which only those people who are most educated and aware of their obligations, most moral and sensitive, are obligated to obey the law. Surely it is absurd to suppose that all the rest are free to do whatever they please, whatever they can get away with. A more common move at this stage in the argument is the introduction of some notion of "tacit consent", demonstrating that even the unaware masses have consented after all. But it appears to be extremely difficult to formulate a notion of tacit consent strong enough to create the required obligation, yet not so strong as to destroy the very substance and meaning of consent.

Let us now examine in more detail how these difficulties are encountered and treated in two consent arguments: the most famous one of the tradition, made by John Locke, and a recent attempt at revision by Joseph Tussman. What should emerge from a review of their arguments is a somewhat unexpected and different doctrine of political obligation: perhaps a new interpretation of consent theory, perhaps a new rival to it.

II. LOCKE ON CONSENT

Locke tells us in the preface to his *Two Treatises* that he wants both to "make good" the title of William III to the English throne "in the consent of the People" and also "to justifie to the World, the people of England, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine."[6] Apart from the exegetic problems of how much of the *Treatises* may have been written before the Glorious Revolution and for quite other purposes, the thrust of Locke's argument makes clear enough that this dual orientation does pervade the work.[7] He seeks both to defend the obligation to obey legitimate authority (which is authority based on consent), and to defend the right to resist coercive force in the absence of authority. But Locke moves easily, and seemingly without awareness, from one to another of our four questions about obligation and back again. Often when the going gets difficult on one, he switches to another.

Legitimate authority, for Locke, comes from the consent of those subject to it, never from mere conquest (force); and even a consent extracted by coercion is invalid.[8] Thus the limits of a government's authority are defined by the social contract on which it is based. Strictly speaking, of course, Locke's contract sets up *society* and government is established by society as a trust.[9] There is no contract with the government. But the government gets its powers (in trust) from "the society", acting by majority vote. And "the society" has only such powers to give, as it has itself received from the separate contracting individuals. Thus, even for Locke, it is the contract which ultimately determines what powers the government can have. He himself makes this assumption and I shall follow suit, since it simplifies the argument.[10]

---

[6] Peter Laslett, ed., *John Locke, Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge University Press, 1960) p. 155.

[7] For a discussion of the evidence on when the *Treatises* were written, see *ibid.*, Introduction, esp. part III.

[8] John Locke, *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, in Barker, *op. cit.*, par. 176.

[9] *Ibid.*, pars. 132, 149, 199 211.

Although Locke sometimes seems to take contract seriously as an account of the historical origins of society, he is nevertheless quite explicit about the requirement that no person is obligated to obey today unless he has himself consented.[11] Most of us have not consented expressly? Ah, but there is tacit consent, and its scope turns out to be very wide indeed. Although a father may not consent for his son, he can make consent to the community a condition on inheritance of the property he leaves behind; then in accepting the property the son tacitly consents to obey the government.[12] But the final definition of tacit consent is even wider, for land is not the only form of property, and property not the only form of right that men enjoy:

> Every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely traveling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territories of that government.[13]

Just as Locke maintained earlier in the *Treatise* that men have tacitly consented to all inequalities in property, simply by accepting and using money as a medium of exchange; so in the political realm he argues that men have tacitly consented to obey a government, simply by remaining within its territory.[14] But now there no longer seems to be much power in the concept of consent, nor any difference between legitimate government and mere coercion. Being within the territory of the worst tyranny in the world seems to constitute tacit consent to it and create an obligation to obey it. Only physical withdrawal —emigration— and the abandoning of all property frees you from that obligation; there is no such thing as tacit *dissent*.

At this point we are likely to feel cheated by Locke's argument: why all the stress on consent if it is to include everything we do; why go through the whole social contract argument if it turns out in the end that everyone is automatically obligated? It seems that in his eagerness to save the consent answer to our question four (because only your own consent *can* justify your obligation), Locke has been forced so to widen the definition of consent as to make it almost unrecognizable. He has been forced to abandon his answers to our other questions as well as one of his own initial purposes: the justification of an (occasional) right of revolution.

But clearly this is not Locke's real position. I have developed it this way only because the corrections we must now make are so revealing about consent theory. For despite his doctrine of tacit consent, Locke does not want to abandon either the right of revolution or the distinction between legitimate authority and coercive power. His position is not, in fact, that living within the territory of a tyrannical government or holding property under it constitutes tacit consent to it.

Suppose that we ask: *to what* have you consented when you live in a country and use its highways? Unfortunately, Locke is less than clear on this question. What he says explicitly in the crucial section on tacit consent is that you have "consented," period; he does not say to what.[15] But apparently, what you consent to is a kind of associate membership in the commonwealth. Full membership, achieved only by express consent, is an indissoluble bond for life. The obligation of a tacit consenter, however, terminates if he leaves the country and gives up his property there.[16] Locke also variously describes tacit consent as a joining oneself to a society, putting oneself under a commonwealth and submitting to a government. Sometimes he simply equates its "joining up" aspects with submission to a government; at other times he regards submission as an immediate consequence of joining.[17]

But in the context of the problems we have encountered, a better interpretation of Locke's intention here would be this: what you consent to tacitly is *the terms of the original contract which the founders of the commonwealth made*, no more and no less. You append your "signature," as it were, to the original "document." Then if you live or use the roads or hold property under a government which is violating its trust, exceeding its authority, taking property without due compensation, "altering the legislative," or generally acting in a tyrannical manner, you have consented to none of these things. You are not obligated to obey one inch beyond the limits of the original contract, any more than its original signatories were. You retain the right of revolution, as they did, in case the government oversteps the limits of its authority.

---

[10] For example, *ibid.*, par. 171: "political power" is spoken of as that power which every man has "in the state of Nature given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over it self. . . . "

[11] *Ibid.*, par. 116.

[12] *Ibid.*, and also par. 73.

[13] *Ibid.*, par. 119.

[14] "But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man, in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes in great part the measure, it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth. . . . " *Ibid.*, par. 50.

[15] *Ibid.*, par. 119.

[16] *Ibid.*, par. 121.

[17] *Ibid.*, pars. 73, 119, 120.

So we seem to be led to the position that you are obligated to obey not really because you have consented; your consent is virtually automatic. Rather, you are obligated to obey because of certain characteristics of the government—that it is acting within the bounds of a trusteeship based on an original contract. And here it seems to me that interpreters of Locke have given far too little attention to the degree to which he regards the terms of the original contract as inevitably determined. In truth, the original contract could not have read any otherwise than it did, and the powers it gave and limits it placed can be logically deduced from the laws of nature and conditions in the state of nature. Not only does Locke himself confidently deduce them in this way, sure that he can tell us what the terms of that original contract were, *must* have been; but he says explictitly tha they could not have been otherwise. For men had to give up sufficient of their rights to make an effective government possible, to allow a government to remedy the "inconveniences" of the state of nature. Nothing short of this would create a society, a government. "There, and there only, is political society, where every one of the members" has given up the powers necessary to a society:[18]

> Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the needs for which they unite into society. . . .[19]

More power than this, on the other hand, men cannot be supposed to have given; and, indeed, they are forbidden by the law of nature to give more. When the limits of authority are to be defined, Locke invokes the purpose for which the contract was made, the intention which those making it must have had:

> But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty and executive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in everyone the better to preserve himself, his liberty and his property (*for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to the worse*), the power of the society or legislative constituted by them *can never be supposed to extend farther* than the common good, but is obliged to secure everyone's property by providing against those three defects above-mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.[20]

Thus men cannot sell themselves into slavery "for nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself" to give to another; he "*cannot* subject himself to the arbitrary power of another."[21] Arbitrary or absolute power can never be legitimate, consented to, because "God and Nature" do not allow "a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation."[22] "Thus," says Locke, "the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others."[23]

If the terms of the original contract are, as I am arguing, "self-evident" truths to Locke, which could not be or have been otherwise, then the historical veracity of the contract theory becomes in a new and more profound sense irrelevant. For now the Lockean doctrine becomes this: your personal consent is essentially irrelevant to your obligation to obey, or its absence. Your obligation to obey depends on the character of the government—whether it is acting within the bounds of *the* (only possible) contract. If it is, and you are in its territory, you must obey. If it is not, then no amount of personal consent from you, no matter how explicit, can create an obligation to obey it. No matter how often you pledge allegiance to a tyranny, those pledges *cannot* constitute a valid obligation, because they violate the law of nature. So, not only is your personal consent irrelevant, but it actually no longer matters whether this government or any government was really founded by a group of men deciding to leave the state of nature by means of a contract. As long as a government's actions are within the bounds of what such a contract hypothetically *would have* provided, would have *had* to provide, those living within its territory must obey. This is the true significance of what we have all learned to say in political theory: that the historical accuracy of the contract doctrine is basically irrelevant—that the contract is a logical construct. The only "consent" that is relevant is the hypothetical consent imputed to hypothetical, timeless, abstract, rational men.

---

[18] *Ibid.*, par. 87.

[19] *Ibid.*, par. 99.

[20] *Ibid.*, par. 131, italics mine. See also pars. 90, 135, 137, 149, 164.

[21] *Ibid.*, pars. 135, 23.

[22] *Ibid.*, pars. 90, 168.

[23] *Ibid.*, par. 135; see also par. 142.

III. TUSSMAN ON CONSENT

A more modern version of the story is told by Joseph Tussman in his excellent and provocative book, *Obligation and the Body Politic*. Tussman, too, seeks to found political obligation in the consent of the governed. Only on that basis, he maintains, is political obligation "distinguishable from captivity," for "obligations are, or even must be voluntarily assumed."[24] Tussman acknowledges the rarity of express consent except in the case of naturalized citizens who take an oath of citizenship. But, like Locke, he introduces a notion of tacit consent. Unlike Locke's, however, Tussman's tacit consent does not include merely walking on a country's highway; he insists that even tacit consent must be "knowing," made with awareness of what one is doing and of its significance.[25] A great many different actions, done with awareness and intent, can constitute such tacit consent: pledging allegiance to the flag, voting in an election, and so on. But even this doctrine, as Tussman admits, produces only a relatively small number of persons who can be said to have consented. Reluctantly he accepts this conclusion, which he calls the notion of "shrinkage."

> If it is insisted that only those who have consented are members of the body politic then the body politic may shrink alarmingly. . . . [But] any description of a body politic, like the United States, would have to recognize that there are some, or many, "citizens" who could not be described as having consented. There is no point to resorting to fiction to conceal this fact.[26]

Thus it is Tussman's position that only those who have consented (perhaps tacitly, but knowingly) are truly members, and that these may be relatively small proportion of the population.[27] But, of course, he is not willing to conclude that only those few consenting members are bound to obey the laws and accept the actions of the government as authoritative. He takes it for granted that everyone must obey, is obligated to obey, ought to be punished for disobeying—even the man who has never given government or obligation a single thought. Tussman allows for the possibility of withdrawal, emigration, as an express refusal to consent; but (as with Locke) there is no such thing as tacit dissent. The clods who merely live in a country without ever being sufficiently aware of public life to consent even tacitly, are not members of the body politic, but they are nevertheless bound to obey the law. The clods are obligated, Tussman says, like children. "Non-consenting-adult citizens are, in effect, like minors who are governed without their own consent. The period of tutelage and dependence is unduly prolonged."[28]

The interesting thing is that this doctrine does not seem to bother Tussman; he sees no inconsistency in it. He is not disturbed by saying on the one hand that membership in a body politic can only be distinguished from mere captivity if it is voluntary, and on the other hand that large masses of people must obey though they have not consented and are consequently not members. He does not seem to be bothered by saying that great masses of adults are obligated like children; he does not discuss why or how children are obligated, how their obligation—let alone its continuation into adult life—can be *justified*. To be sure, he obviously regrets the state of affairs that makes so large a proportion of our population clods who are not truly members. In a sense his whole book is written to advocate a more adequate system of political education, which would make more people aware of morality and public life, so that they would truly consent.

This is his ideal; but we have a right to ask what happens in the meantime, and how satisfactorily Tussman's account explains political obligation in the meantime. And when we do, we have the same feeling of betrayal as with Locke: why all the liberal protestations at the outset about the need for voluntary consent, if the net result in the end is that everyone has to obey anyway? In Locke the betrayal seems to center in the way he stretches the notion of tacit consent; Tussman avoids this, but instead introduces a second, childlike kind of obligation.

Now, there are good reasons why Tussman's argument proceeds as it does, why he does not seem to see these difficulties. For, although his book purports to be about obligation (as the title indeed indicates) the primary thrust of its argument, the question Tussman really seems to have asked himself, is about *membership* in a body politic. He takes it for granted that exploring the nature of membership will also produce answers about political obligation. At the outset of the book, confronting the question of what membership in a body politic is like, Tussman suggests three alternative possibilities: that membership be construed as subordination to a single coercive power; or as sharing in a common set of habits or customs; or as being party to (consenting to) a system of agreements on the model of a voluntary association. Given these three alternatives, he opts for the last one, because only if membership rests on consent can it be related to concepts like legitimacy and obligation. " 'I have a duty to . . .' seems to follow from 'I have agreed to' in a way that it does not follow from 'I am forced to' or 'I am in the habit of.' "[29]

---

[24] *Op. cit.*, pp. 24, 8. I hope it is clear, in spite of all the criticisms I make of Tussman's argument, how greatly this essay is indebted to his work.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 39–41.

In terms of our classification, Tussman directs his inquiry at question three, the difference between legitimate authority and coercive power. As an answer to that question, as an account of membership, his theory surely is very compelling. Confronted with unaware, non-consenting clods, it seems reasonable then to say that not everyone is truly a member; that no body politic is entirely legitimate, based on the consent of every single subject; that political education might make our nation a better, truer political association in the future. But approached from our question four, for instance, the theory seems arbitrary and inadequate. If "obligations are, or even must be voluntarily assumed," then how can one consistently maintain that children or the non-consenting clods are obligated to obey the law? How is their situation different from captivity, and how can it be justified? Tussman is not interested in our question four. Or perhaps that statement is not strong enough; he refuses to consider the question, because he regards it as "a symptom of moral disorder."[30]

Tussman is right to be suspicious of the question; there is something strange about it, as we shall later see. But it is a symptom less of moral disorder than of philosophical disorder; and it needs to be considered, not rejected. For although Tussman explicitly rejects the question, he is already profoundly committed to one particular answer to it: that only consent can justify obligation, distinguish it from captivity. And this commitment conflicts with his treatment of the clods in society. As a result, Tussman's theory also has difficulties with our questions one and two, concerning the limits and location of authority.

For Tussman wants to maintain that all persons in a country—consenting members and clods alike—are obligated to obey law and government, *except when occasions for revolution arise.* He recognizes that there are occasions and situations when revolution is justified, that there is a right of revolution. He talks about the need to "exhaust the remedies" available within a system, about what happens when there are only "corrupt tribunals" left to appeal to; and he says "where government is based on force, forceful opposition needs no special permit."[31] Thus we may legitimately ask him, *who* has the right to revolt when the occasion for revolution arises. The members presumably do. Surely they never consented to tyranny, and a tyrannical government is acting *ultra vires,* beyond any consent they have given. But surely, too, the clods, who have never consented, ought also to be morally free to resist a "government" that has become a tyranny. Though they may ordinarily be obligated to obey as children are, yet surely Tussman cannot mean that they continue to be obligated no matter what the government does or how it degenerates. Surely a clod who suddenly awakens to moral awareness under a Hitler government is right to resist it.

But why, when, how does their childlike obligation come to an end? Tussman does not tell us, because he does not consider the question. He seems, thus, to be saying: you are obligated to obey a government that is legitimate authority, *whether you personally consented to it or not.* If you have consented, you are obligated as a member; if not, as a child. In either case your obligation ends if the government abuses its power or ceases to be a legitimate authority. And what defines a legitimate authority? Why, consent, of course. Then we are all of us obligated to obey a government based on our consent, whether or not we have consented to it.

Though he never makes it explicit, the position that Tussman really seems to want to take is that we are all obligated to obey a government based on the consent *of the aware elite,* the true members, whether or not we ourselves have consented. A government is legitimate when those who are aware consent to it, and it then becomes legitimate for *all* its subjects; a government is tyrannical if it lacks this consent of the aware ones, or oversteps the limits of it. And then *all* its former subjects are released from their obligation. Some evidence for the contention that this is what Tussman means to say may be drawn from his treatment of the child's obligation. For he says "Non-consenting adult citizens are, in effect, like minors who are governed without *their own* consent."[32]

---

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 8.

[30] *Ibid.,* p. 29.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 44.

But again Tussman fails to tell us who does consent for minors, how and why the consent of some can legitimately be taken to bind others. Thus saying that the aware few consent for the rest is by no means a satisfactory answer, but from it I believe a more satisfactory answer can be reached by one further step. We must ask Tussman whether the aware few *could conceivably* consent to a tyranny, whether such consent would *count*, would be binding on them or the clods. I think clearly Tussman would want to say no, that such an action would not be a genuine consent, that an attempt to consent to tyranny does not create valid obligation either for the aware few or for the many clods for whom they are said to act. Thus a different doctrine begins to emerge between the lines of Tussman's book, as it did with Locke. It is not so much your consent nor even the consent of a majority of the aware few in your society that obligates you. You do not consent to be obligated, but rather are obligated to consent, if the government is just. Your obligation has something to do with the objective characteristics of the government —whether, for example, its "tribunals" are or are not "corrupt." Again the relevant consent seems to be best interpreted as hypothetical or constructive—the abstract consent that would be given by rational men. Like Locke, Tussman can be pushed back to this position: you are obligated neither by your own consent nor by that of the majority, but by the consent rational men in a hypothetical "state of nature" would have to give. A government acting within the bounds of such a hypothetical consent is legitimate and we are all obligated to obey it. A government systematically violating those limits is tyrannical, and we are free to resist it.

Both Locke's and Tussman's argument, then lead us to a somewhat surprising new doctrine: that your obligation to obey depends not on any special relationship (consent) between you and your government, but on the nature of that government itself. If it is a good, just government doing what a government should, then you must obey it; if it is a tyrannical, unjust government trying to do what no government should, then you have no such obligation. In one sense this "nature of the government" theory is thus a substitute for the doctrine of consent. But it may also be regarded as a new interpretation of consent theory, what we may call the doctrine of *hypothetical* consent. For a legitimate government, a true authority, one whose subjects are obligated to obey it, emerges as being one to which they *ought to consent,*[33] quite apart from whether they have done so. Legitimate government acts within the limits of the authority rational men would, abstractly and hypothetically, have to give a government they are founding. Legitimate government is government which *deserves* consent.

I do not mean to suggest that the "nature of the government" theory which thus emerges is really Locke's and Tussman's secret doctrine, which they hide from the casual reader and which has only now been unearthed. Probably neither of them saw that his argument was moving in this direction. Rather I suggest that this theory is a better response to the problem of political obligation from their own premises —that it is the truth toward which they were striving, but which they saw only indistinctly. Only in that sense is it "what they really meant to say," and of course both of them also say other things incompatible with it.

(*Part I of a two-part article*)

---

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 37, italics mine.

[33] *Cf.* Benn and Peters, *op. cit.*, pp. 323, 329.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. PHILIP E. CONVERSE 1001

Matsumoto, Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics. ROBERT E. WARD 1002

Kimbrough, Political Power and Educational Decision-Making. GEORGE R. LA NOUE 1004

Masters, Salisbury, and Eliot, State Politics and the Public Schools. FRANK J. SORAUF 1005

McCord, The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies. RUPERT EMERSON 1006

Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960. HARVEY GLICKMAN 1007

Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. JAMES W. PROTHRO 1008

Russett, Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. RICHARD ROSE 1009

Halperin, China and the Bomb. JAMES N. ROSENAU 1010

Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. 1011

Bouscaren, The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. Robert S. Cahill 1013

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY 1015

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1031

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH 1053

COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1077

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION 1079

BOOK REVIEWS

A Framework for Political Analysis. BY DAVID EASTON. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. Pp. xiv, 143. $4.95.)

The remarkable capacity of the life processes of politics to persist amid endless social and political stress provides the central theme from which David Easton builds *A Framework for Political Analysis.* This important theoretical contribution is designed as the second volume in a projected tetralogy. The first was the author's influential treatise on *The Political System* (1953), which called for political theorists to divert some of their attention from purely historical to empirical theory, while urging empirical workers to recognize the critical role that general theory must play in the conduct of inquiry. The current volume lays out the essentials of that theoretical framework which *The Political System* only adumbrated, and does so while striving in Easton's words to maintain a "strong empirical relevance." At the same time, the reader is cautioned against expecting to see the framework drawn to an operational level, for this is a task reserved for the third volume in the sequence.

If the mood of *The Political System* was hortatory, and in its own way gloomy about the paths which political theory had been pursuing in preceding decades, the new book fairly brims with exuberance at the progress the author feels has marked the discipline in the interim. The title of the book is well-chosen, for while the discussion is clearly at the level of general theory, the effort is less toward the sketching in of such a theory in any full-blown sense, than toward the development of a conceptual orientation—a basic vocabulary, a selection of "essential variables," a statement of the prime point of departure—to serve as an agenda for research.

In keeping with the expectations developed in *The Political System*, the framework is developed from modern systems analysis, retaining the customary admixture of insights first associated with functionalism in social anthropology. Political life is seen as an "adaptive, self-regulating, and self-transforming system of behavior," responding on the basis of feedback to stresses of an internal nature as well as those from the social and physical environment in which it is imbedded. The units of the system are neither the traditional structures and institutions such as parties and legislatures, nor persons as biological entities, but rather the set of relevant interactions among system members. In the measure that it is at all important to set analytic bounds for the system so defined, the relevant interactions are those that are political by virtue of some orientation toward "the authoritative allocation of values" at a societal level. From these definitions are drawn the "essential variables" for investigation: those which reflect the capacity of the system to allocate values, on one hand, and to ensure their acceptance on the other. Taken in sum, the political system may be seen as a "vast conversion process," within which inputs of demands and system support are typically processed, and outputs produced making it possible for the system to persist in its most fundamental characteristics.

It is this persistence in the face of stressful change that Easton highlights as a miracle of the commonplace, warranting attention as the primary goal of political analysis. "Persistence" here is not to be read as stability, maintenance of specific structures, or even "equilibrium" as commonly construed. The reference is to a more fundamental capacity of political systems to allocate values authoritatively. This capacity may endure through all sorts of change in specific structures or even basic forms of government, as in the case of a democracy turned into a dictatorship. Transformations at these more specific levels are seen as either irrelevant to the question of persistence in the form that Easton intends to pursue it, or as indicative of ways in which the system copes with adversity in order to preserve the vital processes of its political life.

By moving to this level of abstraction, the author outflanks the most familiar criticisms of other general theories with similar intellectual roots in functionalism. Change, be it even of broad and dramatic dimensions, secular as well as compensatory, is in no sense alien to the Easton conception. To remain viable, societies must preserve the fundamental life processes of politics, but this may be as well accomplished at some junctures through sweeping change in political forms as by any strain toward the *status quo.*

This hospitality to change opens the way to the possibility of a dynamic analysis, and represents for me one of the most exciting aspects of the book. At the same stroke, the necessary shift in level of abstraction threatens to rob the question of persistence of its savor for me, although it clearly does not do so for the author. The nub of the problem is the negative case, or what it means for the political system in this most overarching sense to *fail to persist.*

At this point, the "general systems" analogy is at its weakest. Biological organisms brush with the limits of survival upon more or less frequent occasion; and the gravity of these approaches is certified by the fact that in Lord Keynes' long run, the survival probability of the organism is an unrelenting zero. But what do we have in mind when we speak of a political system "succumbing," once we have set aside any question of the life and death of particular modes of value-allocation? If the political system is constituted by interactions oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values within whatever geographic scope the society can be said to function, and is considered to persist as long as such interactions persist, then it is hard for me to see what will stop them short of the catastrophe that wipes out the population engaging in them. Indeed, earthquake and epidemic are cited first in these passages wherein Easton sets out to describe negative cases, although these scarcely strike me as theoretically exciting. Once again in vivid contrast to the case of the organism, failure to survive through such causes is extremely rare and hinges on variables exogenous to almost any study of political process.

The few other negative cases hinted at are of much greater potential interest, although they fail to satisfy my curiosity because either there was no real failure to persist, or else the instances seem rather to involve changes in more specific forms of authoritative allocation. Thus, for example, the author considers the Congo to have come as close as any state in the twentieth century to the brink of survival, although he also deems that its political system managed to persist. Now the brush with survival at a certain level in this instance would be plain to all, whatever the theoretical viewpoint. Yet attempting to assess the world from within the Easton framework, I would have seen the Congo as representing more the kind of transition or near-transition between types of government (centralized, decentralized) that the author in every other context sets apart from his abstract concerns with the underlying, "life processes" of politics. Surely if violence is but one variant on the generic processes whereby authoritative allocation occurs, as was argued in *The Political System*, then the sense in which such vital processes were near extinction even in the Congo would escape me.

Although the sheer capacity to persist at all is made the center of inquiry, then, more modest questions of variations in relative success in coping with stress seem to me to enjoy much more realistic referents. Indeed, much of the latter portion of the book strikes me as highly stimulating precisely because this is the level at which the discussion is going forth. Yet at the same time, were Easton to have cast questions explicitly in these terms, the theory would have been drawn within target range of another familiar set of siege guns, since to talk directly of gradations of success or failure is to deal with concepts of eufunction and dysfunction, notions that the author seems anxious to avoid, at least for the moment.

In sum, aside from the emphasis on the wonder of sheer persistence, the theoretical structure is thoroughly provocative and compelling. The properties of political systems singled out for more specific attack in the future are surely fundamental ones, and their treatment here is replete with useful insights developed from the severe yet rich concepts of systems theory. What remains therefore is the problem of establishing some empirical purchase on these essential variables. This is the problem, as it seems to me, that continues to rank as the most recalcitrant one. Hence among other things this volume accomplishes, it serves as well to whet one's appetite for its sequel.

Philip E. Converse
University of Michigan

Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics, vol. II, no. 3 (December, 1964) of the *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* (11 Wakagi-cho, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo; $5.00 per year).

Although Japanese scholarship in the social sciences has made enormous advances in the past twenty years, these are but dimly apprehended abroad. Japanese representatives attend and present papers to the major international conferences and occasionally publish articles or précis of their work in English, German, French, or Russian that appear in periodicals of international circulation. Two or three English-language professional journals of specialized appeal and limited circulation attempt reviews of a tiny segment of the huge corpus of social science writing in Japan, and—very infrequently—someone will translate more extensive selections from or do a serious study of the work of an outstanding Japanese scholar. But in general the language barrier stands as a massive and unbreached wall between Western social scientists and their Japanese colleagues.

This is a pity because Japanese social scientists today represent one of the most vital, lively, and enterprising academic traditions to be encountered anywhere in the world. Where political science is concerned, for example—in numbers, in organization, in output, and in professional enterprise in the sense of a willingness to experiment with and adopt new theories, approaches, and methodologies, they stand far in advance of their colleagues in any continental European tradition. England would have difficulty in matching them. Qualitative judgments are, of course, more difficult and controversial, but the very dimensions and vitality of the professional scene in Japan are enormously impressive to the comparatively minded observer. In support of this judgment one can cite the above-noted issue of the *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* entitled "Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics."

The Journal itself represents an ambitious and systematic attempt on the part of a small group of Japanese scholars, with some American assistance, to breach the language barrier and introduce their Western colleagues to the range and vitality of current social science scholarship in Japan. Three issues are published a year, two of which are devoted to a particular subject or field of intellectual activity (to date, there have been issues on international affairs, education in Japan, Japanese intellectuals, and postwar leftwing movements), and one to a review of selected articles of major importance in a variety of areas appearing during the previous calendar year. In all cases a broad scatter of writers and views is sought. Articles are condensed and average from four to ten printed pages in length. Both the quality of the English and the accuracy of the translations will prove remarkable to anyone familiar with former endeavors of this sort. The Journal has no political stand or bias of its own.

The present issue was edited by Sannosuke Matsumoto, one of Japan's outstanding younger political scientists, who teaches at Tokyo Kyoiku University. His aim is to convey to the reader an understanding of the subjects that have most concerned Japanese political scientists during the years from 1958 to 1964, of the approaches and methods they bring to their work, and some insight into their findings. Professor Matsumoto provides a brief introductory account of the development of political science as a discipline in Japan as well as useful explanatory notes prefaced to each of the four parts into which the issue is divided. These parts are devoted to: the postwar political structure of Japan, political parties, local autonomy and the bureaucracy, and pressure groups and political consciousness. Together they contain a total of twenty-two articles that admirably serve the editor's purposes.

In general the authors represented in this issue have been selected partially because their writings focus upon problems of major interest to the Japanese scholarly community and partially because of their own professional status and attainments. Most of them are younger men; in fact all but five are under forty-five years of age. Not all are political scientists. The issue includes very interesting selections from the writings of several sociologists, an economist, and a statistician relating to problems of political consequence. All are, however, among the more innovative and outstanding members of their profession. In this sense the issue does not purport to represent an average selection of Japanese scholarship in the field of political science.

The general impression that emerges from a reading of these selections is one of a discipline very much in ferment. There is evident in a number of cases a deep interest in increasing the certitude and scientific quality of political knowledge in terms quite familiar to us in the United States. This is still far from the unchallenged mode in Japanese political science, however, and the average Western reader will probably also be struck by the degree to which some of the selections embody explicit or implicit statements of the author's own political persuasions and aspirations. Japanese political scientists in general tend to be a distinctly "engaged" group with strongly melioristic views about their personal and professional roles in society. They rate very highly their function as social critics in an immediate day-to-day sense. The tenor of some of their writing, therefore, seems not infrequently to border on the polemical—especially to Americans more accustomed to at least the pretense of political objectivity where professional writings are concerned. In the present case this impression is doubtless enhanced by the fact that a number of the selections were originally written for publication in the major Japanese journals of opinion rather than in professional journals. However, these are the normal outlets for much of the most stimulating thinking and writing in Japan. Their inclusion here in no wise distorts the selection.

These elements of subjectivism and meliorism are by no means characteristic of all the selections in this issue, however, and, where they do occur, they do not necessarily derogate seriously from the interest of what the author has to say. Given the number and richness of the offerings, it would be both difficult and invidious to pick out particular pieces for more specific comment. Suffice it to say that there does not exist in English any better means of gaining an insight into the discipline of political science in Japan and into the interests and skills of some of its most eminent practitioners than this issue of the *Journal of Political and Social Ideas in Japan*. Its publishers should be commended. It is to be hoped that their enterprise will flourish and provide further insights of equal value into this largely unknown and unappreciated scene.

ROBERT E. WARD
The University of Michigan

Political Power and Educational Decision-Making. BY RALPH B. KIMBROUGH. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964. Pp. ix, 307. $5.00.)

Ralph B. Kimbrough, Professor of Education at the University of Florida, promises in his preface to use "what is currently known about the policy-making process as it exists at the level of the local school district" in order to determine "who really holds the power to make political decisions favorable to the school improvement." His data consists principally of Floyd Hunter's *Community Power Structure* (Atlanta), Gladys Kammerer's studies of Florida cities, and several doctoral dissertations: including the author's own, two others dealing with educational decisions in three Tennessee counties, and three completed at the University of Florida. All of these doctoral dissertations employ, with some variations, Hunter's reputational technique, and all discover another version of Hunter's power elite. Although other studies of urban power structures, like Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* (New Haven), Edward Banfield's *Political Influence* (Chicago), and Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman's *Governing New York City*, are breifly cited, Professor Kimbrough is unconvinced by their method of focusing on decisions or their findings of a pluralistic policy-making process. Nelson Polsby's incisive critiques of the reputational technique are brushed aside on the circular reasoning that no other method can get at the behind-the-scenes maneuvers.

What Professor Kimbrough has produced, though it is not evident in the title or clear that the author himself realizes it, is a regional study of the politics of education based on data almost entirely from Southeastern states. Consequently this is a book on educational politics that contains almost no references to party politics, labor unions, teachers' unions, civil rights organizations and integration, churches with parochial school establishments, or any of the other factors which commonly influence education in other sections of the country.

The monopolistic, conservative, business-dominated educational politics that Kimbrough describes is probably accurate for the Southeast. But his mobilization of evidence is hampered by his adoption of Hunter's technique of using fictitious names for the locations and participants in the case studies. Even the issues discussed are sometimes made purposefully vague. In one instance, the author tells of a mayor who tries to involve the schools in what is only described as an "off-base project" which the school administrators reject with support from the power elite. In a book that raises the question of the legitimacy of public as opposed to private leadership, such ambiguity impedes critical thinking. Furthermore, awareness of the real location of a case study enables the reader to employ his general knowledge of the history and demography of the site as a check on the methodology and conclusions. Everyone knows, of course, that Hunter's Regional City was Atlanta, and this fact leads to acceptance of his finding of a power elite in that one-party, Protestant, "Old South" city. But few readers will recognize River City or Midway County. After more than one hundred pages of fictitious names, cloudy identities and vague issues, the evidence the author wishes to present is blurred and the reading monotonous. Wouldn't it be possible for social scientists, (giving due consideration to ethics, privacy and research realities), to work out some commonly accepted system of using real or fictitious identifications?

For Professor Kimbrough, the critical question is whether a school administrator will find major educational decisions being made in the public or private sectors of his constituency. The author's conclusion is that the wielders of power are most likely to be cliques of businessmen and professionals rather than formal interest groups or public officials. Some political scientists will not be convinced by the author's evidence for this generalization, and others will wish he had explored some obvious variables, such as the nature of party competition, school district size, and the degree of bureaucratization of the educational and political system. More interesting to laymen are the implications of the private clique hypothesis for democratic theory. Early in the book, Kimbrough equates democratic objectives with quality schools and high educational expenditures and suggests that either the monopolistic or pluralistic patterns would be adequate. Later he seems to realize that democracy implies certain procedures which are lacking in a monopolistic clique system. How, then, should the educational administrator be advised? For the sake of here-and-now school buildings and salary increases, should the administrator cooperate with and thus perpetuate the power elite, or should he attempt to build up counter forces among parents, liberals, and minority groups and thus risk his job and all possibility of short term gain? Such questions, of course, can not be answered abstractly. On the basis of his findings, Kimbrough recommends cooperating with the power elite, co-opting them into citizens' advisory committees, if possible, and eventually developing a diversified power base. If the power elite, however, is as generally conservative, anti-government, and anti-spending as Kimbrough suggests, then even short-term cooperation with them may produce only Pyrrhic victories and may delay the building of a sound political base for public education. The author particularly laments the disorganization and consequent powerlessness of teachers in politics, something the elite would doubtless approve and seek to perpetuate.

In evaluating *Political Power and Educational Decision-Making,* it is only fair to emphasize the difficult and complex problems Professor Kimbrough attempted to explore. In most cases, adequate data simply does not now exist. Nevertheless, the attempt to employ the research techniques and to apply the findings of the power structure studies to the problems school administrators face is to be commended. Like most first steps the attempted project, despite its flaws, was worthwhile.

George R. La Noue
Teachers College, Columbia University

State Politics and the Public Schools. By Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. Pp. 319, $4.85.)

As the authors note, this is an "exploratory analysis" of the ways in which public policy in education is made these days in three states (Missouri, Illinois, and Michigan). They have described the organization and representation of interests, the relationships between interest representers and public officials, the ways in which consensus on policy is achieved, and the policy roles of public officials in this one area of policy-making. The book is not, the reader should be clear, a series of case studies in policy-making, nor is it devoted to the substance or wisdom of educational policies. Nor is it a political manual, although educators seeking practical political wisdom can find plenty here. It is a survey of the dynamics and mechanics of policy-making, and because it is, it deserves a wide audience among political scientists.

Even in these three rather similar states the authors find significant differences in the formation of educational policy. Chiefly they note the greater fragmentation of interests and absence of consensus-producing machinery in Michigan than in the other two states. Both in Missouri and Illinois there is some mechanism for moderating educational demands and for achieving consensus on policy before matters ever reach the legislature. In these two states, the educational groups and interests have accepted a heavy burden of self-control as a means to success in legislative relations. Indeed, the story of educational politics in Illinois and Missouri emerges as a story of the flight from political conflict (even though the vehicles of flight are different in each).

As they describe these processes the authors are always alive to questions touching basic, theoretical issues in the political process. In fact, the concluding chapter states some tentative, but stimulating, hypotheses which emerge from the study. To cite only the one on group goals and strategy (p. 272): "Based largely on the mythology that education and politics should be kept apart, a major goal of education interests is to have governmental decisions affecting public schools made in a routine manner; that is, they desire a process in which all decisions are highly predictable as to their outcome, even if this means the sacrifice of certain policy alternatives or acceptance of less desirable results." Such a proposition, of course, challenges the rationalist, "maximalist" assumptions we make so confidently about interest group strategies. It also incidentally suggests how little we know of the political strategies and tactics of interest groups.

This, then, is a fine scholarly work. The three state studies are analytical and perceptive, and they all profit from being set in a sophisticated understanding of the political process. The long chapter on Michigan is especially acute in its observations. The authors also properly recognize the limits of their work—especially that their three states are no sample of the 50 and that educational policy-making (especially in its "non-political" mythology) may not be typical of policy-making in general. If I were to offer any criticism it would be of the absence of a systematic framework of analysis for the three state studies. At times the authors work in that direction—as, for example, in the distinction between interest groups with a "direct" interest and what the authors call "supportive groups." But the analysis and the concluding hypotheses might have been enriched by a fuller preliminary structure for analysis.

Beyond its own intrinsic value the book also offers a worthy example of a fruitful, but surprisingly neglected, scholarly path. Its virtue is that it looks at all the influences and actors shaping public policy and that it examines more than the single case. It suggests, in fact, that scholars of American government have too often segmented the whole of policy-making into the single components which are their specialties—parties, interest groups, legislatures, for example. Its "wholistic" approach should also be an especially apt strategy for a comparative analysis of the American states. (Are we *ever* going to exploit their comparative possibilities?) It is directed toward basic questions: what produces different patterns of interest organization, different systems of policy initiation, different apparatuses for achieving consensus, or different legislative role patterns in one policy area in different states? Finally, this book adds further weight to the growing conclusion that the "policy area" is an important variable in political analysis. Along with other works such as Dahl's study of New Haven and Cater's description of "sub-governments" in national policy-making, it suggests that patterns of political influence are particularized within and relevant only to specific areas of public policy.

It remains only to be said that this book is written in straight-forward and lucid prose and that its typography and format meet the high standards we take for granted from its publisher. In addition to the usual index there are five assorted appendices and a valuable bibliographical essay on the governmental relationships with public education.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies. BY WILLIAM MCCORD. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 330. $6.00.)

For a number of years a great debate concerning what in the remote past were called backward countries and peoples has occupied the attention of social scientists as well as of national and international authorities everywhere. Welcome new realms of inquiry and controversy have been opened up, bringing with them an unexpected bonus in the fresh light which has been thrown on the history of the familiar "old" countries as the problems of the new ones have been explored. Although the labels commonly used have changed—the once "backward" have gone through various euphemistic rebaptisms, of which perhaps the most recent are "underdeveloped" and now "developing"—we have achieved very little in the way of agreement as to how development has come about in the past, how it should (or will) now proceed, and what the prospects are for the future. The changing labels themselves, however, indicate an acceptance of the commitment to pursue development and an optimistic assumption that it is in fact under way.

In *The Springtime of Freedom,* William McCord, an Associate Professor of Sociology at Stanford whose previous writings have been in quite different spheres, has made a brave attack on many of the central issues, and particulary those related to political development. The main hazard which he poses for the reviewer is that, although one may disagree with this point or that, he is indisputably on the side of the angels, and who wants to pick a fight with angels? And yet, despite a well-argued case and a presentation of a wide array of significant material, historical, contemporary, and analytical, his book leaves this reviewer with an unhappy sense that it takes too cheerfully hopeful a view of the world and what can be done with it. Is the present season really the springtime of freedom?

Writing, as he puts it, "for the thoughtful uncommitted person in developing regions," the heart of Professor McCord's thesis is that there has been, on the part both of the developed and the developing, far too ready an acceptance of the necessity and utility of centralized authoritarian regimes, whereas what is needed if freedom is to be won and held is a pluralism which diffuses economic and political power as widely as possible throughout the society. As a matter of basic belief he repudiates the notion that any path, such as a one-party or dictatorial system, is pre-ordained for the new countries and assumes that their leaders have a wide range of choice. He urges upon them the choice of a pluralistic approach which in the long run will bring them and their people a larger measure of freedom and of bread as well. In implementation of this approach he urges that development should start where gains can be achieved most cheaply and swiftly, with rural reform and a transformation of agriculture which produces the food and raw materials on which other aspects of development must rest. He sees it as critically important for a developing nation to undertake the creation of a small-scale, village-based decentralized economy. These specifics of his proposals are obviously open, as he is well aware, to very serious challenge, but it is eminently worth while to have the case against authoritarianism and for a pluralism which sustains freedom through the dispersion of power persuasively set forth. His plea for an expansion of foreign aid programs covers more familiar ground.

In a brief historical survey the author examines the way in which Western Europe, Russia, and Japan developed, rightly concluding on the strength of these and other examples that no clear moral can be drawn as to the relation of different political systems to economic development. Presumably no one would disagree with his modest assertion that neither the crushing of dissent nor the centralization of government will necessarily produce more efficient use of a country's resources. He acknowledges the sovereignty of politics in the drive for development, but he calls upon the wielders of power to build a plural social structure and "most of all plan consciously for a devolution, rather than a concentration, of economic power." The contradiction between the democratic rights of the opposition, guaranteed by "all the majestic liberties first created in the West," and the economic demands of modernization is a problem to which he devotes considerable attention, but he is confident that it is one which can be solved by application of intelligent good will, and surely he is right that the silencing of the opposition itself involves great costs to the society.

It is good that the angels should be heard. Coupled with much realistic discussion and examination both of the actual state of affairs and of the voluminous literature which has appeared, Professor McCord presents something of a counsel of perfection. Two gnawing doubts remain. Has he taken adequate measure of the forces which counter his pluralistic freedom and which in country after country have led to a consolidation of single-party or military one-man rule? One need cherish no illusion that such regimes are the proper embodiment of the good life to conclude that they have a rationale which comes close to establishing their inevitability in the present world. Secondly, do the developing peoples themselves share in the image of perfection which he presents, or do they perhaps look elsewhere to other models embracing different means and goals? The creed of the Western liberal democrat is a most appealing one, but the evidence is far from all in as to whether it appeals to other peoples or not.

Rupert Emerson

Harvard University

Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960. By Dennis Austin. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 459. $10.10.)

Amid more profound consequences of the debate of the past two decades among professional students of politics about "scientific" research is something resembling agreement on what constitutes a *political* study of, for instance, a nation's politics, in contradistinction to works that merely discuss political matters inside a particular country. If a student were forced to articulate the distinction—for a book review, if for no other reason—the issue could be defined in terms of the scope of a *political* study. Surely it must focus on power structures, patterns of decision-making, interest "group" activity and their interrelationships.

By these criteria Dennis Austin has not produced a political study. Instead, he has written a prodigiously well-informed history of some aspects of politics in Ghana: the emergence of political parties within the changing constitutional frameworks of the final decade of colonial rule, the party struggle in the few years it was permitted and the decline of party opposition. But even if Austin re-titled his effort "Political Parties in Ghana," it would not be political analysis; politics in his view are circumscribed by party affairs and revealed by elections. (Elections, in turn, are described by investigating polling procedure and party activities.) By marshaling the arguments of party pamphlets and debates in parliament, by excerpting the findings of official hearings and commissions and by reporting rallies and political meetings Austin captures the heady, volatile atmosphere of Ghanaian politics. By writing unadorned yet graceful prose he can deploy masses of detail that manage to convey a sense of unfolding drama. And by examining electoral results he can show that Ghana's one-party system was not "voted in." This would still be a limited view of politics, even for a country like Britain—Austin's present home after more than ten years in Ghana. But in a place like Ghana, where the political system during the period of Austin's observations was going through turbulent transformations, such a view may be marginal to achieving a sense of political understanding.

Suppose, then, we heed Austin's warning on page one: "the account . . . should be seen as no more than an extended essay in Ghanaian history." But essays usually deal with problems, not merely places. As the author states it, the problem of his study is, "... why did a colony so well endowed in its national life as the Gold Coast, for whose future every prediction in 1946 was cast in the most favorable terms, suddenly enter a period of violent conflict—first between the colonial government and local nationalist leaders, and then between rival political groups—until by 1960 (after three years of independence) the new republic was ruled by a single-party regime whose leaders turned increasingly to harsh measures of control 'of a totalitarian kind.' " Although the last phrase is from Kwame Nkrumah, it seems to summarize Austin's own opinion of the situation in Ghana today. Despite the fact that the question reflects important concerns and serves to formulate the opinions that numerous people bring to their understanding of African affairs, it boils down to asking "what went wrong in Ghana?" or "why don't African politicians behave like British liberal democrats?" Perhaps such questions are better suited to honors examinations than research monographs. In any case Austin's answer avoids what most political scientists want to know more about. Although the social and cultural dimensions of power are noted in the course of the narrative of the rise of the Convention People's Party or in the midst of the discussion of the selection of candidates, they are not related to overall patterns of political action. Similarly, there is virtually no discussion of policy-making. The demands of numerous groups—trade unions, peasants, civil servants, party bureaucrats—are recounted at various stages of the party battle, but they too do not contribute to basic decisions that shape the political system. Finally, there is no overt appreciation of the possible effects of fundamental policies, such as economic development, on the choices left open and the area of maneuver for political leaders.

What is the answer that Austin suggests? Briefly, it is that the top people in politics, especially Nkrumah, have the wrong attitudes and the bottom people have gone along—until recently—because they are inexperienced and unsophisticated. Why has Ghana disappointed its well-wishers? Because Nkrumah believes in and has a "taste for autocratic rule." Because the CPP rank and file were willing "to accept such a lead." ("A more sophisticated movement might then [after 1961] have insisted on retaining a share of power with the leader.") Because the opposition displayed "rash behavior." Because the CPP leaders would not "admit the legitimacy" of political rivals. To these four "forces at work" Austin adds "the uncertainties of the political scene," but such a catch-all category can hardly balance the weight of what can only be described as popular psychology. At the end of the book, as Ghana moves closer to authoritarian dictatorship, Nkrumah's personal shortcomings grow even more significant.

It is very difficult to accept such an answer because it is barely an explanation. If Ghana has become something of an autocracy because Nkrumah willed it and the CPP accepted it, then why so? How come such a party and such leadership swept on to the scene? Austin's case rests on the bad tendencies of the politically powerful, when the more interesting question—politically—focuses on the conditions which permitted the implementation of these tendencies.

All this is not meant to deny the importance of Nkrumah's leadership or the nationalist movement in the fashioning of Ghana's politics. The social and cultural background to the emergence of nationalism and charismatic leadership in Ghana has been laid out by other scholars, notably Apter and Wallerstein. For some reason, however, Austin chose to ignore their hypotheses. The result is a mine of information, but for some future *political* study of authority and decision-making in contemporary Ghana.

HARVEY GLICKMAN

Haverford College

Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. BY ROBERT R. ALFORD. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963. Pp. xxiii, 396. $6.50.)

Despite the exotic appeal of developing and little-known areas, this book is an important reminder that much remains to be gained from genuinely comparative studies of the politics of advanced and relatively familiar nations. In *Party and Society*, Professor Alford examines the importance of class, regionalism, and religion in the voting preferences of citizens in Great Britain, Australia, the United States, and Canada. His simple but efficient index of "class voting" demonstrates that class voting exists in its purest form in Great Britain, is somewhat less pronounced but still overriding in importance in Australia, is considerably less common in the United States, and is at its lowest in Canada. The basic similarities in the political systems of these highly developed democracies permit the author to draw penetrating inferences as to the causes and consequences of the differences he discovers.

In briefest summary, a politics organized around class is presented as highly functional for adaptation to modern problems. Many political sociologists and political scientists have assumed that a politics of pure class would be highly unstable. Hence the wide belief that the more cross-cutting cleavages—ethnic, religious, or regional—in society, the greater the chance for compromise and stability. Alford persuasively argues to the contrary: "Under conditions of highly developed industrialism, class cleavages may actually be the cleavages which are most easily compromised and the ones most likely to retain national unity and political consensus. . . ." (p. 339) The argument that overriding sectional, religious, or ethnic sentiments are more disintegrative and inflexible than class sentiments has received strong support from events in Canada since the publication of this book.

In addition to its contribution to our understanding of the role of party in the Anglo-American democracies, Alford's work is significant as a demonstration of expanding research opportunities made possible by the current state of technology in the discipline. The establishment in recent years of data repositories housing a multitude of opinion surveys from all over the world gives the student access to information that no single scholar could afford to collect. These institutional developments also open the possibility of recapturing data from earlier points in time, permitting the introduction of a historical dimension that has been sorely missed in much survey research. Alford took advantage of these developments to secure the data from 53 surveys of the electorates in the four Anglo-American democracies, covering the period from 1936 to 1962.

This type of secondary analysis necessarily suffers from the fact that the researcher must accept the interview schedules and sampling procedures developed for someone else's purposes. In the present case, the theoretical concerns of the study were well served by the available data. Questionable sampling procedures in many of the studies pose a more serious problem. As the author says, ". . . no particular figure has any great significance." But he immediately adds: "It is probable, however, that the over-all patterns of differences from country to country override any possibility of sampling error." (p. 102) The strength of this probability of accurate information is not spelled out.

For the most part, the cross-national patterns of differences have a great deal of surface validity. This reader is more inclined to discount the probability of accuracy in reference to more detailed discussion of intra-national differences. The author feels obliged, for example, to account for apparently inexplicable variations in party preference of Catholics along sex lines in Great Britain from 1957 to 1962. He quite properly notes the small number of respondents involved and the lack of strict probability methods in the sampling. Why, then, waste time accounting for an about-face on the part of Catholic women when only 21 were included in the first survey and 18 in the second?

The author takes exception to Philip Converse's conclusion that a short-run decline in class voting has occurred in the United States since 1948 and, presumably, since the 1930's. He argues that 1948 was the exceptional year, with a much higher level of class voting than occurred *either* in the 1930's or the 1950's. The evidential base of this conclusion appears most shaky. Alford accepts the Survey Research Center findings (employed by Converse and his colleagues) as much more reliable than those of the American Institute of Public Opinion. Hence he relies on SRC data for his 1948 findings, rejecting those of the AIPO. But *if the AIPO findings in earlier surveys were as far in error as those of 1948*, then a massive decline in class voting since the 1930's has occurred.

The danger of grand ecological fallacies is present in the attempt to relate findings on varying levels of class voting to general attributes of political systems. In describing federalism as "more characteristic of the less class-polarized political systems," for example, Alford notes the greater dedication of Canadians than of Australians to the concept of a unified national broadcasting system. (pp. 315–316) He suggests that this stems from "the greater *need* to have symbols of national unity in Canada as against Australia." But suppose the opposite condition existed? Then one could as easily argue that the greater national unity of Australia was expressed through a unified broadcasting system, and the less successful integration of Canada through a less unified system. Findings that can, whatever their outcome, be used to support a proposition are not very helpful. Or, more accurately, a proposition is not successfully operationalized if it can be supported by opposite findings.

Despite these occasional problems, the author does as well with the subject as his data permit. And he is scrupulous in pointing out the limitations of the data. The massive analysis undertaken by the author produces a valuable mine of descriptive detail on the politics of these four western democracies. But he goes beyond this to the theoretical implications of his findings. The discussion of the consequences of class polarization is a keen and imaginative exercise in political theory.

James W. Prothro
University of North Carolina

Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. By Bruce M. Russett. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:M.I.T Press, 1963. Pp. 252. $7.00.)

This study is different from conventional books exuding goodwill about Anglo-American relations because Bruce Russett attempts to use ideas derived from Karl Deutsch to trace quantitative trends in the links between the two nations. While the volume is about the "special" relationship, the methods of analysis are potentially of general interest.

The basic logic of the book is sensible and straightforward. First the author discusses the general theory of political community or integration, and the specific history of Anglo-American diplomacy since 1890. A series of chapters demonstrate how various aspects of Anglo-American relations may be studied over time by the use of a variety of sources and indices. The conclusion draws implications from this case study for American policy and, to a lesser extent, for theories of integration.

The approach is eclectic. Chapters on diplomacy and military links are virtually free from quantitative analysis; the latter chapter is particularly succinct and pointed. The author disclaims any pretension of producing a definitive work, while not using the excuse that because it is exploratory he can be absolved from digging for evidence. Neither data nor theory are developed exhaustively, yet the book is better because both are employed. The methodology of the study is its most striking feature.

The variable that Russett examines is responsiveness: "the *probability* that the demands of one party will be met with indulgence rather than with deprivation by the other party." The probability increases as the ratio of capabilities to demands rises. Capabilities include attention, communication and mutual identification among other things; demands, or loads, are distinguished in terms of number, importance and whether they are complementary or contradictory as between the two partners. In order to allow for random relationships, an index of relative acceptance is calculated; it is the ratio of actual capabilities to what would be expected to occur randomly between two nations of the importance of Britain and America.

The use of ratios has one obvious shortcoming: it does not allow for changes in the absolute level of capabilities and demands. Two countries will be more "responsive" to each other if they have little contact than if they interact frequently but make demands upon each other even more frequently. In studying scholarly scientific attention, Russett's attempt to control for the great number of American scientists by "controlling" for scientific Nobel prizewinners produces a downward trend in interaction. But comparison of Figure 6.1 with Tables 6.1 and 6.2. in the appendix shows that conclusions of very different significance might also be drawn from the data.

No single type of data or type of relationship is regarded as of central importance for political responsiveness. Russett mines economic, communications, educational and legislative records in order to construct tables approaching the problem from related but different aspects. The author shows sufficient ingenuity and consistency to make future academic writers in this field think carefully before making loose, literary generalizations about Anglo-American relationships.

The author interprets his data as showing a steady decline in responsiveness. For example, nine indices of capability measuring relations in six years between 1890 and 1958 all show that the peak of capability was reached by 1928 or earlier, and the low point in 1954 or 1958. Russett rightly claims that the indices he has constructed should not be expected to substantiate more precise conclusions than this. However, it is possible to suggest that since 1958 trends may have altered, e.g., in respect to foreign travel by tourists, and summer travel by students independent of educational exchange schemes. It is curious that Russett does not tabulate travels of important government officials between London and Washington, for in the jet age, this has certainly shown an increase since 1890 or 1938.

Russett concludes that because responsiveness is diminishing on four of seven major indices, Anglo-American political relations are less secure than superficial comment assumes. Special attention is given to the criticisms of nuclear disarmers, without equivalent emphasis being given to the persisting political weakness of this type of left-wing anti-American group. A much lengthier and more comprehensive discussion of world affairs (including in particular the decline of the Empire and Commonwealth) would be required to substantiate the author's thesis.

In the concluding chapters Russett's ingenuity lapses and the author fails to consider the possibility that Anglo-American interests ought to conflict at times—e.g., in Asia—or that it might be in the interest of one or both nations if ties weakened, e.g., by Britain joining more closely with European nations in supranational organizations. The author implies that what is right for Anglo-American responsiveness must be right for America (or Britain). Little consideration is given to the fact that in theory, and sometimes in practice, conflicting views on foreign policy within one country mirror differences of opinion in the other. For example, while British and American public officials have publicly supported each other on American intervention in Viet Nam, British and American intellectuals have shown some public accord in criticizing the nature and consequences of this intervention.

RICHARD ROSE

University of Manchester

China and the Bomb. BY MORTON H. HALPERIN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. x, 166. $4.95.)

Nothing much happened to the Chinese on the way to nuclearization. They had a few setbacks when the Russians cut off technical assistance in 1960 and the world concluded a test ban treaty in 1963. But they pushed ahead anyway, seemingly unhesitating in their conviction, apparently unaware of the potential dangers, and plainly unshaken in the view that nuclearization was needed as a deterrent against the United States, as a source of increased Chinese influence in the Communist world as well as Asia, and as an additional means of supporting wars of national liberation. So, in October, 1964, they detonated an atomic device and now move unerringly toward what will probably be a "moderate" nuclear capability (though it might be a "major" one). This development will create a variety of strategic problems for the U.S., but there are certain steps that can and should be taken now. Such is the gist of this book, with far more attention devoted to what the United States should do than to what the Chinese are likely to do.

The "shoulds" (I counted 64 appearances of the word, plus 13 "musts," in the last three chapters alone) are derivatives of what is, in effect, a simple zero-sum game theoretical approach to Chinese-American relations, although it is not identified as such. In order to prevent the evolution of a collision course, in the near future the U.S. "*should* (p. 102) call attention to the growing strength of the continental Strike Command" (so as to emphasize that there is more to American power than meets the Asian eye); it "*should* (p. 114) take care to avoid . . . stressing the value of nuclear weapons for defense" (so as to prevent lassitude on the part of Asian friends); it "*should* (p. 118) refrain from initiating proposals" for a nuclear-free zone in Asia (since this would suggest fear of "China's development of a nuclear capability and would make it more difficult to station nuclear weapons on Asian territory" in the absence of agreement on such a zone); it "*must*" (p. 119) make the Chinese realize "that their development of a nuclear capability will increase the likelihood of the United States using nuclear weapons against them"; it "*should* (pp. 121–23) give the impression [of not being] convinced that the Soviet Union will intervene" if the U.S. uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese aggression (so as to "reduce China's expectations of what she can gain from nuclearization); it "*should* (p. 136) reaffirm any specific commitment she has made with an Asian nation to respond, if requested, to China's use of nuclear weapons by an attack of equal or greater force" (for the same reason); and so on through a variety of particular situations to which Taiwan, India, Japan, and Indochina are, respectively, third parties (italics added).

While there is compelling logic to such reasoning when viewed in a game theoretical context, one does not need to be among those who shudder at the thought of game theory to question whether the context is appropriate. Game theory is theory in the narrow sense. It takes into account a very selected range of values and behavioral responses, and it makes no allowance for changing motives or circumstances on the part of the actors. As such, as a set of predictions about highly abstract actors, game theory is an incisive and useful tool of analysis. But the Chinese of the 1960s are neither narrow-gauged nor abstract. They are, among other things, an aging leadership, a bursting population, a sluggish economy, an authoritarian polity, an evolving and complex community.

Unfortunately Professor Halperin's analysis does not also treat them in this broad-gauged context. For him China is not a dynamic society, but a composite of its past pronouncements and its present commitments. The possibility that it may undergo all kinds of change is not conceded, and thus there is no probing of how change might affect the nuclearization program. Is it not possible that the very forces which facilitate success of that program will also precipitate changing postures toward the external world and the relevance of nuclear weapons thereto? And, if so, is it not conceivable that all the positions to which the U.S. "should" adhere are precisely those that are most likely to inhibit the pace of change in Chinese policy? Further, even if negative answers to such questions seem warranted, and even if the recommended American policy toward Chinese nuclearization does serve as a deterrent, may not this benefit prove inconsequential in comparison to the harm that may be caused by the policy elsewhere in Asia?

I do not pretend to know the answers to these questions. I do not even mean to imply that Professor Halperin's analysis is faulty. It may well prove sound and certainly it should be considered. I am only saying that an attempt to provide answers should have accompanied and informed the recommendations. The problem is too crucial and the dangers too horrendous for narrow-gauged treatment. It may be that nothing has happened to the Chinese on the way to nuclearization, but something still might. At least we ought to estimate the probabilities before taking the steps urged by the author.

James N. Rosenau
Douglass College, Rutgers University

Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. By Ernst B.

HAAS. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 595. $11.50.)

Professor Haas, who has earned and enjoys a wide reputation as an exceptionally imaginative and sophisticated analyst of the processes operative within and around international organizations, has set out in this study to develop the concept of international integration, to examine the means by which such integration may be brought about, and, in particular, to assess the contribution of the International Labor Organization to that end. From the author's own viewpoint, he has written a book less about the ILO as such than about the process of international integration. Nevertheless, it is open to the reader to exploit the book for his own profit—if not to the reviewer to treat it for purposes of assessment—as a case study of the development and functioning of the ILO. However, if the reader makes this choice, he must be prepared to find the meaty ILO material sandwiched between a thick slice of theoretical bread and a thinner, but still substantial, one. His reaction may well be that the sandwich includes an unnecessarily large amount of bread for his purposes.

The reviewer must emphasize that the author's purposes are clearly not those of our hypothetical reader who is intent upon chewing into a study of the ILO. Haas' Part I, on "Functionalism and the Theory of Integration," is not conceived as an introduction to his treatment of the ILO, nor is his final section, "The Utility of Functionalism," designed merely to provide a conclusion for that treatment. Reverting to the metaphor of the sandwich, one might suggest that Haas regards the outer layers of the volume as the real meat of the dish—and, considering their toughness, one would be inclined to agree. Those parts demand strenuous intellectual molar activity.

Haas' central concept of international integration does not lend itself easily to clear definition. In his most elaborate attempt at definition, the author puts it this way: "If the present international scene is conceived of as a series of interacting and mingling national environments, and in terms of their participation in international organizations, then integration would describe the process of *increasing* the interaction and the mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the system of international organizations and the environment provided by their nation-state members." (p. 29) At other points, Haas refers to the "process of growing mutual deference and institutional mingling," (p. vii), to "social transformation leading to system-dominance," (p. 83), or simply to "transformation of the international system." (p. 126) Whatever may be the inadequacies of these definitional statements, the book as a whole indicates that Haas conceives integration as involving the progressive diminution of the separateness of states, the linking of interest groups across political boundaries, and the growth of effective international institutions, capable of harmonizing and coordinating national policies. This introduces the notion of functionalism, which figures as importantly in the study as does the concept of integration. Essentially, Haas is asking whether the theory of functionalism points to the *means* by which the *end* of integration can be achieved. He selects the ILO, a notable institutional expression of functionalism, as a test case.

Hitherto, the functional theory of international organization, most closely associated with David Mitrany, has occupied a prominent niche in the gallery inhabited by international organization specialists, but has been kept there in a state of theoretical isolation. What Haas has undertaken to do is to bring this theory out and set it into the broader context of social science theory, examining its relationship with, and exposing it to refinement in the light of, systems theory, organization theory, the functional theory of law, functional sociology, conflict resolution theory, etc. This accounts for the heavily abstract character of major sections of the book. Among international organization specialists, Haas was perhaps uniquely qualified for the task, and he has performed it with admirable industry and intelligence. From the viewpoint of this reviewer, it was a task that very much needed doing, if only to find out whether it was worth doing. From the same viewpoint, the result is not significantly rewarding. Haas would presumably disagree. At the beginning of Part III, he notes that the middle section represented a sharp descent from "the lofty level of general inquiry" with which the book began, and announces a new takeoff "to recapture that initial loftiness" (p. 429); he apparently enjoys the higher altitudes of theorizing. So be it; I can only reply that I prefer Haas Debased to Haas Exalted. Going into orbit produces exhilaration—but also weightlessness. Haas is a weighty man when he has his feet on the ground.

During the period of the author's grounding, in Part II, he develops a sophisticated analysis and appraisal of the functioning of the ILO, valuable not only as a case study but as a contribution to the general undertanding of the possibilities and limitations of international institutions. Here, his concept of integration becomes more meaningful as he makes it clear that he is concerned with such issues as the growth of institutional autonomy, the expansion of the tasks of the ILO, the acceptance by members of unintended consequences of policies and decisions, and the evolution of the ILO's effectiveness in influencing the behavior of its members. Haas distinguishes between the "authority" of the organization—its capacity to persuade states to perform their obligations unwillingly—and its "legitimacy"—the capacity to convince states that they *should* perform their obligations. He employs a set of statistical devices for measuring the development of those capacities, which, despite the inevitable imperfections of such gadgets, serve as useful indicators. He develops important insights into the means available to international organizations for influencing the policies and behavior of states, the factors affecting the sensitivity of states to pressures emanating from international bodies, the positive as well as the negative impacts of political conflict upon the evolution of the powers and the programs of such agencies as the ILO, and the possibilities of bureaucratic leadership in international organizations. In short, one finds here an impressive contribution to the theory of international integration—a contribution that appears to derive from the author's thorough investigation and imaginative utilization and interpretation of his data, without substantial indebtedness to the body of theoretical material that occupies a prominent place in the volume.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
The University of Michigan

The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. BY ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965. Pp. 174. $3.95).

This book simply cannot be taken seriously as a work of scholarship, even though it surely purports to be one. Sometimes it is comical, sometimes pathetic, sometimes merely banal; but it is never scholarly. However, it may have other uses. It has some passing interest as an event in the developing public debate over our role in Vietnam. Students of public opinion may find it useful as an instance of propaganda-by-monograph; instructors of English may use it as an example of how not to write. Its professional utility, however, would seem to be seriously limited.

These judgments require some explanation. To read this little volume is to experience two distinct sensations which, although disconcerting, are familiar enough to college professors when they are confronted with a certain type of student paper. The first is the feeling that the style is shifting abruptly and unaccountably from place to place in the text. The second is the clear impression of having encountered this material before, in some more original setting. Neither space nor inclination permits identification of all the facts which help to explain these impressions, but some important details may deserve mention.

Apart from a handful of quite trivial differences, the portion of the Bouscaren text which is contained between the fourth line from the top of page 46 and the fifth line from the bottom of page 48 has previously appeared in Donald Lancaster's *The Emancipation of French Indochina* (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), pages 385–387. Lancaster's footnotes reappear, suitably renumbered, as Bouscaren's own. Nowhere is Lancaster's prose enclosed within quotation marks. A comic touch is added when, at the very end of this three-page section, and so placed that it can refer only to the dozen or so lines which immediately precede it, there is a footnote citing one page of Lancaster's book. This sort of thing begins, at least, to explain the feeling of *déjà vu,* and especially the sense of shifting styles, which the Bouscaren text inspires. The writing on either side of Lancaster's contribution was composed, after all, not by Lancaster but by someone else.

Several others have made important, even if unwitting, contributions to the volume. Ellen J. Hammer's *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1954) is occasionally quoted and properly cited, but it is more often paraphrased, and, in at least one instance, is simply and quietly reprinted. Bernard B. Fall's *The Two Vietnams* (New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) supplies much material. Very occasionally Fall is actually quoted, sometimes epithetically as, for instance, "the anti-Catholic Fall." Sometimes he is merely paraphrased. Just as often, however, he is simply reproduced without ado, either verbatim, or verbatim except for small, yet entertaining, alterations, e.g., when, in an otherwise nearly verbatim transcription, Fall's image of Diem's "religious fierceness bordering on fanaticism" becomes, for Bouscaren, Diem's "deep religious faith."

But surely the strangest case is that of Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah. The entire Appendix on "The Philosophy of President Ngo Dinh Diem" which is featured in the Bouscaren text, appeared previously as Chapter VIII in Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah's *Viet Nam* (London, Octagon Press, 1960). Bouscaren's seventh chapter is similarly related to the last half of the seventh chapter of Shah's book, but the Appendix is far the more interesting phenomenon. It begins with a short indented quotation from Shah's book, which is properly cited in a footnote. From there it continues for two pages to follow the Shah text, this time without acknowledgment, and then once again there is a short and properly acknowledged quotation. This pattern of alternation continues through the entire text of the Appendix. There are, to be sure, a few modest differences between the two texts. Shah's book was written when Diem was still living but the Bouscaren volume is chiefly a rueful account of Diem's downfall and death, with the result that the tense of many of Shah's verbs must be changed from present to past if they are to suit Bouscaren's needs. They *are* fairly consistently so changed, but with occasional interesting lapses, such that on pages 166–169 Diem is very clearly a thing of the past but suddenly, on page 170, Diem and Nehru "are fully alive" to something or other and on page 171 Diem actually "speaks." Perhaps this is only wishful thinking on Bouscaren's part?

This sort of thing is all the more curious when one considers that at least twice Bouscaren reveals a commendable concern for the responsibilities of scholarship. For example, Chapter Ten is explicitly acknowledged to be nothing more than a sequence of excerpts from an article written by Marguerite Higgins, published originally in the magazine *America*, and now "reprinted with permission." Furthermore, Bouscaren draws quite heavily on Suzanne Labin's *Vietnam: An Eye-Witness Account* (Springfield, Virginia: Crestwood Books, 1964), and whenever he does so he is exceedingly careful to identify each word that is original with Miss Labin. However, instances of such scrupulous extremes are few and scattered, and seem to be reserved, by and large, for authors with whose views of Diem and Vietnam Bouscaren is enthusiastically sympathetic.

The book does indeed contain a substantive argument, but this is hardly the context in which to restate it or pass on its merits.

As scholarship, in short, this little reader-in-disguise has some rather serious weaknesses. Yet, precisely by virtue of the tantalizing artlessness of its scholarly disguise, as comedy it holds up rather well. Indeed, only as a joke can it be taken at all seriously.

ROBERT S. CAHILL

University of Hawaii

TO THE EDITOR:

I appreciate the opportunity to respond to Mr. Cahill's "review." As I told you previously, there were some errors in the first printing, mostly due to the fact that at a critical time in reading proofs, an illness in the family forced me to put the project in the hands of an assistant. Thus quotes are missing on pages 19 (Fall) and 48 (Lancaster); "as cited in Lancaster" is missing for notes 19–25 (pages 47, 48), and the excerpts from Ali Shah in the appendix were inexcusably edited.

Mr. Cahill not only fails to review my book, he limits his criticism to portions of chapters 2–5 and the appendix. He fails to touch on the substantive issues developed in chapters 6 and 8–12. In chapters 2–5, covering much of the historical background, I cite Fall eight times, Hammer four times, and Lancaster twice. In addition I refer to Fall and Hammer and their ideas in the text itself five times. But in these same chapters there are 51 other citations, especially Devillers, Mus, Shaplen, Buttinger, Lindholm, and Fifield.

The Last of the Mandarins is based on a trip to Vietnam, interviews with U.S. and Vietnamese government officials, missionaries and newsmen, in addition to the writings of experts in the field. In her new book on Vietnam, Marguerite Higgins fully supports my thesis; many of the news people and government officials who once thought Diem was a crook and the Buddhists saints, have revised their views.

Men far better qualified than Mr. Cahill have seen merit in this book, including former Ambassador Nolting and former Assistant Secretary of State John Allison. Writing in *Saturday Review* (May 22), Mr. Allison says: ". . . the author does succeed in persuading the reader that Diem was a personally honest, intelligent, and dedicated Vietnamese patriot. It is not claimed that he was a true democrat but instead that he knew enough about his country and his people to realize that what the author calls 'the little-comprehended idea of democracy' was too weak a weapon with which to beat Communism. . . . He is not completely convincing but his book is worth reading for what it tells about the dangers of letting emotion and prejudices take the place of understanding, sympathy, and firmness in dealing with people in Southeast Asia."

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

Le Moyne College

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Teaching Political Science. Edited by Robert H. Connery (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 284. $5.95.)

Taken together, the twelve essays collected in this book constitute the kind of "shop talk" that is often witty and humorous, and is always informed, reflective, provocative, responsible and interesting. The quality of these papers should enhance the professional pride of those who have chosen to spend most of their lives teaching political science.

For the purpose of illustrating the variety of topics and diversity of views presented in this collection, and at the risk of offending the contributors by oversimplifications and omissions, summations and excerpts follow:

Professor Robert H. Connery, the editor, takes note of various criticisms of higher education and sets forth the purposes for which the Duke University Conference (at which these essays were first presented) was called.

Professor Lindsay Rogers asserts that reading is the principal avenue to literacy, but that many books published these days are not real books because they cannot be read, that most course prerequisites are indefensible, that segmentation in political science has been extreme, if not idiotic, that many of our abstractions have a dehydrating, dehumanizing effect, that skepticism is the proper response to quantitative approaches to the study of judicial behavior, and that the old fashioned classical education is conducive to furthering political imagination.

Professor Avery Leiserson believes that the behavioral approach is coextensive with the scientific outlook, which in turn is probably crucial to the survival of our civilization, but that enthusiasm for science, taken alone, is no substitute for intuitive speculation, logical brilliance, historical insight, legal reasoning and trained experience, that the classical theorists are important teachers of politics because their questions about the structure and functioning of political systems produced meaningful concepts and principles necessary to understanding political behavior, that Wilson, Merriam and others live today because of their commitment to political comprehension rather than because of their adherence to a fixed set of moral absolutes, and that "it is the great teacher indeed who, given the state of the discipline in his time, can formulate in his mind, exhibit in his life, and transmit through his students a sense of the vital balance between political philosophy, a scientific theory of politics, and personal participation."

Professor Edgar Brookes (an Englishman) observes that the Ph.D. is here to stay, but that degree requirements should be re-examined (Shakespeare would not have received a Ph.D. for writing *King Lear*), that compulsory attendance of students at lectures should be eliminated, that fewer lectures should be given at the upper division level, and that, on balance, it is desirable for teachers and students to become involved in practical politics.

Professor William Anderson adds historical perspective to the volume by contributing, for example, an analysis of the differences between Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum.

Professor William Livingston suggests that curbing admissions is not a solution to the problem of burgeoning enrollments, that we must find ways of improving methods and freeing faculty from functions which impair their ability to teach, and that state universities are best equipped to handle the increasing numbers of students.

Professor Earl Latham begins by jousting with the fallacies that "Svengali-like teachers dominate narcoleptic students," that "students come to the college as empty vessels," that it is dangerous to read books and that what teachers are remembered for is what makes them good teachers, and ends by exploring the question of student motivation.

Professor Margaret Ball responds to the question, should women be taught political science, by saying: "Of course, but not because of any spurious specialization of function which divides the human race into those who support the family (men) and those who are responsible . . . for the preservation of the nation's culture . . . "

Professor John Gaus testifies to, and illustrates, the value of John Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems* in elucidating the nature of government.

Professor Charles Hyneman believes that "we need to strive more consciously for the realization of certain learning experiences that tend to be made incidental to other worthy teaching objectives, or left to realization by chance, or ignored altogether."

Two criticisms: (1) The inclusion of a bibliographical essay at the end by J. Peter Meekison, however comprehensive, points up the misleading promise of the Preface that this book will help bridge the gap between education professors and political scientists; (2) Professor Robert Presthus should have been invited to contribute his critique of the bureaucratic structure of American universities today. This topic is relevant because the way power is organized within a university may bear upon the quality of its teaching staff.—MARVIN A. HARDER, *Wichita State University.*

Benjamin Constant. Seine Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz. LOTHER GALL. (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1963. Pp. xii, 433.)

From Sainte-Beuve in 1862 to Henri Guillemin in 1958 Jeremy Bentham's estimate of Benjamin Constant as "inconstant" has been repeated countless times by biographers, who have concentrated on his vacillating personal and political conduct. Few either in Europe or America have taken him seriously as a political theorist but at long last he is beginning to receive the attention he deserves in that respect.

Lothar Gall in this excellent study shows that there is interest in Constant's political thinking in contemporary Germany, while Antonio Zanfarino illustrates the Italian concern with his book entitled, *La Libertà dei Moderni nel Constituzionalismo di Benjamin Constant,* which was published in 1961 but is not cited in the bibliography of the volume under review.

Gall deals, of course, in large part with Constant's influence and reception in Germany in the period of the *Vormärz.* By extensively examining the political literature of the time—the *Staatslexicon* of Karl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor Welcher and the writings of Robert Mohl, Paul Pfizer, Ignaz Rudhart, Friedrich Murhard, and Friedrich Julius Stahl, he indicates "what authority" Constant exerted in "all questions of constitutionalism." It is Gall's elucidation of Constant's ideas on this subject that is the most interesting part of the book for historians of political thought.

He rightly places Constant in that "line of great liberals in the Nineteenth Century, who foresaw more or less clearly the decline of libertarian forms of life" and the threat of authoritarianism in modern society. In fact, "long before Tocqueville, Constant had described the connection between the principle of equality and the extension of state power, even to totalitarian dictatorship." Gall is perceptive in his scrutiny of Constant's views on Jacobinism and Bonapartism but in his own reflections on the roots of totalitarianism he would have profited from a reading of J. L. Talmon's studies of *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* and *Political Messianism.*

It was Constant, who, along with Madame de Staël, epitomized the liberal reaction to the French Revolution, which has never been studied as much as the conservative. "There are two dogmas," he said, "equally dangerous—the one, divine right and the other, unlimited popular sovereignty." He thought that in the Revolution arbitrary power was simply transferred from the Bourbons to the people. The evils, resulting from what Joseph de Maistre called *le monarque peuple,* were due in Constant's opinion to the influence of Rousseau, whose "*Contrat Social,* so often invoked in favor of liberty, was the most vicious auxiliary of every kind of despotism."

Constant believed that Rousseau was also to blame for introducing the concept of ancient liberty. Gall points out that, long before Fustel de Coulanges, Constant claimed that the ancients had no notion of individual rights, since to them liberty consisted in "participation in the collective power." For Constant, modern liberty, on the contrary, includes the "peaceful enjoyment of private independence." The excesses of the French Revolutionists followed from the confusion of ancient with modern liberty, or, in the words of Madame de Staël, "they wanted political liberty at the expense of civil liberty." To Constant, political liberty can only serve to guarantee individual liberty. Gall would have added another dimension to his discussion here, if he had been familiar with Sir Isaiah Berlin's lecture on *Two Concepts of Liberty,* where Constant's idea of individual or private rights is identified with negative and public authority with positive freedom.

Constant specifically defined liberty at one point as "the triumph of individuality as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods as over the masses who seek to render the minority a slave to the majority." When he discussed freedom and rights he rejected Benthamite utilitarianism in favor of the natural law tradition of the Enlightenment. However, under the influence of German philosophy Constant, before Tocqueville, repudiated the Eighteenth Century view that religion is the enemy of liberty and concluded that only a religious people ever remained free.

It was in concrete political institutions, however, rather than in religion that Constant saw the strongest basis of freedom. Although he does not have the idea of intermediate powers in the traditional sense of the *Ancien Regime,* he does emphasize counter weights to the state, such as the peerage, juridical forms, and local self-government, all of which he found exemplified in the English constitution. In fact, his respect and veneration for precedents and customs is not only an illustration of his Anglophilism but also of the counter-revolutionary influences on his thought, which are not sufficiently stressed by Gall.

In his theory of constitutional monarchy Constant recognized a balance of five rather than three powers—the king, the ministers, the hereditary assembly, the elective house, and the judiciary. The unique feature of this distribution was the role played by the non-political king, whom Constant regarded as *le pouvoir neutre,* separated from the ministers and armed with the right of veto and dissolution to prevent parliamentary omnipotence. If he exaggerated the arbitral role of the monarch in harmonizing the executive and legislative powers, it must be remembered that he was writing before cabinet government was completely developed in England, to say nothing of Restoration France.

Gall sees Constant's political thinking as marking the transition between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. We are in his debt for helping to restore him to his rightful place beside the other luminaries of European Liberalism—Mill, Tocqueville, and Acton.—GUY H. DODGE, *Brown University.*

Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies. BY ROLLO HANDY. (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1964. Pp. 182, $6.75.)

Rollo Handy is, in his terms, a transactionalist of sorts. His approach is contextual and empirical. He seeks to investigate the actual methodological problems arising among researchers in each social science discipline, rather than debate issues as formulated by fellow philosophers of science. He is disappointed, however, to find that "practitioners" are often unaware of issues, naive when reconstructing their logic of inquiry, inarticulate about the steps involved, or dogmatic about what canons must be followed. Looking about for exponents of distinctive views with whom to conduct a dialogue, he often tends to settle for the polemical excesses of irate book reviewers, the copybook formulae of textbooks about methods, pseudo-philosophical pronouncements found in presidential addresses, and other marginalia. It can fairly be said that he does not do what he sets out to do. He writes a series of rambling essays that make few significant new points, and that often leave the reader frustrated. One learns that anthropologists tend to describe cultural forms meticulously while disagreeing about the frame of reference to adopt, that economists tend to adumbrate complicated rationalist schema for explaining market or firm behavior while disagreeing about the value of studying institutional arrangements or behavioral patterns, that psychologists tend to accept scientific standards as appropriate only to argue about which techniques meet the test, that sociologists disagree about the importance of subjective data as a source of ideas about behavioral determinants but also tend to accept the view that scientific methods—systemic, empirical, tentative—are *de rigeur,* that political scientists (and students of jurisprudence plus policy scientists as well) are addicted to propounding solutions to complex problems in government and public affairs but have been slowly acquiring an appreciation for newer canons of field research as well as documentary scholarship, that historians disclaim the intent to formulate generalizations rather than explain particular time-and-place developments, but nevertheless often adduce (and even invent) general propositions about philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, and/or psychology, both mass and individual, to help the argument along—these are the kinds of "findings" to be gleaned.

Handy's position can perhaps be summed up as orthodox eclecticism. He accepts science as a historically emerging discipline, its canons constantly changing, and necessarily at different "stages" in sister disciplines, not only because of historical peculiarities and habits, but also because of career and institutional considerations. It is possible to give tentative encouragement to a transactionalist approach, although various styles of interactional inquiry remain viable.

The net effect of his tour through the social science provinces is, unfortunately, to encourage one to think of each discipline as possessing a substantial solidarity concerning scientific practices, albeit no unanimity. Perhaps his most useful chapters deal with ad hoc analytical distinctions, terminology, questions of verifiability and predictability, measurability, and alleged differences between physical and behavioral inquiries. In these he largely abandons the effort to characterize the scientific preoccupations of each discipline and instead considers the views of individual scholars—R. M. MacIver, George Lundberg, Leslie White, Michael Scriven, Peter Winch, Theodore Mischel, Karl Popper, Maurice Cranston—many of whom discourse in familiar philosophical style.

There are some crucial problems confronting modern intellectuals whose subject matter lies within the behavioral science orbit and whose disciplinary paraphernalia derive from an amalgam of work in various fields therein. To suggest why Handy's work is disappointing, perhaps it will help to pose three problems, noting that Handy has nothing to say about any of them.

1. What are the operational ethical constraints on behavioral inquiry field by field—both as they arise from a "value-free" abdication of responsibility for the social-political-psychological consequences of one's findings—and as they encourage a "conscience-free" invasion of privacy for the sake of knowing?
2. What are the developmental patterns implicit in the world's population growth, the

diffusion of nuclear warfare capabilities, and the prospects of mass leisure—to cite three indubitable trends—on the research priorities, use of scarce resources, and similar dederminants of behavioral methodology?

3. What are the prospects for creativity—for *visions* of how human enterprises and associations work and for *ingenuity* in contriving techniques for testing the empirical warrant for such imaginative constructs—in an academic future full of pedestrian contributions to knowledge, each meeting the extant criteria for disciplinary excellence, each bent on making a modest contribution to an ineluctably incrementing pile of knowledge? It is a sad fact today that much of the effort of those who prefer "wisdom" to "evidence"—and who enforce the requirement that a choice be made—goes into a tiresome denigration of the efforts of behavioralists. At the same time it is an equally sad fact that conceptions of social and/or behavioral science tend to downgrade brains in favor of discipline, eccentricity in favor of balance, geniuses in favor of journeymen. Something is wrong with formulations of intellectual desiderata which leave out sensitivity (not doctrinaire beliefs, but sensitivity of any kind) to ethical overtones, to emerging forces, and to imaginative efforts.—DWAINE MARVICK, *University of California* (*Los Angeles*).

Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics. BY HARRY V. JAFFA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 229. $5.75.)

This volume is a collection of Professor Jaffa's essays, described in his Preface as "for the most part chips from a much-interrupted work-in-progress on the American Civil War." Nine of the ten essays have been published before, in books or journals. The sixth, which gives its name to the subtitle of the present volume, was presented at a panel at a meeting of the American Political Science Association. Several of the essays are critical reviews of books and articles, and so is a nine-page appendix to the thirty-page first essay.

The Preface states that "the theme that runs through nearly all" of the essays is "the supreme importance of the Declaration of Independence as a statement of principles which not only did justify, but must ever justify our existence as an independent people." The emphasis is expectedly upon the American Civil War and Lincoln's appreciation, shared with Jefferson and Madison, that a free people under a democratic government must understand and abide by the principle that all men are created equal. This historical example is generalized to the proposition that only those people who accept the principle are qualified to participate in the democratic process. As I understand it, this proposition is meant to explain the popular solidarity or "consensus" necessary for the successful operation of democratic government, including "rule by the majority" and organized partisanship. Although it is certainly not a full explanation, it does emphasize that a respect for one another's opinions is a necessary element in the cohesiveness of a democratic people.

The principle of equality is treated in two different ways. It is described as the operative principle that has held the American people together and that, especially, was a major determinant in Lincoln's reaction to the possible spread of slavery and to secession, and it is analyzed in an attempt to state its philosophical meaning. The first treatment is adequate, as noted above, but it does not appear unfair to the author to point out that the most important question is how the American or any other democratic people can believe, as they obviously do believe, that "men are created equal." Regarding Lincoln, there seems to be little doubt of his full awareness that a belief in racial inequality is inconsistent with the maintenance of democratic government.

When the author attempts a philosophical analysis of the concept of equality, the results are less satisfactory. "All men are created equal" means that they are equal in certain "rights." This is explained by saying that no man is the master of another man as he is "by nature" the master of dogs, horses, cows, and monkeys. As a consequence, government arises from consent and not from nature. This natural human superiority over animals and this lack of natural superiority within mankind cannot, however, be demonstrated. They are "self-evident" truths, that is, the evidence for them is contained within them, and they are admitted to be true by everyone who already grasps the meaning of their terms (pp. 176–177). Hence, the argument from the "nature" of men and beasts is declared irrelevant. We are reminded, in short, that if we wish to preserve democracy as we know it, we must continue to believe that men are equal, even if we do not know the reasons for or even the meaning of this belief.

The essays dealing with the problem of equality are very repetitive: one gets the impression he has read the same essay four or five times. The essays seem untouched by editing: the fifth, a hitherto unpublished panel-paper, begins "Our subject is a broad one," and the fourth begins, "The topic set for this panel is . . . " (This fourth essay was published in the September, 1958—not 1959, as the Acknowledgments inform us—issue of this REVIEW and there it began in the same way. It was also incorporated in Jaffa's book, *Crisis of the*

House Divided.) The first essay has attached to it an appendix one-third its length; the ninth essay has three pages of small-type substantive notes following it; and some of the other essays have a few footnotes. For these reasons, it is difficult to see why this volume, dedicated to Leo Strauss and with a Foreword by Charles H. Percy, was put together.—C. W. CASSINELLI, *The University of Washington.*

John Randolph of Roanoke: a Study in American Politics with Selected Speeches and Letters. BY RUSSELL KIRK. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Pp. 485. $5.95.)

In this book Russell Kirk has combined an analytic study of the political ideas of John Randolph, first published in 1951, with selections from Randolph's speeches and letters. Some of the source documents have until now been relatively inaccessible, and their appearance here is a welcome addition to the growing body of readily available primary literature on American political ideas. Well over half of the volume is given over to the source materials. These, of course, have been selected from a much larger *corpus*, and while particular choices may inevitably be open to question, the pieces offered here seem well selected to reflect Randolph's political perspectives and personal style. The book also includes a short "Randolph Chronology" and a quite exhaustive bibliography of relevant primary and secondary materials.

John Randolph has been a neglected figure in recent histories and political analyses of the American tradition; Mr. Kirk believes quite unjustly so. There is no question that Randolph was an interesting and rather enigmatic actor on the political scene. His influence and force of character were great, and they were particularly felt through his long tenure in the House of Representatives, where he served intermittently from 1799 to 1829. During this time he worked with and against nearly all the principal national leaders: Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Jackson, Clay, Webster, Calhoun. In his second term in the House he was the Jeffersonian Republicans' majority leader, but later he broke with Jefferson over the Florida purchase and the Yazoo land claims. Near the close of his public life he supported Jackson for the Presidency, but later was to denounce Jackson in the nullification controversy. While it may be doubted that Randolph was a major figure in the development of political theory, his career illustrated, perhaps as well as any, the convolutions of the rapidly changing American political society during its first fifty years of independence. He participated in a central (and highly vocal) way in debate over all the main public issues of this developmental period.

Mr. Kirk is, to put it mildly, a Randolph enthusiast. "Clay and Webster are only textbook names, now"; he writes, "Madison and Monroe are not much more; but John Randolph, even in his torment, lives for us still." (p. 9) In his commentary he has undertaken two principal tasks, construction of a coherent political theory out of Randolph's ideas, and demonstration of the relevance of these ideas to the politics of our time. Neither task is an easy one.

Kirk's approach to the business of making a theorist out of Randolph revolves around two central points. One, relying heavily on insistent assertion, is that Randolph succeeded better than most men of his time, and particularly better than Jefferson, in maintaining consistency in the face of changing conditions. The other is that Randolph was unwavering in his adherence to the political beliefs of Edmund Burke. Indeed, in a major way the book is an attempt to show that Randolph was an American Burke and that the American political tradition is an unfortunate repudiation of both.

There is ample evidence that Randolph was strongly influenced by his reading of Burke. Whether he contributed a relevant and constructive conservatism to the American tradition is another question. While Kirk associates Randolph with Burke's rejection of abstractions as guides to political action, his account of Randolph's devotion to strict construction, to the liberty of privilege, and to agrarianism, for example, fails to explain how these are absolutes not held by absolute natural conviction. To assert (even citing Burke) a difference between principle and abstract law does not solve the problem. Randolph, via Kirk, does not convey the depth of the conservative position as one finds it argued in Adams or Calhoun. Indeed, Randolph as treated here had little of the appreciation for community and incremental change that so distinguished Burke's outlook on the social world. His resistance to change was so dogged as to suggest the certitude of the doctrinary.

Perhaps the difficulty is that Kirk attempts to make a theory of what is no more than an ideology. For Randolph is most easily understood as an ideologist, as the defender of a peculiar way of life then pressed by the early glimmers of industrialization and by the rising tide of democracy. Unfortunately, in his insistence on treating this ideology as theory, Mr. Kirk does not apply to it the kind of analysis that makes ideology most relevant to the explanation of politics, the systematic treatment of social causes and policy effects.

Kirk does not devote much of his skill to explaining the relevance to contemporary politics of Randolph's ideas; here again he tends to rely chiefly on assertion. The question of contemporary relevance of the "classics" is of great importance (and difficulty) for students of politics. Perhaps the ideological material with which he works sets his limits. For the contemporary appeal of the ideas of a defender of a particular time and milieu, both long since dead, may be confined to those whose perspectives on today's politics impel them merely to say "Oh, if only our world were like that."—DAVID W. MINAR, *Northwestern University*.

The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law. BY LEONARD KRIEGER, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. i–ix, 311. $6.50.)

Samuel Pufendorf's numerous scholarly tomes on natural law, history and theology are not exactly prominent items on the standard intellectual bill of fare in our day and age. Perhaps that is the inevitable—even the deserved—fate of most old scholarly books. But no matter; the scholarly resurrection of obscure scholarly works is part of the stock-in-trade of scholars. And so Professor Krieger, Professor of History at the University of Chicago, has dusted off Pufendorf's writings and made them the basis of an essay in intellectual history. His book treats, practically simultaneously: (1) Pufendorf's intellectual development; and (2) the general development of political-moral thought in the latter half of the seventeenth century. His book is clearly organized around these themes: the man, the philosopher, the moralist, the political theorist, the jurist, the historian, and the theologian.

When I first read the title of Krieger's book, I was puzzled: Why should a treatment of Pufendorf be called "The Politics of Discretion"? The answer is that the title reflects a specific and a general thesis about "intellectuals" and their relation to "reality." The specific thesis concerns Pufendorf's mode of "accepting" the natural law of his "age," and is as follows: Pufendorf was a second-rank thinker compared to the illustrious ones of his century: Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Leibniz. However, because he was second-rank, his intellectual development reveals more readily and sharply than does that of a first-rank thinker the *general* intellectual processes, problems and tendencies of his age. But he is also significant in his own right, because he tried more deliberately than did Hobbes *et al.* to join the new theory of natural law to political, moral and religious reality: "His problem was to validate a doctrine that was essentially universal, egalitarian and anti-authoritarian in a real world that was primarily traditional, hierarchical, and monarchical and that, moreover, he had no intention of reforming." (p. 37). Pufendorf's solution: to "compromise"—that is, continuously to adapt the "theory" to the "reality," even to the point of undermining his own "political logic." Pufendorf thus created an "early model for the conjunction of a libertarian rationale with a conservative reality," and this remains his "most relevant bequest to his twentieth century posterity." (p. 38).

Krieger's more general thesis emerges at this point: Pufendorf is significant less for the content of his thought than for the fact that he "represents the fundamental human type of the mediator," or the "man of discretion," the very model of the "trimmer." He faced, and attempted to resolve, the "tension inherent in man's simultaneous commitment to logical coherence and to a reality that splinters logical coherence." (pp. 3, viii.). Even the fact that Pufendorf's ultimate resolution depended on a return to "Lutheranism," as the foundation of the natural law, is explicable as a mode of "integral compromise." (cf. pp. 243 and pp. 37–38).

The preceding theses give structure to the book and permeate its detailed arguments. But whether it contains an exact historical interpretation of Pufendorf's works remains, for me, an open question. My doubt is based not on any great, independent familiarity with the mass of sources, but on uneasiness about Krieger's general approach to Pufendorf. The approach is that of the "history of ideas"; as such, it seems to require seeing the author through the medium of fairly breathtaking syntheses of enormously complex matters. For example: we are told that "the relationship between the rational and the real" had become, for Pufendorf and his contemporaries, "the problem of the age." (p. 16). For example: in a scant fifteen pages, we are given a summary treatment of "the problem of secularization in the seventeenth century." This includes the contention that "the secularizing intellectuals of the seventeenth century" typically sought to establish the "role of positive religion in anchoring the rational morality that mediated between philosophy and politics." (p. 215). It is hardly surprising, then, to discover that this is precisely what Pufendorf did, along with Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and others, for was he not also—nay, even pre-eminently—a "man of his age"? In short, I have a feeling—no more—that the detailed exposition of Pufendorf's thought *may* have been filtered through the screen of the dazzling synthesis. But this caveat does not prevent my concluding that the book is a helpful guide to the scope and nature of Pufendorf's works.—RICHARD H. COX, *State University of New York, Buffalo*.

The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge. BY WILLIAM P. MCEWEN. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963. Pp. 590. $12.50.)

"The aim of this book is to contribute toward the formulation of a philosophical theory of knowledge which emerges out of the context of social-scientific inquiry, in order to provide an epistemological perspective for behavioral research and theory." The main problem which such a theory of knowledge must resolve is: "How are the perceptions and ideas which the knower has constructed related to the reality to which they supposedly refer?" The book may be described as an attempt to answer this question and state the consequences of the answer for the methodology of the social sciences. Basic to the answer and highlighting the problem, according to Professor McEwen, is the necessity of adhering to the thesis of "epistemological dualism"—our ideas, the concepts we use, and the statements we make about reality are one thing, reality itself is something else and we can never be sure that the former correctly conform to the latter.

Social scientists can surmount this seemingly insurmountable barrier by adopting the "epistemological perspective" of "situation relativism." Like all such perspectives, this one consists of three related things. First, there is the "value situation"—the dominant motive of a person seeking knowledge. For the social scientist, objectivity requires that his inquiry be primarily motivated by the "desire to know." This permits him, also, to partially adjust to his "value-centric predicament"—he is seeking factual knowledge but his inquiry is necessarily "involved" with values. A full adjustment to or escape from the "predicament" requires recognition of a certain intellectual division of labor. Only the "philosophical axiologist" has the analytical tools needed to acquire "reasonably acceptable" knowledge of intrinsic moral ends. The social scientist should accept the moral ends discovered by the philosopher and seek the knowledge needed to determine the means of achieving them. In the final chapter, the nature of moral inquiry is illustrated in the author's defense of the proposition that the ultimate moral end should be "self realization."

The second ingredient of the appropriate epistemological perspective for the social scientist is the assumption of five postulates which indicate the kind of knowledge of his subject matter which can be acquired. In summary, these are: (1) "There is an objective reality to . . . which the subjective constructs [concepts and generalizations] of the particular disciplines refer." (2) "A high degree of probability (reasonable acceptability), rather than absolute certainty, is the most that can be expected in the operational verification of generalizations which never exhaust all that is yet to be known." (3) "Knowledge about the objective physical and behavioral universe requires an orderly system of constructs [i.e., theory]." (4) There are causal relations among physical and behavioral events. (5) Verification requires both logical consistency and empirical adequacy. McEwen calls these postulates the "meaning situation" of social scientific inquiry. He maintains that the social scientist's "value situation" determines his "meaning situation" which influences his "knowledge situation," the third and final part of the epistemological perspective.

A social scientist's "knowledge situation" is the method by which he acquires and verifies his beliefs. Professor McEwen recommends the "hypothetical-deductive method" which he outlines in terms of four stages: (1) observation and classification of relevant factual data; (2) construction of hypotheses; (3) verification by empirical testing of the logical consequences of the hypotheses; (4) conceptual integration of the confirmed hypotheses to form theories. Because of the necessity of considering the "intervening variable of purposive goal seeking" which is accessible "only through the investigator's intuitive insight," the author concludes that "*law-like* rather than *lawful* generalizations are all that behavioral sciences can hope to achieve."

The significance and manifestations of the three aspects of the suggested epistemological perspective are considered for psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, and history in separate chapters devoted to the "value situation," each of the five postulates of the "meaning situation," and each of the four stages of the "knowledge situation." Political science is discussed at approximately seventeen different places in the book for a total of approximately forty pages.

In an outline such as that presented above, more of what I consider correct in the book is apparent than what I regard as mistaken, but I have adumbrated some of the mistakes. "Epistemological dualism" which the author regards as a fundamental aspect of the philosophy of social science—more so than I could bring out in this review—has nothing to do with social science or its philosophy. Political scientists, for example, study such things as judges, legislators, and international organizations. There is no question about whether they *exist*. Nor is there any issue over the assumption that ordinary observation is a source of knowledge about these or any other physical things. These are matters of common sense, not philosophy. With regard to values, McEwen speaks of moral knowledge on a par with factual knowledge without confronting the many arguments for the fact-value distinction. Within his own position, there are no grounds for his claim that only philosophers can achieve moral knowledge; the empathy combined with introspection which enables philosophers to verify normative propositions is essentially the same as the technique which he said social scientists must use to achieve data about human motivation. This brings me to a final and related point. In his identification of all psychological concepts, such as attitudes and motives, with mentalistic phenomena, McEwen shows no awareness of "methodological behaviorism"—the thesis that psychological concepts are definable in terms of objective behavioral and/or physiological characteristics of people and physical features of their environment—which has been implicit in psychology for decades and explicit in the philosophy of psychology at least since Watson's "Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It" published in 1913.—MILTON HOBBS, *Indiana University.*

The Case for Liberty. BY HELEN HILL MILLER. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 254. $5.95.)

A current and useful fashion in the study of constitutional law is the detailed examination of a single case to provide flesh and blood for dry legal doctrine. De Tocqueville's aphorism that in the United States great social and political questions take the form of legal disputes is clearly demonstrable through such studies which analyze the social order from which a case emerged and provide human dimensions to those whose names are familiar only as keys to legal citations. When a case produces a result of lasting significance, the value of a detailed examination is enhanced. In *The Case for Liberty,* Helen Hill Miller, a journalist, has selected nine such incidents from American colonial history which gave rise to some of the great constitutional guarantees of liberty found in early state constitutions after the Revolution and which eventually were made part of the federal Bill of Rights. Each incident was a *cause célebre* in which the participants "took on theatrical proportions as protagonists of human destiny" (p. xvi) and would be apt to lead a citizen of the post-Revolutionary period to recall when looking at his state's declaration of rights, "Well, Article X certainly takes care of the so-and-so case." (p. xii.) Students of early American history and those concerned with the development of civil liberty guarantees will find this book interesting.

Using the Bill of Rights as a frame of reference, Mrs. Miller tells of nine episodes in six colonies to illustrate the birth of rights which elements of the first eight Amendments were designed to secure: (1) Freedom of religion—the jailing of Baptist preachers in Virginia, 1771; (2) freedom of the press—the Bradford case in Philadelphia, 1692 and the Zenger trial in New York, 1735; (3) the right to bear arms—courts-martial following Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia, 1676; (4) quartering of troops—the indictment of Alexander MacDougall in New York, for seditious libel, 1771; (5) search and seizure—Superior Court hearings on writs of assistance in Massachusetts, 1761; (6) due process—imprisonment of Thomas Powell for contempt of council in South Carolina, 1773; (7) trial in the vicinage—the investigation of the *Gaspee* burning by a special tribunal in Rhode Island, 1773; (8) right to a jury—the case of *Forsey* v. *Cunningham* in New York, 1764; (9) freedom from extortion (excessive bail or fine)—mock trials by the Regulators at Hillsborough, North Carolina, 1770.

Readers of this review will quickly discover in the above listing those events which are familiar and, undoubtedly, several which are unknown to them. In each instance, Mrs. Miller recites the drama of each case as it emerges from official documents as well as from comments by witnesses and spectators as revealed in press reports, letters and memoirs. The social setting and the dramatis personae are presented in almost fiction-like style through extensive use of direct quotations. The flavor of colonial America which pervades the book is enhanced by the reproduction of 28 contemporary paintings and engravings. An excellent 23 page note on sources concludes the book.

The format of the book, though entertaining, will prove mildly troublesome to those who, like this reviewer, prefer their history in more direct narrative form. The extensive use of quotations and an occasional overemphasis on personalities or peripheral matters has the effect, at times, of clouding the precise issue under consideration. As a consequence, the book is apt to have more appeal to laymen than to scholars though even those well versed in the history of civil liberties will find something of value. It is useful to be reminded that much of what we find in the Bill of Rights grew out of experience on these shores and not only in the hidden recesses of English history. Furthermore, one is struck by parallels which can be drawn from contemporary experiences as seemingly ancient guarantees meet new challenges. The similarity between current confusion over electronic eaves-dropping and the use of general search warrants in colonial times is manifest. Continuing struggles against religious (and racial) intolerance and renewed controversy over the long ignored guarantee of the right to bear arms assure us that bills of rights are rooted deeply in the experiences of men and that these experiences continue to shape their meaning.—MILTON GREENBERG. *Western Michigan University.*

Political Authority and Moral Judgment. By Glenn Negley. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965. Pp. 163. $5.00.)

A studied concern for the relationships between political authority and moral judgment seems especially appropriate to this moment in history. The usual practice of men is to assume the legitimacy of a stable political order if only to avoid the exhaustion of calling it into question. But the recent crisis of conscience in regard to America's positions in international politics, or the role of massive civil disobedience in the current civil rights revolution, incline thoughtful persons to seek guidance on the relation of political to moral systems. At the same time, these problems of immediate judgment provide a practical test of the usefulness of ideas advanced under the present title.

The author's stated purpose "is to attempt some small clarification of what we are talking about" in disputes over the evaluation of laws or systems of law. In fact, these essays seem designed to advance many more and more complex purposes than just that modest intent. Among those several purposes, the more important are to attack claims of a moral basis for any political order, to point up the inadequacy of Anglo-American legal conceptions of the corporation, to insist upon an institutional approach to the understanding of individuals and political systems, and to advance a philosophy of administration. The object of the analysis at any given point is not always clear to the reader, but some of the apparent excursions seem more interesting and rewarding than the main path of inquiry.

Prof. Negley's basic contribution to clarity lies in his emphasis on certain analytic distinctions between fact and value, between politics and administration, and between the actual authority of law and its evaluation in an act of moral judgment. His central point is that a system of law cannot be derived from or justified with reference to moral principles because a system of law is a necessary pre-condition for moral judgment. A stable political order provides an environment in which individuals are able to realize their potential for freedom and moral choice. However, the authority of the law does not derive from such consequences. A large part of the author's argument on authority reduces, in his own terms, to the statement, "The authority of the law is what it is because the disposition to obedience is what it is because the institutional structure is what it is." (p. 102). In a later passage, the institutional structure is what it is—or will be what it will be—as a consequence of the work of administrators, and it is this line of reasoning which places the training of administrators at the climax of the entire analysis.

It is valid and probably useful to note that the authority of law is a matter of fact and that moral judgment is, or should be, a matter of rational analysis of facts empirically established and value premises clearly defined. We may agree with the author that the results of moral judgment on inadequate factual grounds are often unfortunate. But the author appears to go somewhat farther when he says (p. 115), "Disaster is the inevitable result when the witless or the dabblers or the dogmatists make political judgments." His distinctions are useful for his purposes of emphasizing the importance of the administrator's role in a modern society and for identifying some still unsolved legal problems of the administrative state. However, analytic distinctions that are useful for some purposes may not be useful for others or when pressed to the logical extreme. That a distinction be useful in one case is no guarantee that it is universally useful or even approximately true.

As noted above, a discussion of this subject would seem to be of particular value now in view of current issues and demands for judgment. Unfortunately, the present analysis is cast at such an extremely high level of abstraction as to place the burden of application entirely on the reader. The author notes that other conceptions of the authority of law make the reconciliation of differences among nations an impossible judicial problem, but his resolution to rest authority on an institutionally conditioned disposition to obey is no improvement where institutions are incompatible. At one point, the author notes briefly the problem of an individual first conditioned by a segregated society and then exposed to conflicting values through education, but he gives no indication of how that problem is to be solved. Hence, while this book contains some excellent asides on the political philosophies of Hobbes and Kant, it disappoints the reader seeking advice on the problems of judgment that confront him today.—Richard H. McCleery, *Antioch College.*

Power and Human Destiny. By Herbert Rosinski. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xvi, 206. $5.95.)

At his death Herbert Rosinski left a number of preliminary drafts and notes dealing with the concept of power in human affairs, a matter that had long concerned him. This material has been used by his friend and colleague, Richard P. Stebbins, as the basis for this book, which is "not so much a transcription as a restatement" of Rosinski's ideas.

The thesis is that human history can be seen as the development of man's power. Until the rise of industrial civilization at the time of the First World War, this power was a power that more or less successfully integrated the elements of his surroundings, including other men, and since that time it has been a power that enables him to change his surroundings. The post-1914 industrial civilization is a completely new level of existence, where the problem is not the exhaustion or decay of power—or, in terms of power's results, the loss of harmony—but the indefinite creation of new power by the power of rationality. To control this ever-expanding power is now our principal problem.

The book has three major parts: an examination of the concept of power, an interpretation of human history, and a prescription for the resolution of the problem of the industrial era. The intent is to provide a new understanding of the past and the present by ordering the events of human history in terms of the concept of power, but in evaluating the book we need not hold it strictly to its pretensions. The historical sections, comprising three-quarters of the book, can probably be appreciated without reference to the author's concept of power. The significance of Christian individualism may, for example, be better understood by viewing it as a special manifestation of power, no matter what the exact meaning of "power" might be; and the challenge to theories of history that assert the inevitable decay of civilizations is similarly valuable. It is always interesting to follow an author's search for a pattern in history, even though one may doubt that such patterns exist. This doubt is, moreover, usually increased by the reader's recognition of inadequacies in his own narrow field of competence. A case in point is the present volume's at best most unimaginative treatment of political systems such as contemporary democracy and communism.

The analysis of the concept of power itself is less successful. Power is not solely the ability of human beings to engage in a range of activities. "Each bit of reality represents a force that has come to fulfillment, something that has shown itself to be truly power by having asserted its capability of being." This force or power behind the becoming of reality is joined by a "power inherent in the established fact itself" that exerts "its own influence in the endless chain of being." These two types of power are manifested in human affairs in the obvious way: "Inevitably, the things that man creates become objectified as established facts which thereupon begin to exercise a power of their own." Not so obviously, however, once man's creation begins to exercise this power of its own, "it becomes independent of his original intention and also of his endeavors to maintain control over it." Indeed, this power tends to "turn against man himself." (pp. 19–22) Man's creation of power in his attempt to advance his freedom cannot be terminated because it is a manifestation of his essence. The only way to prevent our search for freedom ending in our enslavement or even destruction is to maintain our understanding and control of the power we have created.

The concept of power has serious explanatory and logical weaknesses. It is so general that using it to explain human history does not accomplish very much: we learn only that this history is part of the whole of existence and that every part of existence has influence on every other part. The concept of control, which can be nothing other than a result of power, is not integrated with the concept of power. The word "power" is used in different ways in different parts of the argument. The theory of power does not explain the tendency of man's creations to have effects that were not anticipated or to be difficult to control: this tendency is better approached by an investigation of the limits of man's understanding or of the complexities of human associations or of both. We know that nuclear energy and bureaucracy can get out of hand; the theory presented by this volume does little to augment this knowledge.

According to Rosinski and Stebbins, the only way to control power is to imbue men and institutions with responsibility, which is a result of the Christian concepts of guilt and humility combined with insight into the fundamentals of current problems, especially the problem of power. This responsibility is to be got by a revision of education to stress a "general perspective over the whole development of mankind" and a "general view of the over-all state of our present systematic knowledge." (p. 201) Again it can be said that this prescription makes sense, but that it has very little theoretical connection with the concept of power presented as the key to human affairs. Responsibility itself is a kind of power, but no attempt is made to show how it can be a power that controls other forms of power.

Despite these criticisms, *Power and Human Destiny* is a valuable attempt by men who have grasped the realities of the present age to put these realities into historical perspective.—C. W. CASSINELLI, *The University of Washington.*

The Tradition of Natural Law. A Philosopher's Reflections. BY YVES R. SIMON, EDITED BY VUKAN KUIC. (New York, Fordham University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 194. $5.00.)

These lectures by the late Professor Simon, who is best known to political scientists through his *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (1951) and *A General Theory of Authority* (1962), originated in a course he gave on "The Problem of Natural Law" at the University of Chicago in 1958. They should be ranked with the lectures delivered at the same university in 1948 by Professor A. P. D'Entrèves, which were published in 1951 under the title, *Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy* and with the lectures given there in 1949 by Professor Leo Strauss, which came out in book form in 1953 with the title, *Natural Right and History.* There is one reference to the former volume but none to the latter in the notes of the work under review, which was edited by Vukan Kuic, one of Simon's former students.

Professor Simon was a distinguished Christian philosopher—a Neo-Thomist, writing, like his master, Jacques Maritain, in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, according to which natural law signified primarily "the natural law of the moral world." As Simon points out, "the opposition to natural law is as old as the theory," but the "great revival of interest" in it "in our time is certainly related to the devastations wrought by positivism and existentialism in the intellectual and political life of a considerable part of Western society." He also shows how in the Nineteenth Century "a philosophy of historical right" was opposed to "a philosophy of natural right," but he does not stress, like Strauss, the repudiation of natural right in the "name of the distinction between Facts and Values."

Although Professor Simon believes that "acquaintance with history never fails to improve the statement of philosophical questions," his chapter on the history of natural law is not as complete as the treatment of this subject either by Professor D'Entreves or by Professor Heinrich Rommen in his *The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy*, who both give more attention to the secularization of the concept. However, in dealing with the relationship between natural law and the "profound issues of theoretical philosophy," like the problem of the universals and the unity of human nature, his presentation is excellent.

Simon suggests in several places that "the history of ideas about natural law is crowded with myths," which he sets out to "puncture." He feels that the myth of "scholastic doctrine" is as fallacious as the myth of "contemporary philosophy," for "scholasticism lacks doctrinal unity as certainly as contemporary philosophy does," which he proceeds to demonstrate by contrasting Thomas Aquinas and William of Occam, on the one hand, and Henri Bergson and Bertrand Russell, on the other. If, then, there is no scholastic doctrine of natural law, there is, however, according to Simon, a "scholastic system of problems," like whether "primacy belongs to the intellect or the will." He points out very effectively that "legal voluntarism, i.e. the theory that law is primarily an act of sovereign will, is historically associated in a remarkably constant fashion with voluntarism as a general philosophic position, i.e. with the theory that the higher faculty is not the intellect but the will." After referring to Hobbes and Rousseau but not to Marsiglio, he concludes that "the notion of natural law is attacked whenever the voluntaristic trend is predominant."

In the last analysis Simon maintains that the "resolution of man-made laws into their foundations is the very way to the position and determination of the question as to whether there exists a law of nature." Following from his Aristotelian-Thomistic approach, "law is a rule of the reason for the common good," concerning which, according to Simon, there are two myths. "The first is the myth of a common good external to man and conceived upon the pattern of a work of art and the second . . . that the common good is merely a useful one, that is, the greatest good of the greatest number." Instead, to a Catholic liberal like Simon, "the common good enjoys primacy over the private good of the individual when both are of the same order" or in other words when "the common good is internal to man."

As Professor John Hallowell says in the foreword to this book, the "natural law" tradition is the basis of constitutional government, a position he expounded in his own lectures at Chicago on *The Moral Foundation of Democracy,* which were published in 1954. With the same viewpoint, Professor Simon suggests that "pragmatists are at their worst when they contend that the vindication of democracy in terms of natural law is obsolete, ineffective, and uninteresting." It is not surprising to read, after this observation, that "one of the most obvious conclusions of our research" is that "there can be no scientific government," since it is an "ideal found in positivistic schools," in the main.

We should be grateful to Professor Simon for demonstrating that "the difficulties proper to philosophy are present in any discussion involving natural law." This posthumous publication of a "philosopher's reflections" can be read with profit by all political scientists from the behavioralists to the traditionalists, whether or not one accepts his particular orientation.—GUY H. DODGE, *Brown University.*

Survey Sampling. BY LESLIE KISH. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. Pp. xvi, 643. $10.95.)

An authoritative analysis of the theory and practice of sampling by the head of the Sampling Section, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? By LESTER W. MILBRATH. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965. Pp. 195. $1.75.)

The political science of today stands in great need of synthesis. The proliferation of empirical studies has been unmatched by efforts to show continuity among them. The long-standing habits of jealous concern for originality of problem, concept and method have worked against the development of a cumulative empirical political science. In addition, the lack of well worked out empirical theories—with a few very recent exceptions—has meant general confusion rather than coherence and unity in the discipline. The synthetic function has devolved rather upon the introductory textbook writer, in whom its fulfillment has been fitful at best.

An exception to this prevailing drift is Lester Milbrath's *Political Participation.* In the genre of the propositional inventory, Milbrath's work is an effort to identify the leading generalizations concerning why people engage in a variety of political activities. It is also an attempt to organize these propositions according to a theoretical matrix which introduces order into what is at present a cacophony of themes and findings. Probably the only thing that unites these researches as they stand is the fact that, with few exceptions, they have been carried out in the Western democracies in the last few decades.

Milbrath's catalog of existing knowledge in part parallels an earlier effort at synthesis in this area—Robert Lane's *Political Life*—but updates it. Milbrath's treatment (no doubt intentionally) lacks some of the breadth of Lane's coverage. It passes over the historical dimension of political participation, for example, which had been one of the most interesting aspects of Lane's work. Milbrath focuses more exclusively upon survey studies of what has come to be called "the mass public." Lane, in coming to his task at a time when the data were much less rich, extended his view more broadly to the higher and middle levels of involvement. The latter seem underplayed in *Political Participation.*

Perhaps this difference in emphasis reflects the greater disciplinary specialization which has come about between studies of the elite and of the mass in the last few years. Clearly the situation has improved greatly for students of mass political behavior with the production of such fertile data banks as those resulting in *The American Voter* or *The Civic Culture*. The work at the activist and elite levels, particularly in the recruitment studies, has only begun to rival this progress. Thus there is perhaps good reason to underplay the latter in a survey of reliable propositions about political activity and involvement. Milbrath has therefore narrowed his view more than Lane. Concomitantly, he has matched this with a stronger urge for clarity and precision and a form of expression somewhat less likely to delight the gourmet of imaginative political science writing.

A distinct advance in Milbrath is his more explicit differentiation of the propositions for which the data are cumulative and in which we can therefore put greater confidence. In the text, three levels of confidence are expressed by differences in type-setting: bold face, italic and regular type. The seventy-three "bold-face" propositions are those for which several mutually confirming studies exist. The eighty or so italicized propositions represent a middle level of confidence,—where there has been little replication but the evidence available is of good quality. Thirdly, there are a great many interpretive and speculative hypotheses which Milbrath supplies to elaborate and connect the higher confidence propositions. On the whole, this is a valuable effort and points the way toward greater future precision about how reliable is our knowledge.

Another distinguishing feature of Milbrath's synthesis is his theoretical framework. He presents it in an introductory chapter entitled, "Conceptual Problems." This appears to be a wise choice for a title. If there is any part of the book which exhibits a lack of strength, it is this. Milbrath actually identifies a series of organizing categories which have appeared at one place or another in the literature. From these "islands of theory" he attempts to build a micro-theoretical framework which can be used to order and present the propositions. That these taxonomies have issued from diverse parentage means that the overlap among categories is heavy and the levels are mixed. One finds, for example, that political participation "as a function of stimuli" (Chapter II) and "as a function of social position" (Chapter V) are by no means exclusive. They are rather at different levels of analysis but not clearly specified as such.

One can quarrel as well with what appears to be Milbrath's interpretation of what he is doing in providing his ordering devices. He says, in the Preface: "This model was not arrived at deductively from a set of assumptions and then imposed upon the data; rather it was built up inductively from careful examination of the findings." (p. 3) We can readily agree with the first part of the statement. His effort is by no means an exercise in deductive logic. But neither is it a matter of pure induction. He clearly comes with preconceptions to his task. This is admitted, for example, when he presents one of several paradigms on pages 28 and 29. The model presented is a rather complex version of the venerable S–R paradigm of the learning psychologists, Hull and Skinner. Assuming that this model is included in what he is talking about in the Preface, then one doubts that it has appeared full-grown from "careful examination of the findings."

The more general issue this brings to light is the sheer theoretical intractability of an area of research which has been carried on with quite disparate theoretical concerns, where any have entered the picture at all. Milbrath has struggled manfully with the task of making these efforts cohere, but his success is very mixed. A great deal more theory-making is required, preferably, for the future, prior to actual investigations.

A final problem which the work implicitly presents is our present incapacity in this area to weight various factors relatively to each other in their explanatory or predictive powers. A whole host of factors have been found to be related to political participation. But there is little ranking or weighting possible among them. The analyses which have been done are almost exclusively bivariate. Nor has there been much attention to the question of change in these relationships over time, or according to place. The unordered and static nature of these propositions suggests that considerable gaps remain which must be filled by new generations of scholars.

Milbrath's analysis is heartening, on the other hand, for it demonstrates that progress has been considerable, even in the six or seven years since Lane wrote *Political Life*.—Jack Dennis, *University of Wisconsin.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON POLITICAL THEORY

Isaac Kramnick
Harvard University

Anderson, Bo. *et al*, "On Conservative Attitudes," *Scandinavian Review of Sociology*, Vol. **8**, Fasc. 3.

Armstrong, Robert L., "John Locke's Doctrine of Signs: A New Metaphysics," *Journal of History of Ideas*, July–September, 1965.

Barion, Hans, "Kirche Oder Partei? Römanischer Katholizismus und Politische Form," *Der Staat*, 4 Band, 1965, Heft 2.

Barnard, Frederick, M., "Christian Thomasius: Enlightenment and Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1965.

Bartsch, Günter, "Camus und der demokratische Sozialismus," *die Neue Gesellschaft*, July–August, 1965.

Cassinelli, C. W., "Criminal Law: The Rules of the Polity," *Ethics*, July, 1965.

Charnay, Jean-Paul, "Une Méthode de Sociologie Juridique," *Annales*, May–June, 1965.

Clavel, Bernard, "La Politique dans l'Oeuvre de Gogol," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, July–August, 1965.

Cohen, David, "Comte's Changing Sociology," *The American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1965.

de Jouvenel, Bertrand, "Politische Wissenschaft und Vorausdenken," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, March, 1965.

Detienne, Marcel, "En Grèce Archaique: Géométric, Politique et Société," *Annales*, May–June, 1965.

Deutsch, Karl W., and Rieselbach, L. N., "Recent Trends in Political Theory and Political Philosophy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1965.

Eisermann, Gottfried, "Joseph Schumpeter als Soziologe," *KYKLOS*, Vol. XVIII, 1965, Fasc. 2.

Frank, Joseph, "Dostoevsky and the Socialists," *Partisan Review*, Summer, 1965.

Freehling, William W., "Spoilsmen and Interests in the Thought and Career of John C. Calhoun," *The Journal of American History*, June, 1965.

Girardet, Raoul, "Autour de l'idéologie nationaliste: perspectives de recherche," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, June. 1965.

Harrington, M., *et al.*, "The New Radicalism Round II," *Partisan Review*, Summer, 1965.

Hartmann, Peter, "Interessenpluralismus und Politische Entscheidung," *Zeitschrift Für Philosophie und Theologie*, II. Band 1964, Heft 1–4.

Hodges, D. C., "Occam's Razor and Value Fetishism in Marx's Sociology of Labor," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, April, 1965.

Holmes, R., "Freud, Piaget, and Democratic Leadership," *The British Journal of Sociology*, June, 1965.

Howe, Irving, "New Styles in 'Leftism,'" *Dissent*, Summer, 1965.

Isambert, Francois-André, "L'idée de Politique Positive," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, July–September, 1965.

Kaufman, Arnold S., "On Alienation," *Inquiry*, Summer, 1965.

Lenk, Kurt, "Marx, Bernstein und die Wissenssoziologie," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, June, 1965.

Liebel, H. P., "Thorstein Veblen's Positive Synthesis," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, April, 1965.

Lynd, Staughton, "The New Radicals," *Dissent*, Summer, 1965.

MacDonald, H. Malcolm, "Revisionism and Khrushchev," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, March, 1964.

Macdonald, Ronan, "Schumpeter and Max Weber," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August, 1965.

Markus, R. A., "Two Conceptions of Political Authority: Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* and some Thirteenth Century Interpretations," *The Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1965.

May, John D., "Democracy, Organization, Michels," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1965.

Narveson, Jan, "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis," *Ethics*, July, 1965.

Nefzger, Ben, "The Ideal-type: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions," *Sociological Quarterly*, Spring, 1965.

Nelson, William H., "The Revolutionary Character of the American Revolution," *American Historical Review*, July, 1965.

Odegard, Douglas, "Locke as an Empiricist," *Philosophy*, July, 1965.

Olsen, Marvin, E., "Alienation and Political Opinions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer, 1965.

Ripley, Randall B., "Adams, Burke and Eighteenth Century Conservatism," *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1965.

Rogers, Carl R., "Freedom and Commitment," *ETC.*, June, 1965.

Rousseau, G. S., "The *Discoursi* of Machiavelli: History and Theory," *Journal of World History*, IX-I, 1965.

Schmölz, Franz-Martin, "Verfassungstheorie bei Thomas von Aquin und moderne Politik," *Zeitschrift Für Philosphie Und Theologie*, II. Band 1964 Heft 1–4.

Skinner, Quentin, "History and Ideology in the English Revolution," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 8, 1965, No. 2.

Stone, Julius, "Roscoe Pound and Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Review*, June, 1965.

Struve, Walter, "Hans Zehrer as a Neoconservative Elite Theorist," *American Historical Review*, July, 1965.

Tate, Thad W., "The Social Contract in America 1774–1787, Revolutionary Theory as a Conservative Instrument," *The William & Mary Quarterly*, July, 1965.

Tinder, Glen, "Eschatology and Politics," *The Review of Politics*, July, 1965.

Tucker, William T., "Max Weber's *Verstehen*," *Sociological Quarterly*, Spring, 1965.

Verba, Sidney, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," *The Journal of Politics*, August, 1965.

Von Mehren, Arthur T., "Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law," *Harvard Law Review*, June, 1965.

Weinstein, W. L., "The Concept of Liberty in Nineteenth Century English Political Thought," *Political Studies*, June, 1965.

Walz, Albrecht, "Weltanschauliche Grundkonzeption des Neosozialismus," *Zeitschrift Für Philosophie Und Theologie*, II. Band 1964, Heft, 1–4.

Willhoite, Fred H., Jr., "'The Consent of the Governed' in Two Traditions of Political Thought," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, June, 1965.

Zeigler, Harmon, "Group Theory and Political Obligation," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, September, 1964.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*

S. Sidney Ulmer
University of Kentucky

Culture and Institutions

Farace, V. (29); Donohew, L., Mass Communication in National Social Systems: A Study of 43 Variables in 115 Countries, *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 42 #2 (Spring 1965) pp. 253–261.

Fong, S. L. M. (8) Cultural Influences in the

---

* The number in parentheses following the name of each author indicates institutional affiliation which may be determined by reference to the institutional list at the end of this section.

Perception of People: The Case of Chinese in America, *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, Vol. 4 Part 2 (June 1965) pp. 110–113.

Laumann, E. O. (4) Subjective Social Distance and Urban Occupational Stratification, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 71 (July 1965) pp. 26–36.

Westie, F. R. (5) The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30 #4 (August 1965) pp. 527–538.

GROUP BEHAVIOR

Feather, N. T. (4) A Structural Balance Analysis of Evaluative Behavior, *Human Relations*, Vol. 18 #2 (May 1965) pp. 171–185.

Lawson, E. D. (10) Change in Communication Nets, Performance, and Morale, *Human Relations*, Vol. 18 #2 (May 1965) pp. 139–147.

Shaw, M. E. (13); Blum, J. M. Group Performance as a Function of Task Difficulty and the Groups' Awareness of Member Satisfaction, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 49 #3 (June 1965) pp. 151–154.

INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE

Schopler, J. (14); Bateson, N. The Power of Dependence, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 #2 (August 1965) pp. 247–254.

RESEARCH METHODS

Eckland, B. K. (14) Effects of Prodding to Increase Mail-Back Returns, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 49 #3 (June 1965) pp. 165–169.

Foa, U. G. (31) New Developments in Facet Design and Analysis, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 72 #4 (July 1965) pp. 262–274.

Gordon, L. V. (30); Medland, F. F. The Cross-Group Stability of Peer Ratings of Leadership Potential, *Personnel Psychology*, Vol. 18 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 173–177.

Greenberg, M. G. (15) A Modification of Thurstone's Law of Comparative Judgment to Accommodate a Judgment Category of 'Equal' or 'No Difference,' *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 64 #2 (August 1965) pp. 108–112.

Horn, J. L. (32) A Rationale and Test For the Number of Factors in Factor Analysis, *Psychometrika*, Vol. 30 #2 (June 1965) pp. 179–185.

Horvath, W. J. (4) A Mathematical Model of Participation in Small Group Discussions, *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 10 #2 (April 1965) pp. 164–166.

Jordon, N. (35) The 'Asymmetry' of 'Liking' and 'Disliking': A Phenomenon Meriting Further Reflection and Research, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 315–322.

Kish, L. (4) Sampling Organizations and Groups of Unequal Sizes, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30 #4 (August 1965) pp. 564–572.

Morrisette, J. O. (12); Pearson, W. H.; Switzer, S. A., A Mathematically Defined Task for the Study of Group Performance, *Human Relations*, Vol. 18 #2 (May 1965) pp. 187–192.

Radlow, R. (18) An Experimental Study of 'Cooperation' in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 9 #2 (June 1965) pp. 221–227.

MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY

Black, R. W. (29) On the Combination of Drive and Incentive Motivation, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 72 #4 (July 1965) pp. 310–317.

Byrne, D. (27) Authoritarianism and Response to Attitude Similarity-Dissimilarity. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 66 #2 (August 1965) pp. 251–256.

Gollob, H. F. (4); Dittes, J. E. Effects of Manipulated Self-Esteem on Persuasibility Depending on Threat and Complexity of Communication, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 #2 (August 1965) pp. 195–201.

Lerner, M. J. The Effect of Responsibility and Choice on a Partner's Attractiveness Following Failure, *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 33 #2 (June 1965) pp. 178–187.

Lucas, C. (28) Task Performance and Group Structure as a Function of Personality and Feedback, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 66 #2 (August 1965) pp. 257–270.

Simmons, J. S. (16) Liberalism, Alienation and Personal Disturbance, *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 49 #4 (July 1965) pp. 456–464.

White, B. J. (25); Alter, R. D.; Rardin, M. Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, and Usage of Conceptual Categories, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 #2 (August 1965) pp. 293–295.

Willis, R. H. (21) The Phenomenology of Shifting Agreement and Disagreement in Dyads, *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 33 #2 (June 1965) pp. 188–199.

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Georgopoulos, B. S. (4) Normative Structure Variables and Organizational Behavior, *Human Relations*, Vol. 18 #2 (May 1965) pp. 155–169.

Jensen, L. (16) Military Capabilities and Bargaining Behavior, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 9 #2 (June 1965) pp. 155–163.

COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING

Baron, R. M. (4) Cognitive Basis of Attitude Change as a Function of Motivational, Stylistic, and Stimulus Factors, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 #2 (August 1965) pp. 219–230.

Brody, N. (3) The Effect of Commitment to

Correct and Incorrect Decisions on Confidence in a Sequential Decision-Task, *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 78 #2 (June 1965) pp. 251–256.

Edwards, W. (4); Slovic, P. Seeking Information to Reduce the Risk of Decisions, *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 78 #2 (June 1965) pp. 188–197.

Fjeld, S. P. (21) A Longitudinal Study of Sociometric Choice and the Communication of Values, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 66 #2 (August 1965) pp. 297–306.

Greenberg, M. G. (15); Doren, D. G. Relationship Between Latency and Remoteness in Preference Judgements, *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 70 #2 (August 1965) pp. 182–188.

Messick, D. M. (14); Rapoport, A. Expected Value and Response Uncertainty in Multiple-Choice Decision Behavior, *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 70 #2 (August 1965) pp. 224–230.

Nowak, S. Changes of Social Structure in Social Consequences, *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. 10 #2 (1964) pp. 34–53.

Sampson, E. E. (17); Kardush, M. Age, Sex, Class, and Race Differences in Response to a Two-Person Non-Zero-Sum Game, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 9 #2 (June 1965) pp. 212–220.

Suinn, R. M. Anxiety and Cognitive Dissonance, *The Journal of General Psychology*, Vol. 73 #1 (July 1965) pp. 113–116.

Ward, C. D. (23) Ego Involvement and the Absolute Judgment of Attitude Statements, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 #2 (August 1965) pp. 202–208.

Warr, P. B. (7) Proximity as a Determinant of Positive and Negative Sociometric Choice, *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, Vol. 4, Part 2 (June 1965) pp. 104–109.

Zajonc, R. B. (4); Burnstein, E. The Learning of Balanced and Unbalanced Social Structures, *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 33 #2 (June 1965) pp. 153–163.

OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES

Abrams, M. British Elite Attitudes and the European Common Market, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 236–246.

Benham, T. W. (33) Polling for a Presidential Candidate: Some Observations on the 1964 Campaign, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 185–199.

Hebron, M. E. (6); Ridley, F. Characteristics Associated with Racial Prejudice in Adolescent Boys, *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, Vol. 4 Part 2 (June 1965) pp. 92–97.

Lever, H. (11) An Experimental Modification of Social Distance in South Africa, *Human Relations*, Vol. 18 #2 (May 1965) pp. 149–154.

Olsen, M. E. (5) Alienation and Political Opinions, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 200–212.

Rosnow, R. L. (26); Lana, R. E. Complementary and Competing-Order Effects in Opinion Change, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 66 #2 (August 1965) pp. 201–207.

Streufert, S. (24) Communicator Importance and Interpersonal Attitudes Toward Conforming and Deviant Group Members, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 #2 (August 1965) pp. 242–246.

Strickland, D. A. (17) Physicists' Views of Space Politics, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 223–235.

Stycos, J. M. (1) Opinions of Latin American Intellectuals on Population Problems and Birth Control, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 360 (July 1965) pp. 11–26.

Zimbardo, P. G. (22); Weisenberg, M.; Firestone, I.; Levy, B. Communicator Effectiveness in Producing Public Conformity and Private Attitude Change, *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 33 #2 (June 1965) pp. 233–255.

VOTING

Abrams, P. (9); Little, A. The Young Voter in British Politics, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 16 #2 (June 1965) pp. 95–109.

Berrington, H. B. (36) The General Election of 1964, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 128 Part 1 (1965) pp. 17–66.

Boynton, G. B. (29) Southern Conservatism: Constituency Opinion and Congressional Voting, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 259–269.

Stone, C. E. (34) Local Referendums: An Alternative to the Alienated-Voter Model, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 29 #2 (Summer 1965) pp. 213–222.

Key to Institutions Listed in Bibliography

1. Cornell University
3. Princeton University
4. University of Michigan
5. Indiana University
6. University of Hull, England
7. University of Sheffield, England
8. San Francisco State College
9. Peterhouse, Cambridge
10. Acadia University, Wolfville, Nova Scotia
11. University of Witwatersrand, South Africa
12. Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

13. University of Florida
14. University of North Carolina
15. University of Minnesota
16. University of Illinois
17. University of California, Berkeley
18. State College, Pennsylvania
19. Whitman College
20. University of Kentucky
21. Washington University
22. New York University
23. University of Maryland
24. Rutgers University
25. University of Utah
26. Boston University
27. University of Texas
28. Syracuse University
29. University of Iowa
30. U. S. Army Personnel Research Office, Washington, D.C.
31. Israel Institute of Applied Social Research
32. University of Denver
33. Opinion Research Corporation
34. Emory University
35. Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington, Virginia
36. University of Keele, England

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Studies in Money in Politics. A Series of Seven Monographs. EDITED BY HERBERT E. ALEXANDER. (Princeton, New Jersey, Citizens' Research Foundation, 1965. Limited to 500 edition.)

Campaign financing continues to be an urgent, persistent and baffling problem. Notwithstanding widely heralded "definitive" studies, the nature of the task continues to haunt concerned political scientists. Herbert E. Alexander has compiled within the hard covers of a single volume, entitled *Studies in Money in Politics*, seven studies originally published as paperbacks by the Citizens' Research Foundation of which Doctor Alexander is the Director. In fact, he is author or editor of five of the studies most of which are familiar to serious students of campaign finance. Availability of all these publications under one cover should prove useful, especially with an index of fifteen pages, though the absence of consecutive pagination may cause some difficulty.

Alexander's *Studies* represents a form of research once very widespread but considered outmoded by some contemporary behavioralists. There is no elaborate design of research projects nor any esoteric schema or hypotheses. The purpose of the studies is to clarify and not confuse. The separate monographs range from a compiling of actual data to a brief list of suggestions not very novel by both political scientists and politicians. There are significant aspects for political scientists in this publication aside from its contents. First of all, a full time Foundation with a specialized director of research has replaced the work of such individual scholars as James K. Pollock and Louise Overacker in this area. However valuable the studies may be this represents a loss for the academic political scientists whose Association abandoned this field of study as a collective effort at the instigation of the Establishment in the profession. Now further specialization takes away from the individual political scientist a legitimate area of study unless carried on under the auspices of a foundation. Thus the availability of research money affects the study of money in politics. Perhaps a study of money in political science is next in order as tax evading corporate foundations increasingly dominate the study of politics. This marks one more surrender of scholarship to the cash nexus. Promotion precedes research if it does not dominate it.

None of this detracts from the fact that the reports incorporated in the *Studies* are valuable contributions. This is the more true since Congress has made no elaborate investigation of 1960 and 1964 campaign expenditures. The reviewer was informed by a prominent Republican Senator that no investigation of 1960 was permitted because Republicans simply had too few votes to override Democratic opposition. The shrine in Arlington Cemetery now precludes any thoroughgoing investigation of 1960, and the politics of consensus thwarts a senatorial inquiry into 1964 campaign funds. Hence private reports are useful as the only available systematic inquiries. These *Studies* of campaign finance reveal how little impact previous political science research has had upon the practice of politics.

Campaign finance is so vital to political parties under democratic capitalism that something more than statistics, personal confessions, and discreet interviews are essential to a genuine comprehension of the many sides of the subject. Nothing less than a systematic review by an outstanding body of scholars, politicians and economists with full power of subpoena will ever suffice. Something on the order of a British Royal Commission or a Hoover Commission is demanded, not merely an *ad hoc* committee designed to bring in a set of hurried recommendations to be ignored by Congress. There is room for a complete and detailed investigation to determine the role of parties in the Great Society. The entire profession of political science should be involved in something of the order of the 1952 study of the nominating process except greater in both economic and political detail and further exploration of the theoretical aspects needs to be included.

The most original of the studies in the volume under review is the one by Henry Wells, "Government Financing of Political Parties in Puerto Rico." Wells makes a thoughtful and perceptive analysis of a first genuine attempt to use government subsidy to develop party independence. The result is not too discouraging though the results do not justify rejoicing. The practices of employee assessment and private contributions have not ceased. In other words, government subvention is no panacea.

All of these approaches are really only oblique advances towards the central problem of the mass media, privately owned and operated for huckstering purposes. These daily irritants with their emotional appeals in sloppy jingles to sell deodorants to morons contribute to the difficulty of an adequate approach to the matter of civic education by political parties. A civic culture primarily commercial in nature provides a steady diet of stimuli which produce traditions and norms of fragmented looks at public policy.

Current efforts by agents of the mass media to shorten campaigns are only additional grist in the mills of those who wish public policy to be crowded out of the domain of intelligent dialogue. Another region for fruitful survey is the success or failure of the compulsory vote as a means of increasing citizen participation and civic intelligence. The issues are profound enough to enlist the attention of professional political scientists and their various organs unless the study of politics is to degenerate into a morass of methodical nonsense in which political scientists become an adjunct to computers in a technological society.

It is a cause of regret that only five hundred copies of the *Studies* will be available.—JASPER B. SHANNON, *University of Nebraska*.

Church and State in Social Welfare. BY BERNARD J. COUGHLIN, S.J. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 189. $6.95).

Public discussion of the Church-State issue rarely focuses on the problem of the relation of government to the thousands of church-owned welfare agencies in the United States. Here is a fertile field for normative as well as descriptive inquiries, and the scope of this book makes it a valuable point of departure for either kind.

Father Coughlin, Dean of the School of Social Service at St. Louis University, has addressed himself to the theory as well as the practice of church-state relations in this area, as well as to the theories of sectarian practitioners, and to public law. Through a questionnaire survey and other devices, he has found that at least some of the agencies of all denominations receive tax support on a contractual basis (sometimes contrary to the resolutions of denominational governing bodies). Only five percent of the administrators answering his questionnaire reported an explicit policy of refusing public funds. In fact, most responding institutions had no clear policy concerning public funds, but most of these, in turn, did accept them. When we add the agencies reporting a policy of accepting funds to those having a nonpolicy of accepting them, we find that two-thirds of the Protestant and Jewish respondents, and more than 90 of the Catholic, receive public monies. In a great many cases, it seems, the chief effect of the doctrine of separation is that Protestant administrators are notably more anxious than their Jewish or Catholic counterparts about the implications of governmental *subsidy* for the principle of separation, and for institutional autonomy. But even the Protestants were overwhelmingly unconcerned about a *purchase-of-service* type of public support. From the standpoints of effective church policy, size and needs of the "private sector," and public law, it appears that state-supported, privately-administered welfare is here to stay.

The survey and public-law data are presented in the context of a theoretical discussion which draws on sociological as well as theological sources. Catholic, Protestant and Jewish doctrines are summarized, and the author's own resolution of the issue is presented. The theoretical discussion is marked by clarity, by wide use of ecclesiastical sources (the bibliography is invaluable)—and by a brevity which is a bit disappointing. Polar theories are stated, and are liberally illustrated with quotations; their policy implications are noted; but the author does not grapple with the values, hazards, basic assumptions or self-serving rationalizations involved.

Coughlin's own preference is for a public policy of reliance whenever possible on private welfare institutions, supported liberally by public funds. He wants the state consciously to promote "a strong voluntary welfare structure," on the ground that such institutions counteract trends toward secularism and state absolutism, and promote "internal unity based on conscience." By the latter he means that "a secular society runs the risk of achieving only a superficial social unity. . . . Unity that arises from social control must be based on something more meaningful than secular custom and law." (p. 128).

Here is grist for many a mill, and one wishes that Coughlin's mills had ground a bit finer. For example: if we grant the dangers of secularism, state-absolutism, and too-superficial social integration, can we simply assume, with but scanty supporting argument, that church-administered social welfare programs counteract them? A careful inquiry would probably yield a complicated answer. Again: does the author intend to leave the impression that the churches' social *concern* is congruent with institutional social *welfare?* He puts, without really examining, the proposition that the churches must be concerned with the world, and *therefore* must administer social welfare programs. In fact, those who would have the churches advocate comprehensive *public* institutions are relegated to pietistic individualism. Thus even Reinhold Niebuhr is placed in the company of those whose theology is "overprotected against the world," affording "no principle of social judgment" (pp. 21, 25).

This suggests a hypothesis supported by this reviewer's casual observation: there is a significant difference in typical theological and political outlook between those churchmen (of whatever faith) engaged in ecclesiastical social *welfare* on the one hand, and those (of whatever faith) engaged in church-sponsored social *action* on the other. But that would be another study.—GORDON L. SHULL, *The College of Wooster.*

The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure Group. BY JOHN A. CRAMPTON. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 251. $5.50.)

In his introduction Dr. Crampton notes that his book is "not a history of the Farmers Union," but rather a "study in ideas and their ramifications." After developing the core of the ideology in the first he shows in subsequent parts how it affects the membership, structure, and policy of the Union.

He accomplishes his end by the use of extensive quotations, which although a trifle too numerous and long to suit a person familiar with the organization, do give the reader in one convenient location a great measure of the flavor of the speechmaking which takes place at typical Union conventions and of the editorializing found in its publications. The research for this study was done primarily by using a series of interviews conducted at the Union's Denver headquarters during the summers of 1956 and 1957, supplemented by the minutes and publications of the national organization.

In Part I we are told that there are four basic strands which serve as the core of the Farmers Union ideology: the sense of disadvantage; pacifism; cooperativism; and the family farm ideal. There are other components of the ideology which are to be found on the periphery and which have undergone changes in the over half-century of the Union's existence. For example, the Union which originated in the South once had a racist ideology, which it lost as its strength weakened in that area and developed in the North.

Part II is perhaps the most valuable section. Here Professor Crampton gives us a look at the social, political, and economic background of the Union's membership and leadership. The author attempts to discover why a "radical" farm organization finds its greatest strength in one of the most conservative areas of the nation—namely the upper Great Plains. He discovers that the Union members come from the middle-income, prosperous sector of the farm economy and that most of them are Republicans. He suggests that the answer to his question may be found in the greater amount of suffering due to a combination of low prices and drought in this section of the nation during the thirties. The memory of this suffering perhaps makes them react faster to potential threats to their economic security than farmers in other areas of the nation. This factor plus the political tradition of dissent as evidenced by such mavericks as Senators Langer and Norris are believed to have developed a core of liberalism in a conservative area.

While the membership votes Republican the state leadership votes Democratic. Sixty of the sixty-seven state leaders who returned their questionnaires reported their pro-Democratic attitude. The leadership of the Union was found to be remarkably homogeneous. With few exceptions they are sons or daughters of farmers, over fifty percent have attended college, and most of them have had previous governmental experience, especially on farm boards.

In Part III the author traces the rise of the Union to 290,000 families in 1956. He notes that maintaining the members is a more difficult problem than recruiting new ones. The major impediments to the Union's growth are federalism, which permits virtual autonomy to chartered state organizations; and liberal ideology, which prevents it from gaining adherents in the South. Finances have always hindered the national educational and organizational activities, though ironically in recent years the Union, through a separate corporation, has gone into business both as a part of the ideology of cooperativism and as a means of raising the national organization's revenue.

The major criticism of this book is the time lag between the research (1956–1957) and publication (1965). This does not, however, make Professor Crampton's study out of date. It is simply not up to date. The material he offers makes a valuable contribution to knowledge—especially on the domestic and foreign policy stands of the Union and its method of operation, which is described in the last part. It is to be regretted also that the time lag prevents the inclusion of more information on the National Farmers Organization, whose direct action is gaining support in Farmers Union territory. In addition, further research should be done to substantiate some of the conclusions which Professor Crampton has tentatively made, with respect to the background of the Union's membership and its growth in a normally conservative section of the United States.—Henry J. Tomasek, *University of North Dakota.*

Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis. By Michael N. Danielson. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. 244, $6.00.)

Read at "face value," Michael Danielson's study of *Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis* is something more than just another of the numerous "case studies" of metropolitan problems being turned out these days. In this context alone its thoroughness is immediately apparent; but beyond this Professor Danielson's writing has a style not too often encountered in serious, academic work. One almost looks forward to the next page and chapter. It is hoped the "academy" will not look unkindly upon this refreshing quality.

Beyond this, the book should be a "must" for all but the most advanced in the field of metropolitan affairs. It should be required reading in Municipal Government classes and recommended for the urban resident who would seek to understand the emerging metropolitan phenomenon.

While the "commuter problem" as dealt with concerns but the largest of our metropolitan areas, Professor Danielson uses it as a device with which to expose the deeper issues which beset every urban complex that bears the dubious but increasingly inevitable label—"Metropolitan Area." Too, though concentrating upon the federal level of involvement, the political interplay at state, central city and suburban levels is also brought into focus. Fragmentation of governmental responsibilities among a multitude of local jurisdictions is made even more difficult when one encounters the diffusion of urban responsibilities at the national level, both in Congress and in the executive structure.

The very title indicates the book's concern with what many regard as the major issue in today's domestic political arena: the federal government in state and local affairs. While anything but a recent phenomenon on the American scene, the "exploding metropolis" provides an extremely fertile environment for the involvement of Washington in the "Commuter Crisis" giving us an opportunity to view it with rare clarity, and to sharply delineate the actors in the drama.

Prior to the Transportation Act of 1958, the federal government's concern with the commuter problem was little beyond the routine action of the Inter-state Commerce Commission's regulation of trains. The Act of '58 was oriented toward the financial condition of the carriers and gave little or no thought for the commuter or the broader economy dependent upon him. Thus, this Act was a/the prime contributor to the mass transportation crisis that developed in the New York region that year. Demands for relief were loud and proposed lines of action were of such variety as to afford the opportunity for every element in the metropolitan galaxy to pursue courses compatible with their "particular goals and strategies." The Kennedy administration became immediately involved and the labor produced the mass transportation section of the Housing Act of 1961. This legislation, in turn, set in motion political activity that culminated in the Transportation Act of 1964.

Professor Danielson relates this struggle in great but never dull detail. The cast of characters is, in general, well known to even the casual follower of the daily news—it is almost like reading about one's neighbors. The art of politics reveals itself throughout as Dr. Danielson skillfully bares the tactics and objectives of the participants. Also brought in sharp view is the fact that in governmental affairs the problem at hand often is lost in the companion issue of who will have jurisdiction.

Except for the vehicle—the commuter crisis—which is handled, as already suggested, with enviable thoroughness and clarity, Dr. Danielson presents little that isn't already known, in some degree, to anyone who has concerned himself with problems of the metropolis. He has, however, done an exemplary job exposing the nature of the participants, which should do much to help the reader understand the magnitude of the challenge of the Metropolis. For those who like to challenge and argue, there is the concluding chapter, The Pattern of Federal-Metropolitan Politics, in which Professor Danielson ventures his personal conclusions and projections. Some samples are:

"Basic changes in the (fragmented) political system . . . are extremely unlikely in most of urban America."

"One force that might foster more centralized and coordinated decision-making in metropolitan areas . . . is the feedback of the output of federal-urban relations on the metropolitan political system."

"In federal-metropolitan relations . . . 'the central-city mayor (will be) the leading figure'."

"The clash of city and suburban interests will increase as reapportionment strengthens them in both the state legislatures and Congress."

All who are concerned with the political and governmental aspects of the metropolis are indebted to Dr. Danielson for this little book and it deserves wide reading.—WILLIAM T. UTLEY, *University of Omaha.*

From Failing Hands, The Story of Presidential Succession. BY JOHN D. FEERICK. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1965. Pp. 368. $6.95.)

Generations of scholars and practitioners of the art of governance in America have wrestled with the problems of Presidential disability and succession. The Founding Fathers, who knew how to dodge insoluble problems when they saw them, provided only partial answers in the fundamental law, and left the rest to posterity. Following Franklin Roosevelt's death, and Harry Truman's sudden trajectory into the Presidency, interest in the succession rose in recent times, and it climbed even more in Eisenhower's several illnesses. It fell with the advent of the youthful, vigorous John Kennedy, but with his assassination, his successor's medical record, and a vacant Vice Presidency, it reappeared. The result is the Bayh amendment, passed by Congress and now circulating among the states for approval.

The development of the Bayh amendment was contributed to importantly by a special committee of the American Bar Association appointed to consider Presidential disability and succession. John Feerick served on this committee, and his book, *From Failing Hands,* is an outgrowth of that experience. Mr. Feerick's study is the most comprehensive one we have on the combined problems of Presidential disability and succession. It possesses historical depth, exploring as it does our pre-Constitutional approaches to disability and succession, the deliberations of the Founding Fathers, the sweep of our post-Constitutional experience, and the practices of our state governments, and of other nations. The assassination of Garfield, Cleveland's secret operation for cancer, Wilson's severely crippling illness, the declining health of Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower's several crises, and the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination, are presented with faithful attention to vivid historical detail. The issues are treated with first-class Constitutional analysis, and a well-reasoned program for action is presented.

Those who, like Mr. Feerick and others, want to do something about the Constitution's vagueness on disability, take as their point of departure the view expressed by Richard Nixon, "Fifty years ago the country could afford to 'muddle along' until the disabled President got well or died. But today . . . there could be a critical period when 'no finger is on the trigger' because of the illness of the Chief Executive." The author and the American Bar Association consider inadequate the memorandum of understanding Eisenhower arranged with Nixon on the subject of disability, a procedure followed by succeeding Presidents. Although some political scientists have argued that the memorandum, endorsed by a joint resolution of Congress, is preferable to a Constitutional amendment, the Bar Association does not share this view. An amendment would give an unquestionable legal sanction, the A.B.A. feels, and it could, as a memorandum could not do, resolve all doubts that in cases of disability, the Vice President succeeds only temporarily and not permanently to the Presidential office.

The most perplexing questions on disability center upon the President's unwillingness or inability to declare his plight, and the necessity of establishing an alternate source to make a finding. The question reappears in somewhat different form when a disabled President wants to resume his duties while still disabled. The Bar Association and the author prefer a finding by the Vice President and a majority of the cabinet that the President is disabled and does not so declare. If, subsequently, the disabled President's claim that he has recovered is not shared by the cabinet, the dispute would be submitted to Congress. Only a two-third's vote, the A.B.A. recommended, should prevent the President from resuming his duties.

The Bayh amendment, as it has emerged from Congress, both reflects the Bar Association, in providing for a cabinet finding, and departs from it by providing for an alternate body to the cabinet, or "such other body as Congress may provide." Presumably, this "other body" would be a commission of private citizens, doctors, psychiatrists, and others. It is easy to imagine a nightmare of possible future confusion where Congress is of a different party than the President, where the cabinet supports his finding on disability, and the "other body" disputes it. Senator Albert Gore wisely objected to this feature of the Bayh amendment, when he declared in debate that it created the possibility that "this nation could undergo the potentially disastrous spectacle of competing claims to the power of the Presidency."—LOUIS W. KOENIG, *New York University.*

The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956. BY ROBBINS L. GATES. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 222. $6.50.)

This admirable book was prepared first as a doctoral dissertation in political science at Columbia University under Prof. Arthur W. Macmahon with Profs. David B. Truman and Wallace S. Sayre as advisers. Such distinguished sponsorship doubtless accounts in part at least for the importance of the subject, for the excellence of the treatment and for the unusual value of the total undertaking. The author, who deserves wide appreciation for his idea and its execution, is academic dean at Fairfax Hall, Waynesboro, Virginia.

As the title indicates, here is a study of what happened in Virginia in the first years after the Supreme Court's public school desegregation decision, handed down by Chief Justice Warren, May 17, 1954. That unanimous decision, it will be remembered, combined four cases arising in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia and South Carolina. A fifth companion case arose in the District of Columbia. Thus Virginia was one of only two states of the Solid South "directly and immediately" affected by the reversal of the "separate but equal" doctrine laid down in race relations by the Supreme Court in the 1896 Jim Crow railway car decision of *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*.

The part of Virginia so affected was Prince Edward County, since the complaint of Dorothy E. Davis and her fellow petitioners was brought against the school board of that county. The Virginia Constitution and the state school laws enacted pursuant to the state Constitution had historically decreed that the races should be should be taught in separate public schools. This joined the issue squarely with the result that Virginia quickly became the first major arena "for the politics of public school desegregation."

The author makes clear that white public officials of Virginia had no thought whatever of moving "gradually" toward racially integrated public schools. The policy and practice of segregation had, so he writes, "an air of legitimate permanence." And so Virginia was not even remotely thinking about doing what the decision of that momentous Monday put it up to the Old Dominion eventually to do. The way in which the Supreme Court handled the specific cases indicated that the formulation of decrees was a year or more away. This meant there was at least some time in Virginia for getting down to the serious business of planning what to do and how to do it.

Gov. Thomas B. Stanley made the first move when he invited five Negro leaders to his office only seven days after the decision in Washington. These were the editors of Negro papers in Norfolk and Roanoke, president of the all-Negro state teachers association, the president of the Negro state college and the chairman of the legal staff of Virginia's N.A.A.C.P. Since the latter was an attorney for the Prince Edward County plaintiffs when their case was before the Supreme Court, there was little prospect that the Governor could prevail when he asked his guests to ignore the Supreme Court decision and to call on fellow Negro citizens to accept continued segregation. The five of course declined. They proposed instead that Virginia "assume southern leadership in moving toward integration, and that it do so without discriminating against Negro teachers in job placement." Some of this information, which was supplied by Oliver W. Hill, the lawyer, is representative of facts that the author obtained through correspondence and interview with the principals in his area of inquiry.

The Governor's next move was to assemble the chief executives of all Southern and border states in Richmond—this less than a month after the decision. Looking back at that meeting and the feelings expressed after it, Gates writes: "It is difficult to say whether this was a wake or a war party." Some 18 months later Virginia, again host, proposed "interposition" as the Byrd organization's answer. But a notion of how the sands were running could be had from the fact that the 12 states represented in 1954 had shrunk to only five in 1956. The hard core, in addition to Virginia, consisted of only South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi.

Special attention properly is paid to Prince Edward County where white citizens, rather than face a court order to desegregate by a certain date, abandoned their public schools. Beginning in September, 1959, white children attended what were said to be private schools. Negro parents were told to establish private schools for their children. From that time on most of the county's Negro children received no more formal education until the Prince Edward Free School Association was established in the fall of 1963. Negro parents went to court and step by step won their way up the judiciary. Finally in the case of *Griffin et al* v. *County School Board of Prince Edward County et al*, 317 U. S. 218, decided May 25, 1964, the Supreme Court ordered the entry of a decree guaranteeing public education for Negroes in the county. A month later the County Board of Supervisors in compliance voted, 4 to 2, to "reopen public schools." As Gates says, "massive resistance had met its match in the public policy of the United States of America. . . . "

The author was born and reared in the south and inherited a sympathy for the South's viewpoint. This does not keep him from stating his conviction that "the southern caste system is morally wrong, historically anachronistic, and clearly destructive of the best values of individualism on which this nation was built." He finds that the white race also loses, for he writes: "The southern caste system does not respect the liberties of individuals in either caste; it merely imposes the racial bias of orthodox southern whites on all individuals in both castes."

Gates is unimpressed by the white southern hint that "Communist agitators" influenced the Supreme Court decision. He puts no more stock in the attempt to discredit the ruling by making much of the footnote that refers "generally" to the work of "that Swedish sociologist." He invites his readers to reflect on these words:

> Our individualism differs from all others because it embraces these great ideals: that while we build our society upon the attainment of the individual, we shall safeguard to every individual an equality of opportunity to take that position in the community to which his intelligence, character, ability, and ambition entitle him; that we shall keep the social solution free from the frozen strata of classes; that we shall stimulate effort to each individual to achievement; that through an enlarging sense of responsibility and understanding we shall assist him to this attainment; while he in turn must stand up to the emery wheel of competition.

This all-out endorsement of equal opportunity for all peoples comes not from some "Communist agitator" or "Swedish sociologist." These are words from page 9 of Herbert Hoover's "American Individualism," published in 1922, more than 40 years ago!

The author's own attitude is summed up in this one sentence: "The caste system, which the southern white supremacist *is* conserving, has no place in a country that presumes to stand for the recognition of individual values." But it should be said that these convictions are stated in the final pages. More than 200 pages of his study are clinically impartial. He sets out to be objective and he is. This book does not cover much territory or a long expanse of time, yet it is a significant piece of research and literature on the major domestic problem of our era.—IRVING DILLIARD, *Princeton University*.

Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection. BY JOEL B. GROSSMAN. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965. Pp. xii, 228. $6.75.)

According to Joel Grossman, the best explanation of judicial decision-making behavior lies in the conception of the judicial role which each judge holds. And that conception is largely a product of socialization. Selection systems provide cues to the qualities considered desirable in a judge and serve as reinforcing agents in socialization for the judicial role.

Using this framework as a point of departure, Professor Grossman sets out to examine the role of a "political interest group" (PIG) in altering the policies governing the recruitment of Federal judges. The PIG chosen for analysis is the American Bar Association and in particular its Committee on Federal Judiciary. Specifically he desires to know: what did the ABA find unsatisfactory in earlier procedures; what is the interest of lawyers in judicial selection; how were the ABA's claims made and received; what changes were effectuated; and what consequences can be associated with the alterations made?

In pursuing answers to these questions, the author's tone is reasoned, he takes no extreme positions, and his writing is consistently of high quality. Moreover, answers are provided in some detail. The ABA has always believed in its right and duty to participate actively in the judicial selection process. Lawyers prefer "good judges" to "bad judges" and bar participation will increase the probability of the former. The claims of the ABA were made through various committees operating with local bar groups prior to 1946; and by the Committee on Federal Judiciary operating through the Attorney General's office from 1946 to the present. The primary change accomplished was the "institutionalization" of the Committee's role in the selection process—a role that assures the Committee of the chance to be heard on most candidates for federal judicial office prior to formal nomination.

As a detailed account of the ABA Committee on Federal Judiciary, its stated aims, its successes and its techniques, *Lawyers and Judges* constitutes a valuable addition to the literature. The book contains a good deal of useful and interesting information which may not have come to the attention of political scientists in general. This reviewer found Bernie Segal and the *New York Times* of particular interest in the context of Professor Grossman's investigation. The fact that Segal was chairman of the Committee on Federal Judiciary from 1956–1962 creates a problem for Grossman's analysis. For Segal's tenure coincided with the period in which the Committee's influence reached its zenith. During that time, press references to "Mr. Segal's Committee" were not infrequent. This development resulted from the combination of the chairman's formal power (primarily based on his control of communications between the Committee and the Attorney General) and his personal capabilities. Segal's obvious political "savvy," his ability to establish close and effective relationships with the Attorney General and the most influential segment of the American press—indeed, his effectiveness with all with whom he came in contact, are reasons for caution in accepting some of Grossman's conclusions. The institutionalization of the role of the Committee in selecting federal judges seemed assured under Segal. But given lesser men, as seems almost inevitable, institutionalization could come "unglued" or significantly diminish in importance.

As for the *New York Times*, the support which it gave the Committee under Segal is merely illustrative of the support received from the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, and other influential papers. In abetting the Committee the editorial writers were not merely sounding views that happened to coincide in content and timing with those of the Committee. Grossman presents evidence that Segal not only had direct access to the editorial chiefs and others on the great metropolitan dailies but he also exerted some influence. This is dramatically reflected in his persuading the *Times* to oppose Irving Ben Cooper for a District Judgeship in New York after Cooper had been "heartily endorsed" on the same paper's editorial pages. These and other episodes suggest that the institutionalization of the Committee's role may depend, in part, on the ability of the Bar and its representatives to mobilize other PIGs in its behalf. Such support is enhanced in importance by the obvious reluctance of many senators to give the organized Bar a larger voice in the recruitment of federal judges.

Having mentioned some of the attractive features of *Lawyers and Judges*, one may be forgiven a critical comment. I do not intend to chastise Professor Grossman for not writing a different book. I do mean to suggest that *Lawyers and Judges* might have been a more satisfying and more significant book if it had included a more explicit statement of the theory underlying the author's analysis. A theory of judicial role choice has only an oblique relationship to an analysis of the American Bar Association's role in selecting federal judges.

More attention might also have been given to explaining the "choice behavior" of the Committee on Federal Judiciary. That would have required, among other things, a more penetrating analysis of motivational factors. The author generally neglects to go behind the public statements of the ABA that its goals are "better judges"—judges who are "politically non partisan" or judges who possess "prior trial experience." Of course, the ABA and its Committee want judges who can be so characterized. But why? Does the Committee on Federal Judiciary derive some mysterious satisfaction out of enforcing such standards? Or does it and the parent ABA believe that such factors point to future behavior of a desired kind? In short, what is the theory underlying the action of the ABA and its Committee in trying to influence selection processes? The author's brief attention to the apparent policy implications of the ABA position on anti-Supreme Court measures in 1937 and 1958 is too brief and soon forgotten in the avalanche of detail regarding the "better judge" philosophy.

The author's approval of an advisory and consulting role for the ABA is as reasonable as his opposition to allowing the group a veto on federal judicial nominations.—S. SIDNEY ULMER, *University of Kentucky*.

Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process. BY HERBERT JACOB. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965. Pp. vii, 215. $5.00; $2.95 paper.)

On a three-point developmental scale (traditional, conventional, behavioral) of approaches to the study of judiciaries, this is a conventional book. As compared to Abraham's *The Judicial Process* (a traditional work), Jacob's text provides a more realistic and politically oriented discussion of the American system of courts. What Jacob purports to have done is to extend Jack Peltason's analysis of a decade ago (*Federal Courts in the Political Process*) to state courts and to all the participants in the judicial process. "[M]y purpose," he states, "is to describe the courts, not the law. . . . I have emphasized what traditional scholars often neglect" (p. v). Given this primary objective, it is not surprising that the strength of the book lies in four excellent chapters (4, 5, 7, 9) on private lawyers and their organizations; government lawyers; juries, groups, and the reporting of judicial proceedings; and trials, negotiations, and settlements. In the latter chapter, the discussion dealing with bail and prosecution (pp. 152–7) is exceptionally lucid, creative, and authoritative.

"A secondary purpose of this book," the author continues, "is to integrate the vast body of reresearch available on the courts so that we may better realize what we know and what we still need to learn" (pp. v–vi). But his statement (p. vi) that legal scholars and sociologists have done "most" of the research on the judiciary is true only in a quantitative sense; and his assertion (p. 207) that political scientists have made only legal analyses (and only of the Supreme Court, to boot) comes somewhat too late. It was perfectly fair for Peltason to say this a decade ago; but for Jacob to echo the charge today betokens a singular lack of appreciation on his part for the merits of much of the research upon which is based the writing of substantial portions of his text.

Perhaps Jacob's apparently selective perception of the research literature helps to explain why the remainder of his book (which discusses how judges make decisions: judicial policy-making, judges, court organization, and appeals) lacks the punch of the four chapters that discuss the *milieu* of judicial decision-making. Given the author's professedly political orientation, it is disappointing to discover *passim* so much traditional thinking, as well as traditional conceptualism.

Throughout he employs a dichotomy between what he calls *policy decisions* ("guideposts for future actions") and *norm-enforcement decisions* ("aimed at the instant case alone"). This same dichotomy was characteristic of the thinking and writing of Ernst Freund; and although Freund was a meticulous craftsman who maintained a very high standard of legal scholarship, the use of this kind of conceptualism by political scientists today does not advance political analysis one whit beyond the understanding of judicial decision-making made possible by Freund's work over half a century ago. Equally outmoded is the suggestion (p. 22) that "In human and monetary terms the losses resulting from criminality that remains unchecked by legal action are staggering." How can legal action either prevent or redress the losses from crime?

If factual errors were random, it would be ungenerous for a reviewer to mention them. Here, however, they are symptomatic of this book's basic problem: the author's differential interests in his subject. In Chapter 8 on court organization, we confront the astounding observation that "courts exist for custom and patent appeals and for claims against the federal government . . . [these courts] have original jurisdiction over their matters, and appellate tribunals treat their decisions in the same manner as decisions by district courts" (p. 135). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has, as its very name implies *prima facie*, exclusively appellate jurisdiction; and the "appellate tribunals" to which Jacob refers—which in context could mean none other than the federal Courts of Appeals—consist of the United States Supreme Court alone; the C.C.P.A. and Court of Claims are at the level not of the U. S. district courts but rather that of the Courts of Appeals. Two pages later the author states that the Supreme Court denies jurisdiction in three-quarters of its docketed cases: the correct proportion is over 90%; and this is hardly a trivial difference, because if he were right, the Court would be deciding on the merits almost 600 cases per term, which would be triple the contemporary output. Similarly, there are various instances of what can perhaps best be described as forgetfulness on the author's part. Some of these are possibly trivial, as when he overlooks probate courts, *inter alia*, in his endeavor to discuss structural specialization in state court organization (p. 142). But other instances are more serious; three pages later one encounters a sweeping generalization, evidently compatible with the historical premises of Thomas Carlyle, that "Almost all administrative reforms that have modernized the American judiciary in the twentieth century can be attributed to the efforts of two men"—Taft and Vanderbilt. For an author whose orientation is so avowedly political, F.D.R.'s efforts (resulting in the establishment of the Administrative Office of United States Courts, the revised retirement system for federal judges, and related products of the "Court-packing" episode) might have seemed relevant.

The value of this book is not enhanced by the author's penchant for invoking such spooks as "the quality of justice" (*e.g.*, pp. 64, 65) and "the public interest" (p. 166; but cf. p. 199). His style also exhibits both an unusually high level of tolerance for clichés ("the horse-and-buggy past" versus "the contemporary space age"; the "labyrinthine" environment in which judges work; the "oracular verdict" of juries) and a predilection for preaching ("left with unremunerative, petty legal jobs, some solo practitioners engage in unethical conduct and thus bring dishonor to the entire judicial process" [p. 66] and "existing court structures are backed by powerful forces who have a high stake in the status quo" [pp. 143–4]). O Bentley, where is thy victory? Realism, where is thy sting?

In his attempts to explain various empirical phenomena, Jacob offers many imputed reasons which might better have been stated (if at all) as hypotheses. "It was undoubtedly not the intention of the writers of the provision [for *public* trials] that trials provide public entertainment" (p. 126). (How can Jacob know this? The "writers" wrote at a time when public hangings did function as a form of public entertainment.) We are told (p. 136) that litigants who seek appeals do so "believing that the judge made prejudicial errors that robbed them of victory." (This is a most formal reason, strictly in accord with traditional legal theory, which may occasionally coincide with empirical reality; but it is hard to see how Jacob can hope to construct a political analysis of litigant behavior out of fragments of theory such as this.) The chief judge of a federal court of appeals "changes the composition of the panels frequently so that permanent cliques within the court cannot emerge" (p. 170). "In recent years the most spectacular policy decisions have not been made by state supreme courts but by the United States Supreme Court. *This is because federal legislation has become more extensive* and therefore more cases can be brought to the federal court system" (p. 174; emphasis added). "*Many* federal district judges in the South enjoy life tenure and *should therefore* be immune to provincial pressures from their localities" (p. 185; emphasis added). The questions raised by Supreme Court justices at oral argument "seek to clarify difficult problems that bother particular justices in their contemplation of the case" (p. 176)—and as an illustration, Jacob offers (then, Solicitor General) Reed's sandbagging by Sutherland in the *Rathbun* case as a demonstration of how the intellectual interchange between court and counsel had clarified the legal principle: if the President could remove Federal Trade Commissioners, then the Court would have to concede his right to remove judges of the Court of Claims. Jacob describes this egregious dictum as the point on which the "decision in the case turned."

Oh, my fur and whiskers! Has anyone seen a tardy white rabbit scamper by?—GLENDON SCHUBERT, *Michigan State University.*

The Republican Party in American Politics. By CHARLES O. JONES (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1965. Pp. 153. $1.50.)

Professor Jones writes this paperback volume in the Macmillan Government in the Modern World series as a Republican and as a political scientist. Although he has profited from the insights gained by his experiences in the Republican Party, readers may be assured that he has written with a detached objectivity worthy of the best political science.

Jones presents an introductory work, with the most essential facts about the minority party and its characteristics as the opposition, for undergraduate students. He intentionally asks more questions than he answers and thus provides the basis for meaningful discussions in undergraduate classes.

The most significant new contributions in this volume are in the chapter on Republican policy-making in Congress. Those most interested in this subject will want to read Jones' book, published almost simultaneously, *Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee*, Rutgers University Press.

This book went to press before complete analyses could be made of the 1964 election and before Ray Bliss became Republican National Chairman. However, the facts Jones presents make clear reasons for Goldwater's debacle and the necessity for the reorientation which Bliss has begun.—WILDER CRANE, *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy. By CHARLES O. LERCHE, JR. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. 324, $6.95.)

The relentless process of change which has unsettled the South and unleashed forces in domestic politics which are familiar to all of us is also drastically altering the South's traditional position on foreign policy issues. That position, at least since Woodrow Wilson, has generally been internationalist. We recall that Franklin Roosevelt looked to Southern conservatives rather than to mid-Western progressives when the time came to move away from the restrictions of neutrality laws and isolationist doctrine. The traditional pattern of responsible Southern internationalism held firm in the period immediately following World War II. Thus, when the Marshall Plan came to a vote in the House of Representatives in 1948 Southern Congressmen proved twice as favorable toward aid to Western Europe as the House as a whole; there were only 74 negative votes in the House on that occasion and less than 16% of them were cast by Southern representatives, Professor Lerche reports.

Today, by way of contrast, the South has become the only major region whose Congressmen cast a majority of votes in opposition to foreign aid. Southern internationalism, as espoused by Woodrow Wilson, Cordell Hull and Walter George, has lost heavily since 1957 to a brand of neo-isolationism which Professor Lerche labels "unilateralism."

In this book the author seeks to penetrate the myths of Southern politics in order to understand the reasons for this momentous and ominous shift in Southern political behavior. The approach is basically quantitative, empirical and objective; it is, in Lerche's words, a "macro-political" study aimed at an "overview" of the entire South. In the process, the voting records of 126 Congressmen from 14 states are analyzed in depth during the period 1953–1962. (Lerche's South, incidentally, includes West Virginia, Kentucky and Oklahoma, as well as the eleven states of the Confederacy.) The author constructs six distinct positions on foreign policy issues, each with its own patterns of consistency. He also examines relevant economic and social data for each of the 126 Congressional Districts; this is done in great detail. From this emerge "profiles" of several Congressional types.

The assumptions on which the study is made are stated explicitly: first, the foreign policy position of any particular Congressman is determined more by the state of mind he senses among his constituents than by any other factor; second, the way a district stands on foreign policy issues is in some direct or indirect way a function of the socio-economic changes which are at work among its people. When all of the data have been collected, analyzed and correlated, the author faces the central problem of meaning. It is very much to Lerche's credit that he faces the issue squarely. Rigorous application of quantitative techniques had carried him a long way toward a potentially significant interpretation of the changing South. Was there, though, a thread which would link the great changes taking place in the South to the international outlook of Southern Congressmen?

Lerche's answer was for me the most interesting part of a continuously fascinating study. The

Southern politician who votes as a unilateralist appears as the spokesman for and a manipulator of a mass unease which permeates the poor white stratum of Southern society. "The new unilateralism of many Southerners is less a judgment on the nature and course of world affairs," the author concludes, "than it is a reflection of their own dismay at what is happening to them at home."

If there was a precise connection between the empirical analysis of 126 Congressional districts and this final all-important generalization, it was not made clear. What is clear is that Lerche has had the courage (and the good judgment) to move beyond the narrow limits of the empirical data in offering his broader thesis concerning the foreign policy implications of the new political activism in the South. His willingness to use intuitive judgment for his most significant finding is equalled by his diligence in hard quantitative analysis. Professor Lerche studied in depth the voting patterns of 126 Southern Congressional Districts. He also lived in the South, read and discussed and observed broadly, and he developed a feeling for "this perplexing region" which, he warns, "remains as mysterious as ever."

I do not agree. Thanks to Professor Lerche's resourcefulness and sound judgment the South is less mysterious than it otherwise would have been. There will be many, along with me, who will find this to be the most illuminating study of Southern politics since V. O. Key's monumental contribution.—JOHN C. DONOVAN, *Bowdoin College.*

Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona. BY ROY D. MOREY. (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1965. Pp. 135. $4.00.)

One of the most interesting features of this small volume is the successful combination of the historical-comparative analysis methodology with quantitative analysis. As the author notes in his preface, "Lest anyone be misled, it is not my belief that all knowledge about politics can be reduced to a numerical product. Quantitative methods can be valuable, however, if they are used with prudence and moderation." Morey seems to have found a happy combination. In addition, his writing style makes this study easily comprehensible for the intended lay reader.

The format is predicated on a tri-partite division. Part I—"The Setting" succinctly develops the constitutional background of executive-legislative relationships in Arizona as well as the political setting of the forty-eighth state. Part II—"The Evidence" carefully examines the relationships of the Governor of Arizona and the state legislature, including an analysis of those traditional topics such as the veto, messages and special sessions, the impact of administration, the informal tools and the Governor's role as "chief legislator." Part III presents a detailed case study of the efforts of Governor Fannin to secure the enactment of his program in 1962. This latter section reflects the personal experience of the author who served on Governor Fannin's staff as a Fellow in State Government of the National Center for Education in Politics during 1961–1962.

While the study is limited to a single state, the author's criticism of the tendency of state and local government text books to generalize into error is well substantiated. Morey's discussion of the budgetary process in Arizona demonstrates clearly the inherent danger of generalization from mere comparative analysis of statutory or constitutional provision. In short, the executive budget suggested by the formal provisions of Arizona law fails to materialize in actual practice.

Special problems relating to Arizona and based upon the traditions and growing pains of what Morey calls, the "baby state" are of real interest to outsiders as a contemporary example of historic problems for most of the country. Only occasional references are made to other states but the contrasts and peculiar problems of Arizona are well drawn.

Many traditional political practices which affect executive-legislative relationships in most of the states are not duplicated in Arizona. The assumptions made by many political scientists of both the formal and informal devices which a governor may employ to influence the legislative process become inapplicable in Morey's study.

This analysis includes some predictions for the future of Arizona. Morey makes the interesting point that the Supreme Court decisions on reapportionment will assist in the development of a two-party system in the state by strengthening the Republican metropolitan areas of Tucson and Phoenix, an unusual phenomenon in American politics.

Despite its geographic limitations, this study does suggest that similar efforts in other states will contribute significantly to our comprehension of state and local government.—J. H. BINDLEY, *Knox College.*

The Federal Government Service, 2nd ed. EDITED BY WALLACE S. SAYRE (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965. Pp. viii, 245. $5.95 Clothbound, $2.95 Paperbound).

In 1954 the American Assembly published *The Federal Government Service* under the editorship of Wallace Sayre as a source book for participants in the Sixth American Assembly. The present volume is a revision of that work under the same editorship with the same authors of individual chapters. Included in the volume are essays by

Herbert Kaufman tracing, historically, the growth and development of the federal personnel system, by Herman Somers describing the relationship of the bureaucracy to the President and Congress, by Harvey Mansfield describing and analyzing the impact of patronage on the bureaucracy, by Frederick Mosher explaining some of the "sticky" problems with respect to the maintenance of quality in the system, and by Everett Reimer spelling out some of the problems of maintaining a high quality personnel management system. As a source book the original volume certainly served as valuable background material for Assembly participants particularly insofar as it presented the mature judgment of a group of eminent scholars and practitioners in the field of public administration. The appearance of the second edition is somewhat puzzling. There are no major revisions in empirical data presented by the authors nor are there any significant changes in evaluation of those aspects of the federal service dealt with by the authors. Kaufman has updated his historical section and other authors have drawn upon recent events for illustrative materials, but no major revision has been undertaken.

In part the lack of genuine revision is justifiable in that the growth, relationships and problems of the federal system have not changed drastically in the past ten years nor has our understanding of them changed substantially. On the other hand there are a number of features which might have been seriously reexamined. Professor Somers' essay on relationships between the Executive and Congress is written with a strong commitment to a concept of a monolithic unified Executive and Congress and with the view that the segmented autonomous subunits in both branches of government are deleterious to the maintenance of quality of the government service. However justified Somers may be in wishing for some semblance of order in our political system, professional civil servants are as much a part of the fragmentation which has taken place in our system as their political superiors. The refreshing and otherwise very sophisticated essay by Harvey Mansfield on the impact of patronage on the service is somewhat hampered by his failure to draw distinctions between patronage in connection with high level policy appointments and pockets of patronage in lower levels within the service. Frederick Mosher has raised some really important questions with respect to quality in the service and the image problem. Although he makes some reference to the Kilpatrick, Cummings and Jennings study he might, in fact, have used it as a backdrop for his entire essay in view of the immediacy of the problems suggested in that volume with respect to the federal service.

On the whole this volume is well written as one would have expected from the group of authors, but neither the authors nor the editor have adequately justified in my mind the need for a second edition.—ROBERT FRIEDMAN, *University of Michigan.*

Where Science and Politics Meet. BY JEROME B. WIESNER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Pp. viii, 302, $6.95.)

Jerome B. Wiesner, a communications engineer and executive over scientific and technical affairs, became science adviser to President John F. Kennedy in 1961. He served for three years then returned to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as Dean of the School of Science.

By the time he joined the White House staff the position of science adviser—legally the job is Special Assistant for Science and Technology but few ever use this term—had become the most influential post in the government for the shaping of programs in research and development. Two predecessors and the firm demands of presidential responsibility for strategic programs had made the central office strong. The President's Science Advisory Committee and the Office of Science and Technology had gained a say in both large and small decisions of what research should be done and in what scope. The adviser was chairman of the first and director of the second.

In this book Mr. Wiesner published the lectures and statements he uttered during his tenure as presidential adviser. He adds some articles and a report on disarmament, with which he became involved as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee before he became adviser to the President.

One should not expect an Assistant to the President to reveal anything that isn't available in news, journals, and government publications. Although Mr. Wiesner has done his best to introduce each section and to edit out the duplication, one should, indeed, question why such a "nonbook" should be read at all. This one has some nuggets divided widely by the usual official statements. These new items could have been written in a new and small book. Saving a reader's time, however, is hardly the custom in this time of the collected volume.

In pages 34–40, in a lecture delivered at Johns Hopkins, Mr. Wiesner gives a brilliant summary of the development of science and technology which makes the social (and political) consequences so critical. The truly significant bases for social change are not in end-uses but in the "understanding of atomic structure, a theory of the chemical bond, an understanding of atomic nuclei, the major advances in fundamental biological phenomena, particularly at a cellular and sub-cellular level, and the development of information theory and feedback and control theory." Then he thinks aloud about the proper percentage of the national product that should be spent for research and development. He suggests a budget for more research in some fields that have been neglected relatively, up to now. These fields are education, environmental health, civilian technology, natural resources, desalinization, oceanography, and the technical problems of new nations. He also thinks the United States should spend more on such under-supported fields of basic research as chemistry, social science, communications science, low energy nuclear physics, mathematics, and the engineering sciences.

In the rest of the book Mr. Wiesner rewards a patient reader with an unconscious self-portrait of the best educated, best purposed type of scientist-engineer-political executive who controls federal policy for research and development. A credo for the whole group can almost be constructed from the expression of any one.

Mr. Wiesner, for example, knows that a single department of science, long advocated by the more naive, would be a disadvantage to science as a whole. Science is much too pervasive in too many programs to be isolated. He thinks basic research should be supported for its own value in the increase of knowledge, but development should be started only when there is a clear need for the product. The choice of what to study in basic research must be left to the scientists.

He accepts the present machinery for making grants knowing that it is filled with interlocking persons and institutions. "It is the product of evolution in a permissive atmosphere. . . . But, from the point of view of scientific accomplishment, there is great danger that much would be lost if highly structured arrangements were substituted for those we now have." Universities should administer government funds in more detail than now.

He believes that help should be given universities that have a potential for excellence in graduate education and research. But he also believes "that it would be disastrous to the scientific enterprise if standards other than quality were made the primary basis for the allocation of money for support of basic research." So the government should build "centers of research excellence." These centers later might become competitive for grants for basic research.

One can find in these papers a broad, humane, thoughtful public official. One cannot find much revelation of the politics of governmental science. There is no discussion of such big questions as the decision to expand space research and development at what cost to other programs. There is no discussion of the centers of power in federal science and no mention of the small number of "ins" who are said to control. There is no mention of the distortions in education and economy that may have come from the formula that money should go to where the excellence is, and no mention of how excellence is determined. There is no discussion of the question that ought to be closest to the heart of a top political excutive. Is there any better way to get more men with the broad training and the broad social concern that all executives in science should have?—James L. McCamy, *University of Wisconsin.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Franklin L. Burdette
University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Magrath, C. Peter. Lyndon Johnson and the Paradox of the Presidency. *Yale Review.* June, 1965.

Merritt, Richard L. The Emergence of American Nationalism: A Quantitative Approach. *American Quarterly.* Supplement, Summer, 1965.

Moore, John Norton. Federalism and Foreign Relations. *Duke Law Journal.* Spring, 1965.

Nelson, William H. The Revolutionary Character of the American Revolution. *American Historical Review.* July, 1965.

Riddick, Floyd M., and Murray Zweben. The Eighty-Eighth Congress: Second Session. *Western Political Quarterly.* June, 1965.

Shull, Charles W. The Tenure of Michigan in the Congress of the United States. *Michigan History.* June, 1965.

State Government

Alyea, Paul E. The Role of the State of South Carolina in the Taxation of Property. Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina. 1965.

Barker, Twiley W., Jr. Illinois Tries [Reapportionment] Again. *National Civic Review.* September, 1965.

Blackburn, John O. Intangibles Taxes: A Neglected Revenue Source for States. *National Tax Journal.* June, 1965.

Brydges, Earl W. The Electronic [Statute Retrieval] Solon. *National Civic Review.* July, 1965.

Dye, Thomas R. Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States. *Journal of Politics.* August, 1965.

EDP in State and Local Governments. [Symposium.] *Public Administration Review.* June, 1965.

Francis, Wayne L. The Role Concept in Legislatures: A Probability Model and a Note on Cognitive Structure. *Journal of Politics.* August, 1965.

Friedman, Robert S., and Sybil L. Stokes. The Role of [Michigan] Constitution-Maker as Representative. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* May, 1965.

Grumm, John G. The Systematic Analysis of Blocs in the Study of Legislative Behavior. *Western Political Quarterly.* June ,1965.

Saye, Albert B. The Precedent Setter [Georgia Reapportionment]. *National Civic Review.* September, 1965.

Simmons, Robert H. The Washington State Plural Executive: An Initial Effort in Interaction Analysis. *Western Political Quarterly.* June, 1965.

Wilder, Bessie E. Bibliography of the Official Publications of Kansas, 1854–1958. Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas. 1965.

Wright, Deil S., and Richard L. McAnaw. American State Executives: Their Backgrounds and Careers. *State Government.* Summer, 1965.

Local Government

Ayres, Douglas W., and Leonard L. Whorton. Annexation: The Forgotten Answer to Metropolitan Services? *Public Management.* August, 1965.

Bernard, Michael M. The Development of a Body of City Planning Law. *American Bar Association Journal.* July, 1965.

Cease, Ronald C. Alaskan Boroughs Establish Role. *National Civic Review.* July, 1965.

Cities. [Symposium.] *Scientific American.* September, 1965.

Feldt, Allan G. The Metropolitan Area Concept: An Evaluation of the 1950 SMA's. *Journal of the American Statistical Association.* June, 1965.

The Financial Effects of the Incorporation of Fairfax County as a City. Institute of Government, University of Virginia. 1965.

Grant, Daniel R. Opinions Surveyed on Nashville Metro. *National Civic Review.* July, 1965.

Heikoff, Joseph M. Planning Is the Responsibility of the Executive. *Public Management.* July. 1965.

Local Government Fiscal Reform. [Symposium.] *Municipal Finance.* August, 1965.

Poland, Orville F. Local Government Gets New Tool [Operations Research]. *National Civic Review.* July, 1965.

Prevention of Subdivision Control Evasion in Indiana. *Indiana Law Journal.* Spring, 1965.

Sato, Sho. Municipal Occupation Taxes in California: The Authority to Levy Taxes and the Burden on Intrastate Commerce. *California Law Review.* August, 1965.

Sazama, Gerald W. Equalization of Property Taxes for the Nation's Largest Central Cities. *National Tax Journal.* June. 1965,

Urban Renewal. [Symposium.] *Commentary.* July, 1965.

Vogel, Joshua H. Design of Subdivisions. Bureau of Governmental Research and Services, University of Washington. 1965.

Wright, Deil S. Trends and Variations in Local Finances: The Case of Iowa Counties. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Iowa. 1965.

Zisk, Betty H., Heinz Eulau, and Kenneth Prewitt. City Councilmen and the Group Struggle: A Typology of Role Orientations. *Journal of Politics.* August, 1965.

Intergovernmental Relations

Webber, Edwin W. Regional Cooperation: A Modus Vivendi for New England. *State Government.* Summer, 1965.

Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Austin, Douglas V. Governmental Censorship in Radio and Television Broadcasting. *Public Utilities Fortnightly.* August 19, 1965.

Avins, Alfred. The Right Not to Listen. *American Bar Association Journal.* July, 1965.

Barnett, Helaine Meresman, and Kenneth Levine. Mr. Justice Potter Stewart. *New York University Law Review.* May, 1965.

Berger, Raoul. Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry. Part II. *UCLA Law Review.* August, 1965.

Bernhard, Berl I., and Ronald B. Natalie. Between Rights and Remedies. *Georgetown Law Journal.* Summer, 1965.

Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act. *Iowa Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Confer Citizenship by Naturalization. *Ibid.* Summer, 1965.

Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1965.

Edgar, J. Roger. Tax Records, the Fifth

Amendment and the "Required Records Doctrine." *Saint Louis University Law Journal.* Summer, 1965.

Exclusion from Private Associations. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1965.

Folsom, Victor C. The *Sabbatino* Case: Rule of Law or Rule of "No Law"? *American Bar Association Journal.* August, 1965.

Foote, Caleb. The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* May, 1965. Part II. *Ibid.* June, 1965.

Friedman, Lawrence M. Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890–1910: A Legal and Social Study. *California Law Review.* May, 1965.

Gill, Robert L. The Negro in the Supreme Court, 1963. *Negro Educational Review.* January–April, 1965.

Gillmor, Donald M. The Puzzle of Pornography. *Journalism Quarterly.* Summer, 1965.

Hill, Alfred. The Inadequate State Ground. *Columbia Law Review.* June, 1965.

Jewell, Malcolm E. Minority Representation: A Political or Judicial Question? *Kentucky Law Journal.* Vol. 53, No. 2. 1964–65.

Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes—Some Constitutional Considerations. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1965.

Lang, Richard A., Jr. State Action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Remaining Scope of Private Choice. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Spring, 1965.

Mason, Barry. Defamation of Public Officials—Free Speech and the New Constitutional Standard. *UCLA Law Review.* August, 1965.

O'Brien, F. William. The States and "No Establishment": Proposed Amendments to the Constitution since 1798. *Washburn Law Journal.* Spring, 1965.

Palmer, Paul C. Miscegenation as an Issue in the Arkansas Constitutional Convention of 1868. *Arkansas Historical Quarterly.* Summer, 1965.

Religion and the Constitution. [Symposium.] *Journal of Public Law.* Vol. 13, No. 2. 1964. [1965.]

Rothenberg, Lawrence J. The Registration of Communist-Front Organizations: The Statutory Framework and the Constitutional Issue. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* June, 1965.

Shull, Charles W. Legislatures and the Process of Constitutional Amendment. *Kentucky Law Journal.* Vol. 53, No. 3. 1964–65.

Sprecher, Robert A. The Lost [Second] Amendment: II. *American Bar Association Journal.* July, 1965.

Steamer, Robert. Congress and the Supreme Court during the Marshall Era. *Review of Politics.* July, 1965.

Van Alstine, William W. Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action. *Duke Law Journal.* Spring, 1965.

Velvel, Laurence R. Suggested Approaches to Constitutional Adjudication and Apportionment. *UCLA Law Review.* August, 1965.

Wechsler, Herbert. The Courts and the Constitution. *Columbia Law Review.* June, 1965.

Wilson, Richard B. Massive Insistence or Massive Resistance? The Judicial Administration of the Civil Rights Revolution. *George Washington Law Review.* April, 1965.

Witherspoon, Joseph P. Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a Better Use of Administrative Process. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1965.

Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

Alexander, A. Lamar, Jr. En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities. *New York University Law Review.* May, 1965.

Bail and Indigency. [Symposium.] *University of Illinois Law Forum.* Spring, 1965.

Brooks, Thomas R. "New York's Finest." *Commentary.* August, 1965.

Carlson, Ronald L. Appointed Counsel in Criminal Prosecutions: A Study of Indigent Defense [in Iowa]. *Iowa Law Review.* Summer, 1965.

Cassinelli, C. W. Criminal Law: The Rules of the Polity. *Ethics.* July, 1965.

Clark, Tom C. Citizens, Courts, and the Effective Administration of Justice. *Journal of the American Judicature Society.* June, 1965.

———. The Decisional Processes of the Supreme Court. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Spring, 1965.

Coughlin, George G. The Shame of [Tort] Immunity. *National Civic Review.* September, 1965.

Criminal Justice—Contemporary Problems. [Symposium.] *Kentucky Law Journal.* Vol. 53, No. 3. 1964–65.

Danforth, Frederick W., Jr. Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege against Self-Incrimination. *Rutgers Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Dubroff, Harold. Recidivist Procedures. *New York University Law Review.* April, 1965.

Eagan, Dennis M. Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal Courts. *California Law Review.* August, 1965.

Foster, Henry H., Jr. What Psychiatrists Should Know about the Limitations of Law. *Wisconsin Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Gross, Alan D. Successive Prosecutions by City and State—The Question of Double Jeopardy. *Oregon Law Review.* June, 1964. [1965.]

The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts. *Georgetown Law Journal.* Summer 1965.

Kauffman, Joel. The Judicial System as

Viewed by Jerome Frank. *American Business Law Journal.* Fall, 1965.

Lavinsky, Michael B. Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem [in Illinois] Arising in the Terminal Stages of the Criminal Process. *Chicago-Kent Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Mathes, William C., and Robert T. Jones. Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions. *Georgetown Law Journal.* Summer, 1965.

The Morality of Law—A Symposium. *Villanova Law Review.* Summer, 1965.

Nagel, Stuart S. Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence. *Wisconsin Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Our "Legislative" Courts. [Symposium by Paul C. Bartholomew and August O. Spain.] *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly.* June, 1965.

Paone, Arthur J. The New Trial Procedure on Confessions in New York. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Spring, 1965.

Paulsen, Monrad G. The Expanding Horizons of Legal Services—II. *West Virginia Law Review.* June, 1965.

Preventive Law Symposium. *Southern California Law Review.* Summer, 1965.

Quinney, Richard. A Conception of Man and Society for Criminology. *Sociological Quarterly.* Spring, 1965.

Roberts, Leigh M. Some Observations on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist. *Wisconsin Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Ross, Irwin. Trial by Newspaper. *Atlantic.* September, 1965.

Savage, Royce H. Justice for a New Era. *Journal of the American Judicature Society.* August, 1965.

Schmidt, Dana M. The Scope of Review of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals: Time for a Change? *George Washington Law Review.* April, 1965.

Science and the Law Symposium. *Michigan Law Review.* June, 1965.

Slaughter, James C. Basic Principles of the Law of Admiralty. *Arkansas Law Review.* Summer, 1965.

Sloane, Homer W. The Juvenile Court: An Uneasy Partnership of Law and Social Work. *Smith College Studies in Social Work.* June, 1965.

Smit, Hans. International Litigation under the United States Code. *Columbia Law Review.* June, 1965.

Symposium on the Warren Commission Report. *New York University Law Review.* May, 1965.

Temple, David G. Facing up to Gideon. *National Civic Review.* July, 1965.

Vasoli, Robert H. Growth and Consequences of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing. *Notre Dame Lawyer.* June, 1965.

Weckstein, Donald T. The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action against State "Direct Action" Laws. *Wisconsin Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Winters, Glenn R. Current Trends in State Court Modernization. *State Government.* Summer, 1965.

———. Judicial Reform from Coast to Coast. *Tulsa Law Journal.* June, 1965.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Dakin, Melvin G. The Revised [Louisiana] Model State Administrative Procedure Act—Critique and Commentary. *Louisiana Law Review.* June, 1965.

Fesler, James W. Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization. *Journal of Politics.* August, 1965.

Golembiewski, Robert T. Specialist or Generalist?: Structure as a Crucial Factor. *Public Administration Review.* June, 1965.

Gross, Bertram M. What Are Your Organization's Objectives? A General-Systems Approach to Planning. *Human Relations.* August, 1965.

Hammond, Paul Y. Foreign Policy-Making and Administrative Politics. *World Politics.* July, 1965.

Jacoby, Richard A. A Judicial Process Study of the Review of Licensing Decisions of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* May, 1965.

Loevinger, Lee. The Administrative Agency as a Paradigm of Government—A Survey of the Administrative Process. *Indiana Law Journal.* Spring, 1965.

Lomax, W. Richard. The Federal Personnel System and the Challenge of the Space Age. *Western Political Quarterly.* June, 1965.

Long, Norton E. Politicians for Hire—The Dilemma of Education and the Task of Research. *Public Administration Review.* June, 1965.

Lundstedt, Sven. Administrative Leadership and Use of Social Power. *Ibid.*

Marcus, Philip M., and Dora Cafagna. Control in Modern Organizations. *Ibid.*

Ramo, Simon. Management of Government Programs. *Harvard Business Review.* July–August, 1965.

Smith, Lincoln. Professional Backgrounds of Regulatory Commissioners. *Public Utilities Fortnightly.* August 5, 1965.

Whelan, John W. Law of Public Administration: Need for Legal Study. *Georgetown Law Journal.* Summer, 1965.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Bagdikian, Ben H. Press Agent—But Still President [Johnson]. *Columbia Journalism Review.* Summer, 1965.

Benham, Thomas W. Polling for a Presidential

Candidate: Some Observations on the 1964 Campaign. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Bermel, Albert. The Split Personality of USIA. *Harper's Magazine*. September, 1965.

Bloomfield, Douglas M. Joe Tumulty and the Press. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Bower, Joseph L. Group Decision Making: A Report of an Experimental Study. *Behavioral Science*. July, 1965.

Boynton, George Robert. Southern Conservatism: Constituency Opinion and Congressional Voting. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Bradley, Donald S., and Mayer N. Zald. From Commercial Elite to Political Administrator: The Recruitment of the Mayors of Chicago. *American Journal of Sociology*. September, 1965.

Chapman, Shirley, and Richard Claude. A Deviant Election in a One-Party County. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Elazar, Daniel J. Which Road to the Presidency? *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. June, 1965.

Fair, Daryl R. The Reaction of Pennsylvania Voters to Catholic Candidates. *Pennsylvania History*. July, 1965.

Flower, Milton E. American Political Pressure Groups. India International Centre, 40 Lodi Estate, New Delhi. [1965.]

Gough, Harrison G., and Giuseppe di Palma. Attitudes toward Colonialism, Political Dependence, and Independence. *Journal of Psychology*. July, 1965.

Gray, Charles H. The Social Base of the Coalition of Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans. *Political Science* [New Zealand]. March, 1965.

Hahn, Harlan. The Republican Party Convention of 1912 and the Role of Herbert S. Hadley in National Politics. *Missouri Historical Review*. July, 1965.

Hall, Alvin L. Virginia Back in the Fold: The Gubernatorial Campaign and Election of 1929. *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*. July, 1965.

Kavolis, Vytautas. Political Determinants of Artistic Styles. *Social Research*. Summer, 1965.

———. Political Dynamics and Artistic Creativity. *Sociology and Social Research*. July, 1965.

King, Larry L. Washington's Money Birds [Lobbyists]. *Harper's Magazine*. August, 1965.

Kirby, Jack Temple. Alcohol and Irony: The Campaign of Westmoreland Davis for Governor, 1909–1917. *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*. July, 1965.

Larson, T. A. Woman Suffrage in Wyoming. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*. April, 1965.

Lichtheim, George. "All the News That's Fit to Print": Reflections on *The New York Times*. *Commentary*. September, 1965.

Lynd, Staughton. The New Radicals and "Participatory Democracy." *Dissent*. Summer, 1965.

McMurray, Carl D., and Malcolm B. Parsons. Public Attitudes toward the Representational Roles of Legislators and Judges. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. May, 1965.

Miller, James G. Living Systems: Basic Concepts. *Behavioral Science*. July, 1965.

Olsen, Marvin E. Alienation and Political Opinions. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Patterson, James T. The Failure of Party Realignment in the South, 1937–1939. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1965.

Rakove, Milton. A Democrat Looks at the Republican Party. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Summer, 1965.

Raven, Bertram H., and Philip S. Gallo. The Effects of Nominating Conventions, Elections, and Reference Group Identification upon the Perception of Political Figures. *Human Relations*. August, 1965.

Reporting Election Returns and Computer Predictions: Proposed Regulation. *Iowa Law Review*. Summer, 1965.

Rice, Ross R., ed. The 1964 Elections in the West. [Symposium.] *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1965 (Part 2).

Sibley, Joel H. The Southern National Democrats, 1845–1861. *Mid-America*. July, 1965.

Stone, Clarence N. Local Referendums: An Alternative to the Alienated-Voter Model. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Troldahl, Verling C., Robert Van Dam, and George B. Robeck. Public Affairs Information-Seeking from Expert [Civil Defense] Institutionalized Sources. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Verba, Sidney. Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1965.

Walker, Jack L. The Republican Party and the Birth Rate. *Antioch Review*. Summer, 1965.

Weibull, Jorgen. The Wisconsin Progressives, 1900–1914. *Mid-America*. July, 1965.

Wildavsky, Aaron. The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and the Two-Party System. *Review of Politics*. July, 1965.

Wirt, Frederick M. The Political Sociology of American Suburbia: A Reinterpretation. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1965.

Economic and Social Functions

National Economy

English, H. Edward. The Nature of Democratic Economic Planning. *Canadian Public Administration*. June, 1965.

Fisher, John E. Government Support for Economic Growth. *Business and Government Review*, *University of Missouri.* September–October, 1965.

Heilbroner, Robert L. The Power of Big Business. *Atlantic.* September, 1965.

Johnson, Harry L. Excise Tax Reductions: A Stimulant to Economic Growth. *National Tax Journal.* June, 1965.

Wallich, Henry C. Taxation of Capital Gains in the Light of Recent Economic Developments. *Ibid.*

Natural Resources

Cutler, Richard W. Chaos or Uniformity in Boating Regulations? The State as Trustee of Navigable Waters. *Wisconsin Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Dunn, James R., and John G. Broughton. A Mineral Conservation Ethic for New York State. *State Government.* Summer, 1965.

Fuller, Lon L. Irrigation and Tyranny. *Stanford Law Review.* July, 1965.

Galbreath, Paul M. Maryland Water Law. Water Resources Study Committee, University of Maryland. 1965.

Hoese, William J. Recapture of Reclamation Project Ground Water. *California Law Review.* May, 1965.

Preservation of Indiana's Scenic Areas: A Method. *Indiana Law Journal.* Spring, 1965.

Veeder, William H. Winters Doctrine Rights: Keystone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conservation and Utilization. *Montana Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Worsnop, Richard L. Water Resources and National Water Needs. *Editorial Research Reports.* August 11, 1965.

Agriculture

Bressler, R. G. Agricultural Economics in the Decade Ahead. *Journal of Farm Economics.* August, 1965.

Dethloff, Henry C. Missouri Farmers and the New Deal. *Agricultural History.* July, 1965.

Jones, Lamar B., and James W. Christian. Some Observations on the Agricultural Labor Market. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review.* July, 1965.

Business and Labor

Abraham, Henry J., and Peter C. Loder. The Supreme Court and the Preemption Question. *Kentucky Law Journal.* Vol. 53, No. 2. 1964–65.

Barbash, Jack. The Structure of Union Political Action—A Trial Analytical Framework. *Labor Law Journal.* August, 1965.

Boulwareism and Good Faith Collective Bargaining. *Michigan Law Review.* June, 1965.

Bridges, Benjamin, Jr. State and Local Inducements for Industry. Part II. *National Tax Journal.* June, 1965.

Caldwell, Wallace F. Discrimination and Fair Employment Practices Laws. *Labor Law Journal.* July, 1965.

Clark, S. G., Jr. Interplay between the LMRA and Arbitration. *Ibid.*

Dempsey, J. R., S. J. The Right-to-Work Controversy. *Ibid.*

An Experiment in Preventive Anti-Trust: Judicial Regulation of the Motion Picture Exhibition Market under the *Paramount* Decrees. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1965.

Frost, George E. Patents and Antitrust Laws. *Antitrust Bulletin.* May–June, 1965.

Getman, Julius G. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice. *University of Chicago Law Review.* Summer, 1965.

Handler, Alan B. Jurisdictional Abstention in Federal-State Branch Bank Conflicts. *Rutgers Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Hays, Paul R. The Future of Labor Arbitration. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1965.

Hildebrand, George H. Reducing Unemployment: Problems and Policies. *Labor Law Journal.* August, 1965.

Holman, Mary A. Government Research and Development Inventions—A New Resource? *Land Economics.* August, 1965.

Jordan, Robert L. Robinson-Patman Act Aspects of Dual Distribution by Brand of Consumer Goods. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Spring, 1965.

Kellman, Leon. Life Plus Fifty in American Copyright Law. *American Bar Association Journal.* August, 1965.

Kovarsky, Irving. Apprentice Training Programs and Racial Discrimination. *Iowa Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

Labor-Management in the Great Society. [Symposium.] *Current History.* August, 1965.

Latty, Elvin R. Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"? *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Summer, 1965.

Lesnick, Howard. Job Security and Secondary Boycotts. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* May, 1965.

Leventhal, Harold. Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of Utilities in a Growth Economy. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1965.

Marshall, Ray. Equal Employment Opportunity: Problems and Prospects. *Labor Law Journal.* August, 1965.

Meltzer, Bernard D. Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws. *University of Chicago Law Review.* Summer, 1965.

O'Neal, F. Hodge. Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Summer, 1965.

O'Neil, Robert M. Television, Tort Law, and

Federalism. *California Law Review.* May, 1965.

Rico, Leonard. The Manpower Development and Training Act: A Case Study. *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business.* Summer, 1965.

Rosen, Sanford Jay. The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment. *California Law Review.* August, 1965.

Sherman, Herbert L., Jr. Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. *Minnesota Law Review.* April. 1965,

Shneidman, Daniel L. Industrial Decisions and Labor Law. *Labor Law Journal.* July, 1965.

Shuman, Louis. Requiring a Union to Demonstrate Its Majority Status by Means of an Election Becomes Riskier. *Ibid.*

State Taxation of Multistate Businesses. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1965.

Topol, Allan J. Union Elections under the LMRDA. *Ibid.*

U. S. Policy on Labor-Management Relations. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest.* August–September, 1965.

Health, Education, and Welfare

Chen, Yung-Ping. Present Status and Fiscal Significance of Property Tax Exemptions for the Aged. *National Tax Journal.* June, 1965.

De Facto Segregation: Racial Concentration as a Consideration in School Redistricting. *Rutgers Law Review.* Spring, 1965.

District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act. *Columbia Law Review.* June, 1965.

Fleming, Donald R. The Big Money and High Politics of Science. *Atlantic.* August, 1965.

Harper, Dean. The Growth of Bureaucracy in School Systems. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology.* July, 1965.

Hassinger, Edward W., and Charles E. Grubb. The Linking Role of the Local Public Health Nurse in Missouri. *Rural Sociology.* September, 1965.

Hegland, Kenney F. Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment. *California Law Review.* August, 1965.

Kauffmann, Stanley. Can Culture Explode? Notes on Subsidizing the Arts. *Commentary.* August, 1965.

Kistiakowsky, George B. On Federal Support of Basic Research. *Dædalus.* Summer, 1965.

Levy, Robert J. Protecting the Mentally Retarded: An Empirical Survey and Evaluation of the Establishment of State Guardianship in Minnesota. *Minnesota Law Review.* April, 1965.

Lukaczer, Moses. Farmer Participation in the Social Security Program. *Journal of Farm Economics.* August, 1965.

March, Michael S. Poverty: How Much Will the War Cost? *Social Service Review,* June, 1965.

McKie, James W., ed. Education and the Southern Economy. [Symposium.] *Southern Economic Journal.* July, 1965.

Morgan, Daniel C., Jr. Financing Higher Education in Texas: Needs and Methods. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1965.

Munster, Joe H., Jr., and Justin C. Smith. A Second Look at Government-Supported Research. *Educational Record.* Spring, 1965.

Orlans, Harold. Some Current Problems of Government Science Policy. *Science.* July 2, 1965.

Power, Richard W. The Racially Discriminatory Charitable Trust: A Suggested Treatment. *Saint Louis University Law Journal.* Summer, 1965.

Reich, Charles A. Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1965.

Rosner, George. Criminal Liability for Deceiving the Food and Drug Administration. *Food-Drug-Cosmetic Law Journal.* August, 1965.

Schmickel, Bert W., and David Guralnick. A State Program [Connecticut] to Combat Mental Retardation. *State Government.* Summer, 1965.

Social Security Disability Determinations: The Burden of Proof on Appeal. *Michigan Law Review.* June, 1965.

Symposium on Housing and Home Finance. Part 2. *New York Law Forum.* Spring, 1965.

Tarver, James D., and Ernest A. Hellwege. Area Redevelopment Act Training Programs in Oklahoma. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly.* June, 1965.

Thackrey, Russell I., and Jane Otten. State Universities, Land-Grant Colleges and Disadvantaged Minorities. *State Government.* Summer, 1965.

Unruh, Jesse M. California's Legislative Internship Program. *Ibid.*

Windle, Charles. Factors in the Passage of Sterilization Legislation: The Case of Virginia. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Summer, 1965.

Military Affairs and National Security

Lawrence, Keith D. Military-Legal Considerations in the Extension of Territorial Seas. *Military Law Review.* July, 1965.

Levine, Gene N., and John Modell. American Public Opinion and the Fallout-Shelter Issue. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Summer, 1965.

McLaughlin, Gerald. Foreign Agents Registration Act: Proposed Amendments. *New York University Law Review.* April, 1965.

Melnick, Arnold I. The Defendant's Right to Obtain Evidence: An Examination of the Military Viewpoint. *Military Law Review.* July, 1965.

Partan, Daniel G. Individual Responsibility under a Disarmament Agreement in American Law. *Minnesota Law Review.* April, 1965.

Ramsey, Paul. The Ethics of Intervention. *Review of Politics*. July, 1965.

Rosi, Eugene. Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Tests and Fallout, 1954–1963. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Stone, Jeremy J. Containing the Arms Race. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. September, 1965.

Strickland, Donald A. Physicists' Views of Space Politics. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1965.

Wilson, David M. Investigative Procedures in the Military: A Search for Absolutes. *California Law Review*. August, 1965.

Government Documents

Congress

House. Committee on Agriculture. Amend and Extend the Sugar Act of 1948. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Cotton. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Rice. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Suburban Land Development Corporation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Wheat and Feed Grains. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Armed Services. The Aerospace Corporation: A Study of Fiscal and Management Policy and Control. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. To Amend the Bank Holding Company Act. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Amending the Bank Holding Company Act with Respect to Registered Investment Companies. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Coinage Act of 1965. Hearings. Also House Report No. 509. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Investigation into Federal Services Finance Corporation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong.,1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on the District of Columbia. Administrative Procedure Act. Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Revenue, Highway Program, and Federal Payment Formula. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Zoning for Foreign Chanceries. Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Education and Labor. Antipoverty Program in New York City and Los Angeles. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. De Facto School Segregation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Disaster School Assistance and Measures to Eliminate Inequities in Public Laws 815 and 874. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Equal Employment Opportunity, 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. To Extend the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Higher Education Act of 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 621. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Minimum Wage-Hour Amendments, 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. National Arts and Humanities Foundations. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 618. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Repeal of Section 14(b) of the Labor-Management Relations Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Teacher Fellowships and National Teacher Corps. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 830. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Comptroller General Reports to Congress on Audits of Defense Contracts. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Evaluation of the Donable Property Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Payment of Travel Costs for Applicants for Federal Employment. Hearing before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 710. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1965 (Creating an Environmental Science Services Administration). Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1965 (Locomotive Inspection). Hearing before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 701. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 (Interagency Committees). Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1965 (National Science Foundation). Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Policies, Programs, and Activities of the Department of the Interior. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Saline Water Conversion Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 594. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Silver: Production and Availability. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1965. Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising—1965. Hearings. Also House Report No. 449. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Clean Air Act Amendments. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Commerce Department Transportation Research. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Federal Boxing Commission. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Health Professions Educational Assistance Amendments of 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Railway Labor Act Amendments Relating to NRAB. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Regional Medical Complexes for Heart Disease, Cancer, Stroke, and Other Diseases. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. State Technical Services Act of 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 817. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Immigration. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 745. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Law Enforcement Assistance. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Providing Penalties for the Assassination of the President. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. State Taxation of Interstate Commerce. House Report No. 565. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Vessel Exchange Authority Extension. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Civil Service Retirement Annuities. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 529. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Federal Employees Salary Act of 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Fourth-Class Mail. Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Mail Transportation by Common Carrier Motor Vehicles. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Zip Code System in the United States Postal Service. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Public Works. Omnibus Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Bills—1965. Hearings before Subcommittees. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. Also House Report No. 539. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Hearings Relating to . . . Creation of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. Also House Report No. 629. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Provision of Indemnity or Insurance for Individuals Serving in the Armed Forces. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Ways and Means. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1965. Executive Hearings. Also House Report No. 602. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Removal of Tax Barriers to Foreign Investment in the United States. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Organization and Operation of the Small Business Administration. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

House and Senate. Committee on Education and Labor, House, and Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate. National Arts and Humanities Foundations. Joint Hearings before Subcommittees. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committees on Government Operations. Five-Year Record of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and Its Future Role. Joint Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. High Energy Physics Research. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Peaceful Application of Nuclear Explosives—Plowshare. Hearing. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Proposed Extension of AEC Indemnity Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Joint Economic Committee. The Balance of Payments Statistics. Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Economic Impact of Federal Procurement. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Fiscal Policy Issues of the Coming Decade. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Guidelines for International Monetary Reform. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Improved Statistics for Economic Growth. Joint Committee Print. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Measuring the Nation's Wealth. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. United States International Space Programs: Texts of . . . International Arrangements, 1959–1965. Senate Doc. No. 44. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Food and Agriculture Act of 1965. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Military Pay Increase. Hearing. Also Senate Report No. 544. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Hearing before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Proposal to Realine the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve Forces. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. U. S. Army Reserves. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Commerce. Adequacy of Trunkline Air Service to Medium-Sized Intermediate Cities. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Freight Car Shortages. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. High-Speed Ground Transportation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Progress Report from FCC—1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on the District of Columbia. Crime in the District of Columbia. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Rail Rapid Transit for the National Capital Region. Hearings. Also Senate Report No. 637. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Finance. Indemnity Insurance Coverage for Combat Service. Hearing. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Donable Surplus Property Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Establishment of a Department of Housing and Urban Development. Senate Report No. 536. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Federal Role in Traffic Safety. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. National Wildlife Rivers System. Hearings. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Communist Youth Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Constitutional Amendments. Senate Report No. 458. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Distribution Problems Affecting Small Business. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Economic Concentration. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Professional Sports Antitrust Bill—1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Amend the Public Health Service Act to Provide Adequate Medical Library Services and Facilities. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Amendments to the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Expand the War on Poverty. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. Higher Education Act of 1965. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. National Arts and Humanities Foundations. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 300. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

——— ———. To Repeal Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 697. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Small Business Administration—1965. Hearing. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

———. Special Committee on Aging. Conditions and Problems in the Nation's Nursing Homes. Hearings before Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965.

Other Federal

Commission on Civil Rights. Hearings Held in Jackson, Miss. Vol. I: Voting. 1965.

Department of Commerce. National Bureau of Standards. Computer Literature Bibliography, 1946 to 1963. Miscellaneous Publication 266. 1965.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Public Health Service. Public Awareness and Concern with Air Pollution in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area. Prepared by Public Administration and Metropolitan Affairs Program, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville. 1965.

Executive Office of the President. Bureau of the Budget. Inventory of Automatic Data Processing Equipment in the Federal Government. 1965.

General Services Administration. National Archives and Records Service. Office of Records Management. Source Data Automation. (Records Management Handbook: Mechanizing Paperwork.) 1965.

Goddard Space Flight Center. Publications, 1963. Vol. I: Space Sciences. 1965. Vol. II: Space Technology. 1965.

Post Office Department. Bureau of Operations. National Zip Code Directory. 1965.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Democracy in Germany. By Fritz Erler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 139, $3.75.)

Of the many German politicians who lecture in foreign capitals, Fritz Erler, the SPD's "shadow" foreign minister and chairman of its parliamentary party, has an outstanding knack for leaving ripples of afterthoughts in his wake. Known as the Bundestag's outstanding debater, he has also this year been the first German Socialist to lecture in Franco Spain, where the frankness of his criticism has been as much noticed as it has on other occasions in Paris. In this little volume, based on the Jodidi Lectures at Harvard, Erler has sought to assess certain aspects of evolving German institutions from a perspective in which the criteria of both the German actor and the American audience are joined.

The result is an extremely readable little book in which quite objective assessments are interspersed with the policy preferences to which the author has become committed as a result of his political roles. One of the more interesting chapters is devoted to a discussion of the revived German armed forces. Here Erler seeks to meet residual mistrust by stressing the positive side of the build-up of internal and external control mechanisms on the military, and concludes that these are "now in keeping with a democratic society and are under proper control of a civil government and a freely elected parliament." In another interesting chapter Erler seeks to convey to an American audience just what it is that has happened to the SPD since the Bad Godesberg program, and here the terms and concepts employed come very close to those employed by political scientists. Erler's main aim however is to win wider confidence for the thesis that German democratic institutions are this time here to stay and that they actually operate in the spirit of a pluralistic society.—Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *University of Florida.*

The French Civil Service. By Roger Grégoire. (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Science, 1964. Pp. xii, 363. $8.00.)

This work is a revised and enlarged English version of a study originally published in French as *La Fonction Publique* in 1954. The author, a member of Council of State, was, after the War, a close collaborator of Michel Debré and as such participated in the reform of the Civil Service which led to the creation of the National School of Administration (E.N.A.) in 1946. For eight years he then served as Director of the newly established Civil Service Directorate attached to the Prime Minister's Office. The *French Civil Service* gives us the observations and prescriptions of a senior civil servant who has devoted much of his career to reforming the French Civil Service, attempting in particular to make it more democratic in its recruitment and less rigid in its regulation of career streams.

In his introduction the author states his intention to break with a purely legal approach but warns that his analysis might still be disappointing to political scientists and to sociologists. To anyone hoping to find here a study in the nature of those by Crozier on French Civil Servants, this work will indeed be frustrating; it is a detailed catalogue of rules which govern the French administrative system. I admit a certain fondness for the exact presentation of laws and decrees in the full regalia of their serial number, year, month and day of printing; such as . . . "the Decree of 9 August 1953, which took effect on 1 September 1953 and was amended by a decree of 26 December of the same year . . ." or "Decree No. 62-805 of 17 July 1962 and No. 62–114 of 1 October 1962 (obtained) that on the following 1 December the minimum salary, which had been raised to 3.153 francs as from 1 October 1962, would be 3.665 new francs. . . ." But this fondness should not be taxed too much.

The author describes the various categories of Civil Servants; presents in one of the better chapters the French conception of the Civil Service, giving proper importance to status, security and formation of closed groups; he presents the system of recruitment at various levels of the service, but, strangely enough, is far too brief on the National School of Administration. I doubt the uninformed reader will realize that there are two separate entrance examinations, one for students and one for civil servants. That the segregation of civil servants from students has not produced the effects desired should have been added reason for presenting more fully the system devised in 1946 and for analyzing the reasons explaining its failure to obtain the desired in-service promotion from middle to upper ranks. The reader is introduced to the complicated French system of promotion and rating; to the rules regarding pay, pension, social benefits, leaves of absence, secondment and right to collective bargaining.

Throughout his analysis the author makes constant and welcome comparisons with British and American legislation and to a lesser but still large extent with the German, Belgian and Swiss systems. These comparisons give some air to an analysis which tends to be suffocating and often help to clarify French regulations by setting them between opposites; for example the comparison between the U.S., the British and the French conceptions of the relationship between civil servant and work-position is very clearly presented.

Regretfully, the author did not draw much on his extensive knowledge of the French Civil Service to describe actual situations and practices. For example it would have been interesting to know how Communists are in fact barred from sensitive positions or from taking civil service examinations notwithstanding laws preventing discrimination on political grounds; or how many and what kind of civil servants take advantage of the rules favoring their running for elections and sitting in parliament. The serious problems created by civil servants serving on the personal cabinets of ministers are only briefly analyzed and lack illustrations. The disaffection for the Civil Service due to low pay could easily have been documented; the evidence is readily available on the quality of candidates sitting the E.N.A. or Polytechnique examinations, and on the number of them leaving school or the civil service after graduation.

The clear and logical ordering of chapters, sections and subsections in the table of contents compensates, to a limited extent, for the absence of an index.—J. A. Laponce, *The University of British Columbia.*

Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia. By Sidney I. Ploss. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 312. $6.50.)

This is a disappointing and irritating book. Dr. Ploss, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, is a Kremlinologist whose main thesis here is that one-man decision making is rarely present in the Kremlin. From 1953–1963, Ploss says, one could single out three distinct groupings of political forces: authoritarian centralists (Malenkov, Molotov, Suslov, Kozlov *et al.*); centrists (Khrushchev and his followers); and reformers (Khrushchev and his followers). To illustrate his point, he attempts to show how these groups clashed over agricultural policy. The book, however, is not about agricultural problems. Professor Ploss states that he has used no specialized agricultural journals or newspapers since his main interest is policy-making among Soviet leaders. In effect, he read all the central party and state organs from 1953–1963, took from them most of the major references to agriculture and then, it seems to me, tried to fit the speeches and proclamations into his master plan.

Even so, one would be grateful if Professor Ploss had indeed proved that the behavior of Soviet leaders is usually consistent with their place in his spectrum of political groupings. He does not do so. Take, for example, the case of Matskevich, presently Minister of Agriculture of the USSR. When we first encounter him in 1955 Matskevich (101) has just become Minister of Agriculture, a victory for the Khrushchev forces. But power apparently corrupted Matskevich so by 1959 (177) we find him an "authoritarian." Thus the liberal reader is pleased when Matskevich is replaced by "M. A. Ol'shanskiy (205), an agricultural scientist, which foreshadowed the ministry's conversion to a scientific research establishment, avowedly on the initiative of Khrushchev." Poor Khrushchev, however, just didn't know how to separate the conservatives from the reformers for in 1962 "Ol'shanskiy of the

(257) generally 'conservative' body of agricultural scientists was replaced . . . by a utilitarian party boss, Pysin," thus marking another blow by Khrushchev against the conservatives. To some observers, these episodes might suggest that other factors, i.e., performance in office, personality clashes, the state of agriculture might have had something to do with the administrative shifts. Professor Ploss, however, steadfastly attributes every change to the clash of reformers with conservatives.

Throughout, one finds faulty logic. Ovechkin, a writer on agriculture, in 1952 praises the practice of raising rank-and-file farmers to the position of *kolkhoz* chairman. Khrushchev says the same thing, almost *ten* years later, and this is used as one proof that Ovechkin is Khrushchev's "agent." *Izvestiya* attacks money scandals in the Ministry of Agriculture four months before a big meeting on agriculture and Ploss assures us (161) that these exposures were part of Khrushchev's plans to discredit the authoritarian centralists. A 1958 party decree (138) condemning Stalinist practices in the regulation of music becomes, in the author's interpretation, a veiled attack against the authoritarian centralists' agricultural views. How, one wishes to shout, does Ploss know these things?

The author's treatment of the problem of the conversion of collective farms into state farms is typical of his whole approach. Khrushchev, we are told, struggled mightily to stop these amalgamations which were (217) a pet project of the authoritarian centralists, Suslov and Kozlov. Nowhere in this whole book is there one quotation from these latter gentlemen to substantiate Ploss' view. Instead, Matskevich (176), we learn, is their spokesman. In a December, 1959 speech, "Indeed Matskevich even advocated the merger of economically weak kolkhozes with strong kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This, of course, was sharply at odds with the viewpoint which Khrushchev had expressed at the 21st party Congress." First, the use of the word "even" indicates that Ploss may not know that party policy from 1954 on had generally approved of the conversion of some weak kolkhozes into sovkhozes. Second, Ploss unaccountably fails to note Matskevich's opening remarks in this very same speech. For Matskevich directly quotes Khrushchev's words at the 21st party Congress and *agrees* with the former Soviet leader that the two forms of agriculture, sovkhoz and kolkhoz will develop separately, but ultimately will merge into one form of "communist property." Further on, in the same speech, Matskevich (authoritarian centralist that he is) declares that the state farms are too undemocratic in their administrative structure to serve as a model for agricultural organization under communism. Fourth, Leonid I. Brezhnev, in his March, 1965, speech, without specifically mentioning Khrushchev's name, indicated that one of Khrushchev's main faults was the excessive conversion of collective into state farms. Fifth, Brezhnev and Kosygin, having denounced the Khrushchev policy, have now placed Matskevich, whom Ploss would have us believe strongly favored the conversion policy, in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture.

In short, the book is both a poor example of Kremlinology and an inaccurate guide to Soviet agricultural problems.—Allen B. Ballard, Jr., *City University of New York.*

Political Succession in the USSR. By Myron Rush. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xv, 223. $5.95.)

For twentieth century autocracies the problem of transferring the mantle of authority from one leader to another in some kind of orderly fashion has been a peculiarly troublesome one, given the powerful, almost exclusive position of the leader in these systems and their rejection of tradition, their revolutionary attack on legitimacy, the absence of offices of authority, etc. In the case of the Soviet Union the question seemed largely an academic one for the space of nearly three decades, while Stalin exercised his monopoly of political power. In the last dozen years the significance of the question has been brought home to us all, prompting some—and Myron Rush among them—to conclude that, though it may not be the Achilles heel by which the Soviet system is to be destroyed, the succession problem is at least the source of recurrent, inevitable crises.

Rush's brief inquiry into the problem is provocative but also disappointing. He begins in a summary, even casual fashion, sketching some common-sense observations on the nature of successions and relating his observations in an equally summary way to the leadership changes following the deaths of Lenin and Stalin. The conclusion that he draws is that it is the peculiar weakness of the Soviet system that it can function effectively only when headed by a powerful, perhaps autocratic leader, yet the system formally rejects such a role, obliging each new head to win acceptance through a long and probably bitter contest. Though in both successions it was the party secretary who was victorious, it was not the office itself which mattered but simply the opportunities it afforded for competing more effectively. Rush speculates that the party Central Committee might seize the initiative in a succession crisis, naming a single candidate to top posts in both party and government, but he rejects the possibility at once as requiring the Central Committee to place itself in bondage to a new master at the moment when it has been freed from the old.

In like manner he dismisses the possibility of an aging leader designating his successor in a way which might be made effective.

The succession is likely thus to develop as a relatively unregulated conflict among competing interests and among ambitious candidates, a type of conflict, experience indicates, which may continue for a considerable time. It is Rush's principal argument that this conflict introduces a new element in Soviet politics, calling for a new interpretative theory. And the theory Rush suggests is what he terms a "cyclical theory," by which he means that we ought not to expect the Soviet system to function in a stable way or with consistent policies but rather in phases which repeat themselves in the following order: "a stable phase of personal rule in which it is difficult for the disaffection that exists in Soviet society to gain political expression; an unstable phase of succession crisis, in which dissident groups within the regime have an improved opportunity to influence politics; and a final phase, in which either the crisis is resolved, resulting in some modification of the regime and a new stability, or, what is conceivable but improbable, the dissolution of the Soviet regime." The theory is of limited value, Rush agrees, for it suggests no particular strategy for the West but only the urgency of recognizing the "variability of the Soviet regime" and hence the necessity for flexible strategies. If a more direct conclusion can be drawn, it is that the second phase is a paralyzing one during which political energies are devoted chiefly to resolving the succession crisis, leadership is able to perform only an "arbitral function," and the system can do little more than mark time.

Given the modest nature of his interpretative theory, Rush is forced back in his exploration of the Khrushchev succession to the uncertainties of personalities, offices, and policies. Among the questions he examines are: the degree to which Khrushchev manipulated offices beneath him to prepare for the succession, thereby weakening his own position; the effort Khrushchev made to replace Stalin's system of mutual surveillance by competing institutions with his own system of reliance on the party machine exclusively, its loyalty to be assured by deliberate segmentation of the machine and by rotation in office; the roles of figures such as Brezhnev, the "heir-presumptive," Podgorny, the "counter-heir," Kirilenko, the balancing figure in the party's Russian Bureau, etc. The conclusions Rush draws are frankly speculative as well as suggestive.

The study is disappointing in its failure to explore the ongoing features of the Soviet system as they may be affected by the succession problem. To what extent, for example, might we anticipate that the stimulus provided by the succession crisis to the formation of effective intra-party fractions might cut away at the party's traditional monolithic principle? Or, again, might not the form of collective leadership, characteristic of the leadership succession conflict, move the Soviet Union toward an oligarchic system? Or, more broadly, might it be useful to suggest a "developmental" rather than "cyclical" theory of Soviet politics with the expectation that succession crises may serve as the principal focal points for transformation of the traditional Soviet system, which in turn may modify the pattern of future successions?—ROBERT S. SULLIVANT, *University of Missouri at St. Louis.*

Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries. BY NILS ANDRÉN. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964. Pp. 241. 28 Sw.kr.)

Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits. BY MORRIS DAVIS. (Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1963. Pp. 136. 28.75 D.kr.)

Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress. BY VINCENT H. MALMSTRÖM. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Searchlight, 1965. Pp. 128. $1.45.)

Iceland: Reluctant Ally. BY DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961. Pp. xiii, 213. $4.50.)

When Professor Andrén's *Modern Swedish Government* was noted in the March, 1962, issue of this REVIEW, it was pointed out (p. 203) that surveys in English of Swedish government and politics were relatively abundant, compared to those on her neighbors. Since then, two good books have come out on Norway—Storing's *Norwegian Democracy* (see this REVIEW for June, 1964) and Valen and Katz' *Political Parties in Norway* (see this REVIEW for March, 1965)—and two fascinating case studies have appeared on Iceland, as described below. Still neglected are Denmark and Finland. Andrén has stopped the gap with his *Governments and Politics in the Nordic Countries*, which covers Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The last English-language multi-nation survey of Scandinavian governments appeared in 1951.

Following a brief introduction, the author takes the five countries in turn, each in a section of several chapters on constitutional history, the franchise, legislative procedure, the executive, the administration, and political parties. Apart from passing reference to public opinion and pressure groups, the approach is institutional. A final section compares the categories of the previous ones and ends with chapters on local government and Scandinavian regionalism, respectively. Ten pages on the institutions of local government in five countries is too much or too little; the chapter either should be expanded or deleted.

Otherwise, the author, who is chairman of the political science department at Stockholm University, has done an excellent job of portraying the salient governmental features of the five Northern countries.

Andrén's book is necessarily contemporaneous. Professor Malmström—geographer at Middlebury College in Vermont—takes a different tack, primarily historical and geopolitical. *Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress* traces the international relations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, both among themselves and with the rest of the world. Slightly more emphasis is given to modern times. Malmström and Andrén can well be read together as introduction or refresher. The latter would have been improved as a reference work by the addition of a general index.

The two major issues which have dominated Icelandic politics since the end of the second World War have been dissected in a pair of case studies. Each is well written and has the virtue of relating internal political configurations—public, parties, pressure groups, and political institutions—to external relations.

In *Iceland: Reluctant Ally,* Dr. Donald Nuechterlein portrays Iceland's stance in the Cold War, as reflected in domestic policy toward the United States' NATO airbase at Keflavik. The story centers on the Icelandic parliament's 1956 decision (since rescinded) to demand the expulsion of American armed forces. The author did his research while serving as press officer of the United States Embassy in Reykjavik.

Professor Davis, now of Illinois, spent less time in Iceland than did Nuechterlein, and did not learn the language. He relied judiciously upon interviews in English and upon translations of documents and periodicals. In *Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits,* Davis describes the 1958 extension of exclusive fishing boundaries to twelve miles which culminated in the codfish war between Iceland and Great Britain.

For the intellectual voyager, these books open four more paths to the Northern countries of Europe.—Stanley V. Anderson, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

Finland in Crisis 1940–1941: A study in small-power politics. By Anthony F. Upton. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. 318. $7.50.)

Aristotle's approach to the fall of the tragic hero can be interpreted in two ways: a fatal flaw, which makes the hero's fall inevitable and removes his actions from the realm of moral judgment, or an error in judgment, which is the result of deliberate choice among real alternatives, and which therefore can be criticized. Tragedy, of course, characterizes the lives of nations as well as fiction. Nowhere in political life is the importance of the meaning of tragedy clearer than in the fate of smaller nations in the Second World War. Finland was perhaps an extreme example. During the Winter War in 1939–1940 the Finns were almost universally acclaimed as heroes, but the military collapse of Finland in 1944 saddened few outside that country.

Whether Finnish leaders had real policy alternatives during the Second World War is still a very important political question. Apologists for wartime Finnish policy argue that Finnish leaders did only what they had to do, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the catastrophe which faced defeated Finland in 1944. These apologists, of whom the most important is Arvi Korhonen, maintain that after the Winter War Finland had no choice but to seek assistance in strengthening its defences wherever such assistance was available. As it turned out, only Germany was willing and able to sell arms to Finland. German assistance was paid for by the granting of transit rights over Finnish territory to German troops en route to occupied Norway. From this transit agreement the road led to Finish participation in Operation Barbarossa, and to *Waffenbrüderschaft* with Adolf Hitler. Those who argue, on the other hand, that the war of 1941–1944 could have been avoided, judge Finnish political leaders of those years severely indeed. The most vigorous attack upon these leaders came from an American scholar, C. Leonard Lundin, in his important study of *Finland in the Second World War.*

At long last an objective umpire has appeared. Upton, a young British historian with few axes to grind, has provided an honest and factually detailed picture of the controversial events between the Treaty of Moscow in March, 1940, and the outbreak of war between Germany (and Finland) and the Soviet Union in June, 1941. It is now clear that the possibilities for Finnish neutrality after March, 1940, either in cooperation with Sweden or alone, were substantially greater than apologists for Finnish policy have conceded. There were real alternatives, and most Finnish political leaders did not even bother to explore them. Among these leaders only J. K. Paasikivi, then Ambassador to Moscow, seriously attempted to ensure that the Winter War would be Finland's last war. When it became clear to Paasikivi that his government was willing to initiate a war of revenge to undo the harsh terms of the Treaty of Moscow, he resigned.

The official Finnish policy, of course, could hardly be publicized. The four or five members of the inner circle of the government therefore lied to Parliament, to the less powerful members of the Cabinet, and even to each other. Candor was reserved for dealings with the Germans, since it was assumed that the new world order would be German. General Halder wrote in his diary in early June, 1941: "The Finnish High Command has squared its plans with ours and seems to be going at it with every ounce of energy." Upton concludes that the inner circle of the Finnish leadership was "guilty of one terrible error of judgement . . . the destiny of nations, even of small nations, is determined by the choices of men, not by impersonal historical forces." Even if this is true, it does not apply to ordinary Finns, who were not permitted to discuss—let alone to decide—their impending fate. When Operation Barbarossa had been implemented, Finland's largest newspaper, the historical voice of Finnish liberalism, proclaimed that Finland must be grateful to Hitler for his protection. Long rows of white crosses in every Finnish village suggest that this expression of gratitude was premature.—MARVIN RINTALA, *Boston College.*

The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation. BY HENRY FRANK GOODNOW. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 328. $6.75.)

The first duty of anyone asked to review this book would seem to be to dispel the ambiguity of its title for readers not familiar with Pakistan's governmental arrangements. In Pakistan there are many "civil services," superior and subordinate, of which "The Civil Service of Pakistan" is only one, an elite corps of a few hundred "generalists" at the top of the heap. It is the Pakistani equivalent of the British "administrative class." The book under review is a study of this power elite, with only tangential references to Pakistan's other "Central Superior Services," such as the Foreign Service, the Audits and Accounts Service, and the Police Service.

Goodnow first became "extremely interested in the Civil Service of Pakistan and in its predecessor, the Indian Civil Service," while serving (1954–57) "as a public administration member" of a University of Pennsylvania team responsible for establishing an Institute of Public and Business Administration at the University of Karachi. (p. vii) In 1959 he completed a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University entitled "The CSP: An Appraisal of the Higher Civil Service in the Governing of Pakistan." The present book is an outgrowth of the dissertation.

Factually, the book seems to me sound and as comprehensive as one could reasonably expect it to be. Gathering the materials for it was in itself no small accomplishment, and no mean contribution to our growing body of data about Asian and African bureaucracies. My own experience in Pakistan during part of the period that Goodnow was there suggests that he probably had to contend, among other things, with insufficient and fragmented sources of information, distrust of the motives of his research, a tradition of secrecy in governmental affairs, and a very high degree of sensitivity and self-protectiveness on the part of most CSP members. Merely as a source of reliable factual information on one important Asian bureaucratic elite, his book has value.

It is, however, intended to be far more than a "fact-book" on the CSP. Goodnow's real goal is to present his comprehensive personal *evaluation* of this elite corps "as a Participating Institution in the Governing of Pakistan." (Part of the title of Chapter 10)

In my estimation, he succeeds rather well at this, though I may be led astray by the coincidence of so many of his value judgments with my own. On the other hand, it can be said that they "jibe" also, in all essentials at least, with the findings of Rowland Egger and Bernard Gladieux in studies never released for general circulation outside Pakistan and largely suppressed there. (Egger's study, "The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan," was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and submitted to the Pakistan government in November, 1953; Gladieux's, entitled "Reorientation of Pakistan Government for National Development," was done for the Pakistan Planning Board in 1955.) Less sweepingly critical of the CSP is Ralph Braibanti's "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis" (*South Atlantic Quarterly,* Vol. 58 [Spring, 1959], pp. 258–304). However, this interesting and well written essay is not really comparable with Goodnow's work or with the Egger and Gladieux reports. It is not similarly comprehensive in its intended scope; it is an examination of the implications of the CSP's "generalist" and "literary" traditions and biases for Pakistani administration and national development. Goodnow comes much closer to telling "the whole truth" about the CSP, it seems to me.

"The whole truth" is complex. Examined in the book are the origins of CSP attitudes, traditions, and procedures; recruitment and training policies; the multiple roles played by CSP officers at central, provincial, and local levels; CSP relations with the President, politicians, the public, and "other bureaucracies" (civilian and military); the "secretariat system" of administration which has been one of the main safeguards of CSP dominance; the "generalist versus specialist" problem (Braibanti's essential theme); and CSP control over the assignment, promotion, pay, perquisites, and discipline of its own members. The picture that emerges is that of an extremely influential, prestigious, self-conscious, self-protective, and tradition-bound elite. The great question raised by the book (and by other studies of Pakistani public administration) concerns, not the competence, dedication, and integrity of individual CSP members, but the CSP as an institution. Does it not need to be modernized and modified and brought into better balance with the other elements of Pakistan's political system? Egger, Gladieux, Braibanti, Goodnow (and Beckett) think yes.

Though it certainly should be read by anyone interested in Pakistan or in comparative public administration generally, the book is not without some obvious weaknesses. Most importantly, it has been outrun by events, always a major hazard of this type of research. The great bulk of Goodnow's data and insights are pre-1958. He has tried to remedy this situation by adding a chapter on developments under Ayub Khan. Inevitably, this chapter (Chapter 11) is sketchy and incomplete. Whether the new regime will effect any fundamental change in the CSP, and its role in the governance of Pakistan, remains an unknown. The same problem creates a stylistic difficulty (I would in any case describe the book's literary style as competent but not distinguished). Goodnow is hard put to know when to use the present tense and when the past. The result is a good deal of jumbling of tenses which ultimately becomes a minor irritant to the reader, as well as being the source of some ambiguity. Finally, Chapter 1 of the book, in which Goodnow undertakes to provide a conceptual and perceptual matrix for his analysis by generalizing about "Bureaucracy and Political Power in the New States," seems to me rather weak.—Paul L. Beckett, *Washington State University.*

The Civil Service in New African States. By A. L. Adu. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 242. $6.00.)

The luxury of precision and certainty that Louis XIV demonstrated with his egotistical provocation *"L'état, c'est moi"* is lost to the contemporary political world. Today the state cannot be packaged so neatly. What is the *"moi"* of the complex modern state and particularly the developing African states: the leader with exceptional skills and appeal; masses with the vote and veto; nationalist movement with its arsenal of non-violent and violent weapons; dominant political party; powerful economic enterprises and related trade associations and labor unions; government, or civil service? Clearly none by itself is accepted as the state, for in some measure, varying considerably to be sure, all participate in its composition and power structure. In British Africa the Colonial Service locally came close to being the *"moi,"* never completely however, but the civil service in the successor states inherited no such power. The politics of nationalism, as well as the manner in which the British Government handed its responsibilities over to African political leaders, resulted in a diminished though by no means negligible position for the civil service in these new states formerly under British rule. Its influence, if far from supreme, is nonetheless weighty for obvious reasons: traditions of "strong" administration; government direction of programs for economic development and nation-building; extensive public sector activities, and wide-spread approbation of African socialism as the public ideology. Hence, there has emerged national civil services deemed critically essential to but not dominating the ships of state in Africa. It is to this version of the civil service in former British African dependencies Mr. Adu addresses his inquiry in this work.

An authority of impeccable credentials and incomparable experience in the civil service field, Mr. Adu, Ghanaian by nationality and an international civil servant, has delineated with sharp clarity his aim in writing this study, an aim that fixes the span of coverage, sets the direction, and imposes certain limitations. Through it, he is endeavoring, as he says, to help Africans "understand the principles which have applied to the establishment and structure of the system of public service we have inherited as well as the policies which governments have adopted for its future development." In as much as British civil service traditions are his point of departure, he makes no attempt to apply his observations to services drawing upon the French or Belgian traditions. Such an approach, it may be noted, stands in considerable contrast to an alternate approach centering around "development administration" as being pertinent to all developing nations regardless of their imperial ties in the colonial period.

The breadth of Mr. Adu's study, brief as it is, is admirable, for he offers comments deliberately or in passing on most aspects of the topic, including the perplexing problems of Africanization and political loyalty. His method is of his own choosing and will not satisfy fully those readers who prefer the evidence of case studies or insights of anecdotes. As he knows thoroughly of what he writes, the author tends to treat issues and situations in a rather abbreviated and abstract manner.

For example, he examines, as of first importance, the relationship between a minister of the government and a permanent secretary. He recounts that in the British tradition the civil servant of this rank must serve his minister loyally but objectively and in turn the minister should refrain from subverting or compromising politically this type of official. In general terms

Mr. Adu indicates that in Africa both have lessons to learn in this connection, not the least of which is the value of respect and confidence. Yet at no point does Mr. Adu relate some of the actual experiences of permanent secretaries in the last few years or assess the dynamics of actual postures in this regard. The practitioner, no less than the student, may acquire a useful perspective from such a review, regrettably absent. Moreover, he leaves virtually unexplored the theory and practice of the minister-permanent secretary relationship in the prevailing African context, with (a) tendencies towards the emergence of one-party systems in lieu of the bi-party Westminster model with a government and loyal opposition; (b) preference for the "strong executive" type of government with the legislature in a reduced role; (c) personalism in even professional relationships; and (d) gaps in education and experience. It should not be thought that Mr. Adu is unaware of this side of the picture, for his sensitivity to the local conditions is notably evident throughout the study.

To sum up Mr. Adu's thesis, the African states stand to progress through the realization of the basic values of the Whitehall model, such as "integrity, impartiality, efficiency of service, loyalty to the government of the day and devotion to duty." The appropriate conditions for their realization, as well as alternatives, he leaves to other authors to ascertain.—JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN, *Syracuse University.*

From French West Africa to the Mali Federation. BY WILLIAM J. FOLTZ. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965, Pp. xiv, 235. $6.50.)

The contours of the political landscape in French-speaking West Africa are now in the process of being filled in with almost the same startling rapidity that these ten sovereign states acquired independence half a decade ago. Almost overnight, the once meager English-language bookshelf has been filled with such valuable contributions as Ruth Schacter-Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa;* I. M. Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence: Ghana and Ivory Coast;* Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast;* and Victor T. Le Vine, *The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence.* This group is now enlarged by the appearance of William J. Foltz's excellent anatomy of the Mali Federation.

Foltz has sought insight into the nature of transitional politics in West Africa by selecting a focus of analysis rather different from the others cited; rather than examining political parties, or making a "country study," he has explored the compressed life cycle of the Mali Federation (1959–1960). This abortive exercise in super-territorial unification was conceived by its supporters as an effort to achieve decolonization without "balkanization" in the former administrative federation of *Afrique Occidentale Française.* Of the eight former component territories of AOF, only four (Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey) were prepared to consider a joint destiny, and the tentative affiliation of the latter two to the embryonic Mali enterprise lasted only a few weeks. However, Senegal and Soudan did make a serious effort to achieve political unification; they became independent as "Mali" on June 20, 1960, and for two months lived together within the same political framework. Ultimately, the unresolved issue as to whether cohabitation or full union was the goal tore the federation apart; Senegal seceded in August, and Soudan was left with only the new appellation of Mali as a permanent memorial to the stillborn partnership.

Foltz traces the life history of "Mali" as a federation, centering his study primarily upon the Senegal-Soudan relationship; the relationships of the other prospective participants are only peripherally treated. The major part of the work is a political history of the immediate antecedents of the federation, 1956–58, the details of its formation, its functioning, and its rupture. The author describes his objective as the answering of two specific questions: Why was the federation formed? Why did it fail? In providing his answers, he has made excellent use of a wide range of documentary materials, and numerous interviews with key actors during extended field work in 1960–61.

One may detect traces of a determined effort to apply sophisticated methodological techniques to this study. Foltz, however, has been plagued by intractibility of his subject matter, as have many other students of African politics. It proved impossible to utilize a systematic interview schedule, and the political and environmental constraints made interview situations non-comparable, even when comparable questions could be asked. The one offering on the altar of quantification which survived is the weakest chapter in the book, "Economic Integration in French West Africa" (Chapter 3). Based upon Deutschian theory on the relationship between economic transaction flows and integration potential, this section is an opaque analysis of export-import relationships between the ex-AOF territories, with the outcome nothing more than what would be immediately suggested by examination of a railway map. Another mathematical experiment, a content analysis of leading Dakar and Bamako newspapers, has been modestly relegated to the appendices; the latter did yield some interesting data supporting the view that Senegalese politics are more personalized than those in Soudan.

The contribution of this book lies in the discerning, persuasive analysis of the difficulties of knitting together dissimilar political systems. Although both were essentially one-party states, the character of the ruling parties was sharply different. *Union Soudanaise* was a monolithic, disciplined mass movement, which could be counted on to pursue a single purpose. The *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* was an uncertain alliance of radical youths, conservative Muslim marabouts, Lamine Gueye's Dakar patronage net, a highly sophisticated and acculturated elite, and a large mass of peanut farmers. Thus Senegal was always in a fundamentally unequal negotiating position; while the Soudan delegation would be immune to splintering, on any given issue there was likely to be one or more group from the Senegalese side which would defect. The author resists the temptation to impute all misfortune to the former metropole; French influence remains substantial, and Foltz presents a convincing discussion of its means and ends during this period, but without exaggerating its impact on the outcome.

There are points at which the reader's appetite for detail may not be fully satiated. More might have been said, for example, about the short-lived Dahomey and Upper Volta association with the Federation at its early stages. The theoretical discussion of Mali as a case in political integration through federation might have been carried further in drawing more widely from the available body of literature; Deutsch is not the only contributor to this debate.

But to ask all these things perhaps reflects undue greed. There is every cause to be highly pleased with what Foltz has given us: an authoritative, well-written, important contribution to our understanding of African politics.—Crawford Young, *University of Wisconsin.*

An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa. By Leo Kuper. (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1965. Pp. 452. $12.50 cloth, $2.95 paper.)

The political sociology of South Africa cannot escape the calculus of racial conflict, but not many studies go beyond that conclusion. Leo Kuper's skillful and absorbing study starts where others have stopped, illuminating the relationship between differences in the social situations of "the 'upper' occupational strata of African society" and perceptions of political alternatives. The result is a new appreciation of the subtleties of social tension in South Africa and a number of interesting suggestions concerning the significance of class—which Kuper candidly limits to the category of "occupational milieu"—in the determination of African political attitudes.

Bourgeoisie is Kuper's shorthand reference to African professionals, traders, and senior government and municipal clerks who comprise the African upper occupational strata. Inside South Africa they are important for their revolutionary potential, as they are rising groups, struggling on the one hand against traditional birthright prerogatives, as well as against racial privilege on the other. Traditional tribal status and racial distinctions converge in the government's avowed aim of restricting the African's civic position to tribal "citizenship." In this way the embourgeoisification of the African is doubly hostile to official policy and the role of the bourgeoisie invested with oppositionist tendencies by its very existence. Given a shift in the pattern of racial domination, the African bourgeoisie would furnish the new men of power, thereby duplicating the political development of the post-colonial states of tropical Africa.

This is a work of massive but unobtrusive scholarship, informed by obvious but controlled passionate opposition to the systematic depersonalization of human life in South Africa. In documenting the ambivalence of roles and the fragile ambiguity in the positions of these Africans, Kuper indicates that patterns of interracial contact are "complex and varied," retaining certain latent possibilities for racial accommodation. Nevertheless he writes under no illusion about the prospects for the African bourgeoisie. He is well aware that official policy pushes slowly toward eliminating the avenues for political co-operation among the races in South Africa.

"The objective core" of research (Kuper's phrase) is confined to Africans, mostly Zulu, in Durban. Research procedures embrace interviews, questionnaires, the analysis of records and observations growing out of the author's "participation in South African society over many years." The discussion swings gracefully back and forth from considerable detail to general conclusions, accounting for gaps in coverage without apparent loss of significance, although it is probably fair to note that not all of Kuper's description of interpersonal relations are relevant to the interests of political scientists.

What makes the work pertinent to political science is Kuper's abiding concern with the problem of political change, his intense interest in political choice and the role of social situations. Against the background of a society "saturated with racialism" (sketched with masterful cogency), Kuper is engaged in investigating measures of class differentiation and the resulting patterns of attitude and behavior which modify the choices that lie between complete acceptance of the present system of suppression and routinized insecurity and absolute opposition to it by force and violence. One of the major hypotheses emerging from such an investigation—which Kuper approaches first from the viewpoint of perspectives, then by occupational group and finally by modal organizations—is that the nature of the Africans' involvement in racial conflict varies with differences in the social situations of particular groups. Within the bourgeoisie, status incongruity and the type of occupational setting especially affect political choice, although the choice, as one might suspect, lies within the limits set by a general rejection of racial subordination.

Kuper carefully lays out the variables possibly interfering with a monolithic racist rejection of the present system. Occupations differ in the opportunity they provide for interracial contact; e.g., African clergymen deal with White clergymen more than African teachers communicate with their White counterparts (perhaps this contributes to the higher intensity of political involvement on the part of African teachers). Occupations differ also in amount of exposure to competition; e.g., African professionals are less exposed than African traders. Indeed African traders are among the most vulnerable groups within the bourgeoisie, since the promotion of African entrepreneurship conflicts with the aim of restoring traditional societies, it collides with the economic interests of the government's Afrikaner supporters and it creates a base for challenging European power. Occupations may exhibit contradictions between practice and doctrine and thus give rise to varying adjustments to other institutions, etc., etc. In consequence the reader is sensitized to several new dimensions in comprehending patterns of political change.

The author's examination of three cases of associational life—an Advisory Board, a sports association and political organizations—permits a glimmer of hope regarding racial "adjustments." "The politics of football" appears to foster nonracial sentiments in relations with White sports associations. A sort of "balance of racial interests" approach obtains. The desire for international approval or affiliation, coupled with the preparedness of international sports tribunals to withhold valued recognition, have compromised the government's aim of eliminating interracial contact in sport. Without equating sports and politics, Kuper suggests that a similar process may be applicable in the potential role of the United Nations in influencing the course of domestic policy in South Africa. The slight movement toward "deracialization," as exemplified in football (and to a lesser extent in the English-speaking churches), a history of interracial contact, continually enlarging areas of economic interdependence of the races and a rather flexible commitment to apartheid on the part of the Afrikaner government all combine, in Kuper's view, as "forces making for accommodation between the races."

An evaluation of the possibilities for UN sanctions falls outside the author's province, but even if the UN could muster the resources and the determination, Kuper's painstakingly honest and balanced assessments do not allow any more optimism than questioning the complete inexorability of racial civil war. Repeatedly, his sharp observations encapsulate the anguish and frustration of groups whose livelihoods are turned into instruments of self-debasement and self-mockery. As he briskly notes, "A numerous and well-armed ruling class, partly fortified by the religious sanctification of apartheid, may be expected to fight for survival with great determination and ruthlessness." Elsewhere he describes the "totalitarian" sweep of controls over the personal lives of the Africans, leading to brutalization of White and Black alike. While the African political organizations struggle to suppress emotions of race hatred with intellectual rejections of racism, the government "deforms many of its subjects to its own infirmity." Many readers may feel that the evidence assembled by the author does not permit even the tentative hopes pressed forward by him for a nonviolent solution.—HARVEY GLICKMAN, *Haverford College.*

Poor Countries and Authoritarian Rule. By MAURICE F. NEUFELD. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1965. Pp. xiv, 240, $5.00.)

This is a most intriguing book and one which should stimulate thought as well as controversy. The author sets out his theme strikingly in the opening pages: "Astronauts will reach the cold moon long before the nations of the world will lift the curse of poverty from the brow of mankind and secure human dignity as the birthright of all human beings on earth." Of the world's three billion people, two-thirds live at a subsistence level in countries where the per capita national income falls below $200 and the median rate of annual growth in gross national product is the slowest of the nations of the world—thus widening the disparity of wealth between rich and poor nations. Within the latter, nationalist leaders spring forth espousing utopian answers to the poverty issue. With independence, grandiose and all too often impractical schemes, sold by slogans and buttressed by military coercion, produce falling production and further discontent. Ultimately, force predominates and authoritarian political systems are installed in place of popular government.

Professor Neufeld, already established as a highly knowledgeable specialist of Italian economic and political systems, now endeavors to draw from Italy's experiences parallels to happenings in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and contends that "Italy, of all the countries in Europe with extended experience of industrial change . . . even today still resembles most closely the emerging nations of the world in the character of its past and present economic, cultural, political, and social development." This can best be seen through nine major historical propositions which, when taken in broad terms, offer a more or less chronological flow of developments in Italy and similarly in most of the poor countries of the world's developing areas.

Neufeld's analytical approach—and this constitutes most of his book—is to define each of the nine propositions in terms of Italian history and then elaborate their applicability to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He suggests that (1) cultural nationalism usually preceded political nationalism, while foreign rule defined the state's geography and foreign ideas fostered liberation movements; (2) there followed a rejection of these foreign influences and the search for a distinctive national character and mission; (3) but the fulfillment of nationalist goals depended upon international political-economic-social events and, very importantly, changes in world public opinion; (4) the achievement of independence reimplanted awareness of such chronic social maladies as illiteracy and parochialism and caused leaders to extend the central government's authority to counter threats to national solidarity; (5) at the same time, the founding fathers expanded public works and military budgets at the expense of public welfare and entered into relations with other countries that often led to costly adventures in territorial aggrandizement; (6) pre-independence's high expectations were largely nullified with nationhood as economic gulfs widened; (7) repression followed; foreign radical doctrines absorbed early by the intellectuals anticipated effective economic growth by years and froze answers to the challenges of industrial life even before it appeared. (8) These seven historical developments set out certain conditions—an essentially agrarian economy, labor's tie with political groups, and uneven industrial growth that delimited the extent of unionism—which shaped the labor movement and, in turn, societal development. Finally, (9) all of these factors had the cumulative effect of advancing the rise of the authoritarian state, though "that self-proclaimed novel form of government did not advance industrial progress against the backward pull of historical forces any more swiftly than the looser and less involved devices of liberal parliamentary systems." In this regard, Fascism's success lay not in bringing off any economic miracles, but rather in consolidating Party power domestically and upgrading Italy's international prestige—a failure and a feat characteristic of Sukarno, Ne Win, Ayub Khan, Nasser, Ben Bella, Touré, Nkrumah, and Nyerere.

The foregoing list of political leaders implies one of the weaknesses of Neufeld's broad treatment of the historical propositions. For if, as he alleges, they can be applied in general form to all the developing areas (except for his discussion of Proposition 8), only a modest case is made for Latin America. While Sukarno's Indonesia and Nkrumah's Ghana stand at center stage, Castro's Cuba is left outside the stage door. Such an analytical approach will naturally tend to emphasize exemplary models, but if the hypotheses are to possess validity, they must be tested more broadly. Occasionally, too, minor statements of factual interpretation could be challenged—thus, why not rank Costa Rica with Uruguay and Chile as enjoying governmental stability? (p. 154)

On the other hand, much remains to be commended in this study. The propositions themselves provoke interest as focal points for further analysis and the genuine effort at comparative evaluation is laudable. Proposition 8, dealing with labor, is strongly augmented with a lengthy appendix which stands by itself as an insightful survey of the labor movements of Japan, Egypt, Latin America, and the former British West Indies. The author's writing is lively in style and lucidly communicative and his argument rests upon rich documentation. This is an exceptional book which deserves the attention of economists as well as political scientists.—BEN G. BURNETT, *Whittier College.*

Self-Government in Modernizing Nations. EDITED BY J. ROLAND PENNOCK. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1964. Pp. viii, 120. $4.95.)

This small volume of essays, edited by J. Roland Pennock, makes an admirable "first reader" on the problems facing the new nations in their quest for the benefits of modernization. The book is thoughtful and provocative, and it raises many of the significant questions which must be considered in trying to understand the most momentous and dynamic movement of our times. The movement has challenged the world of scholarship; it has also challenged the policy-makers, who have scanty theoretical foundations to support their expensive and sometimes dangerous actions. The title chosen for this volume, while perfectly adequate, shows how difficult it is to find suitable labels to apply to this massive political ferment;

the term "self-government" is too restrictive; "modernizing" does not isolate the subject matter, for the industrial countries are also proceeding with their own "modernization" at breakneck speed; and "nations" seems too precise a word for countries where tribal affinities are strong.

The problem of analyzing and comprehending this development is described by Professor Lucian Pye in a prescient introductory chapter. Professor Pye argues that comparative analysts have reached an impasse, with cultural relativists stressing the unique aspects of the various political systems whereas political modernization assumes the existence of general principles which have not yet been discovered. An escape from this impasse may be found in trying to seek "a clearer understanding of how the contemporary forces at work in the world are likely to affect the particular experiences of currently underdeveloped countries." In this extensive diffusion of culture which we are now witnessing, the "practices, standards, techniques, and values" of the Western industrial world are being "imposited" on the non-Western world and a world culture is developing whose standards are generally recognized as being the essence of modern life. The undeveloped countries are making adjustments to modernity in various ways, reconciling the universals of world culture to the parochial expressions of local culture, and, in Pye's view, this process of blending lies at the heart of the modernization process. It is in this area that the values of democracy can play an important part, and Professor Pye finds a close association between democratization and modernization.

However, in practice, the new countries have not found it easy to adjust the parochial claims of traditional life to the requirements of a Western-type political and legal system, and some of the difficulties they have encountered are discussed by Francis X. Sutton, who as an officer of the Ford Foundation has been professionally concerned with strengthening African institutions. Self-government for African states was advocated by many Westerners on moral grounds, Mr. Sutton points out, but the countries achieving independence have been "uncertainly equipped" to man their own affairs. The negotiations for independence were carried through under the assumption that Europeans would continue to serve African governments, but in many countries where this trained cadre has been largely replaced by local talent there has been a deterioration in administrative standards.

The chapter contributed by Professor Thomas L. Hodgkin is entitled, "The Relevance of 'Western' Ideas for the New African States," but the placing of quotation marks around the word Western puts us on our guard that there is doubt in some quarters about the appropriateness of the adjective. And so there is. Professor Hodgkin does not develop the topic, basing his reticence on what he calls the confusion about the meaning of Western ideas, a misunderstanding of the political process of modern African states, and "the lack of an adequate frame of historical reference." He prefers to stress the elements of freshness in African political thinking, thereby dispelling "the illusion that Western democratic ideas have been exported to Africa in the same kind of way as bicycles." However, the Hodgkin explanation of African development seems too particularistic, too contrived, and does not ring true for many parts of Africa.

Professor Hodgkin quotes Tom Paine, "I support your revolutions," and challenges the "British Burkes" who try to frighten him with the reminder that revolutions have a habit of eating their children and their sympathizers. "In that case," he says, "I must be content to be eaten." While Professor Hodgkin is waiting for the faggots to be lit, or the pot to boil, the problems remain. To take one example, a great deal of constructive work is being devoted to "modernizing" African law and building it into a broadly-based legal system, and in this enterprise the applicability of Western concepts is constantly relevant.

In the chapter "Communism and the Emerging Nations, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that we are now living in an age where "nations are being shaped consciously and developed purposely" and that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is "inadequate as a framework for analysis of the complex phenomena of the contemporary world." Many intellectuals of the new nations, he says, have found attractive such theories as that proposed by Walt Whitman Rostow in *The Stages of Economic Growth.* Whether this is good or bad economic history, "it is an excellent foundation for an ideology of transition," it gives a sense of mission to the elites, and it also gives them some notion of when their mission is concluded. A sense of purpose and ends is necessary "if these countries are to go through a stage of development which is rapid yet does not involve a commitment to totalitarianism."

The volume concludes with a chapter on American policy toward political development, contributed by W. Howard Wriggins, a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. Most of the crises of the past fifteen years have occurred with the emerging countries, Mr. Wriggins says, and he discusses a series of problems which face the policy-makers in Washington. We are now back on square one, to the headlines which we put aside when picking up the book, and we are confronted with problems ranging from guerilla insurgency to the overthrow of long-standing tyranny.—ROLAND YOUNG, *Northwestern University.*

Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration. BY EDWARD W. WEIDNER. (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964. Pp. xi, 247. $8.00.)

No dimension of technical assistance overseas holds greater potential interest for political scientists than the work in public administration. Here, uniquely, as compared with agriculture, public health, education, civil engineering, or community development, knowledge and theory of political science is required, and the field experience gained can contribute to our expanding interest in comparative government and political development. It is ironically disappointing that, nevertheless, the aid administering agencies have made limited use of political scientists, and those who have gone on overseas assignments in public administration have, for their part, contributed little to the growth of theory and knowledge in our discipline.

Among the notable exceptions to this generalization is Edward W. Weidner. Emerging from the main stream of political science, with a primary interest in American local government, he went on to serve as chairman of the political science department at Michigan State University, where he first became involved in technical assistance by helping to establish a contract program of that university in Viet Nam. Subsequently, as director of the Institute of Research on Overseas Programs at Michigan State, from 1957–1961, Weidner carried on extensive overseas interviewing and observation in 23 countries of Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, as well as the headquarters of the United Nations and American private and public agencies sponsoring overseas programs. As vice chancellor of the East-West Center in Hawaii, subsequently, he has continued his interest in this field, and played an active role in the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration.

Weidner himself is one of the first to admit the limited horizons which have handicapped operating programs tackled through public administration assistance as contained within the "triple threat" of personnel, budgeting-finance, and organization and methods. (p. 19) The extent and character of these programs is fully and lucidly described in the first two-thirds of his book: part one dealing with "Programs" and part two with "Results." Under programs, Weidner describes the stated goals of the major operating agencies, which are also characterized as to operating methods. The backgrounds and orientations of the key personnel involved in the agencies, in the field teams, and in the host governments are also described.

The second part of the book describes the academic impact of the programs on the curricula, students, teaching methods, and research output of the beneficiary institutions, and explains why the impact on the host governments, through in-service and "participant" training, and through consultation and other techniques has been generally modest if not inconsequential. Weidner acknowledges that various defects in the programs—poor techniques, inadequate personnel, organizational weaknesses, shortsighted goals—have been partially responsible. But a deeper explanation, he thinks, lies in the gap between the available theoretical framework and socio-political and administrative realities. He writes:

> Public administration's response to the challenge of political, social, and economic development has been one of means unrelated to ends, of enshrining the so-called principles of public administration the world around regardless of the goals or the conditions surrounding a particular administrative system. (p. 159)

The third part of the book, entitled "Significance," gives Weidner's analysis of the political and economic context of administrative reform, stresses the educational system in relation to the preparation of civil servants and the socialization of citizens for participation in governmental processes, and advocates a developmental perspective as the key to effective use of technical assistance in public administration.

Weidner pinpoints the crucial political basis of administrative development. He writes: " . . . in some cases national development and administrative change will have to await greater political maturity," "Effective leadership and stability at a responsible level greatly facilitate the improvement of administration . . . " and "The bureaucracies of the less developed countries tend to be both powerful and isolated. Their position of power encourages them in a lack of responsibility. Their isolation contributes to their lack of responsiveness." (pp. 162, 167, 169)

A more effective approach to technical assistance in public administration would evolve, Weidner believes, if it were based on the concept of "development administration." For him,

> Development administration is the process of guiding an organization toward the achievement of development objectives. It is action oriented, and it places administration at the center in facilitating the attainment of development objectives. (p. 200)

It is not clear to this reviewer, however, whether the initiative for stating and enforcing developmental goals can be taken by officials in a state bureaucracy, or whether the goals can be attained, if so defined, without the support of powerful organizations including even a mass movement political party outside the bureaucracy.

Weidner states that the "administrative base" for development administration consists of two elements:

> First, the personnel that man the bureaucracy must be sympathetic to, even positively concerned with, national development, in addition to having administrative, professional, and technical capability. Second, administrative organization, procedures, and processes must be adapted to furthering development ends. Both elements are based on the assumption, of course, that development politics has set goals for the nation as a whole. (p. 207)

But this is precisely the most troublesome point. As Weidner's book amply demonstrates, technical assistance has been most effective in those countries where political institutions and leadership have provided a framework for energizing and rewarding officials who dedicate themselves to the tasks of modernization. But where such institutions are lacking or ineffective, where power rests predominantly in rather than outside of the bureaucracy, it is not clear how foreign advisers can help generate them. "The task of technical assistance in public administration," Weidner says, "is to further both of the elements of development administration—as well as to give what assistance it can to furthering development politics." (207)

No doubt it was not within the scope of the volume under review to consider how foreign aid can be used to further "development politics," yet until we have learned more about the processes of political change and how they are, or can be, influenced by conscious design, it is this reviewer's conviction that we may be helping to create, through our technical assistance programs, precisely the opposite results of those we aim at. "If an efficient bureaucracy is developed," Weidner writes, "ahead of a strong political system, the desirable balance between them is lacking." (p. 166) Yet without such a balance, a country may be heading either for a breakdown and stagnation, or for autocracy and tyranny.—FRED W. RIGGS, *M.I.T., on leave, 1965–66.*

The African World, A Survey of Social Research. ED. FOR THE AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION BY ROBERT A. LYSTAD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 575. $15.00.)

A comprehensive inventory of accumulated knowledge and research needs and achievements in the African field has been compiled under the sponsorship of the African Studies Association. The majority of the contributors would be generally acknowledged as the ranking Africanists in their respective fields. Although the coverage and focus of the 18 chapters is somewhat uneven, and some were submitted long before publication, overall this inter-disciplinary inquest into the state of Arican studies has produced a valuable reference volume.—M. C. Y.

Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929–1946. BY THEODORE FRIEND. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 312. $7.50.)

There is a newness and freshness of flavor about this volume which in the reviewer's judgment give it considerable value. The author's readable writing style and his excellent scholarship, in which a number of relatively untapped sources are employed, contribute to this conclusion. Indeed it is clear that unusually good use was made of original materials in this study. These include the Philippines National Library's Quezoniana Collection (where papers of both Quezon and Osmeña are located), the papers of Jose P. Laurel, captured Japanese documents, materials from the National Archives in Washington, the papers of W. Cameron Forbes, J. R. Hayden, and Henry L. Stimson, the archives of the Roosevelt Memorial Library, and several other sources. Also, use is made of a vast assortment of individual interviews, quite a number of which appear to be significant. An excellent final section of the work is devoted to a review of source materials. Being nearly exhaustive, this section is very valuable and should be of great help to scholars in diverse disciplines.

The study is full of details and insights which are significant and interesting. Much of this underscores what was already known, but almost invariably in so doing the author uses some new materials and thus sheds new light. At other places new information emerges.

Friend's commentary on the movement for independence is one of the many interesting sections of the book. The reluctance of many Filipinos to move into the sphere of full independence was of course known. Friend's documentation makes it clear, however, that this sentiment was rather widespread.

The personalities of both Quezon and Osmeña are set in fuller perspective than is usually the case in such studies. The scope of the Quezonian drive, determination, maneuverability, and duplicity are interestingly brought out at various places in the volume. Perhaps in this connection the Hare-Hawes Cutting—Tydings-McDuffie controversy is among the most revealing. Through all of this the popularity of Quezon and his tremendous ability show clearly. His political instincts were extremely sharp and they reinforced his almost animalistic affinity for power. Yet in this connection the reader often finds himself immensely sympathetic to Osmeña whose constitutionalism, reserve, detachment, and essential decency gave him weapons, which however, were inadequate in themselves for conflict with Quezon. Perhaps, nevertheless, they were sufficient to give him a unique moral position in Philippine history.

Among the many important topics discussed in the book is the brief consideration given to the American military policy prior to the second world war. This is a matter which many Americans may prefer to ignore because it does not present a very flattering picture. Neither the glow of Fil-American friendships, nor the glories of MacArthur's return, nor even the unique compliment of consistent Filipino backing for the United States erases the essential fact that the United States was not prepared to defend the Philippines adequately. Since the Philippines was a territory under American sovereignty, the United States had an obligation to be prepared for a real defense. Lacking the ability or determination to do so, this country should have abandoned the archipelago early enough so that the Philippines could make her own adjustment to Japanese power. With a singular disregard for essentials the United States did neither, and for this folly there was needless death and suffering. But this is really part of a more comprehensive international ineptness which was the natural offspring of isolationist philosophy. The Philippines was merely an unintended victim.

In summary, Friend's interesting and readable work represents a real contribution to knowledge about the Philippines. It should be widely read and well received.—H. B. Jacobini, *Southern Illinois University.*

Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade. Compiled and edited by Stewart Fraser (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 542. $10.00.)

The relation between education and politics in 20th century totalitarianism is generally regarded as a key to important political questions. The bearing of a refined intellectual tradition on the emergence of modern dictatorships, and vice versa, continues to be the object of probing investigation. Because hard information about this relationship in Communist China is still relatively so inadequate, we are prepared to welcome every serious effort to increase our knowledge and deepen our understanding. We have seen what education's role proved to be in European totalitarianism. We suspect that the subservience of education to politics on the Chinese mainland is similar, but more so. But facts are not easy to come by.

In the volume under review Professor Fraser presents us with a three-tiered study of the topic. One is reminded of insulated tiers because there is little passage back and forth between layers. The first 69 pages present the compiler's capsule review of principal trends in higher education under the Communists mainly in the decade 1950–60 plus preliminary remarks on the period after 1944. The next 336 pages provide 48 speeches, articles, and documents on—or related to—education within the inclusive dates, February 1944 to October 1960. These, in the words of the subtitle, comprise "Records of the First Decade." The final 84 pages are devoted to a bibliography of English language works under 17 headings dealing mainly with educational matters but including some more general historical background. A preliminary bibliographic essay will be helpful to those outside the China field who are unacquainted with the major translation agencies. These are described in clear detail and identify, at the same time, the sources of documents in this compilation.

First, a word about the compilation. Always, of course, there is an inherent interest in a statement of any kind from someone near the heart of a vast social upheaval like China's. We want especially to hear the voices of shapers of policy. These are indicators of what is going on. But organized indicators are more useful than a random selection, and to this reviewer this collection appears to be little more than random. The only principle of order is chronology: two documents in 1944, one in 1949, the remainder spread over ten years averaging four and a half documents per year. Yet we are promised that "Here . . . are outlined the plans and ideals for all levels of education as a means of reshaping China. . . " When will the publishing industry be held to account for reasonable standards of truth-in-packaging? Aside from a single document dealing with standards of conduct for middle school students and passing references elsewhere to elementary levels, they deal almost exclusively with higher education and the intelligentsia as a class. Despite the book's title, the compiler himself is obviously preoccupied with higher education in his introductory essay. And instead of an outline of plans and ideals, we encounter this random selection of speeches and articles spread over a decade—all in some way relevant to higher education and the role of intellectuals—but surely not a systematic outline of educational programs and objectives. Readers rightfully expect a meaningful topical arrangement, or a grouping of documents by sources (for domestic as against foreign consumption), or classification by leading spokesmen. At one point we are promised that "the collection . . . will give various illustrations of the different political movements and indicate the development of an educational and political philosophy." (p. 21) One movement is poignantly illustrated by four samples of self-deprecatory confessions by leading intellectuals. If other movements are systematically illustrated, this reviewer failed to get the point.

As for the development of an educational philosophy, one can justifiably ask, on the basis of this presentation, What philosophy? The documents disclose the obvious drive toward linking theory and practice and the combining of education with labor in a variety of institutional forms. But this seems essentially to be a political strategy in Communist China which no amount of verbalizing can elevate to much of an educational philosophy.

The compilation would have been substantially more useful had the compiler's essay been related clearly to each document setting it in a meaningful context. Or the documents might have been grouped topically with the essay addressed to the significance of each topic. Or, at least, each document might have been introduced by a more adequate and precise indication of its significance. Some entries have none at all. Obvious questions are ignored: for instance, the constitution of the All-China Federation of Students is dated February 1960 (p. 341) when it was established in 1949. No explanation. At the conclusion of a Yang Hsiu-feng article, a note (p. 340) says, "For a different set of enrollment figures and goals of education . . . see Yang Hsiu-feng . . . pp. 301–307 in this collection." In making sense of the discrepancy, the reader is left to himself.

The extensive bibliography has been compiled with considerable care and with special attention to unpublished dissertations on education in China. Students especially of comparative education will probably rely on it heavily. Students of Chinese politics will find it less useful. When the bibliography is a major portion of the work, it invites comment on what appear to be lacunae. Under "Bibliography, Reference, and Documentation" (p. 422) the *Journal of Asian Studies* "Bibliography of Asian Studies, 1962" is listed but not the remaining *JAS* (and *FEQ*) annual bibliographic issues. The American Universities Field Staff *Select Bibliography* (1960) is listed but not its two supplements. T. L. Yuan's *Economic and Social Development of Modern China: A Bibliographic Guide* is listed but not his massive *China in Western Literature.* The China Year Books (both missionary and governmental), the Missionary Research Library resources, the American Historical Association *Guide to Historical Literature* would appear to belong in his compilation. Finally, it must be said that the bibliography would make a stronger bid for attention if it were at least selectively annotated.

One last word. Surely the central fact about Chinese Communist education is simply that the Party controls and exploits education for its own ends. This large volume manages to make this point only by indirection.—Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., *Bryn Mawr College.*

Local Government in Japan. By Kurt Steiner. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 564. $10.00.)

Professor Steiner has given us not only his long-awaited study of Japanese local government, but a brilliantly thorough work which will be valuable to all students of comparative government. While admittedly stressing the legal aspects of pre- and postwar governmental relations, the book rises far above the formalistic, descriptive level by keeping the central problem of local autonomy always in sight. Deeply committed to the theory that local autonomy insures against authoritarian national government, Professor Steiner raises a series of provocative questions with relevance far beyond his Japanese case study.

"Local autonomy did not fail in Japan; it was never established." (p. 470) Prewar Japan never tried to decentralize political power, first because of the felt exigencies of Meiji modernization and later because of rising militarism. Dr. Steiner's personal service in the Allied Occupation of Japan (SCAP Legal Section) gave him a unique vantage point to observe Occupation reforms in local government. His sad conclusion cited above reveals his dissatisfaction with the incomplete nature of those reforms which failed to give autonomous functions and tax bases to the local entities. "Only when the local political process itself has become democratic will local government become the training ground for democracy envisioned by de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and Lord Bryce. The democratization of local politics is an important challenge confronting present-day Japan." (p. 469) One may quarrel with this equation of decentralization with democracy, but Professor Steiner's argument is the most complete and well-documented report of this subject available. It deserves wide circulation and careful study.

The first part of the book provides background on Japanese local government in the feudal era; under the prewar centralized system; and as affected by the Occupation reforms. Like most developing nations, prewar Japan preferred the French model in educational, police, and local governmental controls. The Home Ministry, pivotal agency to control domestic administration before 1945, was abolished by the Occupation. Local governments were made fully elective and given major control of police and schools, but Occupation second-thoughts, financial weakness of local governments, and the tradition of looking up to Tokyo limited the practical effectiveness of decentralization.

The major portion of the book deals with post-

1952 local government as seen in the legal and operational dynamics of an independent Japan. Successive chapters deal with the constitutional framework; prefectural and municipal organization; neighborhood associations (banned by the Occupation but revived under other names); the "muddle of functions"; the financial dependence of local government; interrelations between levels of government; and two excellent final chapters on citizen participation in local government. He shows how the conservative post-Occupation regime has partially recentralized police, schools, and other functions. The Autonomy Ministry may not be a revival of the old Home Ministry, but it performs many similar duties of advising, supervising, and guiding the local governments. Revisions of 1952 and 1956 brought the pendulum "somewhere in between the centralized system of prewar days and the decentralized system instituted by the Occupation" (p. 255). The press, unions, Socialists, and other groups have deterred conservative projects to appoint governors or combine prefectures into larger units. Professor Steiner might have cited the many government opinion polls to show public disapproval of some of the shelved proposals, proof that Tokyo does listen to mass opinion.

This reviewer especially enjoyed the discussion of the political role played by local Red Cross and P.T.A. associations in such cities as Osaka, confirming 1953 reports of local Osaka politicians. National motivation behind the widespread movement to amalgamate villages and towns into "new cities" which retain rural traditions is also clarified as part of the recentralization trend.

Is stronger local autonomy desirable or practical for Japan? Professor Steiner thinks so, given a genuine popular will. Yet the "progressives" (Socialists) might well drop their hostility to centralization if they came to power. A nation smaller than the state of California, with serious problems at home and abroad, might find it impractical to decentralize. Our own national experience shows that even the wealthiest nation on earth cannot solve many problems on a local basis. Progressive-conservative views of local autonomy differ, as do voting rate patterns, in Japan and the United States. Perhaps the balance of national power in Japan should be tilted further toward the localities, but this is unlikely to occur.

"Local entities must not be simply agents of the state, but must stand between the individual and the state." (p. 474) Ideally, this may be defensible. Professor Steiner shows clearly, however, that the postwar struggle over local autonomy is largely a reflection of the larger national struggle between the conservative majority and the left-wing minority. The opposition fears any conservative restriction on unions, students, teachers, and other client groups, but is not hostile to central government economic and welfare programs. Yet the psychological and ideological base for the kind of local autonomy urged in this book seems most uncertain. Ironically, efforts of the Tokyo government to create outlying industrial cities may help to build stronger local government. Much of the political success of the quasi-religious *Soka Gakkai* and its political arm, the *Komeito*, derives from urban dissatisfaction with the low level of municipal services in Japan. The governing Liberal-Democrats, for their own future, must give more attention to local problems.

The book is enriched by 21 tables, a bibliography of Japanese and English-language works, and the good practice of placing parenthetical footnotes on the page and others at the end of the text. This work shows evidence of years of devoted research and meticulous scholarship. It will long remain the definitive work on Japanese local government, and a valuable source for all students of comparative local government.—DOUGLAS H. MENDEL, JR., *University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee.*

Communist China's Crusade, Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution. BY GUY WINT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 136, $4.50.)

The academic world is fortunate to have Professor Guy Wint's new contribution, *Communist China's Crusade.* It deals in depth with a wide range of problems and interpretations. As a profound scholar of contemporary Asia, he offers new meanings to the widening rift between China and Russia, the future role of Japan in Asia, China's relentless expansionism in the coming decades, and the inherent Soviet hesitation (or reluctance) to get involved in Asia except supporting the domestic anti-Western forces when it was expedient. He explains powerfully Stalin's failure in China in 1927 and the subsequent rise of Mao Tse-tung and his home-made revolution.

In this volume the author contributes many additional interpretations and meanings to the chain of events in Asia since 1920's when Communism became a factor in Asian nationalist movement. He reminds us that it is a mistake to think of Mao's victory as "the result of Russian planning;" nor is it correct to believe that Russia "strove ceaselessly to promote the advance of Communism in Asia." (p.2) Stalin's acceptance of the Kuomintang Government after 1945 proved again his underestimating of Mao's personal ability and the strength of his party organization. It is, however, important to note that Stalin's domination of Chinese Communist party during the pre-Mao era (1921–34) was dictated by his struggle with Trotsky. Blind instruction to the CCP leaders was blindly accepted, without any concern for the particular internal conditions in China. Moscow, for example, ordered the CCP to ally with and eventually to be purged by the Kuomintang in 1927.

The rise of Mao in 1934 put an end to Russia's dogmatism and contained also the future seed in Sino-Soviet conflict. Mao has been a realistic man of action, not "the apostle of his theories, as was the case with most of his predecessors." (p. 29) Mao did not delude his countrymen that "the Chinese could act like a Western people." He, in fact, derived most of his revolutionary strategies from the Chinese popular-romantic novels. Three concepts, according to the author, were responsible for Mao's victory in 1949—the creation of peasant armies, secure guerrilla bases, and encircling the cities from the countryside. He also skillfully made good use of the "United Front" concept to gather several conflicting classes of people in order to isolate the Kuomintang government. As a revolutionary conspirator, he knew how to "turn the smouldering discontent in the rural China into a storm of terror." (p. 40) The Japanese aggression gave Mao the greatest fortune to "Build up Communism as true nationalism." (p. 44) Finally, the victory in 1949, with almost no Russian aid at all, has convinced the Peking leaders today the applicability of the Chinese model of revolution to Asia, Africa and Latin America. This conviction was eloquently expressed by Liu Chiao-chi in as early as 1950 when he said that the victory "road is the road of Mao Tse-tung. It can also be the basic road for liberation of peoples of other colonial and semi-colonial countries, where similar conditions exist." (p. 62) The Soviet Union has never agreed to such a liberation theory.

The author brings out more clearly that the Peking regime is dedicated to two rather conflicting goals—world revolution and traditional Chinese interests in Asia. Such "double aims" create a "double foreign policy" which tolerates neither the Russian co-existence theory, nor the American military presence in Asia—both limit Peking's freedom of action. In practice, however, Peking has preserved, in the reviewer's opinion, its sense of prudence and retained flexibility in policy at home and abroad. Professor Wint demonstrates most effectively the ambivalent but real Sino-Soviet split that is rooted in Stalin's faithlessness and Khrushchev's betrayal of Chinese national interests and aspirations. The two nations appear to remain in "deadly enmity with one another" and the split "may last indefinitely." (p. 103) China may eventually claim those border territories taken by Russia during the past 250 years. Racial feud may become the additional source of "profound mistrust of each other." The real difference for the non-Communist world is that "Peking has replaced Moscow as the potent source of subversion." (p. 113) The instability of world politics may provide opportunities for China, but Peking has "undone much of its work by acting with a high-handedness and superiority which Africans and Latin Americans interpret as racialism and overweening pride." (p. 121) The world must, however, be alert that the disciplined Chinese leaders with resilience and monopoly of political power, have no real regional enemy except Japan which is capable of resisting Peking but Japan's future role in relation to China is not immediately predictable with any degree of certainty.

In short, Professor Wint has reinforced many of our convictions and interpretations on events in Asia, especially his interpretation of the nature of Communism in China and Mao himself as a product of Chinese history. This volume will aid vastly our observing of events in Asia and Communist behavior elsewhere. This reviewer, on the other hand, cannot avoid regretting that the author does not integrate other significant factors which seemed equally responsible for the rise of Mao and his seizure of power in 1949, such as the Marshall Mission and the self-defeating factionalism within the Kuomintang Party.—DAVID W. CHANG, *Wisconsin State University—Oshkosh.*

Bibliographie retrospective des Publications Officielles de la Belgique, 1794–1914. BY D. DE WEERDT. (Louvain, Editions Nauwelaerts; Paris, Beatrice Nauwelaerts, 1963. Pp. 427. Centre Interuniversitaire d'Histoire Contemporaine. Cahiers 30.)

The retrospective bibliography of Belgian official publications has been conceived as a supplement to the *Bibliographie de l'histoire de Belgique, 1789–1831,* by Paul Gérin, published in 1960 as Cahiers 15, together with its two as yet unpublished supplements covering the period 1831–1914. Mrs. De Weerdt covers the period of the nine departments attached to the French Republic and the following period attached to the Netherlands to 1830, as well as the independent Belgium, 1830–1914. In all, 3,471 entries are included. In each of the three periods, the arrangement is alphabetical, mainly by title, with the fewer numbers having individual authors and editors interspersed. The work has been based on the holdings, not always complete, of the Bibliothèque Royale, Brussels, of the Archives Générales du Royaume, and of the libraries of various ministries. There are two indexes, one by personal authors, and the other by topics, places and agencies. The arrangement alphabetically by title, with frequently no mention of the issuing agency represents a Belgian as well as European library practice that often makes it difficult to locate all the materials published by a particular agency. Normally the agency has a basic statute, decree, or order regulating its functions and furnishing guidance as regards its responsibility for publication. Thus, Belgium has become the second European country to have a retrospective bibliography of its official publications. The other European country, Italy, in 1924, published a bibliography covering the period 1861 to 1923. Despite the ramifications and changes that had been made during those sixty-odd years, the arrangement there was a grouping as far as possible along the then in 1923 existing arrangement of ministries. Mrs. Denise De Weerdt has preferred an alphabetical arrangement in each period, since "Une classification systematique aurait donné a la bibliographie un aspect déséquilibré, vu la grande quantité d'ouvrages à classer sous une même rubrique." The annual lists of official publications now being published by some European countries invariably are arranged by agency. Even so, as it stands, the contribution of Mrs. De Weerdt is one of considerable merit for the student of governmental institutions and probably the only practical one capable of being carried out under present conditions.—JAMES B. CHILDS.

Le Suffrage Politique en France. BY JEAN-PAUL CHARNAY. (Paris: Mouton, 1965. Pp. 832. 95 F.)

An encyclopedic account of French law regulating nominations, elections, and referenda.

American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead. BY JOHN C. CAMPBELL. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. 1965. Pp. xi, 136, $4.50.)

Mr. Campbell's new book on Eastern Europe is an eminently useful and succinct political guidebook on the limits of American direct influence on events and evolution in the area between West Germany and Soviet Russia. It is a miniature encyclopedia of sorts (the text proper is a mere 104 pages), written in a concise, sophisticated and above all, realistic manner in the best tradition of those associated with the Council on Foreign Relations. The author traces the different phases of American foreign policy in Eastern Europe from the unrealistic hopes at Yalta through Truman's policy of containment, preoccupied with Southern and Western rather than Eastern Europe, and Eisenhower's policy of liberation (mostly by electoral declamation) to Kennedy-Johnson's gradualism, actually initiated during Eisenhower's second term. The book then focuses on the past ten years whose most characteristic trend has been toward autonomy and self-assertion, not because of American policy and action, but often regardless or even despite of it. The last portion of the book examines three possible and realistic alternatives of immediate policy goals: 1) constant pressure by all means short of war or incitement to open rebellion; 2) building economic and cultural bridges with the hope and aim of gradual change; or 3) a detente with the Soviet Union at the cost of shelving the German and Eastern European question for a considerable length of time. For each of the three alternatives the book presents a realistic list of appropriate methods of action in the diplomatic, military, propaganda, trade, and cultural exchange fields. Two policies are deemed by the author to be totally unrealistic and therefore not worth a further analysis: first, the United States' definitive acceptance of the status quo; second, a United States' effort to alter the situation by force, be it war or support of civil wars that could escalate to nuclear confrontation. The book does not plead for any of the alternatives suggested. The author's main plea seems to be that of consistency and awareness of facts. In his words "successful policy is not made in a vacuum, in ignorance or in defiance of the actual conditions that prevail."

The author wisely differentiates between American ultimate *objectives*, that is the desire of the American people and its government to see free elections in a unified democratic Germany and in "desatellized" Eastern Europe, on one hand, and the American actual *policy* that must unavoidably relate its immediate as well as ultimate objectives to available means and anticipated opposition, on the other. The Eastern European question, however important and irritating, especially in view of our false hopes at the time of Yalta and subsequent bitter partisan oratory, is an issue, but not *the* issue in the global context of American commitments and aims. Furthermore, the Eastern European complex problem does not affect only Moscow and Washington, but also Paris, Bonn, London and Rome. And West Europe, so much nearer to the area and its ferment, as the author warns, "cannot be counted on automatically to follow American policies in Eastern Europe which do not take account of their interests as they see them."

The book raises also a disturbing but cardinal point: If the goal of total independence from the Soviet Union *and* the end of Communist monopoly of power within Eastern European states is presently beyond the reach, then American foreign policy may be confronted with two possible developments; some states may reach a degree of independence in foreign affairs while remaining Communist dictatorships within (as is the case of Yugoslavia); or some nations may conceivably (but this point has so far been reached by none) replace totalitarian communism by some form of democratic socialism (including a two-

Socialist-party system as once suggested by Milovan Djilas) while remaining Soviet satellites in matters of foreign and military policy. In some areas of the world the Soviet Union seems to be satisfied with a non-Communist but pro-Soviet regime. This is, of course, a matter of necessity rather than choice, and therefore hardly applies to the situation in an area under the shadow of Soviet power. At any rate, if such choice were at hand, namely to support either democracy within a loyal Soviet satellite or neutralism of a Communist dictatorship, what line should be taken by the United States?

Campbell's discussion of the desirable in the framework of the possible results in many useful lessons in humility but not necessarily in frustration. As the author points out, "relations within the Communist world have their own dynamics; it was not Western policy that brought about the Tito-Stalin break or the revolt in Hungary." Actually neither was foreseen and both were scarcely believed when they happened. The same observation applies to the defection of that strange Chinese satellite on the Mediterranean, Albania, in 1960 and the astonishing assertion of economic self-interest on the part of Rumania. In international politics things sometimes go our way not on account of our foresight and action, but as a result of our rivals' errors or simply their incapacity to prevent changes, especially the rise of new and more pragmatic generations.

The book has issued from a scholarly debate in which government officials were involved. It will certainly lead to more debate on both higher and lower levels, including seminar discussions at our colleges and especially at our four war colleges for which the book seems tailored to exact measurement. The book can be recommended as a first-class additional reading for courses on international politics and American foreign policy.—Ivo D. Duchacek, *The City College of the City University of New York.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Richard L. Merritt
Yale University

Akzin, Benjamin. La Place de la Constitution dans un Etat Moderne. *Bulletin Sedeis: Futuribles.* No. 95 (June 10, 1965).

Beyme, Klaus von. Repräsentatives und Parlamentarisches Regierungssystem—Eine Begriffsgeschichtliche Analyse. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift.* 6:2 (June 1965), 145–59.

Duverger, Maurice. Les Images des Institutions Politiques Futures. *Bulletin Sedeis: Futuribles.* No. 93 (May 20, 1965).

Fagen, Richard R. Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro. *Western Political Quarterly.* 18:2 part 1 (June 1965), 275–284.

Faye, Jean-Pierre. Langages Totalitaires: Fascistes et Nazis. *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie.* Vol. 36 (1964), 75–100.

Holmes, R. Freud, Piaget and Democratic Leadership. *British Journal of Sociology.* 16:2 (June 1965), 123–139.

Krockow, Christian Graf von. Staatsideologie oder Demokratisches Bewusstsein. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift.* 6:2 (June 1965), 118–31.

Ionescu, Ghita, L'Avenir du Party Monolithique. *Bulletin Sedeis: Futuribles.* No. 98 (July 20, 1965).

Nenning, Günther. Demokratie als Diktatur der Funktionäre. *Politische Studien.* 16:161 (May–June 1965), 316–19.

Tucker, Robert C. The Dictator and Totalitarianism. *World Politics.* 17:4 (July 1965), 555–83.

Elite Analysis

Abrams, Mark. British Elite Attitudes and the European Common Market. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* 29:2 (Summer 1965), 236–46.

Benda, Harry J. Political Elites in Colonial Southeast Asia: An Historical Analysis. *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* 7:3 (April 1965), 233–51.

Stycos, Mayone J. Opinions of Latin-American Intellectuals on Population Problems and Birth Control. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 11–26.

Taylor, Charles. Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study. *Queen's Quarterly.* 72:1 (Spring 1965), 150–68.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. Elites in French-Speaking West Africa: The Social Basis of Ideas. *Journal of Modern African Studies.* 3:1 (May 1965), 1–34.

Political Development

Brandenburg, Frank. The Relevance of Mexican Experience to Latin American Development. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 190–213.

Braithwaite, Lloyd. The Role of the University in the Developing Society of the West Indies. *Social and Economic Studies.* 14:1 (March 1965), 76–87.

Djordjevic, Jovan. L'Anatomie des Institutions Politiques de la Société en Transition. *Bulletin Sedeis: Futuribles.* No. 96 (June 20, 1965).

Eisenstadt, S. N. Processes of Modernization, and of Urban and Industrial Transformation under Conditions of Structural Duality. *Social Sciences Information.* 4:1 (March 1965), 40–50.

Georgis, P. Ascension Sociale et Enseignement dans les Pays d'Afrique Noire. *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie.* No. 1 (1965), 51–68.

Hijazi, Ahmad. Kuwait: Development from a Semitribal, Semicolonial Society to Democracy and Sovereignty. *American Journal of Comparative Law.* 13:3 (Summer 1964), 428–37.

Lambert, Jacques. L'Expérience Latino-Américaine et le Développement Politique Après la Colonisation. *Tiers-Monde.* 6:21 (January-March 1965), 59–80.

Nash, Manning. The Role of Village Schools in the Process of Cultural and Economic Modernization. *Social and Economic Studies.* 14:1 (March 1965), 131–43.

Cross-National Research

Anderson, Bo, Morris Zelditch, Paul Takagi, and Don Whiteside. On Conservative Attitudes. *Acta Sociologica.* 8:3 (1965), 189–204.

Farace, Vincent, and Lewis Donohew. Mass Communication in National Social Systems: A Study of 43 Variables in 115 Countries. *Journalism Quarterly.* 42:2 (Spring 1965), 253–61.

Hickrod, Lucy Jen Huang, and G. Alan Hickrod. The Communist Chinese and the American Adolescent. *China Quarterly.* No. 22 (April-June 1965), 171–80.

Janson, Carl-Gunnar, and Bengt Rudolfsson. Ecological and Geographical Distances in Stockholm. *Acta Sociologica.* 8:4 (1965), 285–92.

Lipset, Seymour M. The Political Behaviour of University Students in Developing Nations. *Social and Economic Studies.* 14:1 (March 1965), 35–75.

Pearson, D. S. Income Distribution and the Size of Nations. *Economic Development and Cultural Change.* 13:4, Part 1 (July 1965), 472–78.

Sweetser, Frank L. Factor Structure as Ecological Structure in Helsinki and Boston. *Acta Sociologica.* 8:3 (1965), 205–25.

Latin America

Adams, Richard N. The Pattern of Development in Latin America. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 1–10.

Alisky, Marvin. Mexico's Special Districts: Municipal Civic Betterment Boards. *Arizona State University Public Affairs Bulletin.* 4:2 (1965), 1–4.

Arias, Ricardo M. What Will Be the Instruments of Latin American Advancement? *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 78–84.

Dorner, Peter, and Juan Carlos Collarte. Land Reform in Chile: Proposal for an Institutional Innovation. *Inter-American Economic Affairs.* 19:1 (Summer 1965), 3–22.

Eder, George Jackson. Urban Concentration, Agriculture, and Agrarian Reform. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 27–47.

Kuebler, Jeanne. Smoldering Colombia. *Editorial Research Reports.* 2:5 (August 4, 1965), 565–82.

McAlister, Lyle N. Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 85–98.

Mann, Thomas C. Disparities in Progress Among Nations. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 63–67.

Margain, Hugo M. Mexican Economic and Social Development. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 68–77.

Martz, John D. Political Parties in Colombia and Venezuela: Contrasts in Substance and Style. *Western Political Quarterly.* 18:2, Part 1 (June 1965), 318–33.

Payne, James. Peru: The Politics of Structured Violence. *Journal of Politics.* 27:2 (May 1965), 362–74.

Powell, John Duncan. Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America. *Western Political Quarterly.* 18:2, Part 1 (June 1965), 382–92.

Powelson, John P., and Anatole A. Solow. Urban and Rural Development in Latin America. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 48–62.

Snow, Peter G. The Evolution of the Argentine Electoral System. *Parliamentary Affairs.* 18:3 (Summer 1965), 330–37.

Szulc, Tad. Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 99–109.

Wiarda, Howard J. The Changing Political Orientation of the Church in the Dominican Republic. *Journal of Church and State.* 7:2 (Spring 1965), 238–54.

Western Europe

Die Liberalen Europäischen Parteien ausserhalb Deutschlands und Österreichs. *Politische Studien.* 16:159 (January–February 1965), 33–37.

The United Kingdom

Abrams, P., and A. Little. The Young Voter in British Politics. *British Journal of Sociology.* 16:2 (June 1965), 95–110.

Alderman, R. K. Discipline in the Parliamentary Labour Party 1945–51. *Parliamentary Affairs.* 18:3 (Summer 1965), 293–305.

Berrington, H. B. The General Election of 1964 (with Discussion). *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.* 128:1 (1965), 17–66.

Brand, Carl F. The British General Election of 1964. *South Atlantic Quarterly.* 64:3 (Summer 1965), 332–50.

Britain and Her Immigrants. *Round Table.* No. 219 (June 1965), 209–17.

Cadart, Jacques, and Albert Mabileau. Les Elections Britanniques de 1964: Les Parties en Face d'une Nouvelle Société. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* 15:4 (August 1965), 645–704.

Crick, Bernard. The Prospects for Parliamentary Reform. *Political Quarterly.* 36:3 (July–October 1965), 333–46.

Fanti, Giorgio. The Resurgence of the Labour Party. *New Left Review.* No. 30 (March–April 1965), 27–44.

Fellowes, Edward. Changes in Parliamentary Life 1918–1961. *Political Quarterly.* 36:3 (July–October 1965), 256–65.

Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Reference Division. *The English Legal System.* No. 5312/64 (1964).

Hornby, Richard. The Influence of the Back-Bencher: A Tory View. *Political Quarterly.* 36:3 (July–October 1965), 286–94.

Johnston, Franklyn A. Politico-Military Organization in the United Kingdom: Some Recent Developments. *Journal of Politics.* 27:2 (May 1965), 339–50.

Marshall, Geoffrey. Parliament and the Constitution. *Political Quarterly.* 36:3 (July–October 1965), 266–76.

Ryle, Michael. Committees of the House of Commons. *Political Quarterly.* 36:3 (July–October 1965), 295–308.

Starzinger, Vincent E. The British Pattern of Apportionment. *Virginia Quarterly Review.* 41:3 (Summer 1965), 321–41.

Strauss, G. R. The Influence of the Back-Bencher: A Labour View. *Political Quarterly.* 36:3 (July-October 1965), 277–85.

Walkland, S. A. Science and Parliament: The Role of the Select Committees of the House of Commons. *Parliamentary Affairs.* 18:3 (Summer 1965), 266–78.

Williams, Raymond. The British Left. *New Left Review.* No. 30 (March–Apri, 1965), 18–26.

Wood, David. The Parliamentary Lobby. *Political Quarterly.* 36:3 (July–October 1965), 309–22.

France

Anderson, Malcolm. The Myth of the "Two Hundred Families." *Political Studies.* 13:2 (June 1965), 163–78.

Chelini, Jean. Formazione Civica e Politica in Francia. *Civitas.* 15:12 (December 1964), 19–32.

Kaminsky, Elijah Ben-Zion. The Reorganization of Metropolitan Paris. *Arizona State University Public Affairs Bulletin.* 4:1 (1965), 1–4.

Levy, Yves. Du Parlementarisme au Presidentialisme. *Bulletin Sedeis: Futuribles.* No. 94 (June 1, 1965).

Monnerville, Gaston. Le Sénat: Institution Fondamentale d'une République Démocratique. *Paris, Editions SERPIC.* (1965).

Viansson-Ponté, Pierre. L'Esperienza dei "Clubs" in Francia. *Tempo Presente.* 10:2 (February 1965), 45–49.

Williams, P. M. Party, Presidency and Parish Pump in France. *Parliamentary Affairs.* 18:3 (Summer 1965), 257–65.

West Germany

Cartellieri, Diether. Der Generationskonflikt. *Wehr-Wissenschaftliche Rundschau.* 15:4 (April 1965), 224–36.

Dowell, Jack D. The Politics of Accommodation: German Social Democracy and the Catholic Church. *Journal of Church and State.* 7:1 (Winter 1965), 78–90.

Frye, Charles E. Parties and Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn. *World Politics.* 17:4 (July 1965), 635–55.

Gross, Johannes. Erhard's Regentschaft. *Monat.* 16:192 (September 1964), 7–15.

Henning, Friedrich. Die Deutschen Liberalen und Ihre Parteien. *Politische Studien.* 16:159 (January–February 1965), 7–16.

Johnson, Nevil. State Finance for Political Parties in Western Germany. *Parliamentary Affairs.* 18:3 (Summer 1965), 279–92.

Lush, C. D. The Relationship Between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:3 (July 1965), 742–87.

Müller-Armack, Alfred. The Principles of the Social Market Economy. *German Economic Review.* 3:2 (1965), 89–104.

Robertson of Oakridge, Lord. A Miracle: Potsdam 1945—Western Germany 1965. *International Affairs.* 41:3 (July 1965), 401–10.

Schiller, Karl. Germany's Economic Requirements. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 671–81.

Sieber, Georg. Die FDP vor der Wahl. *Politische Studien.* 16:159 (January–February 1965), 17–27.

Stiefbold, Rodney P. The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections. *American Political Science Review.* 59:2 (June 1965), 391–407.

Italy

Bertoluzzi, Claudio. I Nati Dopo: 1003 Studenti delle Scuole Medie Superiori di Voghera Rispondono su "Fascismo e Antifascismo." *Ponte.* 21:3–4 (March–April 1965), 389–552.

Renton, Bruce. The Italian Communists. *Quarterly Review.* No. 645 (July 1965), 265–72.

Segre, Umberto. Una Via Per la Sinistra Italiana. *Ponte.* 21:6 (June 1965), 752–66.

Belgium

Poswick, Charles. Le PLP, Premier Parti Déconfessionnalisé du Pays. *Flambeau.* 48:2 (March–April 1965), 129–35.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Achminow, Herman. The Current Political Scene in the Soviet Union. *Studies on the Soviet Union.* 4:3 (1965), 16–26.

Bartsch, Gunter. Das Dilemma der Revolutionären Situation. *Politische Studien.* 16:160 (March–April 1965), 184–90.

Benton, William. The Teacher and the Taught in the USSR. In Extension of Remarks of Bernard F. Grabowski. *Congressional Record* [daily ed.]. Vol. 111 (May 12, 1965).

Bilinsky, Andreas. Sozialismus oder Oligarchie? Grundtendenzen im Sowjetischen Staatsrecht. *Zeitschrift für Politik.* 12:2 (May 1965), 139–72.

Bochenski, J. M. Toward a Systematic Logic of Communist Ideology. *Studies in Soviet Thought.* 4:3 (September 1964), 185–205.

Bociurkiw, Bohdan R. De-Stalinization and Religion in the U.S.S.R. *International Journal.* 20:3 (Summer 1965), 312–30.

Brunner, Georg. Veränderungen im Propaganda-Apparat der KPdSU. *Osteuropa.* 15:5 (May 1965), 306–09.

Burks, Richard V. Yugoslavia: Has Tito Gone Bourgeois? *East Europe.* 14:8 (August 1965), 2–14.

Bush, Keith. Soviet Agricultural Reforms Since Khrushchev. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* 12:7 (July 1965), 28–42.

Cleary, J. W. The Virgin Lands. *Survey.* No. 56 (July 1965), 95–105.

De George, Richard T. Soviet Ethics and Soviet Society. *Studies in Soviet Thought.* 4:3 (September 1964), 206–17.

Deutscher, Isaac. Der Fehlschlag des Chruschtschowismus. *Frankfurter Hefte.* 20:7 (July 1965), 449–65.

Directing Y. C. L. Work Toward Youth's Needs. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* 17:25 (July 14, 1965), 3–7.

Fedenko, Panas. The Rise and Fall of Khrushchev. *Studies on the Soviet Union.* 4:3 (1965), 3–15.

Frank, Z., and J. Waelbroeck. Soviet Economic Policy since 1953: A Study of its Structure and Changes. *Soviet Studies.* 17:1 (July 1965), 1–43.

Gamarnikow, Michael. Economic Reform in Poland. *East Europe.* 14:7 (July 1965), 13–19.

Herman, Leon. *Varieties of Economic Secrecy in the Soviet Union.* (RAND Corporation Paper P-2840 1963).

Holesovsky, Vaclav. Czechoslovakia's Economic Debate. *East Europe.* 13:12 (December 1964), 13–21.

Hough, Jerry F. A Harebrained Scheme in Retrospect. *Problems of Communism.* 14:4 (July–August 1965), 26–32.

—— The Soviet Concept of the Relationship between the Lower Party Organs and State Administration. *Slavic Review.* 24:2 (June 1965), 215–40.

Laird, Roy. Agriculture under Khrushchev. *Survey.* No. 56 (July 1965), 106–17.

Law in the Soviet Society. *University of Illinois Law Forum.* (Spring 1964), 1–297.

Maggs, Peter. *Nonmilitary Secrecy under Soviet Law.* (RAND Corporation 1964).

Mandel, Ernest. La Réforme de la Planification Soviétique et ses Implications. *Temps Modernes.* 20:229 (June 1965), 2161–86.

Meissner, Boris. Party and Government Reforms. *Survey.* No. 56 (July 1965), 31–45.

Meyer, Fritjof. Der Volksstaat: Chruschtschows Bruch mit der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Staatstheorie. *Osteuropa.* 15:7–8 (July–August 1965), 475–79.

Nimitz, Nancy. *Agriculture under Khrushchev: The Lean Years.* (RAND Corporation Paper P-3073 1965).

Olgin, C. What is Soviet Ideology? II. Role and Effectiveness. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* 12:7 (July 1965), 3–21.

Reddaway, Peter. The Fall of Khrushchev. *Survey.* No. 56 (July, 1965), 11–30.

Rexin, Manfred. Recent Reforms in East Germany. *World Today.* 21:7 (July 1965), 300–07.

Scharndorff, Werner. Die Stabilität der Heutigen Sowjetführung. *Politische Studien.* 16:161 (May–June 1965), 268–73.

Stöckigt, Rolf. Democratic Land Reform in the

GDR. *German Foreign Policy (DDR)*. 4:2 (1965), 110–21.

Vingt Ans Après: La "DDR"—A Symposium. *Documents*. 20:2 (March–April 1965), 82–126.

Yaney, George L. Law, Society and the Domestic Regime in Russia, in Historical Perspective. *American Political Science Review*. 59:2 (June 1965), 379–90.

Zimmerer, Ludwig. Polens Schriftsteller und die Partei. *Frankfurter Hefte*. 20:7 (July 1965), 482–97.

Middle East and North Africa

Gorce, Paul-Marie de la. Problèmes Politiques Egyptiens d'Hier et d'Aujourd'hui. *Politique Etrangère*. 30:2 (1965), 161–72.

Guldescu, Stanko. Background of the Yemeni Revolution of 1962. *Dalhousie Review*. 45:1 (Spring 1965), 67–77.

Halpern, Manfred. New Perspectives in the Study of North Africa. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 3:1 (May 1965), 103–14.

Harris, George S. The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics—II. *Middle East Journal*. 19:2 (Spring 1965), 169–76.

Rogati, Elio. Situazione Interna e Politica Estera dell'Algeria Indipendente. *La Comounità Internazionale*. 20:1 (January 1965), 47–74.

Simpson, Dwight J. Development as a Process—The Menderes Phase in Turkey. *Middle East Journal*. 19:2 (Spring 1965), 141–52.

Ulman, A. Haluk, and Frank Tachau. Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy. *Middle East Journal*. 19:2 (Spring 1965), 153–68.

Vallin, Raymond. Socialisme Musulman en Algérie. *L'Afrique et l'Asie*. No. 69 (1965), 14–32.

Africa

Balandier, Georges. Réflexions sur le Fait Politique: Le Cas des Sociétés Africaines. *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*. Vol. 37 (1964), 23–50.

Bourde, Andre. The Comoro Islands: Problems of a Microcosm. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 3:1 (May 1965), 91–102.

Hachten, William A. The Press in a One-Party State: Kenya Since Independence. *Journalism Quarterly*. 42:2 (Spring 1965), 262–66.

Hannigan, A. St. J. The Role of Rural Local Government in an Independent Kenya. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. 4:3 (July 1965), 165–72.

Hazard, John N. Negritude, Socialism and the Law. *Columbia Law Review*. 65:5 (May 1965), 778–809.

Heisler, Halmuth. Continuity and Change in Zambian Administration. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. 4:3 (July 1965), 183–93.

Le Quesne, C. M. French West Africa. *African Affairs*. 64:255 (January 1965), 78–90.

Lewis, W. Arthur. Beyond African Dictatorship. *Encounter*. 25:2 (August 1965), 3–25.

Mondlane, Eduardo C. Le Mouvement de Libération au Mozambique. *Presence Africaine*. No. 53 (1965), 9–35.

Singh, Chanan. The Republican Constitution of Kenya: Historical Background and Analysis. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. 14:3 (July 1965), 878–949.

Tanner, R. E. S. The Belgian and British Administrations in Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. 4:3 (July 1965), 202–11.

Tordoff, William. Regional Administration in Tanzania. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 3:1 (May 1965), 63–89.

Zolberg, Aristide. Political Revival in Mali. *Africa Report*. 10:7 (July 1965), 15–20.

South and Southeast Asia

al-Mujahid, Sharif. Pakistan's First Presidential Elections. *Asian Survey*. 5:6 (June 1965), 280–94.

Beteille, André. The Future of the Backward Classes: The Competing Demands of Status and Power. *Perspectives* (Supplement to *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 11:1, January–March 1965). 1–39.

Chang, Sen-dou. Peking: The Growing Metropolis of Communist China. *Geographical Review*. 55:3 (July 1965), 313–27.

Chao, Kang. *Two Studies on Mainland China's Economy*. University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies. (Occasional Papers No. 2 1963).

Clark, Colin. Les Problèmes Politiques et Economiques de la Chine Communiste. *Diogene*. Vol. 49 (January–March 1965), 3–30.

Emerson, John P. *Sex, Age, and Level of Skill of the Nonagricultural Labor Force of Mainland China*. Department of Commerce. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division. International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 21 (1965).

Fall, Bernard B. North Viet-Nam: A Profile. *Problems of Communism*. 14:4 (July–August 1965), 13–25.

Ferguson, C. G. The Story of Development in Malaya (Now Malaysia)—Some Aspects. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. 4:3 (July 1965), 149–64.

Gledhill, Alan. Pakistan's Search for a Constitution. *Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique*. No. 4 (1964), 295–320.

Gorvine, Albert. The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan. *Middle East Journal*. 19:2 (Summer 1965), 321–36.

Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. The DMK and the

Politics of Tamil Nationalism. *Pacific Affairs.* 37:4 (Winter 1964–65), 396–411.

——— The Riots in Tamiland: Problems and Prospects of India's Language Crisis. *Asian Survey.* 5:8 (August 1965), 399–407.

Hickey, Gerald Cannon. *The Major Ethnic Groups of the South Vietnamese Highlands.* (RAND Corporation Research Memorandum RM-4041-ARPA 1964).

Iijima, Shigeru. Cultural Change Among the Hill Karens in Northern Thailand. *Asian Survey.* 5:8 (August 1965), 417–23.

Jaspan, M. A. West Irian: The First Two Years. *Australian Quarterly.* 37:2 (June 1965), 9–21.

Johnstone, William C., Jr. Burma Today. *SAIS Review.* Vol. 9 (Summer 1965), 9–16.

Karnik, V. B. Trade Unions in India: A Preview of 1975. *Perspectives* (Supplement to *Indian Journal of Public Administration,* 11:1, January–March 1965), 40–74.

Kumar, Satish. The Panchayat Constitution of Nepal and its Operation. *International Studies.* 6:2 (October 1964), 133–52.

Osborne, Milton E. *Strategic Hamlets in South Viet-Nam: A Survey and a Comparison.* Cornell University, Department of Asian Studies, Southeast Asia Program. Data Paper No. 55 (1965).

Pauker, Guy J. *Communist Prospects in Indonesia.* (RAND Corporation Research Memorandum RM-4135-PR 1964).

Phillips, Herbert P., and D. A. Wilson. *Certain Effects of Culture and Social Organization on Internal Security in Thailand.* (RAND Corporation Research Memorandum RM-3786-ARPA 1964).

Roberts, Adam. Buddhism and Politics in South Vietnam. *World Today.* 21:6 (June 1965), 240–49.

Sarkar, Chanchal. The Press in India: Today and Tomorrow. *Perspectives* (Supplement to *Indian Journal of Public Administration,* 11:1, January–March 1965), 75–98.

Tilman, Robert O. The Sarawak Political Scene. *Pacific Affairs.* 37:4 (Winter 1964–65), 412–25.

Turner, K. Some Comments on the 1964 Malaysian Election. *Australian Outlook.* 19:1 (April 1965), 62–72.

Wolf, Charles, Jr. *National Priorities and Development Strategies in Southeast Asia.* (RAND Corporation Paper P-3035 1964).

Far East and Oceania

Bridgham, Philip L. The National People's Congress. *China Quarterly.* No. 22 (April–June 1965), 62–74.

Granades, Hermenegilde F. Budget Administration in the Philippines. *Federal Accountant.* 14:1 (Spring 1965), 19–34.

Local Autonomy and the Bureaucracy: A Symposium. *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* 2:3 (December 1964), 65–97.

Malden, William. A New Class Structure Emerging in China? *China Quarterly.* No. 22 (April–June 1965), 83–88.

Morris, Ivan. Soka Gakkai Brings "Absolute Happiness." *New York Times Magazine.* (July 18, 1965), 8–9.

Political Parties: A Symposium. *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* 2:3 (December 1964), 37–64.

Postwar Political Structure: A Symposium. *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* 2:3 (December 1964), 12–36.

Pressure Groups and Political Consciousness: A Symposium. *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* 2:3 (December 1964), 98–143.

Schiffer, Wilhelm, The Soka Gakkai: Its History and its Claims. *France-Asia.* 19:182 (January–March 1964), 1111–18.

Takane, Masaaki. Economic Growth and the "End of Ideology" in Japan. *Asian Survey.* 5:6 (June 1965), 295–304.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

NIMROD RAPHAELI
The University of Michigan

General Works

Abueva, Jose V. Social Backgrounds and Recruitment of Legislators and Administrators in the Philippines. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration.* January, 1965.

Aikman, C. C. and R. S. Clark. Some Developments in Administrative Law (1964). *New Zealand Journal of Public Administration.* March, 1965.

Blank, Blanche Davis. A Proposal for a Statistical Approach to Comparative Administration: The Measurement of National Bureaucracies. CAG Occasional Paper. July, 1965.

Carleton University, School of Public Administration. Library Selected List of Current Materials on Canadian Public Administration: September 1954–December 1962. Cumulative Issues of no. 1–17. 1964.

Co-Operative Administration. *Public Administration* (Sydney). March, 1965.

Frankel, Charles. Bureaucracy and Democracy in the New Europe. *Daedalus*. Winter, 1964.

Graham, L. M. Do Politicians Rely on Administrators to Ease Their Burden of Work? *New Zealand Journal of Public Administration*. March, 1965.

Henderson, Keith M. Sensitivity Training in a Middle East Culture. *Public Personnel Review*. July, 1965.

Les Mémoires de stage de l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration. Liste bibliographique (146–1963). *La Revue Administrative*. Mars–Avril, 1965.

Luhmann, Niklas. *Funktionen und Folgen formales Organisation*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1964.

Savage, Peter R. Public Administration in Literature: A Bibliographical Essay. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. January, 1965.

Szamel, J. Les tâches de la science administrative dans les pays socialistes. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3 (1964).

Thompson, Victor A. Bureaucracy and Innovation. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. June, 1965.

U. S. Department of State. *Political Development: A Bibliography 1960–1964*. External Research Paper 159. August, 1964.

Max Weber Today. Articles on Weber. *International Social Science Journal*. No. 1. (1965).

Bureaucratic Systems

Adu, A. L. *The Civil Service in New African States*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1965.

Dodd, C. H. Administrative Reform in Turkey. *Public Administration* (London). Spring, 1965.

Hoseh, Louis E. The Public Administration Division of the United Nations. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3 (1964)

Kim, Paul S. Dynamics of the Japanese Imperial Civil Service under the Maiji Constitution, 1889–1945. *Public Personnel Review*. July, 1965.

Langrod, G. Le Gouvernement et l'Administration de L'Irlande indépendante. *La Revue Administrative*. Mars-Avril, 1965.

Mihcioglu, Cemal. The Civil Service in Turkey. *Public Administration Review* (Lahore). Jan–March, 1964.

Robertson, John F. The Royal Commission on State Services in New Zealand. *Public Administration* (L). Spring, 1965.

Personnel and Fiscal Administration

Caiden, Gerald E. Higher Grades Examinations in the Public Service of New South Wales. *Public Personnel Review*. July, 1965.

De Carbon, L. Bourcier. La rationalité fiscale, ses implications, ses difficultés et ses problèmes. *La Revue Administrative*. Mars. Avril, 1965.

Engelbert, E. A. Major Issues in Professional Training for Public Administration. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3 (1964).

Haq, Mehboobul. Fiscal Policy for a Developing Economy. *Public Administration Review* (Lahore). Jan–March, 1964.

Langrod, Georges. Le nouveau statut des fonctionnaires en Espagne. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3 (1964)

Lomax, W. Richard. The Federal Personnel System and the Challenge of the Space Age. *The Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1965.

Mueenuddin, G. Public Service in Pakistan: Recruitment and Training Policy. *Public Administration Review* (Lahore). Jan–March, 1964.

Administrative Responsibility and Control

Anderson, Stanley V. The Scandinavian Ombudsman. *American-Scandinavian Review*. December, 1964.

Dror, Y. Administrative Agencies and Courts: Some patterns of inter-organizational relations. *International Review of Administration Sciences*. No. 3 (1964).

Fischbach, Oskar Georg. *Bundesbeamtengesetz* (3rd ed.) Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1964.

Quande, Quentin L. and Thomas J. Bennet. Shield for the Citizen: The Ombudsman of Scandinavia. *Modern Age*. Fall, 1964.

Schechter, Alan H. *Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals*. London: Steven, 1964.

Spadairo, Salvatore. Le pouvoir judiciare et spécialement l'action des tribunaux administratifs dans les pays africains anciens et nouveaux. *Civilisations*. No. 4 (1964).

Stacey, Frank. The Machinery for Complaints in the National Health Service. *Public Administration* (L). Spring, 1965.

Development Administration

Banda, Harry J. Political Elites in Colonial Southeast Asia: An Historical Analysis. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. April, 1965.

Bauman, Zygmunt. The Limitations of "Perfect Planning." CAG Occasional Papers. July, 1964.

ESAPAC. *Informe del Seminario sobre Administración para el Desarrollo*. San Juan, Costa Rica, 1964.

Grassmuck, George. Polity, Bureaucracy, and Interest Groups in the Near East and North Africa. CAG Occasional Papers. June, 1965.

Hentgen, E. F. La formation des cadres administratifs des pays en voie de développement: Programmes et mannière d'enseigner. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3 (1964).

Katz, Saul M. A Systems Approach to Development Administration. Papers in Comparative Public Administration. Special Series No. 6. CAG, 1965.

Micaud, Charles A. et al. *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1964.

Planning in Canada. Special issue of *Canadian Public Administration*. June, 1965.

Roxas, Sixto K. The Problems of Public Administration for Economic Development. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. January, 1965.

Sweetman, L. T. Prefects and Planning: France's New Regionalism. *Public Administration* (L). Spring, 1965.

United Nations, Technical Assistance Programme. *Administrative Problems of Rapid Urban Growth in the Arab States*. 64.II.H.1. New York: 1964.

———. *The Workshop on Organization and Administration of Agricultural Services in the Arab States*. 64.II.H.3.

Comparative Local Government

Mariano, Leonardo C. Financing Local Government. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. January, 1965.

Potter, David E. *Government in Rural India. Introduction to Contemporary District Administration*. The London School of Economic and Political Science, 1964.

Technical Assistance

Abendländisch Akademie. *Das europäische Erbe in der beutigen Welt*. Nuremberg, Abendländische Akademie E. V., 1963.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

United Nations Forces. BY D. W. BOWETT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xxiii, 579. $15.00.)

Despite the adversity it has known, the United Nations has been more active, more critically involved in international politics, than the League of Nations ever was. The involvement, moreover, has to a remarkable extent been military and quasi-military in character. It is extraordinary that

> since 1948, there has never been a time in which, in one or several parts of the world, a group or force comprising military personnel was not operating in the name of the United Nations. Whether in the form of observer groups, or of a military force such as that in Korea, engaged in hostilities indistinguishable from war, or of a 'peace-keeping' force like UNEF in the Middle East or ONUC in the Congo—and whether 200 or 20,000 strong—United Nations Military Forces have in fact played a not insignificant part in maintaining the peace and security of the world.

Professor Bowett, Queens College, Cambridge, undertook the examination of this broad spectrum with the advisory assistance of a study group organized by the David Davies Memorial Institute. Seven collaborators helped him digest the vast amount of documentation. However, the final work, which bears Bowett's imprint throughout, is a unity.

It is a legal study, and it is a most difficult undertaking. In the first place, the use of military forces by the United Nations has in no instance conformed to the pattern envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. In the second place, the resolutions of the Security Council and/or the General Assembly authorizing such use neglect to specify the provisions of the Charter that are being relied upon. The constitutional law of the subject is, then, highly confused. Yet a number of vital issues turn on Charter interpretation, such as finance, the relation of United Nations action to the internal politics of the "host" country, and the question of the consent of the government whose territory is involved. Bowett's is a reasoned and persuasive interpretation. Taking as his guideline the broad purposes of the Organization, he refuses to be rigid. Lauterpacht's characterization of Kelsen's strict interpretation of the Charter is certainly not applicable to Bowett: "the pessimistic tendency to exact the largest possible element of absurdity from an admittedly imperfect document."

Beyond the constitutional questions are numerous and highly novel questions of international law. Many of them are dealt with in the United Nations regulations governing the forces, and in the United Nations agreements with the contributing states and with the "host" countries. These highly interesting documents are, no doubt, the product of the Organization's own lawyers. They are creative acts of unique importance to the legal development of the international community. Bowett's analysis is based to a large extent upon them, upon actual practice, and upon his own perception of still unanswered questions of the future.

Unlike the recent writings of some American scholars, Bowett does not reject as absurd the kind of international force envisaged in the third stage of the disarmament plan projected by the United States Government—a large force, sufficiently equipped, to impose the will of the United Nations on a recalcitrant power. His skepticism is enough, however, to place such a possibility in the distant future. Meanwhile, he sees as urgently necessary, and as within the realm of the practicable, the creation of a permanent force which though incapable of undertaking enforcement measures in the sense of Chapter VII, would be able to perform a "peace-keeping" function after the examples of UNEF and ONUC. The concluding chapter is a proposal for proceeding to that end by carefully prepared stages over a ten-year period. Based upon the already considerable experience of the United Nations, it is a course of action that awaits political consensus, achievable until now only at the moment of crisis, and then only temporarily.

The book is an encyclopedic treatment of the almost bewildering variety of legal problems that surround the United Nations forces. Dire circumstance has created the forces, and out of necessity a new field of international law has followed in train. The book does not tell the story of what has happened, though it is not insensible to the drama of it. It is analytical and thus somewhat disjointed. But this is in the nature of the legal approach. It is a task that very much needed doing. Bowett is to be congratulated on having surmounted the formidable difficulties.—EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, *Indiana University.*

Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System. BY DAVID BROOK. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964, Pp. 151. $3.75.)

There is by now a considerable body of literature on the three most ambitious United Nations peace-keeping operations: the Korean "police action"; the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East; and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). There is, however, a remarkable dearth of literature on the numerous minor UN peace-keeping forces, "UN Presences," and "UN Observer Groups" that have been sent into the field during the past two decades. For this reason, David Brook's monograph on the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East is particularly welcome.

This reviewer is impressed anew by the *sui generis* character of each UN peace-keeping operation. Political circumstances, troop composition, and financing patterns have differed from case to case and no easy generalizations are possible. The Brook study demonstrates that there is a lot to learn from the more modest UN operations. After presenting a concise history of the Arab-Israel Armistice System, Dr. Brook proceeds to a careful analysis of UNTSO itself. He discusses the Chief of Staff, the Observer Corps, Local Commanders' Agreements, and the relationship of UNTSO to the Security Council. Perhaps most interesting are the lessons that the author draws from his study.

In the first place, the Brook study demonstrates that UNTSO performed valuable services by keeping lines of communication open between the antagonists during periods of severe political strain. Second, the Observer Corps managed to reduce irritations between military commanders and border populations, and the Chief of Staff became an intermediary between governments that maintained no diplomatic relations. Third, the author describes the ingenious manner in which the Security Council acted as an appeals agency for disputes arising within the local machinery. And finally, the author points out how enemy military officers at times cooperated with one another on matters of infiltration, the apprehension of criminals, and the return of stolen property through the medium of UNTSO.

The general picture of UNTSO that emerges is that of a rather undramatic but extremely useful instrument of peace-keeping. At times, the author states, the observers just "park their jeep, pitch their tents, set up their icebox, and start watching." But this UN vigilance, in the author's judgment, could be profitably applied in other tense areas of the world, especially during periods of transition from active hostility to permanent peace. A UN Observer Group "cannot by itself obtain aims contrary to the wishes of the interested parties. But it is an important tool with which statesmen can help reduce friction if they so desire."

Dr. Brook's careful analytical study is a welcome addition to the body of UN literature and deserves wide attention.—JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College of the City University of New York.*

Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe. BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965. Pp. xi, 208. $5.95.)

This small volume by Zbigniew Brzezinski is the second of a series of 12 studies on the Atlantic Community sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, and it is one of two in that series dealing with the external environment of the Atlantic Community. The book deals with the partition of Europe into East and West, but it is focused particularly on Eastern Europe. The discussion is organized into four chapters: the first reviewing the present status of the Eastern bloc in Europe; the second dealing with the political economic and cultural currents undermining the iron curtain; the third analyzing the policies of the USSR, Germany, France and the United States toward Europe's partition. A fourth chapter contains suggestions for future American policy. Sixteen tables and figures at the back of the volume present a good deal of interesting comparative data which illustrates some of the arguments in the body of the text.

This work is to be welcomed as a serious attempt to sort out the tangled patterns of Europe's political life and future and to search for solutions that America might help to reach. The job is done with both skill and knowledge. Thus this book ought to be read by that wide audience concerned with American policy and with the future of Europe.

It is in the first portion of this book, where the author presents an interesting overview of the recent political and economic evolution of Eastern Europe that the reader will find the best this study has to offer. In this portion of the work the author broaches a large number of fascinating subjects: the contradiction between elites and masses in Eastern Europe; the utilization of narrow nationalism by some of the elites for purposes of nation-building; the much discussed pattern of liberalization in Eastern Europe; the pattern of change in Russo-Eastern European relations; the occasional role of Stalinism as a force loosening interstate relations behind the iron curtain; the strains that domestic demands on the elites are beginning to place on interstate relations in Eastern Europe. A full list would be long indeed.

On occasion one can pick minor and major quarrels with the author. Let me give one or two examples. Contrasting American relations with Western Europe with those of Russia and Eastern Europe Brzezinski suggests that relations in the West are in better shape (and I agree), but in the explanation proper weight is not given to the fact that Russia's difficulties in dealing with Eastern Europeans are due in some part to the vicissitudes of the industrialization drives. Low standards of living and repression have certainly not endeared Russia to Eastern Europeans. High prosperity, on the other hand, has favored warm relations between Western Europe and America. Brzezinski makes these points but they seem to get lost in the discussion of other factors.

The conception underlying the discussion of "the ideological neutrality of industrial development" moves me to make a comment. Obviously Communist dogmatists are silly in suggesting that their political system is "better" than ours for industrialization but we should also be careful not to assume at all times that political systems are interchangeable so far as industrialization is concerned.

Some readers may wonder at the realism of the strategic goals suggested throughout this book. The thesis is that America should help build bridges to Eastern Europe, and there can certainly be little disagreement on this point. But the argument suggests that the ultimate goal of the strategy is that Eastern Europeans (with Russian permission) will walk across these bridges into neutrality. But will Russia give permission? Is it really in her interest as she sees that interest to do so? Once Eastern Europe becomes industrial will not Russian control become more sophisticated more invisible, less painful, and therefore more acceptable and secure?

I also have some serious questions as to the central thesis in regard to Germany, i.e. the desirability of German reunification. Is it really prudent to suggest that a reunified Germany is in the interests of Europe and America? Is there not evidence that political moods in Germany and in the rest of Europe have not changed sufficiently from the past to make unification safe? Is it really likely—when one regards the West German elite—that Germany will agree to neutrality, which is rumored to be the Russian price for unification? Granted that Eastern Germany is a political abomination, is it really necessary for greater ties with Eastern Europe that Germany be unified? Is the division of Germany indeed a major source of instability today, and would the instability diminish or increase once Germany were reunified? On many of these questions Mr. Brzezinski has not altogether convinced me.

The reader of this work will be moved—as I have been—to argue. Any good book in this area should stimulate the reader to review his own thinking, to disagree, and to amend—and this is a good book.—A. F. K. Organski, *The University of Michigan.*

Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War. By Wilfred G. Burchett. (New York: International Publishers, 1965, Pp. 253, $4.95.)

"The almost vertical watercourses were dry, except for the occasional deep pools, but the stones were greasy with humidity." This sentence appears on the first page of Mr. Burchett's book and represents the last attempt at objectivity in his treatment of the subject matter. It is to his credit that he makes no attempts to hide his political sympathies or purpose in writing the book, and the reader should be prepared to do a discriminating job of reading. It is unfortunate that one searches the press and literature in vain for an objective evaluation of the activities of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front. The scholarly works on Vietnam have neglected an extensive treatment of the Front as the "experts" have no means of gathering the required information. The treatment given the Front by the news media is highly suspect as western newsmen have consistently claimed that they have been denied access to the facts necessary to file an unslanted story. Their sources of information seem limited to government press releases carefully censored by a bevy of public relations experts. One of the unfortunate facts of contemporary political life is that the goal of having an informed citizenry is sometimes subordinated to what certain elites feel to be the national interest.

For these reasons it seems ludicrous for a person to claim that he is fully informed as to the nature of the Liberation Front, the sources of its support, and the reasons for the war in Vietnam from reading exclusively in conventional western sources. Burchett deals with these issues by questioning the people involved in Front activities and the replies that he reports seem much more plausible in many cases than the more "official" answers. Many of his observations have been largely confirmed by dispatches, that now and then are found on the back pages of newspapers, from "maverick" correspondents as well as by the huge United States military build-up necessitated by the inability of the South Vietnamese to make any progress in their struggle against the Liberation Front. Burchett's claim that over seventy-five per cent of South Vietnam is under nominal Front control has recently been corroborated by the publication of official maps showing the extent of this control. Similarly, Georges Chaffard, writing for the French magazine "L'Express," has supported Burchett's attack on the myth, generated by the "White Paper," that the Front is largely supplied from the North. Both writers contend from first hand experience that most of the weapons used by the Front are captured from the South Vietnamese or else manufactured by them in their own jungle factories. Finally, his contention that the Front is living integrated with and supported by the peasants is partially attested to by the frustration of American officers who find it necessary to give orders to burn villages to the ground if they offer any resistance whatsoever to troop advances.

Burchett's book also has its bad points. His portrayal of the use of terror in the war as being completely one-sided is obviously untenable. He can be excused for adopting a clearly partisan point of view in the book, but this does not free him from the obligation to substantiate his allegations and to be discriminating in collecting information. His description of the typical Front controlled village as a small taste of paradise on earth is clearly false. He damages his own purpose by making such naive contentions as well as by using polemical phrases such as "the puppet regime in Saigon" whenever the occasion presents itself.

Mr. Burchett's book is not the most elegant work ever written, but he does present the heretofore unpublished other side of the story in very readable form. After having been subjected to a constant barrage of statements about the necessity and the viability of winning the war in Vietnam from available news sources, the reader is finally faced with the task of critically evaluating both sides of the story. It is the duty of the informed citizen as well as the scholar to weigh the information presented by those at the extremes of political opinion on this issue to seek out what appears to be the most plausible explanation of the events that have transpired in Vietnam in the last six years. When it is found that the channels of information on a complex issue become increasingly constricted, one should worry about having a mind closed to possible alternative policies. Especially for this reason, this book, which contains much revealing and relevant information among the polemics, should be read by anyone who claims that he is qualified to intelligently discuss the merits of current American policy in Vietnam.—DENNIS PIRAGES, *Stanford University*.

Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe. DAVID S. COLLIER AND KURT GLASER, EDS. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Pp. xii, 207, $6.00.)

This book of essays, published as volume 9 of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs Series, is the result of an American-German conference held in September 1963 in Wiesbaden. This was the second conference bringing together American and German scholars interested in Eastern Europe, with an added sprinkling of scholars from other European countries and of a few (especially German) politicians. The first conference took place in March 1962 in Chicago (see *Berlin and the Future of Eastern Europe* by the same two editors). In the meantime a third conference was held in March 1965 also in Chicago (title: *Western Policy and Eastern Europe*).

The titles of the three conferences suggest clearly the main area of their concern. The current situation in Eastern Europe is questioned.

Policy alternatives to the existing (more or less reluctant) acceptance of Soviet control over countries, which have had century long connections with the West, are looked for. Each time about 100 people gathered listening to the major addresses, taking part in vivid discussions, and exchanging views and ideas in private sessions. Whether these discussions are apt to result in policy changes of the West is certainly debatable, especially since some of the participants are political "outs" in their countries. The participating "ins" and the seriousness of the concerns should not be assessed too low, however.

From the volume on *Western Integration* emerges a series of interesting policy alternatives.

Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University occupies one extreme. He favors a greater share for Western Europe in "the fundamental decisions and responsibilities of strategy" and hopes that NATO with "conventional preponderance" will give the "captive peoples of East Central Europe" more bargaining strength against the Soviets. Increasing flexibility could also be gained by these countries as a result of closer economic ties with the West.

Boris Meissner of Cologne University takes a similar stand. He analyzes Soviet foreign policy in the traditional way as a fusion of nationalistic and ideological elements. History proves to him that the ideological elements will be diluted, as they indeed already are. This dilution suggests to Meissner a policy of contributing "appreciably to the acceleration of the process" so that the West "takes advantage of the opportunities offered by the trend toward a scattering of power in the Eastern bloc."

Wenzel Jaksch, a socialist member of the German Bundestag, becomes more specific in his policy proposals. The West has, as he sees it, proven "the accomplishments of a mixed economic system." And so he notes the necessity of taking up a historical task in the form of a "Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe" to help these people "toward a share in the West European standard of living." This would open for Jaksch "an evolutionary avenue of escape through a great common concept."

Eugene Davidson, the president of the sponsoring Foundation for Foreign Affairs, explores a still more definite stand. The West has to be more active not only in the flow of goods, but also of ideas. Sacrifice may be necessary and is called for to maintain "the first and last line of civilization." The alternative to an active policy of a united West may be an end to Western civilization or its deliverance "to the men who have themselves become machines."

In similar categories operates the argument of another member of the German parliament, Baron Guttenberg of the Christian-Social Union. He observes in the West "indifference, resignation, and not infrequently brutal selfishness." Contrary to other authors he does not notice any major changes in Soviet views and states bluntly "the enemy has not changed his goals." Therefore also the cold war is to continue. And a warning is in place. Do we really have a correct image of the Soviet Union or do we base our present views just on our own wishes?

Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution becomes even more specific. He recognizes our problems as NATO out of joint, American isolationism, and European isolationism. Institutional gadgets cannot solve the situation. Strength of the existing system based on an "ethos of interdependence" is needed, and even more. "Constitutional government" has to be extended eastwards to bring about an "all-European open society."

This is a cross-section of the arguments found in this interesting book. From utilizing changes in the Soviet bloc to replacement of the Soviet system by an open society. The policy-maker will find here materials for challenging explorations. The common element of all the articles is well stated by the editors when they propose more flexibility in Western policy and remark that "such a policy, representing true flexibility, would be best equipped to deal with the alternation of 'peaceful' and violent tactics envisaged by communist strategists."—JERZY HAUPTMANN, *Park College.*

Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy. By HERMAN FINER. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. xix, 538. $7.50.)

The intensity of attitudes toward the events of the Suez crisis of 1956 may well be measured by considering the feelings displayed eight years after the event by Professor Finer's work. He has written a highly partisan polemic denouncing John Foster Dulles, and in effect, supporting the British, French and Israeli actions in Egypt.

To understand Finer's evaluation of Dulles, one must realize the type of world in which Finer perceived these events to have taken place. No stranger to controversy, he lets his readers know at all times his attitudes toward all the persons and nations about which he is writing. The work is a mass of *obiter dicta* on events and people, which a review can but illustrate briefly.

Of the greatest of importance is Finer's view of the underdeveloped world, and in particular, Egypt. Finer, typically, calls Nasser (p. 40) "paranoiac," "juvenile," and "barbarian." Further, (p. 42), "The Soviet Union was now wildly popular with all the Arab peoples . . . ", and (p.43), " . . . Dulles had before him a Nasser who not only had embraced the Soviet Union, but had recognized *Red China!*" The italics are Professor Finer's.

India shares with Egypt Finer's extreme distaste, particularly as personified by Nehru and Krishna Menon. Since Egypt and India took a common position in this situation, they are linked. For example, (p. 56), "Nasser's language is a clear, overt indication of his own personal savagery and despotic temperament." Concluding that paragraph (p. 57), Finer states, "Nehru, some have said, had purposes similar to those of Nasser, but his 'style' was polished and sanctimonious." A favorite Finer device when discussing a nation which ranks low in his opinion is to insert parenthetically one of that nation's sins. Thus India (e.g., pp. 124, 135) is constantly mentioned as occupying illegally Kashmir, or attacking Portugal (Goa).

On the other hand, those nations which rank high in Finer's favor, that is, Israel, Britain and France, totally escape these pejorative phrases or parenthetical remarks. In contrast, Israel's attack on Egypt is just, and Britain and France are protecting peace and justice in supporting the Israeli attack on Sinai. It remains then, to discuss Mr. Dulles, the American State Department and President Eisenhower against this background of international actors.

Questions concerning the relative degrees of influence of Dulles, Eisenhower, Lodge and the other leading participants; apparent contradictions in American policy during the period; the breakdown in communications and understanding between the United States and Britain; the basic goals of American policy, and the perceptions of the means to attain them—all of these are of the highest interest to political scientists. Finer has performed a vast labor in reviewing the known documents, the journalistic accounts and relevant memoirs. In addition he interviewed a lengthy list of participants on both sides of the Atlantic.

Mr. Finer answers these questions; but in the context of an outspoken argument for one set of actors as opposed to another, his answers are of doubtful validity. His chapter headings indicate the thrust of his thesis: e.g., "Dulles's First Crunch Over Suez"; "The Poisoned Apple: The Users Club"; "Eden Vanquished"; "Dulles Impeaches His Allies"; "Dulles Sanctions His Allies." In short, Finer explains these events in terms of the personalities of the leaders involved; in the United States, that means for him John Foster Dulles, who personifies all American policy.

According to Finer, Dulles dominated the decisions, although Eisenhower's pacific views occasionally enter the picture, and once in a while the Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, and State Department personnel, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, receive mention. Any inconsistencies in American policy then become facets of Dulles' personality. The question of why he let down his allies, of why he "aided," or "yielded" to, the Soviet Union, helped out Nasser, and was ugly to Israel, all must turn on this one factor.

Finer toys with some of Dulles' basic attitudes, particularly his religious views, his moralism and his anti-communism, but he does not explore them fully. While these get some credit for the final outcome, the significant explanation is Dulles' fear, as Finer sees it, of the Soviet Union. This above all explains American policy concerning Suez in 1956. Any fears Dulles might have had of losing friends among the Afro-Asian countries are interpreted in light of possible relationships with the U.S.S.R. Fears of direct confrontation with Russia, or of Russian participation actively in the Middle East in the form of missiles or "volunteers," these caused Mr. Dulles to waver, vacillate, stall for time, and eventually lead the forces of Russia, Egypt and India to victory over Israel, Britain and France.

Curiously, in Finer's chapter labeled "Dulles Yields to Russia," the events described all took place while Dulles was in the hospital for major surgery. Dulles was operated on November 3rd; the Russian notes threatening Britain, France and the United States, came on November 5th; the cease-fire was on November 6th; and Dulles began receiving documents again, while still in the hospital, on November 8th. But the conclusion, at bottom, remains the same: (p. 512) it was "Dulles's deficiency of nerve in not standing fast at the Suez brink created by Nasser and Moscow;" " . . . faced with reality in Suez and Sinai, his action was stultified by want of courage."

The adequacy of this explanation can certainly be questioned, especially as Finer is arguing a case, rather than exploring a question. The entire work, with the exception of those pages describing British, French and Israeli actions, is replete with constant Finer interruptions which argue with the actions taken and with the participants, stating wherein they are telling falsehoods, taking incorrect actions, or deviating from Finer's prescribed course of action. The work could be cut by a third if these were removed, or were gathered together in one chapter instead of being repetitiously scattered throughout the text. The fascinating questions posed by this situation are illustrated but not answered. The work, then, is a justification for the British, French and Israeli actions, and a denunciation of Mr. Dulles, bell, book and candle. As such, it is a part of the series of events themselves, rather than an examination of the events.—JOHN H. MILLETT, *Wichita State University.*

France and the European Community. Edited by Sydney Nettleton Fisher. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 176. $5.00.)

Does De Gaulle really represent France? What is the extent of the "European Community?" Both of these questions became lively after De Gaulle's unilateral rejection of Britain's bid to enter the European Economic Community.

In this publication eight experts from such diverse fields as Romance Literature, International Law, International Economics, History, Agricultural Economics, Foreign Relations, Geography, and Government contribute papers from a three-day conference held in October of 1963. These have been aptly rearranged but there is no commentary or cross-questioning. Only in the first and last essays are De Gaulle and the extent of a future Europe seriously considered. Otherwise this collection fails to treat the European question in the nexus of French politics and eschews discussion of the confines of Europe. Its main focus is the Common Market.

Jean-Jacques Demorest commences the symposium with a witty essay in which he claims that "during the last thirty years French culture has been, if not wholly European, at least the only moving culture in Europe." (p. 13) Because Germany and Italy had abandoned their culture to fascism during the 1930's, it was General De Gaulle who resurrected both France and Europe as he entered Notre Dame in 1944. Demorest links De Gaulle both to key strands of French culture and to Europe's historic mission to serve as intellectual and spiritual leader of the world. Standing between Charles Péguy and Teilhard de Chardin, he safeguards "Europe by promoting France" on the assumption that his is the voice of "the Europe of tomorrow." (p. 14) Nowhere in the six ensuing papers are these propositions taken seriously.

Instead Carl Fulda gives an optimistic legal analysis of the evolution of the Common Market which he calls a "promising teenager" already establishing certain individual rights based on " 'federal' law." (pp. 34, 31) Klaus Knorr retorts that EEC must await the test of economic crisis before a really affirmative judgment can be made. He considers De Gaulle's challenge to NATO serious but basically "nationalistic and traditional." (p. 51) In his opinion Western Europe is unlikely to follow De Gaulle's views on confederation.

In a paper misleadingly entitled "French Politicians and the European Communities," Hans Schmidt catalogues the role of individual Frenchmen in formulating the European idea and of staffing European institutions. These heroes of his presumably represent "something more than political opinion" (p. 63) and he manages to avoid mention of De Gaulle by name (save in one reference to the General's brother-in-law). French battles for a favorable Common Market policy on agriculture and Africa are condemned as expression of narrow French National interest. In his view the present regime in France merely stifles temporarily the continuing European spirit of most Frenchmen.

Paul Minneman's reply is that it is essential that French agriculture be harmonized constructively in EEC if the European idea is to advance. William Diebold reiterates this theme, reminding readers that the monetary reforms of 1958 made France's collaboration in EEC much easier. Critical of De Gaulle's rejection of Britain's bid to enter the Common Market in 1963, he nonetheless recognizes that there is no European Community without France.

Norman Pounds reviews the resources of Western Europe, stressing the role of France in agriculture and evidence of recent modernization. Still far behind the efficiency of America, Western European agriculture is likely to demand at least temporary protection.

In the final essay Zbigniew Brzezinski uses changing Soviet interpretations and policies in response to the Common Market to demonstrate that EEC poses an ideological threat to an increasingly fractured Communist world. He takes seriously De Gaulle's vision of a larger European Community, "Europe to the Urals," considering this a sign that Europe looks ahead. He recommends the use of the ideology of European unity to reunite Europe (accepting the Oder-Neisse line) and to reintegrate Russia in the West.

Ironically the concentration of some contributors on rather rigid views both of De Gaulle and of "the European Community" can have the merit of stimulating greater interest in the subject of De Gaulle, France, and the future of Europe.—Luther A. Allen, *University of Massachusetts.*

Law, Politics, and the Security Council—An Inquiry into the Handling of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations. By Tae Jin Kahng. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xiv, 252. $7.80).

In the few instances in which the UN Charter expressly mentions respect for international law as a goal, it refers at the same time to justice: So in the Preamble ("to establish conditions under which justice and respect for . . . international law can be maintained") and in the provisions concerning the Purposes ("to bring about, by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes") and Principles of the UN ("all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered"). "Strict" law is thus tempered with justice.

In the same vein, the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it (Article 11(2)), without being bound by international law. And under Article 14 it may "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin . . . " which stipulation is said to be the main Charter provision for the peaceful change of the *status quo*. In a similar way, the Security Council may "recommend such terms of settlement (of a dispute) as it may consider appropriate" (Article 37(2)), again without having to comply with international law. Of course, UN organs are expected to observe also the Charter provisions other than those authorizing them to make recommendations without regard to international law. However, these provisions permit so many interpretations—as Kelsen has shown in *The Law of the United Nations*—and there is so little room for the political or judicial review of the constitutionality of action taken under the Charter—as I have tried to show elsewhere—that often the "political" or "legal" character of a given action seems to be a moot question.

The League of Nations Convenant was more emphatic about the observation of the rules of international law: the Preamble speaks of "the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments" and of the "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." However, the Covenant, in the same Preamble provision, also stresses "the maintenance of justice" (how this can be combined with said scrupulous respect for *all* treaty obligations is another question). Both the League Council and Assembly could make "recommendations which are deemed just and proper" in regard to disputes "likely to lead to a rupture" (Article 15 (4) and (10)), also without being bound by international law. There is, moreover, the famous peaceful change provision of Article 19. And finally, the Covenant, like the Charter, did not provide for judicial review and even less for political review.

Under these conditions which the author of the book under review might have pointed out, it is remarkable that twenty-eight requests for advisory opinions of the Permanent Court were made—all by the League Council which also used committees of jurists. The Security Council, on the contrary, has not asked for a single advisory opinion of the International Court, has not had recourse to committees of jurists (except for the occasional use of its Committee of Experts), and has recommended only one case for submission by the parties to the International Court while the General Assembly has requested the advisory opinion of the Court in only eleven cases. Why did the Security Council prefer to handle itself legal problems involved in disputes and situations brought before it and how did it handle such problems?

The author of the present work which, originally, was a Ph.D. dissertation at Columbia University, endeavors to answer both questions. He diligently analyses important cases (but not all the cases) which came before the Security Council from the point of view of the competence of the Council, its procedure (meaning, exclusively, voting procedure), and the substantive rights and duties of the parties. His conclusions are quite obvious and so are some of his suggestions (use of rapporteurs, committess of jurists and the Legal Department of the Secretariat) while another (to explore whether the parties would be willing to request the Court to decide the case *ex aequo et bono*) is less another available "avenue" than a dead end street. This reviewer found Oscar Schachter's recent Hague lectures on *The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations* which were published after Professor Kahng's book, more enlightening.—SALO ENGEL, *The University of Tennessee.*

The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Pp. xiv, 266. $5.95.)

In his classic commentary on American society, de Tocqueville asserted that in the conduct of foreign affairs the United States was not, like the old nations of Europe, "compelled to accept an immense inheritance bequeathed by their forefathers, an inheritance of glory mingled with calamities, and of alliances conflicting with national antipathies." He went on to describe the American propensity for "the gratification of a momentary passion" in its policy, stemming largely from an impatience in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

Henry Kissinger's lucid analysis of the difficulties besetting the Atlantic Alliance can be read from two perspectives. It is, on the one hand, a detailed chronicle of the issues and policies which have brought to an impasse the most successful creation of American foreign policy since World War II. The book may also be read as a measured critique of the American "style" in foreign policy. In this respect, Kissinger stands squarely within the tradition of de Tocqueville; his indictment is drawn up not so much against specific policy-makers or decisions as against a distinctively American attitude toward foreign policy.

> Americans live in an environment uniquely suited to a technological approach to policy making. As a result, our society has been characterized by a conviction that any problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise. With such an approach, problems tend to appear as discrete issues without any inner relationship. It is thought that they can be solved "on their merits" as they arise. It is rarely understood that a "solution" to a problem may mortgage the future—especially as there is sufficient optimism to assume that, even should this prove to be the case, it will still be possible to overcome the new problem when it materializes (p. 23).

Kissinger's analysis can be summarized briefly. The cohesive cement of the Soviet threat to invade Western Europe has all but vanished. Concomitantly, American hegemony over Europe has dissolved in the face of other recent events: European recovery from the devastation of World War II; European integration; the end of colonialism; and the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath. Moreover, the end of American nuclear monopoly has called into question traditional assumptions about the function of alliances; faced with the risk of nuclear annihilation, will any partner risk its existence for another? But, owing to "two conflicting conceptions of international order, two different views of the historical process, two variant visions of the future," the lesson of these developments is perceived quite differently in Paris and Washington. In De Gaulle's view, the structure of the alliance has not been modified to reflect these events; many problems of NATO thus stem from the incongruity between the "old structure" and the "new situation." This disparity manifests itself in a series of policy issues which Kissinger examines in detail: *force de frappe*, the Berlin crisis, the Anglo-American agreement at Nassau, M. L. F., the future of Germany, and others.

While such problems are not American in origin, Kissinger insists that the typical American approach toward their resolution has often aggravated stresses within the alliance. American leaders have tended to impose technical solutions upon political and psychological problems, and to concentrate on the immediate rather than long-term solutions. Moreover, Washington has been remarkably insensitive to the domestic political situations of the allies; changes in policy have often been announced with an almost calculated disregard for political consequences elsewhere in the alliance.

Kissinger's verdict on most issues which divide the alliance is that whereas technical truth resides with the United States, De Gaulle has historical and political truth on his side.

The first seven chapters of this book serve as documentation to refute "the fashionable [American] theory that all problems in the Atlantic Alliance have been caused by one man [De Gaulle]," the solution to which "is to await his disappearance from the scene." The concluding chapter is devoted to some suggestions for revitalizing the alliance. It is in part a tribute to the care with which the author lays bare in detail the multiple roots of the difficulties that his prescriptions—most of which are structural in nature—do not seem wholly adequate.

Occasionally one can take issue with Kissinger's interpretation of recent NATO history. For example, he dates the crucial turning point in the history of the alliance with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. An alternative interpretation, one which seems more tenable, would look back to the Suez fiasco six years earlier. Kissinger indicates that European resistance to American dominance of the Alliance is fed by doubts of genuine support from Washington; fear of a Soviet-American detente at the cost of European vital interests; resentment of the paternalistic self-righteousness with which American policy is presented; and anger with the American propensity to place the governments in London, Paris, and Bonn in political jeopardy with divisive policy pronouncements on which there has been no prior consultation. At no time have such feelings received more substantial empirical support than during the events of July-November 1956.

Such minor criticisms aside, Kissinger's book, prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, stands as the best analysis of present problems—and probable future difficulties—facing the Atlantic Alliance.—OLE R. HOLSTI, *Stanford University*.

The European Community and American Trade. BY RANDALL HINSHAW. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 188. 4.95.)

The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe. BY FINN B. JENSEN AND INGO WALTER. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1965. Pp. 278. $1.95.)

The recent literature on European integration is replete with general analyses which seldom penetrate below the most obvious surface problems, and with normative treatises venting, with greater or lesser amounts of spleen, U.S. outrage at De Gaulle and the frustration of our Grand Design for the future of the Atlantic system. Of these two books, both by economists, Hinshaw's unfortunately falls into both categories, although it is more restrained than most, whereas the work by Jensen and Walter is a notable exception. In spite of being designed as a supplementary text it is a useful contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of integration.

Hinshaw sets out to attempt "a new examination of the Common Market in terms of American interests." (p. 7) However, there is very little new here. Hinshaw's list of the constituents of America's interests vis-à-vis the EEC is too short and general and too full of unexamined assumptions to serve as a particularly meaningful reference point for analysis. His statements about the policy direction and workings of the EEC betray an unfamiliarity with the complexities and nuances of its internal bargaining pattern. The EEC is judged primarily in terms of its contribution to the solidarity of the West and to the continuation of American leadership of the free world. And we learn that here the community has very mixed credentials, for "apart from being the source of bitter internal disputes which have threatened to paralyze its development (it) has at least temporarily led to an increase in economic and political friction between those Western European countries that are members . . . and those that are not." (p. 10) Furthermore, the community seems almost inevitably destined to become "inward-looking" (although exactly what this means is never made clear). Finally, we learn that most such problems would have been solved had Britain been permitted to join the Community. (This is taken as a basic premise and never examined critically.) But, unfortunately DeGaulle's protectionist views "have prevailed" (p. 6), and the Community is now "dominated" by "a leader who has a conception of its role very different from that held by its founding fathers . . . or by the many Americans who have placed so much hope in its future." (p. 165) It is "led by a man who has no interest in lowering trade barriers as a means of 'cementing' an Atlantic Partnership . . . ." (p. 165)

There are a number of misconceptions here. For example, it is clear that such founding fathers as Monnet and Schuman also have harbored "third force" ideas from the very beginning. One cannot help agreeing with Stanley Hoffman's observation that "the entity to which Europe's nation-states are summoned to transfer their heritage is being duly and pressingly warned not to act as a super power, not to establish any wall around itself, and not to give any preferences, i.e., not to behave as powers have customarily behaved." At the very least, it seems to this reviewer unrealistic to expect the European Community to be the only major trading unit that is not to some degree protectionist and to castigate it so roundly for being as bad as the rest of us. In fact, Hinshaw's own analysis in the very useful substantive chapter comparing tariff rates and tariff structures of nations in the Atlantic area, shows clearly that the EEC's common external tariff is somewhat *lower* and probably has a less marked incidence on trade than the tariff of either the U.S. or Britain! (It indicates also how much the protectionist French have lowered their tariffs since signing the Rome Treaty.) Similarly, in his interesting chapter on the impact of European integration on U.S. trade, he finds that "trade diversion issuing from the Six and the Seven—if, in balance, it has occurred at all—has been of minor dimensions." (p. 147) In fact American exports of manufactured goods to Europe in 1963 "were exactly twice as high as the $1.6 billion figure for 1958, the last year before the emergence of Western European tariff discrimination." (p. 156)

Although Hinshaw does not re-examine his premises in the light of these findings, he seemingly has sensed the dissymmetry, for his concluding chapter says very little about the EEC. Its purpose (and perhaps Hinshaw's purpose in writing the book in the first place) is to appeal for a greater measure of free trade on the part of the United States which has even less excuse for being protectionist than the EEC. Here Hinshaw has interesting and controversial proposals to make, namely that we should "re-examine two basic premises of American commercial policy: the premise that trade concessions should be reciprocal and the premise that trade concessions should be nondiscriminatory." (p. 171)

The Jensen and Walter volume sets out to describe and analyze the institutions of the European Common Market, how they work and how they affect people in Europe, America, and underdeveloped countries." (p. v) The introductory chapters on historical background, institutional framework, and basic provisions of the Rome Treaty are clear, compact and informative. Of greatest interest, however, are the subsequent chapters which go beyond an exposition of what the Community *is* to explore, the basic economic problems it now faces or may soon confront and to begin an examination of how the policy choices here made will affect the future economic and political contours of Europe. Especially valuable are the chapters on agriculture, regional development problems, social policy, labor mobility and the right of establishment, competition, transportation, fiscal and countercyclical policy and problems of monetary condivation.

These areas are indeed the very stuff of the present and future politics of the EEC (as they are of all industrialized nations). Within the confines of space the authors explore in general terms the problem posed in each policy area by the creation of a common market, how like problems have been handled before by the states separately, what alternative solutions have been proposed by Community institutions and the member states, what progress in the direction of common policies has been made and what progress seems likely. The authors demonstrate a good understanding of the Community's internal dynamics and a more than casual acquaintance with its institutions seen from the inside. The book packs far more useful information into its pages than any other comparable volume this reviewer has seen. It also contains a very good bibliography. Most of the material has not been previously collated or made available to the non-expert, although as with most books on the EEC this one too will date rapidly. Some of the analyses might have been taken farther and economists might quarrel with some of the assertions and projections, but the authors have succeeded in making the book useful for the generalist as well as the specialist.—LEON N. LINDBERG, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Atlantic Union Movement. BY ISTVAN SZENT-MIKLOSY. (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, 1965. Pp. xx, 264, $7.95.)

Professor Szent-Miklosy's work is a handy catalogue of the persons, events, and ideas in the Atlantic Union Movement since the 1930s. It contains a clear chronology of the major steps in the movement and an extensive bibliography. Unfortunately, the presentation suffers from a rather arid, stilted style and a tendency to repetition of fact and personality identification. While the author strives for the contrary, the book is expository rather than analytic, and it frequently labors the obvious—perhaps a virtue for the uninitiated.

Positing that, in the contemporary environment, the major problems confronting the free world are physical survival, avoidance of a nuclear holocaust, preservation of the values of the most advanced civilizations, and aid to the underdeveloped areas, the author proposes to find the most likely assurance of successful solutions to such problems in a unified and *powerful* Atlantic community. (The query rises, almost unbidden, whether, in the long run, a union motivated by distrust, animated by antagonism, and manifesting its essential nature by a display of *power* will contribute to peace and freedom as much as it detracts.) From this premise Szent-Miklosy proceeds to examine the movement, its protagonists, and its problems.

As the reader is led through the beliefs of Clarence Streit (the "radical idealist") and others in the movement, the cultural, ethical, and philosophical bases of Atlantic Union, the impact of NATO, the economic objectives and problems of Atlantica, and the influence of the movement in world politics, he must almost inevitably conclude that, in terms of peace and freedom, Atlantic Union is at once too much and too little to ask of the inhabitants of those units which must merge to form the union. It is too little because, in its realization, the union would be an armed camp competing economically with the opposition to shape the underdeveloped areas in its own image—hardly a heartening atmosphere for the peace dove. It is too much because, despite all the logic and imperative of such union—with whatever advantages might accrue, it simply will not occur presently except on a rather superficial level. (*Vive* de Gaulle and national sovereignty!)

While one may applaud the movement's ideals of peace and freedom, one has to wonder if the achievement of an Atlantic federation would actually forward their attainment. Surely a union of freedom-oriented societies would likely perpetuate and export this concept. And as long as such a union was viewed as a nucleus for an ultimate globalism, its philosophy and aims were consistent. However, as the shift in thinking occurred—with NATO as the hypnotic bauble—which made of an Atlantic community an exclusive and militant club, the spectre of the ragged ghost of "peace through strength" rose again. Perhaps the United Nations concept has a greater validity.

Obviously, neither the ideology nor the organizational pattern of an Atlantic Union or a United Nations can achieve an earthly Eden so long as the human family remains imperfect as it is, and military preparedness is a must in the face of potential aggression. This truism should not, of course, deter attempts to improve the relations of peoples and nations.

On a more plebian level, the author presents well the case for Atlantic Union in an uneasy world. Somewhat grudgingly, it seems, he also concedes that its creation is not in the offing. The "moderate" (and more realistic?) viewpoint that "cooperation" in NATO, OECD, etc. is the most that can be expected of nation-states enmeshed in the traditions of international anarchy and sovereignty is ascendant.—EMILE B. ADER, *Midwestern University.*

The Cold War—And After. BY CHARLES O. LERCHE, JR. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. Pp. viii, 150. $4.95 cloth, $1.95 paper.)

Is the cold war over? The title of the book, the jacket blurb ("The cold war era is over."), and the author's declaration that "the cold war is obsolescent if not yet obsolete" (p. 130) would seem to say so. His modified conclusion, "... the cold war as a system of interaction and as a historic force has almost reached technological and political obsolescence" (p. 131) places the matter back in the doubtful category. The recommendation that "the United States must in its own self defense build its response to Soviet policy today and in the future upon as generous a measure of caution and realism as it did in the darkest days of Stalinist terror" (p. 51) casts further doubt on the question.

The author has undoubtedly set himself a formidable task. To provide a "strategic analysis" of the cold war in only one hundred and forty-two pages limits his ability to qualify his conclusions, to tie them directly to specific historical situations, or to provide supporting evidence and factual illustrations of his generalizations. Furthermore, by analyzing different facets of the cold war in separate and largely unrelated compartments he frequently seems to be engaged in a running debate with himself as well as the different schools of thought on the cold war.

The conceptual basis of American cold war policy is at first described as inadequate. "Great Britain, it was said . . . , conquered an empire in a fit of absence of mind. The same may be said, and with probably more justice, about the prosecution of American foreign policy since 1945. . . . Never before have so many huge enterprises been launched with so little conceptual unity. . . ." (p. 1) "The American strategic style . . . conceptualizes foreign policy as a series of discrete problems, each to be approached in chronological order on its own terms and on its own merits." (p. 26) Yet, the author firmly rejects the idea that "decisions by great powers are made *ad hoc* in particular situations without reference to any intellectual or grand-strategic considerations." (p. 20) He does not dissent from the overall American objective of achieving a peaceful world operating under conditions of law and commends the application of the Truman Doctrine to the problem of Soviet expansion. His conclusion that "The conceptual apparatus and the implementing institutions of American strategy in the cold war proved thoroughly adequate to the task to which they were originally applied" (p. 72) is not precisely in accord with his original premise. It turns out that what is needed is a "broader and more sophisticated approach" (p. 75) but the nature of such a new approach is not indicated.

Can Stalin's foreign policy accurately be described as "no more than a minimal outward expansion of the Soviet's security frontier?" (p. 53) Given the author's excellent review of Soviet ideological and strategic motivations is it fair to state that "American strategic self-denial . . . has permitted—has in fact almost forced—the Soviet Union to adopt a strategy of initiation." (p. 36) If American foreign policy makers are to be criticized for believing that communists "may change their tactics but never their objectives" (p. 17) what is one to say about the author's judgment that the "Soviet Union still retains its ideology, announces its goal of world communism, and professes a total lack of faith in the intentions of all noncommunists. . . . The Soviet strategic concept is unswerving across time as well as in theory." (p. 49)

Finally, the strategic quarrel as to whether policy should be made in terms of a potential enemy's capabilities or its intentions is revived. The critics of the Pearl Harbor disaster concluded that because intentions are at best uncertain, easily disguised, and subject to change the the only safe policy was to consider an opponent's capabilities. Such thinkers are regarded scornfully as "possibilists" here. Perhaps "possibilism" has resulted in some inflexibility in American policy but the argument in favor of acting on the basis of intentions would be more convincing if the author showed more faith in the ability of American intelligence analysts to predict Soviet moves accurately.

Despite the foregoing, this book does make a contribution in pointing out that differences do exist between the ideologies and practices of the cold war participants, in emphasizing that tacit agreements have been established on many matters, and in treating the cold war from a broad vantage point.—HUBERT S. GIBBS, *Boston University*.

The Exercise of Sovereignty: Papers on Foreign Policy. BY CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 282. $6.50.)

This collection of previously published essays by a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff reflects a wealth of insights into various important and timely problems obtained through practical experience. Despite the diversity of the subjects discussed and the aphoristic character of some of the essays, the book has a remarkable degree of unity provided by the author's point of view and the coherence of his reasoning. The central theme running through the whole is the persistence of sovereignty as a problem of international relations. The problem, he insists, must be faced; it cannot be explained away. He discusses sovereignty first as the basic condition underlying foreign policy, then its bearing upon the alliances of the United States and upon the United Nations, and finally the role played by it in the relations of the United States with the new nations.

Although the book is interesting and perceptive throughout, the most thought-provoking part is the last. The essays comprising it raise questions concerning the lack of American success in forming workable alliances with most of the new states and in the realm of conventional warfare. Marshall sees the essential reasons for the former in the American indifference to the new states' need for political progress and the resulting conviction that existing problems can be solved through economic and military aid and administrative reforms. The handicaps encountered in the conduct of unconventional warfare are attributed very largely to what in effect amounts to an ideological bent of American foreign policy, which has committed this country to the universalization of liberal governments while enjoining it from intervening in the internal affairs of other countries.

The practical and moral problems dealt with are of the kind that the statesman at one time or other must face. Written in a lucid and gracious style, the book is free of professional trappings and attempts to conceptualize. Yet it is the work of a thorough going professional. The points made, though frequently common sense propositions, are worthy of the professional's attention. They will guard him against losing sight of the forest for the trees.

The author is objective but not detached. He has no axe to grind nor vested interests to defend. He combines, in admirable proportions, the realist's perceptiveness with the humanist's tolerance. Free of ideological fixations, he cuts through current clichés and avoids providing formulae for solving foreign policy problems. This splendid volume should prove of as much interest to the general reader as to the student.—PETER J. FLIESS, *Louisiana State University.*

The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. The Yearbook of World Polity: volume III. EDITED BY WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN. (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xi, 323. $7.00.)

This third volume of *The Yearbook of World Polity,* published under the auspices of The Institute of World Polity of Georgetown University, is concerned with the impact upon international law and organization of the rather sudden entry of a sizable number of new states into the international community. The first three chapters are devoted to an examination of the international legal institutions of state succession, military servitudes, and recognition in the light of the new developments. From the discussions there emerge certain similarities which all these institutions have in common. As far as their origins are traceable, each was tailored to suit conditions which no longer prevail, and the applicability of each to present-day conditions is doubtful. Although they are intimately related to the most fundamental problems of the existing international order, their substance has become uncertain, and frequently they no longer bear any meaningful relationship to reality.

It is argued that state succession is far too abstract a concept to cope with concrete problems and that the claims made for it suffer from an unrealistic indifference toward the provisions of municipal law. The existing legal rules never imposed very definite obligations in the past and cannot be expected to have greater juridical force in relation to the states that have emerged recently from colonialism. In a similar vein, international military servitudes, through which some states try to maintain troops within the territory of a new state, are condemned as unrealistic and juridically untenable. Derived from the property concepts of Roman law, the principle is ill-suited to solve the political problems with which international law is concerned. It is at best an artificial construct invoked as a legal cloak for intervention and thus a threat to universal peace. A detailed examination of the recognition policy of the United States toward the new nations shows the virtual disappearance of the criteria which in the past were prerequisite to the recognition of new states. Although the increasingly prevalent disregard of ideological factors which has played so eminent a part since the Wilsonian era represents a welcome return to an older and more sensible practice, the authors detect a tendency to destroy "recognition as an institution for fact-finding and for assigning legal rights and duties" and justly fear that this will produce a relativism that may subvert the international legal order by driving a wedge between law and reality. The final chapter in concerned with the changes in the nature and power structure of the United Nations following from the indiscriminate admission of an inordinately large number of new states of frequently questionable viability.

This book differs from most recent reexaminations of international legal institutions in that the authors in their search for the roots of existing difficulties are not inhibited by an excessive reverence even for the most fundamental assumptions of international law. There is at least a suggestion that the present inadequacies of international law are ultimately attributable to the inappropriateness of the Grotian system, on which modern international law rests, to the present distribution of power. One can only hope that this suggestion will stimulate further critical examinations of the theoretical foundations of international law and eventually attempts at reconstruction on the basis of concepts that are more in tune with present power realities than those underlying traditional international law.—Peter J. Fliess, *Louisiana State University.*

Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International Relations and International Law. By Alexander Ostrower. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965. 2 vols; Pp. 963. $20.00.)

The role played by language as a uniting and dividing force in international relations is generally acknowledged. Yet it has rarely been the object of detailed scholarly investigation. This neglect is all the more surprising at a time when hopes for the survival of the race are largely staked on the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow to avert disaster resulting from misunderstanding. While the technical problem of transmitting sound has thereby been solved, the linguistic problem remains cause for concern. Ostrower's work is a welcome contribution to our knowledge of the effects of linguistic complexity and diversity upon international relations.

The first part of the book provides the general background. The author discusses in encyclopedic breadth the history of national, international, and diplomatic languages and analyzes linguistic practices in official international relations. His discussion ranges over too many areas to permit a comprehensive review. He takes the reader into the realms of history, philology, archeology, and diplomacy. Particularly impressive are his observations on the need for distinguishing between international and diplomatic language and the rôle played by national languages as means of international communication. Of equal interest are his attempts to explain why some languages have risen to international and even diplomatic status, while others have played a less illustrious part. Although the ascendancy of a language has often followed the political and military success of the tribe or nation whose possession it was, this has not occurred with sufficient regularity to become a pattern. The author gives a survey of the experiences of numerous empires in the remote as well as the more recent past with reference to the status attained by their languages and explores in each case the cause of linguistic ascendancy and failure. The chapter devoted to an examination of the lack of universality of the Russian language is both timely and illuminating. He sees the reason in the close identification of the language "with the political power of the Soviet Union and the Communist party" which leads us to believe that "we must accept or reject them jointly." And he observes that "what must have been conceived as a means of Russian linguistic advancement by intertwining the language with Russian culture, the Soviet Union, and the Communist doctrine has proved to be a hindering factor to Russian universality in that the future of the language is now dependent on the fortunes of communism in the world community."

Part II is concerned with "Linguistic Provisions in State Constitutions, Treaties, International Engagements, Resolutions and Recommendations of the League of Nations and the United Nations." Part III has to do with "Diplomatic Languages and International Law."

The main weakness of the book is its discursive nature, which gives it a textbookish character. In making his points the author frequently drifts unnecessarily into marginal areas with which the student of history and international relations is well-acquainted. There is, for example, no need to go over the whole ground of *rebus sic stantibus* in his discussion of the linguistic protection provided for by the minority treaties concluded with the succession states after World War I. On page 713 the reader is finally informed that the many generous digressions are "necessary to any examination of the legal aspect of diplomatic languages," which is contained in the remaining 110 pages.

Aside from the disproportion between the introductory and the main parts of the book, it must regretfully be said that the treatment of the latter does not fulfill its promise. One could only wish that the author had stopped at the end of Part I. Instead of carrying out his professed intention to analyze the difficulties arising in international law from linguistic confusion, he shows little more than the substantive uncertainty of many of the existing principles, which is well-known. Moreover, there is nothing startling in the linguistic uncertainties plaguing international law. That difficulty is germane to all law and for obvious reasons is aggravated in international law.

A word must be added with respect to the footnotes. There are far more than are needed. Many either contribute nothing or document points that are general knowledge. By and large, the footnotes are poorly edited. They are frequently inconsistent and at times fail to conform with generally accepted standards. German citations in particular abound with errors. This does not detract from whatever value the work has, but it is irritating, especially in a book dealing with problems of language.—Peter J. Fliess, *Louisiana State University.*

Korea: The Limited War. By David Rees. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. Pp. xvi+511. $10.00.)

An uneasy ceasefire along the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea is the symbol of a diplomatic and military stalemate between the East and the West. The partition of Korea itself is part of the East-West struggle and the whole question of war and peace in that area must be examined against the general background of the Cold War. This is the view presented remarkably well by David Rees, a British freelance writer.

Rees contends that Korean conflict was confined to "limited war" not because of the lack of military resources available to the United States in attaining its strategic objective, whether it be a total unification of Korea or total defeat of the Soviet-Red Chinese-North Korean goals, but rather due to political "choice" of the Truman-Eisenhower Administrations (in which "purely military" considerations have been excluded). Such policy decisions were made by the United States because her leaders at the conclusion of the Second World War launched a containment policy against the U.S.S.R. which was not meant to destroy Communism but to halt its expansion, thus practicing *realpolitik* and waging limited war whenever challenged to do so by the adversary. However, he also points out that the United States has not yet found the answer to how and when the current Communist challenge can best be countered without precipitating nuclear war.

The essential problem of "limited war" is twofold: a) What should be the ends of limited war in an age when total war means annihilation? b) Can the doctrine of limited war be sustained at all? Following the view of Henry Kissinger, that a limited war is a struggle for specific political objectives, Rees equates limited war with political war because "a strategy of limited forces for limited ends . . . is the only one which can conceivably fulfill any rational purpose" if some sort of *détente* or *modus vivendi* is ever to be worked out with the Communists. As to the latter question, however, it is doubtful whether the "liberal-puritan" political tradition of all-or-nothing outlook in the United States can ever accept force, balance of power and *realpolitik* as the necessary ingredients of foreign policy. Since the "Korean War was the first important war in American history that was not a crusade," it was immensely difficult to sell to the American people. (A similar analogy can be made about the American involvement in the South Vietnam.)

The author feels that the United States, and the West in general, have not yet fully appreciated the reality that "power and policy, like idealism and *Realpolitik*, can never be separated and that limited war is the fusion of both. . . ." This was clearly demonstrated by the two incidents—the Truman-MacArthur controversy and the conduct of truce negotiations. The Truman Administration was so preoccupied by von Clausewitz's view of the political nature of war that it failed to combine its policy with power. This MacArthur felt was the reason for losing the war in Korea; therefore the General proclaimed his belief that the war should be fought to a clear-cut solution as quickly as possible by abolishing all political considerations which restrict the military. As to the conduct of truce negotiations, the United States had curtailed and limited drastically its military operations against the Chinese Communists once the peace talks opened. The Communists had no incentive to make peace until the United States had seriously threatened to use atomic weapons on the Chinese mainland. Meanwhile, the number of casualties on both sides had greatly increased and at the conclusion of the 1953 armistice it was estimated that the West's military casualties had reached 500,000 while the Chinese-North Korean forces had lost one and a half million. Civilian casualties totalled two million, approximately one million on each side during the three-year period.

The Communists, on the other hand, have long realized the inevitable fusion of power and policy and successfully integrated military action, propaganda and political manueuvering, as demonstrated in the year-long peace negotiations at Panmunjom. They are also skillful in using force to advance their long-term objective of world domination because they believe in the absolute supremacy of political considerations in war and peace. Rees, therefore, concludes that the most important lesson of the East-West struggle in the Far Eastern War is that the West must accept that limited war is the fusion of power and policy, irrespective of its moral implications, if we are to "meet the Communist challenge decisively on the most important battleground—our own minds."

Rees is neither an academic political scientist nor specialist in international affairs, and hence his writings are largely historical. Nevertheless, he has successfully incorporated mounting data in the detailed accounts of the military campaigning in Korea—from the initial North Korean invasion to the MacArthur's amphibious landing at Inchon to the subsequent Chinese Communist intervention followed by the latter's mass offensives to the conclusion of the war. The Truman-MacArthur controversy (including the subsequent Congressional inquiry) is thoroughly examined. There are also chapters dealing extensively with topics such as the Maoist theory of war, the Communist "brainwash" of POWs, the role of the United Nations, the Panmunjom peace talks, and the domestic politics in the United States and Great Britain during the war period.

Rees has produced an encyclopedic history of the Korean War at a moment when the United States again is deeply involved in a similar war in

South Vietnam. This book is a valuable contribution to the understanding of "limited" wars now going on in other areas of the world. It is well documented and illustrated by photographs and maps. The appendices include the full text of the armistice agreement, the casualties, the various contributions to the United Nations Command, and an extensive bibliography.—JOHN C. H. OH, *The University of Wisconsin, Menasha.*

Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals. BY ALAN H. SCHECHTER. (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xviii, 183. $10.00.)

Professor Schechter of Wellesley College has put us in his debt by producing a clear and systematic analysis of an important aspect of the jurisprudence of the three tribunals competent to resolve disputes on the basis of law between international organizations and their employees. These are the administrative tribunals of the International Labor Organization (successor at the 1946 demise of the League of Nations to that organization's Administrative Tribunal created in 1927 and now exercising jurisdiction also over certain other specialized agencies as UNESCO and FAO) and of the United Nations (established by General Assembly resolution of November 24, 1949), as well as the Court of Justice of the European Communities (created by the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of April 18, 1951 and renamed and jurisdiction expanded by the March 25, 1957 treaties instituting the European Economic Community and EURATOM). The last named differs from the others in many significant respects, not the least of which is that jurisdiction over disputes between Community organs and their employees is only one aspect of its broad competence.

It is well understood that the proliferation of international organizations having status as subjects of international law, together with the growing importance and size of international secretariats, constitutes important evidence not only of a significant extension of the scope of international law but also of evolution in its nature. No longer can international legal rules be considered applicable solely to the relations of states. International administrative law, concerned with international organizations and their personnel as well as with states, has emerged as an important branch of the subject.

Limited and introductory in its conception, this study examines questions of interpretation of contracts and of staff rules and regulations confronting the three tribunals, as well as the problem of the judicial interpretation of treaties establishing the respective organizations. The author finds the judges of all three tribunals inclined to view each problem of interpretation as unique as evidenced by almost total absence of citation of prior relevant decisions by these or other tribunals. This makes for inconsistency as well as for uncertainty concerning future adjudication, Professor Schechter rightly argues, and inevitably retards the development of a more effective legal order.

Comparison indicates that rules of interpretation differ little in the jurisprudence of the three tribunals. In all instances emphasis is placed on ascertaining and giving effect to the intent of the parties, on making effective the right of appeal, and on eschewing restrictive interpretations that would deny equitable relief. The author concludes also that these tribunals, dealing with individuals, are less cautious and more liberal in their construction of the jurisdictional provisions of ambiguous documents than, for example, is the International Court of Justice, confronted with states as parties to litigation. As might be expected from the supranational nature of the European Communities, the European Court of Justice has been especially liberal in the interpretation of treaty provisions granting jurisdiction.

The author suggests but might have examined more fully the essential difference of the communities in which these three tribunals function. This difference in cohesiveness goes far to explain the criticism and controversy surrounding certain decisions of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in the early '50s, for example, in comparison with the favorable reception accorded decisions of the European Court. The author is correct, however, in this reviewer's opinion, in concluding that the law applied by traditional international courts can be significantly enriched by relevant examination of the jurisprudence of international administrative tribunals.—RUTH C. LAWSON, *Mount Holyoke College.*

Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. BY WILLEM F. VAN EEKELEN (The Hague: Martinus Nÿhoff, 1964. Pp. ix, 220. Guilders 22.50. Index.)

During the mid-1950's India formulated *Panchsheel,* or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as the basis of her relations with Communist China and also presented them, almost simultaneously, as a new, specifically Asian contribution to world affairs and the conduct of diplomacy. As between India and Communist China these Principles were: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. Nehru thought it difficult to imagine how anyone could oppose these Principles "unless one thinks that behind them is hidden some evil motive."

There were a few Indian leaders who remained skeptical—especially in view of China's seizure of control over Tibet, an act which extinguished a reassuring buffer state and placed Chinese forces along a common frontier of nearly 1800 miles. But comment in the Indian press and among Indian intellectuals tended to be favorable toward the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954, which enunciated the Principles in its preamble, and toward the Bandung Conference, which expanded upon them in an effort to create a new foundation for Afro-Asian cooperation and solidarity.

Against this optimistic background, how does one account for the Sino-Indian border dispute of the early 1960's and the Chinese Communist invasion of Indian territory in October, 1962? The purpose of the book is to find an answer, and in undertaking this difficult task the author proceeds with admirable detachment and restraint.

The idea for a study of Indian foreign policy originated during the author's posting to New Delhi, between 1957 and 1960, as a member of the Netherlands Foreign Service. These were the years of the Tibetan revolt, the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India, and the first incidents along the Sino-Indian border. "My departure," van Eekelen writes, "coincided precisely with the landing of the aircraft carrying Premier Chou En-lai to the meeting with the Indian Prime Minister which would terminate the preliminary phase of the boundary dispute. The conflict subsequently assumed proportions affecting the entire position of India. It provided the most severe testing ground for Panchsheel . . ."

The author sketches—somewhat briefly—the history of Sino-Indian relations and the status of Tibet, describes the border dispute from early Chinese probes through the Chinese invasion, and discusses both the legal and political aspects of the conflict. Each step is documented and is analyzed dispassionately. In the end he finds it "almost incredible" that in 1954 India gave up her treaty rights in Tibet without trying to obtain Chinese endorsement of the partially negotiated McMahon Line of an earlier era. But Nehru wholly misjudged Chinese intentions and therefore consented to an agreement which "offered respectability to China while receiving in return only the vague precepts of Panchsheel."

Such errors of judgment underlay many Indian decisions. Time and time again Nehru betrayed insufficient awareness of the traditional Chinese policy of playing down unresolved questions until they could be advanced from a position of strength. "India thus acquired the false conviction that she had been successful in delaying Chinese pressure and in dividing spheres of influence so that China would be content with Tibet and leave the Himalayan states to India. Her main weakness was to ignore the fact that Chinese tactics aimed at expanding influence step by step, carefully consolidating each gain." Rather, Nehru found each step explicable against the background of China's history and legitimate Chinese interests after the revolution.

Not long before the Chinese invasion Nehru declared that India would not maintain independence for long "if we go about seeking military aid from others to defend ourselves." He also thought it quite absurd to talk about China invading India because India was not that weak. The invasion forced a reassessment of India's strength. It also brought about demonstrations that the West would provide aid without demanding alignment and that the Soviet Union would not object to India's receiving such aid. Finally, the invasion showed that, in spite of protestations of Afro-Asian solidarity, India—in a crisis—had more friends in the West than among the many who had professed such depths of solidarity at Bandung.—Robert C. North, *Stanford University.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Richard L. Merritt
Yale University

International Politics

Theory and General

Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council. *Resolutions of the Sixth Session, Algiers, 22–27 March 1964.* Cairo, Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. (1964).

Albert, Alain. Notes Sur la Décolonisation. *Presence Africaine.* No. 53 (1965), 47–67.

Anabtowi, Samir N. Neutralists and Neutralism. *Journal of Politics.* 27:2 (May 1965), 351–61.

Bosc, Robert. L'Eglise Catholique dans la

Communauté Internationale. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:1 (1965), 5–21.

Brunt, P. A. Reflections on British and Roman Imperialism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* 7:3 (April 1965), 267–88.

Calvez, Jean-Yves. Racines Sociales et Economiques des Nationalismes du Tiers Monde. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* 15:3 (June 1965), 446–65.

Clark, Colin. Demographic Problems on a World Scale. *World Justice.* 6:4 (June 1965), 435–40.

d'Encausse, Hélène Carrère. Communisme et Nationalisme. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* 15:3 (June 1965), 466–98.

Dinerstein, Herbert S. *The United States and the Soviet Union: Standoff or Confrontation?* (RAND Corporation Paper P–3046 1965).

Girardet, Raoul. Autour de l'Idéologie Nationaliste: Perspectives de Recherches. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* 15:3 (June 1965), 423–45.

Hassner, Pierre. Nationalisme et Relations Internationales. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* 15:3 (June 1965), 499–528.

Kindleberger, C. P. Mass Migration, Then and Now. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 647–58.

Lehmann, Hans. Der Westen nach Kennedy. *Politische Studien.* 16:161 (May-June 1965), 274–85.

Mellichamp, Leslie. George Orwell and the Ethics of Revolutionary Politics. *Modern Age.* 9:3 (Summer 1965), 272–78.

Mosely, Philip E. Present Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations. *International Studies.* 6:2 (October 1964), 117–32.

Ramsey, Paul. The Ethics of Intervention. *Review of Politics.* 27:3 (July 1965), 287–310.

Roma, Rudolf. Gefahren für die Freiheit der Westlichen Welt. *Politische Studien.* 16:161 (May-June 1965), 308–15.

Schall, James V. Ethics and International Affairs. *World Justice.* 6:4 (June 1965), 462–75.

Sulzbach, Walter. Wandlungen des Nationalismus Seit 1914. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft.* 121:1 (1965), 1–20.

Tarlton, Charles D. The Styles of American International Thought: Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann. *World Politics.* 17:4 (July 1965), 584–614.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 691–707.

Political Sociology and Behavior

Gergen, Kenneth J., and Kurt W. Back. Aging, Time Perspective, and Preferred Solutions to International Conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 9:2 (June 1965), 177–86.

Holsti, Ole R. The 1914 Case. *American Political Science Review.* 59:2 (June 1965), 365–78.

Patchen, Martin. Decision Theory in the Study of National Action: Problems and a Proposal. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 9:2 (June 1965), 164–76.

Rosi, Eugene J. Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Tests and Fallout, 1954–1963. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* 29:2 (Summer 1965), 280–97.

Strickland, Donald A. Physicists' Views of Space Politics. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* 29:2 (Summer 1965), 223–35.

Teune, Henry, and Sig Synnestvedt. Measuring International Alignment. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 171–89.

Walker, K. N. Determinants of Castro Support Among Latin-American University Students. *Social and Economic Studies.* 14:1 (March 1965), 88–105.

War, Defense, Arms Control

Barth, Herbert. On the History of MLF. *German Foreign Policy (DDR).* 4:2 (1965), 127–34.

Beaufre, André. The Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities—A Problem in Need of Solution. *International Affairs.* 41:3 (July 1965), 411–19.

Brownlie, Ian. Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:2 (April 1965), 437–51.

Cassuto, Aldo. Competition in Nuclear Energy: International Issues. *World Today.* 20:7 (July 1964), 277–84.

Coulter, John M., and Benjamin J. Loret. Manned Orbiting Space Stations. *Air University Review.* 16:4 (May-June 1965), 33–41.

Dabros, Walter J. The Credibility of the Deterrent and Its Implications for NATO. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* 91:7 (July 1965), 26–35.

Dougherty, James E. The Status of the Arms Negotiations. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 49–97.

Foster, William C. New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 587–601.

Goodman, Eliot B. Five Nuclear Options for the West. *Atlantic Community Quarterly.* 2:4 (Winter 1964–65), 571–87.

Hall, John A. Atoms for Peace, or War. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 602–15.

Harrison, Stanley L. Nth Nation Challenges: The Present Perspective. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 155–70.

Hinterhoff, Eugène. Réflexions sur la Force Multilatérale. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:1 (1965), 45–74.

Horowitz, Irving L. Les Initiatives Unilatérales: Une Stratégie en Quête d'une Théorie. *Diogène.* No. 50 (April-June 1965), 118–33.

Inglis, David R. The Region-by-Region System of Inspection and Disarmament. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 9:2 (June 1965), 187–99.

Jensen, Lloyd. Military Capabilities and Bargaining Behavior. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 9:2 (June 1965), 155–63.

Kintner, William R., and Stefan T. Possony. Strategic Asymmetries. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 23–48.

Krickus, Richard J. On the Morality of Chemical/Biological War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 9:2 (June 1965), 200–10.

Miksche, Ferdinand Otto. Europe as a Nuclear Power. *Military Review.* 45:7 (July 1965), 29–31.

Ollion, General. Comment Utiliser la Force des Armes à l'Ere Nucléaire? *Revue de Défense Nationale.* 21:7 (July 1965), 1201–11.

Owen, Henry. NATO Strategy: What Is Past Is Prologue. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 682–90.

Rapoport, Anatol. Chicken à la Kahn. *Virginia Quarterly Review.* 41:3 (Summer 1965), 370–89.

Robison, David. Self-Restrictions in the American Military Use of Space. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 116–39.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Political Barriers to Disarmament. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 140–54.

Russett, Bruce M., and Carolyn C. Cooper. Cold War Politics of Arms Control. *Trans-Action.* 2:5 (July-August 1965), 3–6+.

Sanders, Ralph. Mass Support and Communist Insurrection. *Orbis.* 9:1 (Spring 1965), 214–31.

Seemann, Klaus. Probleme der Landesverteidigung. *Wehr-Wissenschaftliche Rundschau.* 15:6 (June 1965), 313–43.

Slessor, John. Atlantic Nuclear Policy. *International Journal.* 20:2 (Spring 1965), 143–57.

Stikker, Dirk U. NATO—The Shifting Western Alliance. *Atlantic Community Quarterly.* 3:1 (Spring 1965), 7–17.

Wolfe, Thomas W. *Soviet Commentary on the French "Force de Frappe."* (RAND Corporation Research Memorandum RM-4359-ISA 1965).

X.X.X. La Tactique Nucléaire. *Revue de Défense Nationale.* 21:5 (May 1965), 741–52.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Political Integration and Disintegration

Clark, Marilyn W. *Overseas Chinese Education in Indonesia: Minority Group Schooling in an Asian Context.* Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education. Studies in Comparative Education (1965).

Giap, The Siauw. Religion and Overseas Chinese Assimilation in Southeast Asian Countries. *Revue de Sud-Est Asiatique.* No. 2 (1965), 67–84.

Kornberg, Allan. The Religious Factor in Canadian Attitudes toward Bi-Culturalism. *Western Political Quarterly.* 18:2, Part 1 (June 1965), 285–91.

Lieberson, Stanley. Bilingualism in Montreal: A Demographic Analysis. *American Journal of Sociology.* 71:1 (July 1965), 10–25.

The Atlantic Community; and Western European Integration

Bowyer, John. Practical Interim Measures for Britain. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 284–93:

Buchan, Alastair. The Changed Setting of the Atlantic Debate. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 574–86.

Büchenbacher, Christoph. Freies Europa ohne Ziele? *Politische Studien.* 16:159 (January-February 1965), 46–57.

Ehrhardt, Carl A. EWG und die Koordinierung des Osthandels. *Aussenpolitik.* 16:6 (June 1965), 389–402.

Feld, Werner. The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A Comparative Analysis. *International Organization.* 19:2 (Spring 1965), 223–49.

Grabowski, Z. A. The Mood of Europe, 1965. *Quarterly Review.* No. 645 (July 1965), 237–51.

Grewe, Wilhelm G. L'Avenir de l'Alliance Atlantique. *Documents.* 20:2 (March-April, 1965), 7–25.

Haerdter, Robert. Atlantische Wechseljahre. *Monat.* 17:201 (June 1965), 16–25.

Hallstein, Walter. The EEC Commission: A New Factor in International Life. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:3 (July 1965), 727–41.

Herter, Christian A. Independence of Interdependence. *Atlantic Community Quarterly.* 3:1 (Spring 1965), 18–26.

Howell, David. New Paths for World Trade. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 294–301.

Kollontai, V. M., and Y. Etinger. *The European Common Market and the Developing Countries.* Moscow, Oriental Literature Publishing House (1963).

Kristensen, Thorkil. Europaeisk Integration i Lyset af Nogle Almene Økonomiske Tendenser i Tiden. *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift.* 103:1–2 (1965), 1–17.

Lambert, J. R. Prospects for the Community. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 233–45.

Lambilliotte, Maurice. L'Europe dans le Monde. *Synthèses.* No. 229 (June 1965), 5–12.

Layton, Christopher. Europe, Road to Coexistence. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 274–83.

Massenet, Michel. La Politique Extérieure d'une Europe Unie. *Bulletin Sedeis: Futuribles* (hors serie 1964).

Mayne, Richard. Why Bother with Europe? *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 219–32.

Parfitt, Trevor. The EEC's Common Agricultural Policy. *World Today.* 21:7 (July 1965), 308–14.

Pinder, John. The Case for Economic Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 246–59.

Pryce, Roy. Finding a Future for Britain. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 206–18.

Possony, Stefan T. Die Verlässlichkeit des NATO-Bündisses. *Politische Studien.* 16:159 (January-February 1965), 58–69.

——— Ein Lösungsversuch für die NATO, *Politische Studien.* 16:160 (March-April 1965), 176–83.

Reisner, Ralph. National Regulation of the Movement of Workers in the European Community. *American Journal of Comparative Law.* 13:3 (Summer 1964), 360–84.

Richter, Kurt. EEC and Political Union. *German Foreign Policy (DDR).* 4:3 (1965), 209–17.

Salter, Noël. Is Defense the Entry Ticket? *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 260–73.

Soper, Tom. The EEC and Aid to Africa. *International Affairs.* 41:3 (July 1965), 463–77.

Spinelli, Altiero. L'Alleanza Atlantica tra Indipendenza e Interdipendenza. *Mulino.* 14:6 (June 1965), 561–72.

Thompson, Dennis. Harmonization of Laws. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 302–14.

We Are Seven: EFTA. *Round Table.* No. 219 (June 1965), 218–25.

The Soviet Bloc

Agwani, M. S. The Soviet Union, China and West Asia. *International Studies.* 6:4 (April 1965), 345–66.

Bondy, François. La Roumanie Désatellisée. Preuves. 15:170 (April 1965), 23–34.

Burks, Richard V. Die Auswirkungen des Sowjetisch-Chinesischen Konflikts auf die Kommunistischen Parteien in Südosteuropa. *Osteuropa.* 15:6 (June 1965), 393–408.

Campbell, John C. Eastern Europe: Social Change, Intellectual Restlessness, Political Uncertainty. *Modern Age.* 9:3 (Summer 1965), 248–61.

Chamberlin, William Henry. Erosion in the Soviet Empire. *Russian Review.* 24:3 (July 1965), 227–34.

Dietrich, Helmut. Bank of Cooperation of the Socialist Camp. *German Foreign Policy (DDR).* 4:2 (1965), 140–47.

Freeberne, Michael. Racial Issues and the Sino-Soviet Dispute. *Asian Survey.* 5:8 (August 1965), 408–16.

Holzman, Franklyn D. More of Soviet Bloc Trade Discrimination. *Soviet Studies.* 17:1 (July 1965), 44–65.

Ionescu, Ghita. Communist Rumania and Nonalignment (April 1964–March 1965). *Slavic Review.* 24:2 (June 1965), 241–57.

Lemberg, Eugen. Innermarxistische Marxismuskritik in Ostmitteleuropa. Zeitschrift für Ostforschung. 13:4 (December 1964), 687–708.

Lowenthal, Richard. La Revolution a-t-elle un Avenir? Les Chances du Communisme Pluraliste. *Bulletin Sedeis: Futuribles.* No. 97 (July 10, 1965).

Meissner, Boris. World Communism: Decay or Differentiation? *Modern Age.* 9:3 (Summer 1965), 231–47.

Pourichkevitch. Le Pacte de Varsovie, Fiction Politique ou Réalité Militaire? *Revue de Défénse Nationale.* 21:5 (May 1965), 766–85.

Prybyla, Jan S. Sino-Soviet Economics. *Quarterly Review.* No. 645 (July 1965), 283–92.

Ray, Hemen. Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Sinkiang. *Studies on the Soviet Union.* 4:3 (1965), 37–46.

Stolte, Stefan C. The Search for a New Planning System in the Soviet Bloc. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* 12:6 (June 1965), 3–12.

Szászy, Stephen. Arbitration of Foreign Trade Transactions in the Popular Democracies. *American Journal of Comparative Law.* 13:3 (Summer 1964), 441–50.

Wilczynski, J. COMECON—Successor Failure? *Australian Outlook.* 19:1 (April 1965), 47–61.

Other Regional Arrangements and Developments

Allott, A. N. Towards the Unification of Laws in Africa. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:2 (April 1965), 366–89.

Gibson, Carlos. American Regionalism and the United Nations. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 120–26.

Great Britain, Colonial Office. *Proposals for a Federation of East Caribbean Territories: Documents Published.* Colonial Paper No. 360. London, H. M. Stationery Office (1965).

Joyaux, François. L'Association des Etats Asiatiques. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:1 (1965), 98–107.

Massell, Benton F. *Economic Union in East Africa: An Evaluation of the Gains.* (RAND Corporation Paper P-2254 1964).

N'Goudi, P. N'Gom. L'Industrialisation: Base de l'Unité Africaine. *Presence Africaine.* No. 53 (1965), 68–95.

Rifaat, M. A. Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Co-operation (Afrasec). *Civilisations.* 15:1 (1965), 73–78.

Tolen, Aaron. Une Révolution, Trois Interventions, une Afrique à Construire. *Presence Africaine.* No. 53 (1965), 36–46.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION

International Law

Anand, R. P. The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:3 (July 1965), 788–808.

Chaudhri, Mohammed Ahsen. *Growth of International Law and Pakistan: A Collection of Essays.* Publication of the University of Karachi (1965).

Cigoj, Stojan. International Regulation of Civil Liability for Nuclear Risk. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:3 (July 1965), 809–44.

Coplin, William D. International Law and Assumptions about the State System. *World Politics.* 17:4 (July 1965), 615–34.

Franck, Thomas M. Some Legal Problems of Becoming a New Nation. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.* 4:1 (1965), 12–27.

Fried, John H. E. For a New Image of International Law. *Main Currents in Modern Thought.* 21:5 (May–June 1965), 105–08.

Friedmann. Wolfgang. The Role of International Law in the Conduct of International Affairs. *International Journal.* 20:2 (Spring 1965), 158–72.

Ginsburgs, George. Validity of Treaties in the Municipal Law of the "Socialist" States. *American Journal of International Law.* 59:3 (July 1965), 523–44.

Schermers, H. G. A Time Limit for Punishment of War Crimes? *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:2 (April 1965), 627–37.

Simmonds, K. R. The Sabbatino Case and the Act of State Doctrine. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 14:2 (April 1965), 452–92.

The South West Africa Cases: A Symposium. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.* 4:1 (1965), 47–118.

Velazquez, Carlos Maria. Some Legal Aspects of the Colonial Problem in Latin America. *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 110–19.

Wilson, Clifton E. The Information Agent Abroad: New Dimension in International Law. *Journalism Quarterly.* 42:2 (Spring 1965), 243–52.

Young, Richard. Offshore Claims and Problems in the North Sea. *American Journal of International Law.* 59:3 (July 1965), 505–22.

The United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Holborn, Louise W. International Organizations for Migration of European Nationals and Refugees. *International Journal.* 20:3 (Summer 1965), 331–49.

Jenks, C. Wilfred. Due Process of Law in International Organizations. *International Organization.* 19:2 (Spring 1965), 163–76.

Lee, Luke T. The International Law Commission Re-examined. *American Journal of International Law.* 59:3 (July 1965), 544–69.

Maes, Albert. La Signification de la Conference des Nations Unies sur le Commerce et le Développement. *Chronique de Politique Etrangère.* 18:1 (January 1965), 31–49.

Marshall, Charles Burton. Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, Under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament. *American Political Science Review.* 59:2 (June 1965), 350–64.

Maver, Bruno. Le Nazioni Unite e la Protezione delle Minoranze. *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali.* 31:4 (October-December 1964), 536–64.

Nicholas, H. G. The United Nations in Crisis. *International Affairs.* 41:3 (July 1965), 441–50.

Plimpton, Francis T. P. Preserving the Peacekeeping Powers of the General Assembly. *Department of State Bulletin.* 53:1362 (August 2, 1965), 218–20.

Shihata, Ibrahim F. I. The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice. *International Organization.* 19:2 (Spring 1965), 203–22.

Siotis, Jean. The Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and European Economic Integration: The First Ten Years. *International Organization.* 19:2 (Spring 1965), 177–202.

THE INTERNAL ECONOMY

International Economic Problems and Policies

Bachmann, Hans. Realities and Fallacies in the West-East Economic Relations. *Aussenwirtschaft.* 20:2 (June 1965), 115–29.

Balassa, Bela. Trade Liberalisation and "Revealed" Comparative Advantage. *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies.* 33:2 (May 1965), 99–124.

Bardhan, P. K. Equilibrium Growth in the International Economy. *Quarterly Journal of Economics.* 79:3 (August 1965), 455–64.

French-Davis, Ricardo. Elementos Para una Politica de Comerico Exterior. *Cuadernos de Economia.* 2:5 (April 1965), 41–52.

Johnson, Harry G. A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States. *Political Science Quarterly.* 80:2 (June 1965), 169–85.

Kumar, Dharma. The Commonwealth and Problems of World Trade and Development. *India Quarterly.* 21:1 (January-March 1965), 41–57.

Machlup, Fritz. The Cloakroom Rule of International Reserves. *Quarterly Journal of Economics.* 79:3 (August 1965), 337–55.

Miroschnikoff, Peter. Politik im Ost-West-Handel. *Politische Studien.* 16:161 (May-June 1965), 298–302.

Papi, Giuseppe Ugo. Criteri Economici nella Cooperazione Internazionale. *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionale.* 31:4 (October-December 1964), 511–35.

Shonfield, Andrew. The Progress and Perils of Planning. *Encounter.* 25:2 (August 1965), 32–41.

Spencer, Daniel L. An External Military Presence, Technological Transfer, and Structural Change. *Kyklos.* 18:3 (1965), 451–74.

Uri, Pierre. Le Dollar en Europe. *Preuves.* 15:171 (May 1965), 3–10.

Economic Development

Bauer, P. T. Capitalism and African Economic Development. *National Review.* 17:26 (June 29, 1965), 542–45.

Berg, Elliot J. The Development of a Labor Force in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Economic Development and Cultural Change.* 13:4, Part 1 (July 1965), 394–412.

Delors, J. Politique des Revenus et Stratégie du Développement. *Revue d'Economie Politique.* 75:3 (May-June 1965), 559–92.

Fritsch, Bruno. Die Ökonomische Theorie als Instrument der Entwicklungspolitik. *Kyklos.* 18:2 (1965), 259–76.

Gallois, Pierre M. Crédits Militaires et Développement Scientifique et Industriel. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:2 (1965), 140–60.

George, Pierre. L'Approche Géographique du Sous-Développement. *Tiers-Monde.* 6:21 (January-March 1965), 81–91.

Heimpel, Christian. Das Wirtschaftssystem der Entwicklungsländer. *Frankfurter Hefte.* 20:6 (June 1965), 409–14.

Hirschman, Albert O. Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act. *Economic Development and Cultural Change.* 13:4, Part 1 (July 1965), 385–93.

Holler, Joanne E. *Population Trends and Economic Development in the Far East.* George Washington University, Population Research Project. (1965).

Mabogunje, Akin L. Urbanization in Nigeria: A Constraint on Economic Development. *Economic Development and Cultural Change.* 13:4, Part 1 (July 1965), 413–38.

Palewski, J. P. Les Contradictions de l'Aide aux Pays in Voie de Développement. *Tiers-Monde.* 6:21 (January-March 1965), 93–98.

Pauls, Rolf Friedmann. Aussenpolitik und Entwicklungshilfe. *Aussenpolitik.* 16:6 (June 1965), 375–82.

Tanzi, Vito, and Joseph Aschheim. Saving, Investment, and Taxation in Underdeveloped Countries. *Kyklos.* 18:2 (1965), 205–26.

Usher, Dan. Political Risk. *Economic Development and Cultural Change.* 13:4, Part 1 (July 1965), 453–62.

Williamson, Jeffrey G. Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Patterns. *Economic Development and Cultural Change.* 13:4, Part 2 (July 1965), 3–84.

NATIONAL POLICIES AND ISSUES

The United States

Fleming, D. F. Can Pax Americana Succeed? *Annals of the American Academy.* Vol. 360 (July 1965), 127–38.

Fulbright, J. William. The War in Vietnam. Remarks in the Senate. *Congressional Record* [daily ed.] Vol. 111 (June 15, 1965), 13172–73.

Hammond, Paul Y. Foreign Policy-Making and Administrative Politics. *World Politics.* 17:4 (July 1965), 656–71.

Joxe, Alain. Stéréotypes ou Adaptation dans la Politique Extérieure des Etats-Unis. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:2 (1965), 173–93.

Levine, Gene N., and John Modell. American Public Opinion and the Fallout-Shelter Issue. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* 29:2 (Summer 1965), 270–79.

McNamara, Robert S. American Strategy Now. *Survival.* 7:36 (May-June 1965), 98–107.

Palmer, Norman D. India as a Factor in United States Foreign Policy. *International Studies.* 6:1 (July 1964), 49–68.

Strausz-Hupé, Robert. Mythes et Réalités. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:1 (1965), 35–44.

Canada

Avakumovic, Ivan. The Communist Party of Canada and Sino-Soviet Dispute. *Pacific Affairs.* 37:4 (Winter 1964–65), 426–35.

Latin America

Bosch, Juan. Communism and Democracy in the Dominican Republic. *Saturday Review.* 48:32 (August 7, 1965), 13–15+.

Hanson, Simon G. The Alliance for Progress: The Third Year. *Inter-American Economic Affairs.* 18:4 (Spring 1965), 3–102.

Hechen, Santiago. *Proyección Internacional de*

Brasil. Sante Fe (Argentina), Librería y Editorial Castellví S. A. (1964).

Leoni, Raúl. View From Caracas. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 639–46.

Western Europe

Beloff, Max. The Projection of Britain Abroad. *International Affairs.* 41:3 (July 1965), 478–89.

Bender, Peter. Die Illusion der Isolierung. *Monat.* 17:201 (June 1965), 26–32.

Bertrand, Maurice. *Pour une Doctrine Militaire Française.* Idées Actuelles, 72 (Gallimard). (1965).

Birnbaum, Karl. Sweden's Nuclear Policy. *International Journal.* 20:3 (Summer 1965), 297–311.

Bloemer, Klaus. Labour-Politik und Europa. *Politische Studien.* 16:161 (May-June 1965), 286–97.

Brentano, Heinrich von. L'Allemagne, l'Europe et le Monde. *Table Ronde.* No. 205 (February 1965), 62–71.

Chopra, H. S. The Significance of the Franco-German Co-operation Treaty (1963) in French Foreign Policy. *International Studies.* 6:1 (July 1964), 87–98.

Couve de Murville, Maurice. French Policy Today. *Atlantic Community Quarterly.* 2:4 (Winter 1964–65), 614–26.

Dacier, Michel. Rancunes et Foucades de la Diplomatie Gaullienne. *Ecrits de Paris.* No. 238 (June 1965), 5–13.

Duchêne, François. Britain in a Harder World. *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 3:3 (July 1965), 315–28.

French, Goldwin S. Le Grande Charles: Retrospect and Prospect. *Queen's Quarterly.* 72:1 (Spring 1965), 121–38.

Friedensburg, Ferdinand. L'Unité Européenne et la Réunification de l'Allemagne. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:2 (1965), 125–39.

Gass, Oscar. German Unification: Prospects and Merits. *Commentary.* 40:1 (July 1965), 25–38.

Gladwyn, Lord. L'Angleterre et l'Europe. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:1 (1965), 22–34.

Harper, Norman. A Changing Commonwealth in a Chaotic World? *Australian Outlook.* 19:1 (April 1965), 20–34.

Hoffherr, René. L'Aide de la France aux Pays en Voie de Développement. *Revue de Défense Nationale.* 21:5 (May 1965), 730–40.

Klaus, Josef. Österreich und die Ost-West-Beziehungen. *Politische Studien.* 16:161 (May-June 1965), 261–27.

Kulski, Wladyslaw W. German Reunification and Slavic Attitudes. *Modern Age.* 9:3 (Summer 1965), 262–71.

Lüthy, Herbert. DeGaulle: Pose and Policy. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 561–73.

Mannheimer, Ludwig. Kalter Frieden zwischen den Zwei Deutschen Staaten? *Frankfurter Hefte.* 20:6 (June 1965), 371–74.

Merritt, Richard L. Politics, Theater, and the East-West Struggle: The Theater as a Cultural Bridge in West Berlin. *Political Science Quarterly.* 80:2 (June 1965), 186–215.

Mertens, Pierre. La Reconnaissance de la Chine Populaire par la France à la Lumière de la Doctrine Récente. *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie.* No. 1 (1965), 25–50.

Nairn, Tom. Labour Imperialism. *New Left Review.* No. 32 (July-August 1965), 3–15.

Reese, Trevor R. Keeping Calm About the Commonwealth. *International Affairs.* 41:3 (July 1965), 451–62.

Rovan, Joseph. De Gaulles Letztes Viertel. *Frankfurter Hefte.* 20:7 (July 1965), 443–48.

Schlott, Gerhart. Das Commonwealth—Realität oder Mythos? *Politische Studien.* 16:160 (March-April 1965), 191–201.

Vedovato, Giuseppe. La Cooperazione Tecnica Italiana con i Paesi in Via di Sviluppo nel Quadro della Politica Internazionale. *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali.* 31:4 (October-December 1964), 496–510.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Bhattacharya, Sautipada. Cuban-Soviet Relations under Castro, 1959–1964. *Studies on the Soviet Union.* 4:3 (1965), 27–36.

Brandt, Heinz. Die Sowjetische Deutschlandspolitik im Frühsommer 1953 aus der Sicht Fortchrittlicher Kräfte in der SED. *Osteuropa.* 15:6 (June 1965), 369–77.

Carlisle, Donald S. Stalin's Postwar Foreign Policy and the National Liberation Movement. *Review of Politics.* 27:3 (July 1965), 334–63.

Garder, Michel. Le Potential Militaire des Satellites de l'URSS. *Revue Militaire Générale.* (June 1965), 124–31.

Gelberg, Ludwik. Poland's Western Border and Transfer of German Population. *American Journal of International Law.* 59:3 (July 1965), 590–92.

Kolkowicz, Roman. *Soviet Strategic Debate: An Important Recent Addendum.* (RAND Corporation Paper P–2936 1964).

Koningsberger, Hans. Poland's New "Far West." *Harper's Magazine.* 231:1382 (July 1965), 86–93.

Kucherov, Samuel. The USSR and Spying from Outer Space. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* 12:6 (June 1965), 35–43.

Pickert, Wolfgang. Über die Operative Bedeutung der Territorialen Verteidigung in Mitteleuropa. *Revue Militaire Générale.* (July 1965), 225–33.

Wolfe, Thomas W. Problems of Soviet Defense Policy under the New Regime. *Slavic Review.* 24:2 (June 1965), 175–88.

The Middle East

Doherty, Kathryn B. Jordan Waters Conflict. *International Conciliation.* No. 553 (May 1965).

Eban, Abba. Reality and Vision in the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 626–38.

Gottberg, Erika von. Der Islam und der Kommunismus. *Politische Studien.* 16:160 (March-April 1965), 169–75.

Africa

Anglin, Douglas G. Brinkmanship in Nigeria. *International Journal.* 20:2 (Spring 1965), 173–88.

Brown, Neville, and W. F. Gutteridge. *The African Military Balance.* Adelphi Papers, No. 12. London, Institute for Strategic Studies (1964).

Chauvel, Jean-François. China's Wedge in Africa: How Brazzaville's Youth is Being Taken Over. *Atlas.* 10:1 (July 1965), 13–16.

Crawley, Aidan. Communism and African Independence. *African Affairs.* 64:255 (January 1965), 91–102.

Fishel, Murray I. The International Aspects of South West Africa: The Historical Perspective. *Journal of Human Relations.* 13:2 (1965), 196–207.

Ghai, Dharama P., and Yash P. Ghai. Asians in East Africa: Problems and Prospects. *Journal of Modern African Studies.* 3:1 (May 1965), 35–52.

Hazlewood, Arthur. The Malawi-Rhodesia Trade Agreement. *Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics Bulletin.* 27:2 (May 1965), 93–96.

Jantzen, Günther. Umgruppierungen im Raum Ostafrika. *Aussenpolitik.* 16:6 (June 1965), 417–23.

Nieuwenhuysen, J. P. African Attitudes to South Africa. *Australian Quarterly.* 37:2 (June 1965), 56–66.

South and Southeast Asia

Bradley, C. Paul. Leftist Fissures in Singapore Politics. *Western Political Quarterly.* 18:2, Part 1 (June 1965), 292–308.

Britsch, Jacques. Nouveaux Facteurs dans la Crise Indochinoise. *Revue Militaire Générale.* (June 1965), 3–18.

Burchett, Wilfred G. *My Visit to the Liberated Zones of South Vietnam.* Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House (1964).

Caldwell, Malcolm. Luddites and Lemmings in South-East Asia. *International Affairs.* 41:3 (July 1965), 420–40.

Chen, King. Peking's Strategy in Indochina. *Yale Review.* 54:4 (June 1965), 550–66.

Dobell, W. M. Pakistan's Relations with the Major Powers and Some Minor Agreements. *Pacific Affairs.* 37:4 (Winter 1964–65), 384–95.

Giap, Vo Nguyen. *The South Vietnam People Will Win.* Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House, (1965).

Halperin, Morton H. Chinese Nuclear Strategy: The Early Post-Detonation Period. *Asian Survey.* 5:6 (June 1965), 271–79. Also Adephi Papers, No. 18, London, Institute for Strategic Studies (May 1965).

Kashin, A. Nepal—Chinese Stepping Stone to India. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* 12:7 (July 1965), 22–27.

King, Wunsz. *China and the League of Nations.* Asia in the Modern World, No. 5. New York, St. John's University Press (1965).

Kroef, Justus M. van der. Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power. *Pacific Affairs.* 37:4 (Winter 1964–65), 357–83.

——— Indonesian Communism's Expansionist Role in Southeast Asia. *International Journal.* 20:2 (Spring 1965), 189–205.

Leifer, Michael. Indonesia and Malaysia: The Diplomacy of Confrontation. *World Today.* 21:6 (June 1965), 250–60.

Lüthy, Herbert. L'Indonésie aux Prises avec les Démons. *Preuves.* 15:172 and 173 (June and July 1965), 12–22 and 42–53.

Masani, M. R. The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb. *India Quarterly.* 21:1 (January-March 1965), 15–28.

Mehden, Fred R. von der. Southeast Asian Relations with Africa. *Asian Survey.* 5:7 (July 1965), 341–49.

Montagno, George L. Peaceful Coexistence: Pakistan and Red China. *Western Political Quarterly.* 18:2, Part 1 (June 1965), 309–17.

Nehru, R. K. The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb. *India Quarterly.* 21:1 (January-March 1965), 3–14.

O'Ballance, Edgar. Problems of Thailand. *Quarterly Review.* No. 645 (July 1965), 340–50.

Park, Richard L. Indian-African Relations. *Asian Survey.* 5:7 (July 1965), 350–58.

Powell, Ralph L. China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 616–25.

Rahman, Tunku Abdul. Malaysia: Key Area in Southeast Asia. *Foreign Affairs.* 43:4 (July 1965), 659–70.

Richer, Philippe. Doctrine Chinoise pour le Tiers Monde. *Politique Etrangère.* 30:1 (1965), 75–97.

Singh, L. P. Malaysia and Australian-Indone-

sian Relations. *Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique.* No. 4 (1964), 277–94.

Tsou, Tang, and Morton H. Halperin. Maoism at Home and Abroad. *Problems of Communism.* 14:4 (July-August 1965), 1–13.

——— and ——— Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior. *American Political Science Review.* 59:1 (March 1965), 80–99.

Weinstein, Franklin B. The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts. *Asian Survey.* 5:7 (July 1965), 359–73.

Wurfel, David. A Formula for Viet Nam. *India Quarterly.* 21:1 (January-March 1965), 29–40.

Yu, George T. Sino-African Relations: A Survey. *Asian Survey.* 5:7 (July 1965), 321–32.

Far East and Pacific

An Epoch in Korean Foreign Policy: A Symposium. *Korean Affairs.* 4:1 (May 1965), 1–102.

Billings, Gilbert M., Jr. Japan's Air Self Defense Force. *Air University Review.* 16:5 (July-August 1965), 60–71.

Haggard, M. T. North Korea's International Position. *Asian Survey.* 5:8 (August 1965), 375–88.

Halkin-Destree, Lucie. Le Differend Territorial Nippo-Sovietique: Les Iles Kouriles et Sakhaline. *Chronique de Politique Etrangère.* 18:3 (May 1965), 293–327.

Meadows, Martin. Recent Developments in Philippine-American Relations: A Case Study in Emergent Nationalism. *Asian Survey.* 5:6 (June 1965), 305–18.

Ogata, Sadako. Japanese Attitude Toward China. *Asian Survey.* 5:8 (August 1965), 389–98.

Soukup, James R. Japanese-African Relations: Problems and Prospects. *Asian Survey.* 5:7 (July 1965), 333–40.

Swearingen, Rodger. *Communist Strategy in Japan, 1945–1960.* (RAND Corporation Research Memorandum RM–4348–PR 1965).

Watt, Sir Alan. *Australian Defence Policy, 1951–1963: Major International Aspects.* Canberra, Australian National University, Department of International Relations (1964).

Wilczynski, J. The Economics and Politics of Wheat Exports to China. *Australian Quarterly.* 37:2 (June 1965), 44–55.

NEWS AND NOTES

With the next number, Volume 60 (March 1966), Austin Ranney of the University of Wisconsin becomes Managing Editor, and James W. Prothro of the University of North Carolina, Book Review Editor, of this REVIEW, as previously announced.

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President-elect, three Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight Council members for two-year terms.

Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Bernard C. Cohen, University of Wisconsin, Chairman; Alfred Diamant, Haverford College; Robert A. Horn, Stanford University; Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina; and Gwendolen M. Carter, Northwestern University.

The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1966.

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

More than 3,000 persons attended the Association's 61st Annual Meeting, held in Washington, D.C., from September 7 to 11. One of the most successful meetings in several years, the highlights included a series of major speeches and general evening sessions, the presentation of research and writing awards, and 48 panel discussions.

The addresses and general sessions were:

Tuesday, September 7,
  The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State

Wednesday, September 8,
  Dean David B. Truman, President, The American Political Science Association

Thursday, September 9,
  "The 1964 Elections: Possibilities for Political Analysis"
    Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan
    Donald Stokes, University of Michigan
    Milton Cummings, Brookings Institution
    William B. Prendergast, House Republican Conference
    Richard Scammon, Governmental Affairs Institute

Friday, September 10,
  The Congressional Distinguished Service Awards
    Ralph K. Huitt, University of Wisconsin, presiding

The *Congressional Distinguished Service Awards*—for outstanding service in the 88th Congress—were presented to Reps. William M. McCulloch (R-Ohio), and Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark); and to Sens. John O. Pastore (D-R.I.), and John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky). The award program subsequently was described by Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel of California in a statement in the *Congressional Record* of October 6. He said, in part:

> Mr. President, presentation of the awards was a highlight of the association's 61st annual meeting, which brought some 3,000 political scientists from throughout the Nation to Washington the week of September 6-11. As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, it was an impressive ceremony. All of the 1965 award winners and several from previous years were present, including Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, a recipient of the award in 1959; former Senator Kenneth Keating, also recognized in 1959 when he was a Member of the other body; Senators George Aiken, Paul Douglas, and Leverett Saltonstall; and Representatives Richard Bolling and George Mahon.
>
> Appropriately, the association invited Senator

Everett Dirksen to represent congressional leadership, recognizing at the same time his own contributions to the quality of American life over a long and distinguished career.

While these awards go to the individual Members, it is clear that they have wider implications. They point up the fact that our free elective system produces in Congress public servants of great ability and varied talents. Similarly, Congress offers a wider scope to the capacities of its Members than any other legislative body in the world. And perhaps most significantly, they call attention in a dramatic way to the vital importance of the legislative branch in our democracy.

The recipients of research and writing awards were as follows:

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award: jointly to *The Rulers and the Ruled,* by Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson; and to *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis,* by Samuel J. Eldersveld.

The *Edward S. Corwin Award:* to John D. Sprague, Washington University, "Voting Patterns on the United States Supreme Court: Cases in Federalism, 1889-1959."

Pi Sigma Alpha Award: to James B. Christoph, Ohio State University, "British Political Ideology Today: Consensus and Cleavage."

The following awards will be presented at the Association's 1966 Annual Meeting, September 6 to 10, Statler Hilton Hotel, New York City:

Leonard D. White Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation within the general field of public administration, including broadly related problems of policy formation and administrative history. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1965. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department for consideration for the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than April 1, 1966.

Edward S. Corwin Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of public law, broadly defined to include the judicial process, judicial biography, judicial behavior, courts, law, legal systems, the American constitutional system, civil liberties or any other substantive area, or any work which deals in a significant fashion with a topic related to or having substantial impact on the United States Constitution. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1965. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department for consideration for the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than April 1, 1966.

Helen Dwight Reid Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of international relations. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1965. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department for consideration for the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than April 1, 1966.

Pi Sigma Alpha Award: This award is for the best paper presented at the last annual meeting. Established in cooperation with the political science honorary fraternity, the award carries an honorarium of $250. Nominations for the award are submitted by the annual meeting program section chairmen.

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award: The Association would be pleased to receive recommendations for this award, for the best book published in 1965 on government, politics, or international affairs. Suggestions should be conveyed to the national office prior to February 1, 1966. The award carries an honorarium of $1,000.

Public Affairs Reporting Awards. In mid-November, thirteen eastern newspaper reporters were honored for excellence in the reporting of public affairs in an Association-sponsored reporting awards competition. The winners attended a four-day conference at Lake Harmony, Pennsylvania. Seminar leaders included political scientists, journalists, and public officials. Winners and their newspapers were:

Paul B. Beers, *Harrisburg Patriot-News*
Rugledge E. Carter, *Albany Knickerbocker News*
Robert De Lazaro, *Elizabeth Daily Journal*
Philip Feldman, *Rochester Times-Union*
Stephen B. Goddard, *Hartford Times*
Joseph V. Gormley, *Brockton Enterprise-Times*
Robert L. Hassett, *Boston Herald*
Ronald Kessler, *Boston Herald*
John D. Husband, *Harrisburg Patriot-News*
Gloria Landers, *Perth Amboy Evening News*
Ian E. McNett, *Perth Amboy Evening News*
James Mahan, *Springfield Daily News*
Joseph A. Meyers, *York Dispatch*
Kenneth Schlossberg *Washington Daily News*
Anthony Speranza, Ridgewood newspapers

Speakers at the seminar were:

Richard Fryklund, *Washington Evening Star*
Earl Mazo, *Readers' Digest*

John Herling, John Herling Labor Letter, Inc.
William Prendergast, Republican Policy Committee
Ben Bagdikian, *Saturday Evening Post*
John Stewart, Assistant to the Vice President
Neil Peirce, *Congressional Quarterly*
Ralph Huitt, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Warren Miller, Survey Research Center
D. B. Hardeman, Trinity College
William Rivers, Stanford University

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Sixty-first Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association

Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:20 A.M., September 7, 1965, at the Sheraton-Park Hotel in Washington, D.C., with President David B. Truman presiding. The following members of the Council, nominees for election in 1965, and former presidents of the Association were present: H. Field Haviland, Samuel Hendel, John C. Wahlke, Alex Dragnich, Marian D. Irish, Marver H. Bernstein, John Kautsky, William Riker, Lucian W. Pye, Charles D. Farris, Joseph Tanenhaus, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Emmette S. Redford, Manning J. Dauer, Rupert Emerson, Robert McCloskey, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, Max M. Kampelman, Gabriel A. Almond. Charles S. Hyneman, Lawrence Herson, Byrum Carter, Warren E. Miller, Heinz Eulau, Harvey C. Mansfield, Robert A. Dahl, Karl W. Deutsch, Frederic Cleaveland, James L. McCamy, James K. Pollock, Wallace Mendelson, Victor G. Rosenblum, and William Anderson.

Prior to the meeting the Executive Director had mailed to each Council member an agenda book which included reports of the Executive Director, the Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, the Treasurer, and the Auditor, as well as the minutes of the Executive Committee meetings during the past year.

The President reported briefly on the activities of the Executive Committee since the last meeting of the Council. He announced that Harvey C. Mansfield was retiring after ten years of service as editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. The Executive Committee had given careful consideration to the difficult task of selecting a new editor and it unanimously recommended the name of Austin Ranney. The Council unanimously approved the selection of Ranney as editor. The Council then unanimously approved the editorial board nominated by Ranney: Robert Lane, Harvey C. Mansfield, Roland Pennock, Warren E. Miller, Vernon Van Dyke, Walter Murphy, John E. Turner, and Myron Weiner. It was announced that James W. Prothro has been selected as book review editor.

Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, summarized the highlights of his report, which had previously been distributed. The Association staff has been spending an increasing amount of time planning tours and programs for foreign visitors to this country. The Association will make an effort to secure foundation grants to facilitate the travel of political scientists from this country to attend political science conferences abroad and to make it possible for foreign political scientists to participate in panels at the Association meetings. Members of the Council expressed strong approval of this undertaking. A new award, the *Helen Dwight Reid Award,* will be presented at the next annual meeting for the best Ph.D. dissertation in the field of international relations. Dr. Kirkpatrick announced that the authors contributing to a book edited by Stephen K. Bailey, *American Politics and Government,* had agreed to contribute their royalties from the book to the American Political Science Association. A vote of thanks was approved by the Council.

The Executive Director raised the problem of misuse of papers presented at meetings of the American Political Science Association. Such papers have, on occasion in the past, been misquoted or used without attribution or without permission. The Council approved the Executive Committee's proposal that the Association copyright all such papers to protect the authors. Permission to use material from such papers would then have to be obtained from the authors. Members of the Council indicated their agreement with the suggestion of the Executive Committee that space be made available in the program of the annual meeting or in the REVIEW to provide information about research in progress. The Executive Director described a proposed new procedure to be followed at annual meetings in arranging talks by Democratic and Republican speakers. The Association will set aside facilities and time on the program to enable each of the two parties to present whatever program it desires. The Association itself will not serve as sponsor of such talks and will not undertake to find appropriate speakers. The Council unanimously approved the proposed procedure.

The Treasurer submitted a report indicating that the financial condition of the Association continues to be strong. He pointed out that a table showing the growth of the Association's income and expenditures at ten-year intervals demonstrates how rapidly the Association has been growing in the scope of its program. The Council approved the budget as submitted for the 1965-66 fiscal year. The Council voted its thanks to those who have donated funds to the Association.

The Editor of the REVIEW, in his final report, noted that the circulation has passed the 12,000 mark and that costs are continuing to rise. He noted an increase in the number of manuscripts received, from 225 to 284, for the first time in several years. A total of 38 were published. He thanked the editorial board and all the others who had assisted him in preparation of the REVIEW during the ten-year period. The Council voted a resolution of thanks to Harvey C. Mansfield for his long and devoted service.

The Program Chairman, H. Field Haviland, reported on the 1965 program and stressed the need of making greater use of volunteered papers, as part of regular panels. The Program Chairman for the 1966 meeting, Ithiel de Sola Pool, announced that there will be a larger number of plenary sessions dealing with broad themes in political science and focused on the theme of unity among the older and newer techniques in political science.

The Council discussed at length the problem of publishing a Directory more efficiently and more frequently, and also discussed the related problem of developing more modern methods of record-keeping at the Association headquarters. It heard recommendations from Mr. Ed Lehman, of Herner and Co., for using computer techniques to accomplish both of these purposes, and specifically to make possible frequent supplements to the Directory and the publication of subsequent editions at relatively low cost. The Council approved the principle of modernizing the techniques for publishing the Directory and keeping records and instructed the Executive Committee, in consultation with knowledgeable Council members, to take the steps necessary to implement this decision.

The Council discussed and referred to the Executive Committee proposals for defining various categories of membership in the Association. It was the sense of the meeting that a distinction between members and persons or institutions merely subscribing to the REVIEW would be useful but that it was not desirable to create several categories of members. The Council discussed the question of developing a code of ethics for the profession and possibly creating some machinery to implement such a code or enforce it. It was agreed to refer the question back to the Executive Committee without instruction and without bias.

The Council adjourned at 4:30 P.M.

MALCOLM E. JEWELL, Secretary

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President David B. Truman in the Park Ballroom of the Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., at 4:30 P.M., September 8, 1965.

President Truman, in brief introductory remarks, thanked the officers and staff of the Association for their assistance during his term of office.

The Executive Director, Evron Kirkpatrick, outlined the activities and programs of the Association and pointed out that his full report was available for the members, as were the reports of the Treasurer and Editor of the REVIEW. He noted that the *Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award* once again includes a prize of $1,000. The award is given for the best book published during the preceding year on government, politics, or international affairs. He announced that a new award, the *Helen Dwight Reid Award,* will be given for the best Ph.D. dissertation in international affairs. He emphasized that the political science profession is playing an increasing role in the National Science Foundation, and that the Foundation has granted a number of fellowships in political science during the first year of this program. He stressed the wide range and scope of activities in which the Association continues to be engaged.

The Treasurer, Max Kampelman, reported that the Association remains in good financial condition and that its assets continue to grow. The operating reserve fund is now $150,000, the level authorized by the Council. The general endowment and trust fund is now over $255,000, compared to $133,000 two years ago. The report of the Treasurer was accepted by the members.

The Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW summarized his written report. He noted that the problems of editorial judgment have been increasing because of the growing proportion of articles and manuscripts submitted that rely heavily on or are devoted primarily to mathematical techniques. Another trend that creates problems is the erosion of distinctions among disciplines.

James W. Prothro, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, announced that the Committee recommended the following slate:

President-Elect: Robert A. Dahl (Yale University)

Vice Presidents: Manning J. Dauer (University of Florida), William T. R. Fox (Columbia University), Rupert Emerson (Harvard University)

Secretary: John H. Kautsky (Washington University, St. Louis)

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D.C.)

Members of the Council (two-year terms): James C. Davies (University of Oregon), Alex N. Dragnich (Vanderbilt University), Heinz Eulau (Stanford University), Samuel Hendel (City College of New York), Wallace Mendelson (University of Texas), Laurence I. Radway (Dartmouth College), William H. Riker (University of Rochester), Victor G. Rosenblum (Northwestern University)

Mr. Prothro moved approval of the nominations. There were no other nominations and his motion was unanimously approved.

President-Elect Dahl was invited to the platform. President Truman turned the gavel over to the incoming President, Gabriel Almond.

President Almond declared the meeting adjourned at 5:20 P.M.

MALCOLM E. JEWELL, Secretary

The twentieth annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association will be held on the Reno campus of the University of Nevada, March 24–26, 1966.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Institute for Advanced Studies in Contemporary History, founded in 1964 in London, launched its program of research in October, 1965. Established on the basis of and in association with the Wiener Library in London, the Institute devotes its research to the study of 20th century European history. The Library's large collection of books, documents and newspaper clippings on Central European affairs is being systematically extended to cover other parts of Europe as well. The Wiener Library was originally founded in Amsterdam in 1933 and was transferred to London in 1939. It specialized in the study of fascism, anti-semitism etc.

The Institute, inter-disciplinary in character, is not concerned with current political events, nor is it exclusively devoted to the study of Nazism. The independent non-governmental character of the Institute enables it to sponsor and carry out projects which are not usually undertaken by European university departments. One of its aims is to help solve the problems of growing specialization and to close the gap between specialists in different fields and between the specialist and the interested layman.

The Institute hopes to do this by approaching subjects from a broad but concrete and scholarly perspective. The Institute seeks the cooperation of graduates in the United States and on the Continent. It is willing to put its limited, though in some respects unique, resources at the disposal of American scholars working in the field of international affairs and contemporary history and to provide contacts with other research institutions in Europe. The Institute is particularly interested in establishing links with American academic institutes specializing in contemporary European studies with a view to collaborating on specific research projects, offering facilities on a reciprocal or jointly sponsored basis.

The Institute is preparing a new quarterly journal, the *Journal of Contemporary History*, the first number of which will be published in January 1966. It is edited by Walter Laqueur, director of the Institute, and G. Mosse, University of Wisconsin. Each issue will normally be devoted to one central topic, but there will also be more general issues.

Enquiries may be addressed to: The Director, The Institute for Advanced Studies in Contemporary History, 4 Devonshire Street, London, W.1. England.

In anticipation of the 50th anniversary of the Russian revolutions of 1917, Radio Liberty and the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich have launched a project entitled "The Past Is Prologue."

The aim of the project is to collect oral memoirs of as many participants in and witnesses of these events as are alive today and would be willing to contribute. It is hoped that the material gathered would present a broad political, social, economic and cultural panorama of the Russian Empire in 1917 and thus contribute to a more complete understanding of those fateful events. This project is intended as a public service to the academic community and press, radio and television writers who might wish to add new factual material and sound actualities to documentaries on the revolutions of 1917. Radio Liberty hopes to be able to use certain portions of these oral memoirs in its special programming, but only with the express authorization of the contributors. The Institute for the Study of the USSR plans to incorporate some of the material in its publications devoted to the 50th anniversary of the Russian revolutions.

By agreement with Columbia University transcripts of the oral memoirs will be deposited in the University's Oral History Collection.

Anyone willing to contribute to the project, or who knows someone who can, is requested to communicate with Mr. V. N. Rudin, Radio Liberty, Lilienthalstrasse 2, Munich 19, Germany, or Mr. Gene Sosin, Radio Liberty Committee, 30 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New York.

The Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois conducted its 7th annual assembly on public affairs in January 1965. The subject was Private Groups in Illinois Government. Some 35 academicians, newspapermen, public officials and pressure group representatives took part in the conference. The background papers were prepared by James H. Andrews and the findings of the assembly have been published.

T. W. ADAMS, socio-political specialist in NASA Headquarters Policy Planning Division, has received the Certificate for Achievement from the Department of the Army for his work as author of an area handbook on Cyprus.

JON ALEXANDER will be a Francis Drown Foundation scholar during the 1965–66 academic year at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara.

JOHN ARMSTRONG, University of Wisconsin, has been elected president of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

WILLIAM BALLIS has returned to the University of Michigan after an absence of two years. In 1963–64 he was on research leave in Europe and during 1964–65 he served as the Nimitz professor at the Naval War College.

OLIVER E. BENSON, director of the Bureau of Government Research at the University of Oklahoma, has returned to his position after a year's sabbatical leave. He has been elected president of the International Studies Association for 1965–66.

THAD L. BEYLE has been appointed a research associate on the staff of "A Study of American States" at Duke University. The study is under the direction of former Governor of North Carolina, Terry Sanford, and is financed by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation.

DAVID A. BINGHAM, University of Arizona, will conduct research during a 1965–66 sabbatical leave.

NORMAN BLUME, University of Toledo, is on research leave in Brazil.

ROBERT P. BOYNTON and DEIL S. WRIGHT, University of Iowa, attended the annual conference of the International City Managers Association in Montreal, September 19–23. They presented a progress report on their study of council-manager operations in the United States.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, University of Maryland, has been appointed by the Governor of Maryland to be a member of the Constitutional Convention Commission and will serve as the chairman of the Committee on Style.

MARK W. CANNON, director of the Urban Development Project in Venezuela of the Institute of Public Administration of New York, has become associate director of IPA/NY.

DONALD S. CARLISLE, University of Wisconsin, is on leave of absence and will spend the 1965–66 year at the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

J. LEO CEFKIN, Colorado State University, is serving as senior visiting lecturer at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland during a fifteen-month leave of absence.

H. D. CHERRY, Baylor University, is serving as an administrative assistant to Senator Ralph W. Yarborough during a year's leave of absence.

BERNARD COHEN, University of Wisconsin, is a visiting research scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during 1965–66.

PATRICK J. CONKLIN, University of Missouri, is on leave for a twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1965. He is serving as associate director of the Executive Seminar Center, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Kings Point, New York.

WILLIAM J. CROTTY, University of Georgia, has been awarded a research fellowship by the Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration at the University of Oregon for the 1965–66 year.

JOHN T. DORSEY, Vanderbilt University, has returned to his post after an eighteen-month research leave in São Paulo, Brazil.

CHARLES W. DUNN, The Florida State University, is working as an assistant to the Governor of Washington during 1965–66, under the auspices of the NCEP.

G. Homer Durham, president of Arizona State University, is serving a three-year term as a member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. He was appointed by President Johnson on February 15, 1964.

E. S. Efrat, University of Victoria, B.C., has been elected to the executive council of the Western Political Science Association.

Herbert Emmerich, University of Virginia, was re-elected president of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences at the organization's XIII congress held in Paris, July 19, 1965.

John G. Eriksen, University of Oklahoma, was elected president of the Southwest Slavic Conference for 1965–66. He was also elected to honorary membership in the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

Edwin H. Fedder, Hollins College, is spending the 1965–66 year at the Ohio State University where he is directing the Mershon Western Alliance project. He has served during 1965 as the president of the International Studies Association, Southern Division.

Joseph R. Fizman, University of Oregon, acted as director of a month-long, interdisciplinary institute of Comparative Communist Systems and Ideology held on the campus of the University from June 21 through July 16, 1965. He has also been selected a second time to participate in the exchange between American and East European institutions of higher learning. He will be in Europe during most of the 1965–66 academic year.

G. James Flemming, Morgan State College, is spending the 1965–66 year in Africa. He will visit fifteen countries.

Conner Flowers, The Citadel, is on leave to Columbia University during 1965–66.

Donald M. Freeman, University of Arizona, will represent the University in the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

Thomas V. Garcia, University of Georgia, is now engaged as associate director, Executive Institutes, Office of Career Development, U.S. Civil Service, Washington, D.C.

Elliot R. Goodman is on leave from Brown University during the current academic year.

Daniel R. Grant, Vanderbilt University, was on research leave during the fall term.

Harry A. Green, The Florida State University, has been named assistant director of Florida's Office of Equal Opportunity. He will serve during 1965–66.

Fred I. Greenstein has returned to his position at Wesleyan University from a year as a fellow in the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Joel B. Grossman, University of Wisconsin, is on a study and research leave at the Law School of Harvard University.

Edward Handler, Babson Institute, has been awarded a research fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies.

William John Hanna, formerly of Michigan State University, has accepted the post of research scientist with the Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C.

John S. Harris, University of Massachusetts, was on research leave during 1964–65 in Great Britain on a Rockefeller grant.

David K. Hart has returned to Brigham Young University after two years as a Danforth fellow at Claremont Graduate School.

Harry Holloway has returned to his position at the University of Oklahoma after a year's leave of absence during which he conducted research under a Rockefeller grant.

Franklin W. Houn is on research leave from the University of Massachusetts during 1965–66 and is serving as a research associate at the Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University.

Harold K. Jacobson, University of Michigan, is on a year's sabbatical leave and is engaged in research in Geneva, Switzerland.

Kenneth F. Johnson, Colorado State University, is associated with the Defense Research Corporation during the current academic year.

Earl O. Kline has resumed the chairmanship of the department at The Citadel after serving as a visiting professor at Duke University during 1964–65.

Marian D. Irish, The Florida State University, has been named editor of the *Journal of Politics*.

Walter H. C. Laves, Indiana University, attended a seminar on local government and community development in Honolulu. Representatives of five countries participated.

Arpad von Lazar, Vanderbilt University, lectured for the USIA in West Germany, Austria and Switzerland during the 1965 summer.

Edward N. MacConomy, formerly Chief of the Stack and Reader Division of the Library of Congress, has been promoted to Assistant Chief of the Library's General Reference and Bibliography Division.

Ruth Miner, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater, spent the 1965 spring term studying at the London School of Economics.

Frank Munger is on leave of absence from Syracuse University during 1965–66.

Carl D. McMurray, The Florida State University, has received an NCEP grant to become the assistant to the Governor of Idaho during 1965–66. He will also act as the staff director for the National Republican Governors' Conference.

Fred W. Neal, Claremont Graduate School, will be in Trinidad during 1965–66 under a Rockefeller grant and a Swiss Technical grant. He will set up a program of international studies at the University of West Indies and an institute for the training of foreign service personnel.

Martin C. Needler has accepted an invitation to be a research associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs during 1965–66 and will be on leave from the University of Michigan. He has also received an H. H. Powers Traveling Fellowship for travel in Latin America.

Samuel C. Patterson, University of Iowa, spent the 1965 summer in Washington, D.C. conducting research under the auspices of the APSA's Study of Congress.

Joseph Planinsic, Duquesne University, has been transferred from the political science department to the University's Institute of African Affairs.

Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University, is spending the 1965–66 academic year as a fellow in the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California.

John Roche is on leave from Brandeis University. He will lecture in Europe for part of the year and will devote the rest of his time to a research project for which he has received support from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Thomas M. Sanford has returned to his position at Wesleyan University. During 1964–65 he was on sabbatical leave in Berkeley.

Wallace S. Sayre, Columbia University, is holding the Ford Foundation Research professorship during 1965–66. He will spend part of the year in England.

Karl N. Snow has returned to Brigham Young University after a year's leave of absence which he spent at the University of Southern California.

Robert H. Stern, the State University of New York at Buffalo, is on leave during the current academic year. He will lecture at the Paris Institute of American Studies during part of the time.

James A. Storing, dean of faculty at Colgate University, was in Norway on a Fulbright research grant during the spring term of 1965.

Peter A. Toma, University of Arizona, will be on sabbatical leave from February to July, 1966.

Thomas L. Thorson, University of Wisconsin, will be on leave with the Rockefeller Foundation during 1965–66.

Harvey Walker, The Ohio State University, spent the summer in Europe collecting materials on local government.

John P. Wheeler, Jr., has returned to Hollins College after a year as director of studies at the University of Trinidad.

M. Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin, will teach and do research at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, during 1965–66.

STAFF CHANGES

New Appointments

David Adamany, instructor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

David Baldwin, assistant professor, Dartmouth College.

Michael Barkun, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

John T. Batchelder, instructor, University of Iowa.

Joel Beiser, Kent State University.

Howard Bliss, assistant professor, Dartmouth College.

James Bolner, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts; formerly of the University of Alabama.

Robert J. Bresler, assistant professor, University of Delaware; formerly of the Green Bay Center of the University of Wisconsin.

Richard Butwell, professor and director of Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky; formerly of the University of Illinois.

Allen W. Cameron, instructor, Bates College.

Dwight Marcus Carpenter, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

Florence Casey, instructor, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

John R. Champlin, instructor, Ohio State University.

Shirley Chapman, assistant professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of Vassar.

Phillip C. Chapman, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of Lawrence University.

Ronald I. Cheffins, associate professor, University of Victoria.

William O. Chittick, assistant professor, The Florida State University.

Mary Clawson, assistant professor, Montgomery Junior College.

Leon S. Cohen, assistant professor, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly of the University of North Carolina.

George Cole, instructor, Allegheny College.

H. Richard Cornell, assistant professor, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Kenneth M. Dolbeare, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin; formerly of Hofstra University.

Wonmo Dong, assistant professor, Kentucky Wesleyan, 1965–66.

Russell Edgerton, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

William W. Ellis, assistant professor, Northwestern University.

Eugene Evans, West Kentucky State College; formerly of the University of Kentucky.

Edward Feit, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts; formerly of the University of Michigan.

Joseph M. Firestone, lecturer, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Murray Fishel, assistant professor, University of Denver, 1965–66.

Frederick Fleron, instructor, University of Kentucky.

Donald M. Freeman, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of Charlotte College.

Peter French, instructor, Syracuse University.

Fred M. Frohock, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

Charles Garrison, instructor, Colorado State University.

Marianne Githens, assistant professor, Goucher College.

Sheldon Goldman, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts; formerly of Harvard University.

George J. Gordon, University of Toledo, 1965–66.

H. Gaylon Greenhill, associate professor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

George G. Graham, assistant professor, Vanderbilt University.

William E. Griffith, professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Raymond N. Habiby, assistant professor, Oklahoma State University.

Howard D. Hamilton, professor, Bowling Green State University; formerly of Indiana University.

Jonathan P. Hawley, assistant professor, University of Tulsa.

Klaus H. Heberle, associate professor, Oklahoma State University.

A. Spencer Hill, associate professor, University of Nevada; formerly of Eastern New Mexico University.

John Hodgson, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

JOHN C. HONEY, professor, Syracuse University; formerly associate director of the Institute of Public Administration.

GARY HOSKIN, lecturer, State University of New York at Buffalo.

IRVING HOWARDS, professor and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Massachusetts; formerly of Southern Illinois University.

RONALD F. HOWELL, professor, Long Island University; formerly of Emory University.

JOHN A. JACOBSOHN, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

JUDSON L. JAMES, lecturer, Rutgers—The State University.

LLOYD JENSEN, assistant professor, Northwestern University; formerly of the University of Illinois.

YUNG-HWAN JO, assistant professor, Colorado State University.

JOHN P. JONES, lecturer, the State University of New York at Buffalo.

RALPH G. JONES, professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of the University of Arkansas.

MELVIN KAHN, associate professor, Southern Illinois University; formerly of Indiana State University.

JOHN KESSEL, Arthur E. Braun professor, Allegheny College; formerly of the University of Washington.

JUNG-GUN KIM, assistant professor, East Carolina College.

ILPYONG JOHN KIM, lecturer, Indiana University, 1965–66.

JOHN W. KINGDON, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR., professor, Brown University; formerly Executive Director-Comptroller of the CIA.

BYRON G. LANDER, Kent State University.

KENNETH P. LANGTON, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

ELDON LANNING, assistant professor, Bowling Green State University; formerly of Louisiana State University.

JERRY LANSDOWNE, instructor, Colorado State University.

WILLIAM LAUX, assistant professor, Colorado State University.

LESLIE LAZLO, assistant professor, Sir George Williams University, Montreal; formerly of the University of Virginia.

PAUL LEARY, instructor, Dartmouth College.

R. WILLIAMS LIDDLE, instructor, Ohio State University.

LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, instructor, Lawrence University.

NORMAN LUTTBEG, assistant professor, Southern Illinois University.

ROY C. MACRIDIS, professor, Brandeis University.

ALVIN MAGID, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, professor, Columbia University; formerly of Ohio State University.

ANDREW MARTIN, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts.

JOHN F. MCCAMANT, assistant professor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

DONALD J. MCCRONE, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

ERNEST G. MILLER, lecturer, University of Washington.

LEONARD G. MILLER, assistant professor, State University of New York at Albany; formerly of Kenyon College.

EDWARD L. MILES, instructor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

RICHARD B. MULLER, lecturer, Indiana University, 1965–66.

DAVID A. NICHOLS, instructor, University of Connecticut.

FELIX A. NIGRO, professor, University of Delaware; formerly of San Diego State College.

ERIC NORDLINGER, assistant professor, Brandeis University.

MICHAEL O'LEARY, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

MICHAEL PARENTI, Sarah Lawrence College.

O. WILLIAM PERLMUTTER, professor, Kent State University.

Jeffrey Phillips, assistant professor, The Citadel, 1965–66.

Daniel Di Piazza, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

George Platt, assistant professor, University of Iowa.

Paul K. Pollock, instructor, Beloit College.

Robert Pranger, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

Carolyn Pratt, instructor, University of Oklahoma.

Amir Rafat, Kent State University.

Barbara Reardon, preceptor, Columbia University, 1965–66.

Bradley M. Richardson, assistant professor, Ohio State University.

Alan I. Ritter, acting assistant professor, University of Virginia.

Earle B. Roberts, Kent State University.

Leon I. Salomon, instructor, University of Connecticut.

James R. Scales, professor, Oklahoma State University; formerly president, Oklahoma Baptist University.

Stuart A. Scheingold, University of Wisconsin; formerly of the University of California at Davis.

Gordon J. Schochet, lecturer, Rutgers—The State University.

Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, lecturer, Swarthmore College.

Donald O. Schoonmaker, instructor, Wake Forest College; formerly of the University of Maryland.

David C. Schwartz, assistant professor, University of Pennsylvania.

Donald E. Secrest, instructor, University of Oklahoma.

Ira Sharkansky, assistant professor, The Florida State University.

Jack Shick, assistant professor, Lake Forest College.

John D. Shinglar, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin, 1965–66.

Richard L. Siegel, instructor, University of Nevada.

Zdenek Slouka, lecturer, Columbia University.

Mario Spalatin, instructor, The Florida State University.

Donald Sprengel, the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Iowa.

John Stanley, acting assistant professor, University of California at Riverside.

Edward A. Stettner, instructor, Rutgers—The State University.

Newell M. Stultz, assistant professor, the Center for East Asian Language and Area Studies, Brown University.

Richard L. Sutton, instructor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

Joseph Szyliowicz, assistant professor, the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

Joseph Tanenhaus, professor, University of Iowa.

C. D. Tarlton, assistant professor, University of Victoria. B.C.

William F. Troutman, Jr., professor, East Carolina College.

Frederick C. Turner, assistant professor, University of Connecticut.

Panyotis J. Vatikiotis, professor, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; formerly of Indiana University.

John Vloyantes, associate professor, Colorado State University.

Mark Warden, instructor, Lake Forest College.

C. R. Watts, assistant professor, The Citadel.

John Wenum, instructor, Lake Forest College.

Herbert H. Werlin, instructor, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

Howard Wiarda, assistant professor, University of Massachusetts.

Edward Weidner, professor and director of the Center for the Study of Developmental Change, University of Kentucky; formerly of the East-West Center.

Gary L. Wilhelm, assistant professor, Sacramento State College; formerly of Ohio State University.

Theodore P. Wright, Jr., associate professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly of Bates College.

Joseph F. Zimmerman, professor, the Graduate School of Public Affairs, the State University of New York at Albany; formerly of Worcester Polytechnic Institute.

Victor Zitta, associate professor, Hollins College; formerly of Marquette University.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS, 1965–66

Richard D. Baker, University of Oklahoma: visiting professor, Tulane.

Kwamena Bentsi-Ential, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University: visiting professor, Northwestern University, fall term.

Clarence Berdahl, visiting professor, Southern Illinois University, winter term.

Loren P. Beth, University of Massachusetts: visiting professor, Trinity College, Dublin.

Gerard Braunthal, University of Massachusetts: visiting professor, Visva-Bharati University, India.

Lawrence L. Durisch, director of Government and Economics Research Staff, TVA: visiting professor, Vanderbilt University, fall term.

James W. Dyson, visiting assistant professor and research associate, Institute of Governmental Research, The Florida State University.

Denna F. Fleming, The California State College: visiting professor, University of Arizona, spring term.

George Gant, director of the South and Southeast Asia program, Ford Foundation: visiting professor, University of Wisconsin, fall term.

Dante Germino, Wellesley College: visiting Rockefeller Foundation professor, University of the Philippines.

Arthur Gilbert, University of Denver: visiting professor, Haile Selassie University, Ethiopia.

Andrew Gyorgy, Boston University: visiting professor, University of Arizona, spring term.

Henry Hart, University of Wisconsin: visiting professor, Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, University of Hawaii, second term.

Richard D. Heffner, Rutgers University: visiting professor, University of Arizona, summer, 1965.

Neal D. Houghton, University of Arizona: visiting professor, University of Saskatchewan, Canada.

Nish Jamgotch, California State College at Long Beach: visiting assistant professor, Scripps College, spring term.

Edgar Love, El Camino College: visiting professor, Montgomery Junior College.

Ronald Loveridge, acting assistant professor, University of California at Riverside, fall term.

H. Malcolm Macdonald, William A. John Memorial professor, Pomona College, first term.

Gerald S. Maryanov, University of Iowa: Fulbright lecturer, University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.

Gordon Means, Gustavus Adolphus: visiting assistant professor, University of Iowa.

Eugene Meehan, Rutgers: visiting associate professor, Brandeis University.

Richard Mills, visiting lecturer, Brown University.

Russell Murphy, visiting instructor, Wesleyan University.

Fred Warner Neal, Claremont Graduate School: visiting professor, University of West Indies.

Rex Neaverson, Trinity College: visiting associate professor, Wesleyan University, spring term.

Felix Oppenheim, University of Massachusetts: visiting professor, Istituto di Scienze Politiche, University of Turin, spring term, 1965.

Elinor Ostrom, visiting assistant professor, Indiana University.

F. W. Riggs, Indiana University: Carnegie visiting professor, MIT.

Paul P. Van Riper, Cornell University: visiting professor, University of Michigan, summer term, 1965.

Peter Rowe, Smith College: visiting professor, Wesleyan University, fall term, 1964.

Richard L. Sklar, formerly of the University of Ibadan: visiting associate professor, Brandeis University.

Robert J. Steamer, Lake Forest College: visiting professor, University of California at Los Angeles, summer term, 1965.

Metin Tamkoc, Middle East Technical University, Ankara: visiting associate professor, Texas Technological College.

David Titus, Columbia University: visiting instructor, Wesleyan University, spring term.

Rexford Guy Tugwell, research professor, Southern Illinois University, spring (1965) and fall terms; Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, winter term.

Eric Waldman, Marquette University, visiting professor, University of Marburg, summer, 1965.

Deil S. Wright, University of Iowa: visiting associate professor, University of California at Berkeley.

Other Appointments

Charles Aiken, chairman of the department, University of California at Berkeley.

Benjamin Baker, chairman of the department, Rutgers—The State University.

Joseph L. Bernd, chairman of the department, Southern Methodist University.

John T. Bernhard, chairman of the department, Brigham Young University.

Donald G. Bishop, chairman of the department, Syracuse University.

George Blanksten, chairman of the department, Northwestern University.

Steven J. Brams, research associate, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va.

Alan L. Clem, associate director, Governmental Research Bureau, University of South Dakota.

James B. Craig, Jr., research associate, Institute of Governmental Research, The Florida State University.

Wilder Crane, chairman of the department, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

Alex N. Dragnich, chairman of the department, Vanderbilt University.

Henry W. Ehrmann, reappointed chairman of the department, Dartmouth.

Lee W. Farnsworth, director, Asian Research Institute, Brigham Young University.

Webb S. Fisher, vice president for academic affairs, the State University of New York at Albany.

Phillip O. Foss, chairman of the department, Colorado State University.

Richard B. Gray, director, Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in International Affairs, The Florida State University.

H. Gaylord Greenhill, chairman of the department, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

Frank M. Lewis, chairman of the department, University of Toledo.

Melvin P. Mabey, coordinator, Russian Studies Program, Brigham Young University.

Harvey Martens, director of Public Administration programs, Syracuse University; formerly director, Special Projects, American Society for Public Administration.

C. Peter McGrath, associate dean of the Graduate School, Brown University.

Edwin B. Morell, assistant chairman, Brigham Young University.

Howard D. Hamilton, acting chairman of the department, Bowling Green State University.

James N. Murray, chairman of the department, University of Iowa.

O. William Perlmutter, academic dean of the College of Fine and Professional Arts, Kent State University.

James R. Scales, dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Oklahoma State University.

David Scott, chairman of the department, University of Omaha; formerly of Southern Illinois University.

Dwight James Simpson, president, Roberts College, Istanbul; formerly of Williams College.

Ivan M. Stone, director, Pettibone World

Affairs Center, Beloit College; formerly dean of the College.

VINCENT V. THURSBY, assistant dean of the Graduate School, The Florida State University, 1965–66.

H. ODELL WALDBY, assistant vice president for Academic Affairs, The Florida State University.

ROBERT S. WALKER, chairman of the department, Trinity University (San Antonio); formerly of Oklahoma State University.

WILLIAM O. WINTER, chairman of the department, University of Colorado; formerly of Southern Illinois University.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

DAVID H. BAYLEY, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver: associate professor.

YAROSLAV BILINSKY, University of Delaware: associate professor.

ROBERT C. BONE, The Florida State University: professor.

ALAN L. CLEM, University of South Dakota: professor.

GEORGE A. CODDING, JR., University of Colorado: professor.

ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., Brown University: professor.

BROWNLEE SANDS CORRIN, Goucher College: professor.

RICHARD H. COX, State University of New York at Buffalo: professor.

MICHAEL R. CURTIS, Rutgers—The State University: professor.

FRANK C. DARLING, University of Colorado: professor.

I. RIDGWAY DAVIS, University of Connecticut: associate professor.

ROBERT W. GREGG, Syracuse University: associate professor.

HUGH E. KELSO, University of Iowa: professor.

PAUL C. KITCHEN, Kent State University: associate professor.

DAVID KOVENOCK, Dartmouth College: assistant professor.

MARTIN T. KYRE, Texas Technological College: associate professor.

JOHN C. LANE, State University of New York at Buffalo: associate professor.

ROBERT M. LAWRENCE, Texas Technological College: associate professor.

M. HARRY LEASE, JR., University of Minnesota at Duluth: associate professor.

JOAN LOMAX, Montgomery Junior College: assistant professor.

GENE M. LYONS, Dartmouth College: professor.

RAYMOND D. MACK, Texas Technological College: associate professor.

CONRAD L. MCBRIDE, University of Colorado: associate professor.

FRANK MUNGER, Syracuse University: professor.

EUGENE J. MEEHAN, Rutgers—The State University: associate professor.

RICHARD MERELMAN, Wesleyan University: assistant professor.

WILLIAM E. ODEN, Texas Technological College: professor.

JOHN M. ORBELL, Ohio State University: assistant professor.

DAISY PARKER, The Florida State University: professor.

RICHARD H. PFAFF, University of Colorado: associate professor.

RUSSELL M. ROSS, University of Iowa: professor.

EDWARD J. ROZEK, University of Colorado: professor.

MICHAEL O. SAWYER, Syracuse University: professor.

WALTER F. SCHEFFER, University of Oklahoma: professor.

JEROME N. SLATER, Ohio State University: assistant professor.

GLENN H. SNYDER, State University of New York at Buffalo: professor.

DAVID J. STERN, Colgate University: assistant professor.

Rudolf Tokes, Wesleyan University: assistant professor.

Joe R. Wilkinson, Graduate School of International Studies. University of Denver: associate professor.

Lea E. Williams, Brown University: professor.

Clifton E. Wilson, University of Arizona: associate professor.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

Amry Vandenbosch, director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky, and chairman of the department there from 1933 to 1958, retired on June 30 after 39 years of service at the University.

John H. Ferguson resigned the positions of head of the department and director of the Institute of Public Administration at Pennsylvania State University on September 1. He will remain at the University in a teaching capacity.

Donald E. Hayhurst has resigned his associate professorship at West Virginia University.

Stephen O. Lesser resigned from the University of Victoria, B.C., to accept a position with the Department of State.

Rodney L. Mott, Charles Evans Hughes professor of government and jurisprudence at Colgate University, retired on June 30 after 30 years of service. For 27 years he was director of the University's Division of Social Sciences.

Frank Munger resigned his post of chairman of the department at Syracuse University on June 30.

Ernest B. Schulz has retired from Lehigh University after 38 years of service on the faculty.

IN MEMORIAM

Richard W. Barron, professor of political science at Longwood College, died July 18, 1965.

The death of Professor **Julian Towster**, University of California, Berkeley, on April 15, 1965, at the age of 60, has left a significant void in scholarship in the field of Soviet Studies. A native of Poland, he came to the United States in 1926, studied at the University of Chicago, which awarded him the JD and PhD degrees. His services to the Department of Justice, Office of Strategic Services, and the State Department during the War and subsequently, were notable. He joined the Political Science Faculty at the University of California in 1950. He was the recipient of grants from the Social Science Research Council, the Russian Institute of Columbia University, and the Guggenheim Foundation.

By his voluminous and authoritative writings on the subject of politics and government of the Soviet Union, Professor Towster achieved an eminent reputation as a Sovietologist throughout the United States and abroad. His major work, *Political Powers in the USSR*, first published in 1948, broke new ground. It was extensively studied and cited and was used for teaching purposes in over one hundred colleges and universities. He was continually active in public affairs, was in demand as a lecturer on Soviet subjects in the lecture hall, on radio and television. At the time of his death he was engaged in the writing of two major manuscripts concerned with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and with its conduct of foreign relations. He is survived by his wife and two daughters.—The Department of Political Science, University of California.

Professor **Eugene Burdick**, University of California, Berkeley, died suddenly on July 26, 1965, having just concluded a year's leave of absence from teaching. He was a native of Iowa, and received his higher education at Stanford and Oxford Universities, earning the Doctor's degree from Magdalen College following residence as a Rhodes Scholar. Trained in psychology (M.A.), he carried his graduate studies further in political theory. He joined the Political Science staff of the University of California in 1950.

During the First World War he served in the Navy (Jr.Cmdr.), and during the Korean War was assigned to the Naval War College, Newport, as Academic Consultant.

Although well known as the author of the *Ninth Wave*, *The Ugly American* (with William Lederer), *Fail Safe*, and others, his professional writing is reflected primarily in articles. He was co-author with A. J. Brodbeck of *American Voting Behavior* (1959). His abiding interest in politics and public affairs led him far afield as a practitioner, lecturer and adviser. He served as consultant to the government on various aspects of foreign policy and as special adviser to the President. He was associated actively with the Dooley Foundation and with HOPE. He is survived by his widow, two daughters and a son.—The Department of Political Science, The University of California.

INDEX TO VOLUME LIX

HOW TO USE THIS INDEX

This index is divided into two sections:

(*a*) *Alphabetical Section*

Material is listed here by title, authors' last names, and topic. Many topic entries refer you to the Classified Section where you may be able to find related items by glancing at neighboring classes.

(*b*) *Classified Section**

Here entries concerning the same or related topics are grouped together, or near to each other, to encourage "suggestive browsing" and refer you to the *subject matter* of Articles, Reviews, Notes, and Bibliographies.

Each entry may appear more than once in the Classified Section. Thus, for example, the article "*The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession*," by René Lemarchand, which appeared in the June, 1962 issue of the REVIEW appears in the following classifications:

AA1	Methodology—Case Studies
B436	Comparative Government—Africa—Katanga
D211	International Law—Secession
D610	International Law—United Nations
F806	Election Returns

SECTION ONE

ALPHABETICAL SECTION

Abendroth, W. *Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie.* Book note by Winter, H. R. 186

Adam, T. R. notes *The New Liberia: A Historical and Political Survey.* Marinelli, L. A. 499

The Adams Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. Butterfield, L. H. (ed.) Book note by Grimes, A. P. 465

Ader, E. B. notes *The Atlantic Union Movement.* Szent-Miklosy, I. 1089

Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society. Riggs, F. W. Book review by Pye, L. W. 456

ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR. See AAA6.

Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model. Gore, W. J. Book note by Smithburg, D. 469

Adrian, C. R. notes *At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958.* Lowi, T. J. 481

Adu, A. L. *The Civil Service in New African States.* Book note by Friedman, J. R. 1059

AFRICA. See B43.

AFRICA, SOUTH. See SOUTH AFRICA.

An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa. Kuper, L. Book note by Glickman, H. 1061

The African World, A Survey of Social Research. Lystad, R. A. (ed.) Book note 1066

The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History. Van Jaarsveld, F. A. Book note by Scarritt, J. R. 200

Africa's Quest for Order. Burke, F. G. Book note by Apter, D. E. 497

Aikin, C. notes *Legalism.* Shklar, J. N. 713

——— notes *The States Rights Debate: Antifederalism and the Constitution.* Mason, A. T. 166

Alexander, H. E. (ed.) *Studies in Money in Politics. A Series of Seven Monographs.* Book note by Shannon, J. B. 1031

Alford, R. R. *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies.* Book review by Prothro, J. W. 1008

ALGERIA. See B417.

Alker, H. R., Jr., Russett, B. M., Deutsch, K. W. and Lasswell, H. D. *World Hand-*

---

* The classification scheme is adapted from *A Library Classification for Public Administration Materials*, by Sophia Hall Glidden, Chicago, Public Administration Service and American Library Association, 1942.

book of Political and Social Indicators. Book review by Banks, A. S. 144
Allardt, E. and Littunen, Y. (eds.) *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology.* Book note by Rintala, M. 737
Allen, L. A. notes *France and the European Community.* Fisher, S. N. (ed.) 1085
Allers, U. S. notes *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary.* Cross, R. C. and Woozley, A. D. 466
Allyn, P. and Greene, J. *See How They Run: The Making of a Congressman.* Book note by Kofmehl, K. 158
Almond, G. A. replies to Huntington and Brzezinski's *Communication* 447
Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe. Brzezinski, Z. Book note by Organski, A. F. K. 1080
Altman, J., Ratner, S. and Wheeler, J. E. (eds.) *John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951.* Book note by Hagan, C. B. 468
America Votes, Vol. 5, 1962. Scammon, R. M. Book note 174
The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States. Keefe, W. J. and Ogul, M. S. Book note 174
American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead. Campbell, J. C. Book note by Duchacek, I. D. 1071
American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline. Somit, A. and Tanenhaus, J. Book review by Van Dyke, V. 459
American Political Science Association. See P709.
The American South in the 1960's. Leiserson, A. (ed.) Book note by Sindler, A. P. 163
Amos, J. R., Brown, F. L. and Mink, O. G. *Statistical Concepts: A Basic Program.* Book note 715
Anarchist Thought in India. Doctor, A. H. Book review by Weiner, M. 451
Anderson, M. *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962.* Book note by Salisbury, R. H. 478
Anderson, R. W. notes *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America.* Lieuwen, E. 511
Anderson, S. V. notes *Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries.* Andrén, N. 1056
——— notes *Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits.* Davis, M. 1056
——— notes *Iceland: Reluctant Ally.* Nuechterlein, D. E. 1056
——— notes *Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress.* Malmström, V. H. 1056
Anderson, W. *Man's Quest for Political Knowledge—The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times.* Book review by Brecht, A. 449
Andreae, S. J. F. and Hardenberg, H. (eds.) *500 jaren Staten-Generaal in de Nederlanden. Van statenvergadering tot volksvertegenwoordiging.* Book note by Childs, J. B. 191
Andrén, N. *Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries.* Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056
Apportionment. See K6.
An Appropriations Subcommittee and Its Client Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control. Sharkansky, I. 622
Apter, D. E. notes *Africa's Quest for Order.* Burke, F. G. 497
The Arabs: Their History & Future. Berque, J. Translated by Stewart, J. Book note by Ashford, D. E. 508
Arabia. See B425 and B437.
Arms Control. See D711.
Armstrong, J. A. notes *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II.* Bilinsky, Y. 193
———. *Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons* 643
——— reviews *Soviet Foreign Propaganda.* Barghoorn, F. C. 700
Aron, R. *The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy.* Book review by Crabb, C. V., Jr. 703
Ashford, D. E. notes *The Arabs: Their History & Future.* Berque, J. Translated by Stewart, J. 508
Asia. See B42.
Aspaturian, V. V. reviews *The Life of Lenin.* Fischer, L. 701
At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958. Lowi, T. J. Book note by Adrian, C. R. 481
The Atlantic Alliance. Cottrell, A. J. and Dougherty, J. E. Book note by Colvin, M. 757
The Atlantic Union Movement. Szent-Miklosy, I. Book note by Ader, E. B. 1089
Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. Abendroth, W. Book note by Winter, H. R. 186
Austin, D. *Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960.* Book review by Glickman, H. 1007
Australia. See B461.
Australian Party Politics. Jupp, J. Book note by Overacker, L. 500
Austria. See B416.
Authorities, Public. See B79.
Avakumovic, I. *History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.* Book note by Gyorgy, A. 506

Awa, E. O. *Federal Government in Nigeria*. Book note by Olton, R. 741

Bailey, S. K. reviews *Political Parties in the American System*. Sorauf, F. J. 142

Ballard, A. B., Jr. notes *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia*. Ploss, S.I. 1054

Ballis, W. B. notes *Nationalism and Communism, Essays 1946–1963*. Seton-Waton, H. 195

——— notes *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*. Lowenthal, R. 506

Banks, A. S. reviews *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. Russett, B. M., Alker, H. R., Jr., Deutsch, K. W. and Lasswell, H. D. 144

——— and Gregg, P. M. *Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey* 602

Bantustan: The Fragmentation of South Africa. Hill, C. R. Book note by Dale, R. .. 743

Barber, H. W. notes *The War—Peace Establishment*. Herzog, A. 761

Barber, J. D. *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life*. Book review by Wahlke, J. C. 698

——— notes *Political and Sociological Theory and Its Applications*. Catlin, G. E. G. 708

Barghoorn, F. C. *Soviet Foreign Propaganda*. Book review by Armstrong, J. A. 700

Barker, L. J. notes *Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict*. Record, W. 169

Barnard, F. M. *Christian Thomasius: Enlightenment and Bureaucracy* 430

Barnes, S. H. notes *Il clero di riserva*. Poggi, G. 504

Barron, Richard W. *In Memoriam* 1118

Bates, M. L. reviews *The New States of West Africa*. Post, K. 463

Baum, W. C. *Communication* on Converse, Clauson and Miller's "*Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election.*" 693

Baxter, R. R. and Triska, J. F. *The Law of International Waterways—With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals*. Book note by Lawson, R. C. 212

Bay, C. *Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature* 39

Bayley, D. H. *Public Liberties in the New States*. Book note by Pennock, J. R. 735

Beck, C. F. notes *Law and Politics of the Danube*. Gorove, S. 526

Beckett, P. L. notes *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation*. Goodnow, H. F. 1058

Behavior. See AAA.

Bell, W. *Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation*. Book note by Fitzgibbon, R. H. 509

Bennett, A. L. notes *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs*. Coombs, P. H. 761

Bentham, Jeremy: An Odyssey of Ideals. Mack, M. P. Book note by Cox, R. H. 149

Berdahl, C. A. notes *The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator of the International Mails*. Codding, G. A., Jr. 214

Bernard, S. *Maroc 1943–1956: Le Conflit Franco-Marocain*. Book note by Micaud, C. A. 213

Berque, J. *The Arabs: Their History & Future*. Translated by Stewart, J. Book note by Ashford, D. E. 508

Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929–1946. Friend, T. Book note by Jacobini, H. B. 1066

Beyle, T. L. *Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in a Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation*. Research note 111

Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Haas, E. B. Book review by Claude, I. L., Jr. 1011

Bibliographie retrospective des Publications Officielles de la Belgique, 1794–1914. De Weerdt, D. Book note by Childs, J. B. .. 1070

Bibliography on American Government and Politics. Burdette, F. L. 175, 488, 726, 1043

Bibliography on Comparative Government and Cross-National Research. Merritt, R. L. and Pirro, E. B. 207, 514, 749, 1072

Bibliography on Comparative Public Administration. Raphaeli, N. 211, 519, 755, 1077

Bibliography on Foreign Local Government. Morlan, R. L. 120

Bibliography on International Law and Relations. Merritt, R. L. 224, 531, 764, 1095

Bibliography on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences. Ulmer, S. S. 155, 475, 717, 1028

Bibliography on Political Theory. Kramnick, I. 715, 1027

Bibliography on Political Theory. Shklar, J. N. 154, 474

Bilinsky, Y. *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II*. Book note by Armstrong, J. A. 193

Bill of Rights. See C. See also H211.

Bindley, J. H. notes *Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona*. Morey, R. D. 1041

Binkley, W. E. notes *Herbert Hoover: A Biography*. Lyons, E. 165

Biographies. See F55.

Bishop, D. G. notes *The European Community and Its Role in the World*. Kohnstamm, M. 529

Blalock, H. M., Jr. *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research*. Book review by Flanigan, W. H. 138

Bluhm, W. T. *Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis*. Book review by Riemer, N. 696

Boelling, K. *Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany*. Book note by Rie, R. 738

Bonilla, F., Ward, R. E., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas*. Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146

Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. Ranney, A. (ed.) 137, 448, 694, 1001

Boorstin, D. J. *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*. Book note by Niemeyer, G. 149

Boskoff, A. and Zeigler, H. *Voting Patterns in a Local Election*. Book note by Strong, D. S. 159

Bouscaren, A. T. *The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam*. Book review by Cahill, R. S. 1013

Bowett, D. W. *United Nations Forces*. Book note by Buehrig, E. H. 1079

Boyer, W. W. *Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies*. Book note by Wildavsky, A. 479

Braunthal, G. notes *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*. Pulzer, P. G. J. 502

Brecht, A. reviews *Man's Quest for Political Knowledge—The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times*. Anderson, W. 449

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.
- In Europe. See B41.
- In Asia. See B42.
- In Latin America and West Indies. See B44.
- In Africa. See B431.
- In Australia and Oceana. See B46.

Brook, D. *Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System*. Book note by Stoessinger, J. G. 1080

Brooke, J. and Namier, L. *The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754–1790*. Book note by Childs, J. B. 186

Brookes, E. H. and Vandenbosch, A. *The City of God and the City of Man in Africa*. Book note by Scarritt, J. R. 198

Brown, Everett Somerville. *In Memoriam* 247

Brown, F. L., Amos, J. R. and Mink, O. G. *Statistical Concepts: A Basic Program*. Book note 715

Brown, L. C., Micaud, C. A. and Moore, C. H. *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization*. Book note by Halpern, M. 199

British Guiana. Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society. Newman, P. Book note by Davis, H. E. 512

Brzezinski, Z. *Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe*. Book note by Organski, A. F. K. 1080

——— and Huntington, S. P. *Communication* on Almond's book review of *Political Power: USA/USSR* 446

BUDGETS, See L1.

Buehrig, E. H. notes *United Nations Forces*. Bowett, D. W. 1079

Burchett, W. G. *Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War*. Book note by Pirages, D. 1081

Burdette, F. L. *Bibliography on American Government and Politics* 175, 488, 726, 1043

Burdick, Eugene. *In Memoriam* 1118

Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies. Boyer, W. W. Book note by Wildavsky, A. 479

Burke, F. G. *Africa's Quest for Order*. Book note by Apter, D. E. 497

Burke, R. E. notes *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940*. Leuchtenburg, W. E. 723

Burnett, B. G. notes *The Challenge of Development in Latin America*. Urquidi, V. L. 205

——— notes *Politics of Change in Latin America*. Maier, H. and Weatherhead, R. W. (eds.) 205

——— notes *Poor Countries and Authoritarian Rule*. Neufeld, M. F. 1062

Burnham, W. D. *The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe* 7

Burns, A. L., Hekhuis, D. J. and McClintock, C. G. (eds.) *International Stability*. Book note by Riedel, J. A. 528

Busey, J. L. notes *Social Science Research on Latin America*. Wagley, C. (ed.) 740

Butterfield, L. H. (ed.) *The Adams Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John Adams*. Book note by Grimes, A. P. 465

Cahill, R. S. reviews *The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam*. Bouscaren, A. T. 1013

The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence. LeVine, V. T. Book review by Zolberg, A. R. 462

CABINET GOVERNMENT. See B461, I27.

CAMEROONS. See BY321.

Campbell, J. C. *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead*. Book note by Duchacek, I. D. 1071

Carter, G. M. notes *Political Parties and*

National Integration in Tropical Africa. Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G., Jr. 498
The Case for Liberty. Miller, H. H. Book note by Greenberg, M. 1022
Case Studies. See AA1.
Cassinelli, C. W. notes *Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics.* Jaffa, H. V. 1018
——— notes *Power and Human Destiny.* Rosinski, H. 1023
Catlin, G. E. G. notes *The Crisis of British Government in the 1960s.* Crick, B. 499
——— *Political and Sociological Theory and Its Applications.* Book note by Barber, J. D. 708
Cattell, D. T. notes *The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions.* Grzybowski, K. 526
Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. Blalock, H. M., Jr. Book review by Flanigan, W. H. 138
The Cause is Mankind: A Liberal Program for Modern America. Humphrey, H. H. Book note by Gilbert, C. E. 162
The Center of the World, Communism and the Mind of China. Elegant, R. S. Book note by Chang, D. W. 200
The Challenge of Development in Latin America. Urquidi, V. L. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 205
Chalmers, D. A. *The Social Democratic Party of Germany.* Book note by Groennings, S. 187
Chang, D. W. notes *The Center of the World, Communism and the Mind of China.* Elegant, R. S. 200
——— notes *Communist China's Crusade, Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution.* Wint, G. 1069
The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe. Burnham, W. D. 7
The Changing Structure of International Law. Friedmann, W. Book note by Manner, G. 524
Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament. Marshall, C. B. 350
Charnay, J. *Le Suffrage Politique en France.* Book note 1071
Chau, P. T. notes *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress.* Scigliano, R. 522
——— notes *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis.* Fall, B. B. 522
Childs, J. B. notes *Bibliographie retrospective des Publications Officielles de la Belgique, 1794–1914.* De Weerdt, D. 1070
——— notes *500 jaren Staten-Generaal in de Nederlanden. Van statenvergadering tot volksvertegenwoordiging.* Andreae, S. J. F. and Hardenberg, H. (eds.) 191
——— notes *Guia de la administración, civil del Estado.* Oficina de Información, Presidencia del Gobierno 192
——— notes *The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754–1790.* Namier, L. and Brooke, J. 186
——— notes *Westdeutschland, 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verwaltungseinrichtungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzungszonen Teil II. Einzelne Verwaltungs Zweige: Wirtschaft, Marshallplan, Statistik.* Vogel, W. 190
China. See B422.
China and the Bomb. Halperin, M. H. Book review by Rosenau, J. N. 1010
China's Foreign Policy. Dutt, V. P. Book note by Van Dorn, H. A. 758
Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade. Fraser, S. (ed.) Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 1067
Christoph, J. B. *Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology* 629
——— reviews *Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain.* Ranney, A. 706
Church and State in Social Welfare. Coughlin, B. J. Book note by Shull, G. L. 1032
City Government. See B73.
The City of God and the City of Man in Africa. Brookes, E. H. and Vandenbosch, A. Book note by Scarritt, J. R. 198
Cities. See B73.
Civil Service. See K12.
Civil-Military Relations. See N119.
Civil Rights. See B2, C41.
The Civil Service in New African States. Adu, A. L. Book note by Friedman, J. R. 1059
The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation. Goodnow, H. F. Book note by Beckett, P. L. 1058
Clark, J. S. *Congress: The Sapless Branch.* Book note by Matthews, D. R. 159
——— (ed.) *Congressional Reform: Problems and Prospects.* Book note 725
Claude, I. L., Jr. reviews *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization.* Haas, E. B. 1011
Clausen, A. R., Converse, P. E. and Miller, W. E. *Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election* 321
Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology. Allardt, E. and Littunen, Y. (eds.) Book note by Rintala, M. 737
Codding, G. A., Jr. *The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator of the International Mails.* Book note by Berdahl, C. A. 214
Cold War. See D3.
The Cold War—And After. Lerche, C. O., Jr. Book note by Gibbs, H. S. 1089
Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G., Jr. *Po-*

litical Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Book note by Carter, G. M. 498

Coleman, J. S., Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Hyman, H. H., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas*. Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146

Collier, D. S. and Glaser, K. (eds.) *Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe*. Book note by Hauptmann, J. 1082

COLONIALISM. See D212.

Colombia Today—And Tomorrow. Holt, P. M. Book note by Kantor, H. 510

Colvin, M. notes *The Atlantic Alliance*. Cottrell, A. J. and Dougherty, J. E. 757

——— notes *Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics*. Syed, A. 222

COMMON MARKET. See D721.

The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe. Jensen, F. B. Book note by Lindberg, L. N. 1087

Communication by Baum, W. C. on Converse, Clausen and Miller's *"Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election."* 693

Communication by Huntington, S. P. and Brzezinski, Z. on Almond's book review of *Political Power: USA/USSR* 446

Communication by Lloyd, W. B., Jr., on Low-Beer's *"The Concept of Neutralism."* 119

Communication by Morris-Jones, W. H. on Sartori's *"Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion."* 439

Communication by Russett, B. M. on Banks' book review of *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* 444

Communication by Tinder, G. on Murphy's book review of *The Crisis of Political Imagination* 691

COMMUNISM. See B2, B55, B414, B417.

Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years. Ginsburgs, G. and Mathos, M. Book note by Shao, O. H. 759

Communist China's Crusade, Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution. Wint, G. Book note by Chang, D. W. 1069

Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. Russett, B. M. Book review by Rose, R. 1009

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT. See B4.

"The Concept of Neutralism." Communication by Lloyd, W. B., Jr. 119

Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats. Froman, L. A., Jr. and Ripley, R. B. 52

CONFERENCES, APSA. See P7095.

Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs. Kirchheimer, O. 964

Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia. Ploss, S. I. Book note by Ballard, A. B., Jr. 1054

CONGRESS. See G.

The Congress and America's Future. Truman, D. B. (ed.) Book note 725

Congress: The Sapless Branch. Clark, J. S. Book note by Matthews, D. R. 159

Congressional Reform: Problems and Prospects. Clark, J. S. (ed.) Book note 725

Congressman from Mississippi: An Autobiography. Smith, F. E. Book note by Hamilton, C. G. 171

Connery, R. H. (ed.) *Teaching Political Science*. Book note by Harder, M. A. 1015

Conquest, R. *Russia after Khrushchev*. Book note by Ploss, S. I. 737

Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. Christoph, J. B. 629

Constant, Benjamin. Seine Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz. Gall, L. Book note by Dodge, G. H. 1016

The Constitution of the United States. Dumbauld, E. Book note 174

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, LAW. See C.

"Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion." Communication by Morris-Jones, W. H. 439

"Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion." Reply by Sartori to Morris-Jones' *Communication* 441

Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in a Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation. Beyle, T. L. Research note. 111

CONVENTIONS. See F7.

Converse, P. E. reviews *A Framework for Political Analysis*. Easton, D. 1001

———, Clausen, A. R. and Miller, W. E. *Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election* 321

Coombs, P. H. *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs*. Book note by Bennett, A. L. 761

Corty, F. L. and Havard, W. C. *Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area*. Book note by Ebel, A. L. 721

The Costs of American Governments: Facts, Trends, Myths. Mosher, F. C. and Poland, O. F. Book note by Wengert, N. 483

Cottam, R. W. *Nationalism in Iran*. Book review by Frey, F. W. 702

Cotter, C. P. notes *The Republican Party, 1854–1964*. Mayer, G. H. 167

Cottrell, A. J. and Dougherty, J. E. *The Atlantic Alliance*. Book note by Colvin, M. 757

Coughlin, B. J. *Church and State in Social Welfare*. Book note by Shull, G. L. 1032

The Court of European Communities: New

Dimensions in International Adjudication. Feld, W. Book note by Gathings, J. A. 523
Cowan, L. G. notes *Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society.* Zartman, I. W. 747
——— notes *Morocco: Problems of New Power.* Zartman, I. W. 747
——— notes *Political Awakening in the Congo.* Lemarchand, R. 746
Cowling, M. *Mill and Liberalism.* Book note by Fleming, T. B., Jr. 466
Cox, R. H. notes *Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideals.* Mack, M. P. 149
——— notes *The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law.* Krieger, L. 1020
Crabb, C. V., Jr. reviews *The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy.* Aron, R. 703
——— notes *In Pursuit of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations.* Gardner, R. N. 525
Crampton, J. A. *The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure Group.* Book note by Tomasek, H. J. 1033
Crane, P. M. *The Democrat's Dilemma.* Book note by Kessel, J. H. 160
Crane, W. notes *The Republican Party in American Politics.* Jones, C. O. 1040
Crick, B. *The Crisis of British Government in the 1960s.* Book note by Catlin, G. E. G 499
The Crisis of British Government in the 1960s. Crick, B. Book note by Catlin, G. E. G. 499
The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. Mosse, G. L. Book note by Ebenstein, W. 471
The Crisis of Political Imagination. Communication by Tinder, G. on Murphy's book review 691
The Crisis of Political Imagination. Reply by Murphy, J. S. to Tinder's *Communication* 692
The Crisis of Political Imagination. Tinder, G. Book review Murphy, J. S. 460
Cross, R. C. and Woozley, A. D. *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary.* Book note by Allers, U. S. 466
Crump, Mr., of Memphis. Miller, W. D. Book note by Goodman, W. 482
Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review, Volumes 1–57: 1906–1963. Janda, K. (ed.) Book note 154
A Curtain of Ignorance: How the American Public Has Been Misinformed about China. Greene, F. Book note by Steiner, H. A. 202

Dabbs, J. M. *Who Speaks for the South?* Book note by Irish, M. D. 480
Dale, R. notes *Bantustan: The Fragmentation of South Africa.* Hill, C. R. 743
——— notes *The South African Economy.* Hobart, D. 745
Danielson, M. N. *Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis.* Book note by Utley, W. T. 1034
Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublic Deutschland. Ellwein, T. Book note by Kirchheimer, O. 187
Data Processing: Applications to Political Research. Janda, K. Book note. 715
Davies, J. C. notes *The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups.* Hopkins, T. K. 470
——— reviews *The Symbolic Uses of Politics.* Edelman, M. 695
Davis, C. D. notes *East African Unity Through Law.* Franck, T. M. 742
Davis, H. E. notes *British Guiana. Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society.* Newman, P. 512
Davis, M. *Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits.* Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056
Deeds Under A Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term. Murphy, W. F. 64
DEFENSE POLICY. See N1.
DeJouvenel, B. *Political Science and Prevision* 29
DEMOCRACY. See B83, B2.
Democracy in Germany. Erler, F. Book note by Heidenheimer, A. J. 1053
Democracy, Organization, Michels. May, J. D. 417
The Democratic Civilization. Lipson, L. Book note by Hacker, A. 520
The Democrat's Dilemma. Crane, P. M. Book note by Kessel, J. H. 160
DENMARK. See B4132.
Dennis, J. notes *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Milbrath, L. W. 1026
Der Kampf um den Bau Des Mittellandkanals. Horn, H. Book note by Kirchheimer, O. 187
Derthick, M. *The National Guard in Politics.* Book note by Green, C. R. 720
DESEGREGATION. See CIVIL RIGHTS.
Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society. Zartman, I. W. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 747
Deutsch, K. W., Russett, B. M., Alker, H. R., Jr. and Lasswell, H. D. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.* Book review by Banks, A. S. 144
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. See D211.
The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. Wolfinger, R. E. 896
De Weerdt, D. *Bibliographie retrospective des Publications Officielles de la Belgique, 1794–1914.* Book note by Childs, J. B. 1070

Dickie, J. *The Uncommon Commoner: A Study of Sir Alec Douglas-Home.* Book note by Dugan, A. B. 184

A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Gould, J. and Kolb, W. L. (eds.) Book note 154

Dietze, G. (ed.) *Essays on the American Constitution.* Book note by Mendelson, W. 481

Dilliard, I. notes *The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956.* Gates, R. L. 1035

Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey. Gregg, P. M. and Banks, A. S. 602

Dinerstein, H. S. *The Transformation of Alliance Systems* 589

Diplomacy. See D1.

Disarmament. See D711.

Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline. Truman, D. B. 865

The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan. Hood, F. C. Book note by Schwandt, J. A. 711

Doctor, A. H. *Anarchist Thought in India.* Book review by Weiner, M. 451

Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science. Compiled by Seyler, W. C. 771

Dodge, G. H. notes *Benjamin Constant. Seine Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz.* Gall, L. 1016

——— notes *The Tradition of Natural Law. A Philosopher's Reflections.* Simon, Y. 1024

Does a "Divisive" Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Changes? Hacker, A. Research note 105

Dohrenwend, B. S., Richardson, S. A. and Klein, D. *Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions.* Book note 715

Dominican Republic. See B449.

Donovan, J. C. notes *The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy.* Lerche, C. O., Jr. 1040

Doob, L. W. *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations.* Book note by Verba, S. 468

Dougherty, J. E. and Cottrell, A. J. *The Atlantic Alliance.* Book note by Colvin, M. 757

Drescher, S. *Tocqueville and England.* Book note by Richter, M. 709

Duchacek, I. D. notes *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead.* Campbell, J. C. 1071

Due Process. See C41.

Dugan, A. B. notes *The Uncommon Commoner: A Study of Sir Alec Douglas-Home.* Dickie, J. 184

Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy. Finer, H. Book note by Millett, J. H. 1083

Dumbauld, E. *The Constitution of the United States.* Book note 174

Duroselle, J. and Meyriat, J. (eds.) *Les Nouveaux Etats dan les Relations Internationales.* Book note by Le Vine, V. T. 218

Dutt, V. P. *China's Foreign Policy.* Book note by Van Dorn, H. A. 758

Dye, T. R. notes *Leadership in a Small Town.* Wildavsky, A. 172

East African Unity Through Law. Franck, T. M. Book note by Davis, C. D. 742

East Germany. See B4143.

Easton, D. *A Framework for Political Analysis.* Book review by Converse, P. E. 1001

Ebel, A. L. notes *Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area.* Havard, W. C. and Corty, F. L. 721

Ebenstein, W. notes *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich.* Mosse, G. L. 471

Eckstein, H. (ed.) *Internal War.* Book review by Wilson, D. A. 138

Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary? Nove, A. Book note by Jacobs, D. N. 194

Edelman, M. reviews *The Politics of the Budgetary Process.* Wildavsky, A. 143

———. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics.* Book review by Davies, J. C. 695

Edinger, L. J. notes *German Social Democracy 1918–1933.* Hunt, R. N. 188

Education. See P.

Education and Government. see P, P3.

Education and Politics in Nigeria, Weiler, H. N. (ed.) Book note by Olton, R. 741

Egypt. See B4372.

Elder, R. E. notes *The United States and the United Nations.* Gross, F. B. (ed.) 760

Eldersveld, S. J. *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis.* Book review by Leiserson, A. 141

Elections. See F, F5, F8.

"Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election." Communication by Baum, W. C. 693

Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election. Converse, P. E., Clausen, A. R. and Miller, W. E. 321

Elegant, R. S. *The Center of the World, Communism and the Mind of China.* Book note by Chang, D. W. 200

Eliot, T. H., Masters, N. A. and Salisbury, R. H. *State Politics and the Public Schools.* Book review by Sorauf, F. J. 1005

Ellis, U. *A History of the Australian Country Party.* Book note by Joyner, C. 192

Ellwein, T. *Das Regierungssystem der Bun-*

desrepublic Deutschland. Book note by Kirchheimer, O. 187
EMERGING NATIONS. See D211.
Emerson, R. reviews *The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies* McCord, W. 1006
Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. Fitzsimons, M. A. Book note by Millett, J. H. 216
An End to Arms. Millis, W. Book note by Yalem, R. J. 762
Engel, S. notes *Law, Politics, and the Security Council—An Inquiry into the Handling of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations.* Kahng, T. J. 1085
ENGLAND. See GREAT BRITAIN.
Epstein, L. D. notes *The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945–1962.* Snyder, W. P. 501
Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics. Jaffa, H. V. Book note by Cassinelli, C. W. 1018
Erler, F. *Democracy in Germany.* Book note by Heidenheimer, A. J. 1053
Essays on the American Constitution. Dietze, G. (ed.) Book note by Mendelson, W. 481
Eulau, H. and Sprague, J. D. *Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence.* Book note by Grossman, J. B. 161
The European Community and American Trade. Hinshaw, R. Book note by Lindberg, L. N. 1087
The European Community and Its Role in the World. Kohnstamm, M. Book note by Bishop, D. G. 529
The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups. Hopkins, T. K. Book note by Davies, J. C. 470
The Exercise of Sovereignty: Papers in Foreign Policy. Marshall, C. B. Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1090

Faber, H. (ed.) *The Road to the White House.* Book note 725
Falk, R. A. *The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order.* Book note by Gathings, J. A. 215
Fall, B. B. *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis.* Book note by Chau, P. T. 522
Faulkner, R. K. notes *John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton.* Konefsky, S. J. 712
———. *Reason and Revelation in Hooker's Ethics.* 680
The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962. Anderson, M. Book note by Salisbury, R. H. 478
Federal Government in Nigeria. Ava, E. O. Book note by Olton, R. 741
The Federal Government Service, 2nd ed. Sayre, W. S. (ed.) Book note by Friedman, R. 1041
Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis. Danielson, M. N. Book note by Utley, W. T. 1034
FEDERALISM. See B263, B8.
Feerick, J. D. *From Failing Hands, The Story of Presidential Succession.* Book note by Koenig, L. W. 1035
Feld, W. *The Court of European Communities: New Dimensions in International Adjudication.* Book note by Gathings, J. A. 523
Fellman, D. notes *The Rationing of Justice.* Trebach, A. S. 485
Fenton, J. H. notes *Tales Out of Congress.* Young, S. M. 487
Fernbach, A. notes *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy.* Mason, E. S. 219
Financing the United Nations System. Stossinger, J. and Associates. Book review by Mangone, G. J. 147
Finer, H. *Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy.* Book note by Millett, J. H. 1083
FINLAND. See B4134.
Finland in Crisis 1940–1941: A Study in Small-Power Politics. Upton, A. F. Book note by Rintala, M. 1057
First Tuesday. Wallace, D. Book note by Marvick, D. 486
FISCAL SYSTEM. See L1.
Fischer, L. *The Life of Lenin.* Book review by Aspaturian, V. V. 701
Fisher, S. N. (ed.) *France and the European Community.* Book note by Allen, L. A. 1085
Fitzgerald, E. translates *Germany and Europe: Reflections on German Foreign Policy.* von Brentano, H. Book note by Winter, H. R. 521
Fitzgibbon, R. H. notes *Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation.* Bell, W. 509
Fitzsimons, M. A. *Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century.* Book note by Millett, J. H. 216
500 jaren Staten-Generaal in de Nederlanden. Van statenvergadering tot volksvertegenwoordiging. Andreae, S. J. F. and Hardenberg, H. (eds.) Book note by Childs, J. B. 191
Flanigan, W. H. reviews *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research.* Blalock, H. M., Jr. 138
Flathman, R. E. reviews *Nomos VII: Rational Decision.* Friedrich, C. J. (ed.) 452
Fleming, T. B., Jr. notes *Mill and Liberalism.* Cowling, M. 466
Fliess, P. J. notes *The Exercise of Sovereignty: Papers on Foreign Policy.* Marshall, C. B. 1090

——— notes *Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International Relations and International Law.* Ostrower, A. 1092

——— notes *The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. The Yearbook of World Polity:* volume III. O'Brien, W. V. (ed.) 1091

Flinn, T. A. notes *Interest Groups in American Society.* Zeigler, H. 173

Foltz, W. J. *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation.* Book note by Young, C. 1060

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. Mason, E. S. Book note by Fernbach, A. 219

Foreign Local Government: A Bibliography. Morlan, R. L. 120

The Formation of Malaysia; New Factor in World Politics. Hanna, W. A. Book note by van der Veur, P. W. 508

The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Hartz, L. Book review by Pennock, J. R. 697

The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. Coombs, P. H. Book note by Bennett, A. L. 761

Fox, W. T. R. notes *The Scientific Revolution and World Politics.* Haskins, C. P. 527

A Framework for Political Analysis. Easton, D. Book review by Converse, P. E. 1001

FRANCE. See B417.

France and the European Community. Fisher, S. N. (ed.) Book note by Allen, L. A. 1085

Franck, T. M. *East African Unity Through Law.* Book note by Davis, C. D. 742

Fraser, S. (ed.) *Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade.* Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 1067

FRENCH SPEAKING COUNTRIES. See By32.

The French Civil Service. Grégoire, R. Book note by Laponce, J. A. 1053

Frey, F. W. reviews *Nationalism in Iran.* Cottam, R. W. 702

Freymond, J. *Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History.* Book note by Muller, S. 217

Friedman, J. R. notes *The Civil Service in New African States.* Adu, A. L. 1059

Friedman, R. notes *The Federal Government Service,* 2nd ed. Sayre, W. S. (ed.) 1041

Friedman, R. S. notes *The Politics of Bureaucracy.* Tullock, G. 714

Friedmann, W. *The Changing Structure of International Law.* Book note by Manner, G. 524

Friedrich, C. J. (ed.) *Nomos VII: Rational Decision.* Book review by Flathman, R. E. 452

Friend, T. *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929–1946.* Book note by Jacobini, H. B. 1066

From Failing Hands, The Story of Presidential Succession. Feerick, J. D. Book note by Koenig, L. W. 1035

From French West Africa to the Mali Federation. Foltz, W. J. Book note by Young, C. 1060

Froman, L. A., Jr. and Ripley, R. B. *Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats* 52

Fuchs, L. H. notes *Religion and Politics in America.* Stedman, M. S., Jr. 172

The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo. Lens, S. Book note by Hacker, A. 164

Gall, L. *Benjamin Constant. Seine Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz.* Book note by Dodge, G. H. 1016

Gardner, R. N. *In Pursuit of World Order: U. S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations.* Book note by Crabb, C. V., Jr. 525

Gates, R. L. *The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956.* Book note by Dilliard, I. 1035

Gathings, J. A. notes *The Court of European Communities: New Dimensions in International Adjudication.* Feld, W. 523

——— notes *The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order.* Falk, R. A. 215

GENERAL ASSEMBLY. See D613.

Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America. Lieuwen, E. Book note by Anderson, R. W. 511

German Social Democracy 1918–1933. Hunt, R. N. Book note by Edinger, L. J. 188

GERMANY. See B415.

Germany and Europe: Reflections on German Foreign Policy. von Brentano, H. Translated by Fitzgerald, E. Book note by Winter, H. R. 521

Germany, The Wall and Berlin: Internal Politics During an International Crisis. Keller, J. W. Book note by Reich, D. R. . 189

Gerteiny, A. G. notes *Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958.* Torey, G. H. ... 197

GHANA. See B4312.

Gibbs, H. S. notes *The Cold War—And After.* Lerche, C. O., Jr. 1089

Gilbert, A. translates *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others.* Book note by Pitkin, H. 715

Gilbert C. E. notes *The Cause is Mankind: A Liberal Program for Modern America.* Humphrey, H. H. 162

Gilbert, F. *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence.* Book note by Willhoite, F. H., Jr. 710

Ginsburgs, G. and Mathos, M. *Communist*

China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years. Book note by Shao, O. H. 759
Gvia de la administración civil del Estado. Oficina de Información, Presidencia del Gobierno. noted by Childs, J. B. 192
Glaser, K. and Collier, D. S. (eds.) *Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe.* Book note by Hauptmann, J. . . . 1082
Glickman, H. notes *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa.* Kuper, L. 1061
——— reviews *Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960.* Austin, D. 1007
Golembiewski, R. T. reviews *Organizational Authority: Superior—Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizations.* Peabody, R. L. 140
Goodman, W. notes *Mr. Crump of Memphis.* Miller, W. D. 482
Goodnow, H. F. *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation.* Book note by Beckett, P. L. 1058
Gore, W. J. *Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model.* Book note by Smithburg, D. 469
Gorove, S. *Law and Politics of the Danube.* Book note by Beck, C. F. 526
Gould, J. and Kolb, W. L. (eds.) *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences.* Book note. 154
Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries, Andrén, N. Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056
Grant, B. *Indonesia.* Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 205
Gray, C. H. *A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater, 1957–1960.* 615
GREAT BRITAIN. See B411.
The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy. Aron, R. Book review by Crabb, C. V., Jr. 703
Green, C. R. notes *The National Guard in Politics.* Derthick, M. 720
Greenberg, M. notes *The Case for Liberty.* Hiller, H. H. 1022
Greene, F. *A Curtain of Ignorance: How the American Public Has Been Misinformed about China.* Book note by Steiner, H. A. 202
Greene, J. and Allyn, P. *See How They Run: The Making of a Congressman.* Book note by Kofmehl, K. 158
Greenhill, H. G. notes *Political Parties in Norway.* Valen, H. and Katz, D. 190
Gregg, P. M. and Banks, A. S. *Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey.* 602
Grégoire, R. *The French Civil Service.* Book note by Laponce, J. A. 1053
Griffin, William M. *In Memoriam.* 809
Grimes, A. P. notes *The Adams Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John Adams.* Butterfield, L. H. (ed.) 465
Groennings, S. notes *The Social Democratic Party of Germany.* Chalmers, D. A. 187
Gross, F. B. (ed.) *The United States and the United Nations.* Book note by Elder, R. E. 760
Grossman, J. B. *Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection.* Book note by Ulmer, S. S. 1037
——— notes *Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence.* Eulau, H. and Sprague, J. D. 161
——— notes *The Negro and the First Amendment.* Kalven, H., Jr. 722
GROUPS. See AAA1.
GROUPS, PRESSURE. See AAA10, F53, B1241.
GROUPS, UNORGANIZED. See AAA11.
Grzybowski, K. *The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions.* Book note by Cattell, D. T. 526
Guia de la administración civil del Estado. Oficina de Información, Presidencia del Gobierno. Book note by Childs, J. B. . . . 192
Gyorgy, A. notes *History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.* Avakumovic, I. 506

Haas, E. B. *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization.* Book review by Claude, I. L., Jr. 1011
Hacker, A. notes *The Democratic Civilization.* Lipson, L. 520
———. *Does a "Divisive" Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances?* Research note. 105
——— notes *The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo.* Lens, S. 164
Hagan, C. B. notes *John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951.* Ratner, S., Altman, J. and Wheeler, J. E. (eds.) 468
Halperin, M. H. *China and the Bomb.* Book review by Rosenau, J. N. 1010
——— and Tsou, T. *Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's Internatinal Behavior.* 80
Halpern, M. notes *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization.* Micaud, C. A., Brown, L. C. and Moore, C. H. 199
Hamilton, C. G. notes *Congressman from Mississippi: An Autobiography.* Smith, F. E. 171
Handy, R. *Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies.* Book note by Marvick, D. 1017
Hanna, W. A. *The Formation of Malaysia; New Factor in World Politics.* Book note by van der Veur, P. W. 508
———. *Sequel to Colonialism: The 1957–*

1960 Foundations for Malaysia. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 736
Hanna, W. J. (ed.) *Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom.* Book note. 749
——— reviews *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas.* Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. 146
Hardenberg, H. and Andreae, S. J. F. (eds.) *500 jaren Staten-Generaal in de Nederlanden. Van statenvergadering tot volksvertegenwoordiging.* Book note by Childs, J. B... 191
Harder, M. A. notes *Teaching Political Science.* Connery, R. H. (ed.) 1015
Harris, C. P. *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood.* Book note by Kerr, M. H. 748
Hartz, L. *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia.* Book review by Pennock, J. R. 697
Haskins, C. P. *The Scientific Revolution and World Politics.* Book note by Fox, W. T. F. 527
Hauptmann, J. notes *Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe.* Collier, D. S. and Glaser, K. (eds.) 1082
Havard, W. C. and Corty, F. L. *Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area.* Book note by Ebel, A. L. 721
Hays, F. notes *Men At the Top: A Study in Community Power.* Presthus, R. 168
Heidenheimer, A. J. notes *Democracy in Germany.* Erler, F. 1053
Heifetz, J. and Wolfinger, R. E. *Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress* 337
Hekhuis, D. J., McClintock, C. G. and Burns, A. L. (eds.) *International Stability.* Book note by Riedel, J. A. 528
Herz, J. H. notes *Ulbricht: A Political Biography.* Stern, C. 739
Herzog, A. *The War—Peace Establishment.* Book note by Barber, H. W. 761
The Higher Civil Service: An Evaluation of Federal Personnel Practices. Stanley, D. T. Book note by Presthus, R. 724
Hill, C. R. *Bantustan: The Fragmentation of South Africa.* Book note by Dale, R. 743
Hiller, H. H. *The Case for Liberty.* Book note by Greenberg, M. 1022
Hinshaw, R. *The European Community and American Trade.* Book note by Lindberg, L. N. 1087
The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754–1790. Namier, L. and Brooke, J. Book note by Childs, J. B... 186
A History of the Australian Country Party. Ellis, U. Book note by Joyner, C. 192
History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Avakumovic, I. Book note by Gyorgy, A. 506
Hobart, D. *The South African Economy.* Book note by Dale, R. 745
Hobbs, M. notes *The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge.* McEwen, W. P. ... 1020
Holsti, O. R. *The 1914 Case* 365
——— notes *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance.* Kissinger, H. A. 1086
Holt, P. M. *Colombia Today—And Tomorrow.* Book note by Kantor, H. 510
Home Place: The Story of the U. S. House of Representatives. White, W. S. Book review by Peabody, R. L. 699
Hood, F. C. *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan.* Book note by Schwandt, J. A. 711
Hoover, Herbert: A Biography. Lyons, E. Book note by Binkley, W. E. 165
Hopkins, T. K. *The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups.* Book note by Davies, J. C. 470
Horn, H. *Der Kampf um den Bau Des Mittellandkanals.* Book note by Kirchheimer, O. 187
The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee. Manley, J. F. 927
How Nations Negotiate. Iklé, F. C. Book review by Palmer, N. D. 705
Humphrey, H. H. *The Cause is Mankind: A Liberal Program for Modern America.* Book note by Gilbert, C. E. 162
Hunt, R. N. *German Social Democracy 1918–1933.* Book note by Edinger, L. J. 188
Huntington, S. P. and Brzezinski, Z. *Communication* on Almond's book review of *Political Power: USA/USSR* 446
Hushaw, C. W. *Liberalism vs. Conservatism. Liberty vs. Authority.* Book note 715
Hyman, H. H., Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas.* Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146

Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits. Davis, M. Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056
Iceland: Reluctant Ally. Neuchterlein, D. E. Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056
Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico. Johnson, K. F. ... 656
Iklé, F. C. *How Nations Negotiate.* Book review by Palmer, N. D. 705
Il clero di riserva. Poggi, G. Book note by Barnes, S. H. 504
The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals. Sickels, R. J. Research note..... 100

The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. Boorstin, D. J. Book note by Niemeyer, G. 149
In Memoriam.
  Barron, Richard W. 1118
  Brown, Everett Somerville 247
  Burdick, Eugene 1118
  Griffin, William M. 809
  Jorrin, Miguel 809
  McGovern, William Montgomery 554
  Overstreet, Eugene D. 809
  Steinmeyer, Reuben G. 809
  Towster, Julian 1118
  Vatcher, William H., Jr. 809
In Pursuit of World Order: U. S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations. Gardner, R. N. Book note by Crabb, C. V. 525
In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. Schwartz, B. Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 153
Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom. Hanna, W. J. (ed.) Book note. 749
INDIA. See B421.
Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. van Eekelen, W. F. Book note by North, R. C. 1094
Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power. Laszlo, E. Book note by Stanlis, P. J. 152
Indonesia. Grant, B. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 205
An Instance of Treason: Ozaki and the Sorge Spy Ring. Johnson, C. Book note by Totten, G. O. 203
Ingrams, H. *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions.* Book note by Jwaideh, W. 196
Institute of Electoral Research. *A Review of Elections, 1961–1962.* Book note. 207
Interest Groups in American Society. Zeigler, H. Book note by Flinn, T. A. 173
Internal War. Eckstein, H. (ed.) Book review by Wilson, D. A. 138
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See B42, D2.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. See D.
International Stability. Hekhuis, D. J., McClintock, C. G. and Burns, A. L. Book note by Riedel, J. A. 528
Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals. Schechter, A. H. Book note by Lawson, R. C. 1094
Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions. Richardson, S. A., Dohrenwend, B. S. and Klein, D. Book note 715
IRAN. See B4254.
Irish, M. D. notes *Who Speaks for the South* Dabbs, J. M. 480
ISRAEL. See B424.
ITALY. See B410.

Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis. Schubert, G. 940
Jacob, H. *Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process.* Book note by Schubert, G. 1038
Jacobini, H. B. notes *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929–1946.* Friend, T. 1066
Jacobs, D. N. notes *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary?* Nove, A. 194
Jaffa, H. V. *Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics.* Book note by Cassinelli, C. W. 1018
Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation. Bell, W. Book note by Fitzgibbon, R. H. 509
Janda, K. (ed.) *Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review, Volumes 1–57: 1906–1963.* Book note 154
——— *Data Processing: Applications to Political Research.* Book note 715
Jorrin, Miguel *In Memoriam* 809
Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, special issue: *Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics*, vol. II, no. 3 (December, 1964). Book review by Ward, R. E. 1002
JAPAN. See B423.
Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics, vol. II, no. 3 (December, 1964), special issue of *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* Book review by Ward, R. E. 1002
Jensen, F. B. *The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe.* Book note by Lindberg, L. N. 1087
Jeppesen, J. and Meyer, P. *Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg.* Book note by Rintala, M. 505
John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951. Ratner, S., Altman, J. and Wheeler, J. E. (eds.) Book note by Hagan, C. B. 468
John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton. Konefsky, S. J. Book note by Faulkner, R. K. 712
Johnson, C. *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki and the Sorge Spy Ring.* Book note by Totten, G. O. 203
Johnson, K. F. *Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico.* 656
Jones, C. O. *The Republican Party in American Politics.* Book note by Crane, W. 1040
Joyner, C. notes *A History of the Australian Country Party.* Ellis, U. 192
JUDICIARY. See AAA4, H.

Junn, S. notes *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963.* Rubinstein, A. Z. 221
Jupp, J. *Australian Party Politics.* Book note by Overacker, L. 500
JURISPRUDENCE. See G91.
Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process. Jacob, H. Book note by Schubert, G. 1038
Jwaideh, W. notes *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions.* Ingrams, H. 196

Kahng, T. J. *Law, Politics, and the Security Council—An Inquiry into the Handling of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations.* Book note by Engel, S. 1085
Kalven, H., Jr. *The Negro and the First Amendment.* Book note by Grossman, J. B. 722
Kantor, H. notes *Colombia Today—And Tomorrow.* Holt. P. M. 510
Katz, D. and Valen, H. *Political Parties in Norway.* Book note by Greenhill, H. G. 190
Kaufman, W. W. *The McNamara Strategy.* Book note by Wilson, D. A. 217
Keefe, W. J. and Ogul, M. S. *The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States.* Book note 174
Keller, J. W. *Germany, The Wall and Berlin: International Politics During an International Crisis.* Book note by Reich, D. R. 189
Kendall, W. notes *The Liberal Idea of Freedom.* Spitz, D. 472
Kennedy, M. T., Jr. notes *Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade.* Fraser, S. (ed.) 1067
——— notes *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West.* Schwartz, B. 153
——— notes *The Political Institutions of Modern China.* Tung, W. L. 203
Kerr, M. H. notes *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood.* Harris, C. P. 748
Kessel, J. H. notes *The Democrat's Dilemma.* Crane, P. M. 160
Kimbrough, R. B. *Political Power and Educational Decision-Making.* Book review by La Noue, G. R. 1004
Kirchheimer, O. *Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs* 964
——— notes *Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublic Deutschland.* Ellwein, T. . 187
——— notes *Der Kampf um den Bau Des Mittellandkanals.* Horn, H. 187
——— notes *Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republic.* Vol. 1. *Die Periode der Konsolidierung und der Revision des Bismarckschen Reichsaufbaus 1919–1930.* Schulz, G. 503
Kirk, R. *John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American Politics with Selected Speeches and Letters.* Book note by Minar, D. W. . 1019
Kish, L. *Survey Sampling.* Book note 1025
Kissinger, H. A. *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance.* Book note by Holsti, O. R. 1086
Klein, D., Richardson, S. A. and Dohrenwend, B. S. *Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions.* Book note 715
Koenig, L. W. notes *From Failing Hands, The Story of Presidential Succession.* Feerick, J. D. 1035
Kofmehl, K. notes *Power and Politics in Labor Legislation.* McAdams, A. K. 167
Kofmehl, K. notes *See How They Run: The Making of a Congressman.* Allyn, P. and Greene, J. 158
Kohnstamm, M. *The European Community and Its Role in the World.* Book note by Bishop, D. G. 529
Kolb, W. L. and Gould, J. (eds.) *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences.* Book note 154
Konefsky, S. J. *John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton.* Book note by Faulkner, R.K. 712
Korea: The Limited War. Rees, D. Book note by Oh, J. C. H. 1092
Kramnick, I. *Bibliography in Political Theory* 715, 1027
Krieger, L. *The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law* Book note by Cox, R. H. 1020
Kuchel, T. H. reviews *The Strange Tactics of Extremism.* Overstreet, H. and Overstreet, B. 454
Kuper, L. *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa.* Book note by Glickman, H. 1061

La Noue, G. R. reviews *Political Power and EducationalDecision-Making.*Kimbrough, R. B. 1004
Lane, R. E. *The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence* 874
Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International Relations and International Law. Ostrower, A. Book note by Fliess, P. J. ... 1092
LaPalombara, J. reviews *Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries.* Schramm, W. 457
Laponce, J. A. notes *The French Civil Service.* Grégoire, R. 1053

Lasswell, H. D., Russett, B. M., Alker, H. R., Jr. and Deutsch, K. W. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.* Book review by Banks, A. S. 144

The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. Bouscaren, A. T. Book review by Cahill, R. S. 1013

Laszlo, E. *Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power.* Book note by Stanlis, P. J. 152

LATIN AMERICA. See B44.

LAW, INTERNATIONAL. See D2.

Law and Politics of the Danube. Gorove, S. Book note by Beck, C. F. 526

The Law of International Waterways—With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals. Baxter, R. R. and Triska, J. R. Book note by Lawson, R. C. 212

Law, Politics, and the Security Council—An Inquiry into the Handling of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations. Kahng, T. J. Book note by Engel, S. 1085

Law, Society and the Domestic Regime in Russia, in Historical Perspective. Yaney, G. L. 379

The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life. Barber, J. D. Book review by Wahlke, J. C. 698

Lawson, R. C. notes *Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals.* Schechter, A. H. 1094

——— notes *The Law of International Waterways—With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals.* Baxter, R. R. and Triska, J. F. 212

Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection. Grossman, J. B. Book note by Ulmer, S. S. 1037

Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence. Eulau, H. and Sprague, J. D. Book note by Grossman, J. B. 161

Le Suffrage Politique en France. Charnay, J. Book note 1071

Leadership in a Small Town. Wildavsky, A. Book note by Dye, T. R. 172

Legalism. Shklar, J. N. Book note by Aikin, C. 713

LEGISLATURES. See AAA3, G.

Legum, C. and M. *South Africa: Crisis for the West.* Book note by McKay, V. 744

Leiserson, A. (ed.) *The American South in the 1960's.* Book note by Sindler, A. P. . . 163

——— reviews *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis.* Eldersveld, S. J. 141

———. *Scientists and the Policy Process.* (See p. 693 for corrections.) 408

Lemarchand, R. *Political Awakening in the Congo.* Book note by Cowan, L. G. 746

Lens, S. *The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo.* Book note by Hacker, A. 164

Lerche, C. O., Jr. *The Cold War—And After.* Book note by Gibbs, H. S. 1089

Lerche, C. O., Jr. *The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy.* Book note by Donovan, J. C. . . . 1040

Les Nouveaux Etats dans les Relations Internationales. Duroselle, J. and Meyriat, J. (eds.) Book note by Le Vine, V. T. 218

Leuchtenburg, W. E. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940.* Book note by Burke, R. E. 723

LeVine, V. T. *The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence.* Book review by Zolberg, A. R. 462

——— notes *Les Nouveaux Etats dans les Relations Internationales.* Duroselle, J. and Meyriat, J. (eds.) 218

——— notes *New Nations in a Divided World, The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States.* London, K. (ed.) 218

The Liberal Idea of Freedom. Spitz, D. Book note by Kendall, W. 472

LIBERIA. See B436.

Liberalism vs. Conservatism. Liberty vs. Authority. Hushaw, C. W. Book note. 715

Lieuwen, E. *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America.* Book note by Anderson, R. W. 511

The Life of Lenin. Fischer, L. Book review by Aspaturian, V. V. 701

Lindberg, L. N. notes *The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe.* Jensen, F. B. 1087

——— notes *The European Community and American Trade.* Hinshaw, R. 1087

Lippmann's, Walter, Philosophy of International Politics. Syed, A. Book note by Colvin, M. 222

Lipson, L. *The Democratic Civilization.* Book note by Hacker, A. 520

Littunen, Y. and Allardt, E. (eds.) *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology.* Book note by Rintala, M. 737

Lloyd, W. B., Jr. *Communication* on Low-Beer's "*The Concept of Neutralism.*" 119

Local Government in Japan. Steiner, K. Book note by Mendel, D. H., Jr. 1068

Lockard, D. notes *States in Crisis, Politics in Ten American States, 1950–1962.* Reichley, J. and Others. 170

London, K. (ed.) *New Nations in a Divided World, The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States.* Book note by Le Vine, V. T. 218

Lott, L. B. (ed.) *News and Notes.* 236, 543, 797, 1104

Lowenthal, R. *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith.* Book note by Ballis, W. B. 506
Lowi, T. J. *At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958.* Book note by Adrian, C. R. 481
Lyons, E. *Herbert Hoover: A Biography.* Book note by Binkley, W. E. 165
Lystad, R. A. (ed.) *The African World, A Survey of Social Research.* Book note. 1066

Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence. Gilbert, F. Book note by Willhoite, F. H., Jr. 710
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others. Translated by Gilbert, A. Book note by Pitkin, H. 715
Mack, M. P. *Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideals.* Book note by Cox, R. H. 149
MacRae, D., Jr. *A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes.* 909
Maier, J. and Weatherhead, R. W. (eds.) *Politics of Change in Latin America.* Book note by Burnett, B. G. 205
Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look. Williams, J. 665
The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956. Gates, R. L. Book note by Dilliard, I. 1035
MALAYSIA. See B4252.
Malmström, V. H. *Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress.* Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056
The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Forces. Ries, J. C. Book note by Masland, J. W. 529
Mangone, G. J. reviews *Financing the United Nations System.* Stoessinger, J. and Associates. 147
Manley, J. F. *The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee.* 927
Mann, D. E. *The Politics of Water in Arizona.* Book note by Wengert, N. 166
Manner, G. notes *The Changing Structure of International Law.* Friedmann, W. 524
Man's Quest for Political Knowledge—The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times. Anderson, W. Book review by Brecht, A. 449
Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior. Tsou, T. and Halperin, M. H. 80
Marinelli, L. A. *The New Liberia: A Historical and Political Survey.* Book note by Adam, T. R. 499
Maroc 1943–1956: Le Conflit Franco-Marocain. Bernard, S. Book note by Micaud, C. A. 213
Marquis, L. C. notes *Town Councillors: A Study of Barking.* Rees. A. M. and Smith, T. 185
Marshall, C. B. *Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament.* 350
———. *The Exercise of Sovereignty: Papers on Foreign Policy.* Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1090
Marvick, D. notes *First Tuesday.* Wallace, D. 486
——— notes *Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies.* Handy, R. 1017
MARXISM. See COMMUNISM.
Masland, J. W. notes *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Forces.* Ries. J, C. 529
Mason, A. T. *The States Rights Debate: Antifederalism and the Constitution.* Book note by Aikin, C. 166
Mason, E. S. *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy.* Book note by Frenbach, A. 219
Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries. Schramm, W. Book review by LaPalombara, J. 457
Masters, N. A., Salisbury, R. H. and Eliot, T. H. *State Politics and the Public Schools.* Book review by Sorauf, J. F. 1005
Mathos, M. and Ginsburgs, G. *Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years.* Book note by Shao, O. H. 759
Matthews, D. R. notes *Congress: The Sapless Branch.* Clark, J. S. 159
May, J. D. *Democracy, Organization, Michels.* 417
Mayer, G. H. *The Republican Party, 1854–1964.* Book note by Cotter, C. P. 167
Mayo, H. B. notes *Three Tactics: The Background in Marx.* Moore, S. 150
McAdams, A. K. *Power and Politics in Labor Legislation.* Book note by Kofmehl, K. 167
McCamy, J. L. notes *Where Science and Politics Meet.* Wiesner, J. B. 1042
McCleery, R. H. notes *Political Authority and Moral Judgment.* Negley, G. 1023
McClintock, C. G., Hekhuis, D. J. and Burns, A. L. (eds.) *International Stability.* Book note by Riedel, J. A. 528
McCord, W. *The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies.* Book review by Emerson, R. 1006
McEwen, W. P. *The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge.* Book note by Hobbs, M. 1020
McGovern, William Montgomery. *In Memoriam.* 554
McKay, V. notes *South Africa: Crisis for the West.* Legum, C. and M. 744

The McNamara Strategy. Kaufmann, W. W. Book note by Wilson, D. A. 217
Men At the Top: A Study in Community Power. Presthus, R. Book note by Hays, F. 168
Mendel, D. H., Jr. notes *Local Government in Japan*. Steiner, K. 1068
Mendelson, W. notes *Essays on the American Constitution*. Dietze, G. (ed.) 481
Merritt, R. L. *Bibliography on International Law and Relations* 224, 531, 764, 1095
——— and Pirro, E. B. *Bibliography on Comparative Government and Cross-National Research* 207, 514, 749, 1072
A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes. MacRae, D., Jr. 909
METHODOLOGY. See AA.
Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies. Handy, R. Book note by Marvick, D. 1017
MEXICO. See B444.
Meyer, P. and Jeppesen, J. *Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg*. Book note by Rintala, M. 505
Meyriat, J. and Duroselle, J. (eds.) *Les Nouveaux Etats dan les Relations Internationales*. Book note by Le Vine, V. T. 218
The Miami Metropolitan Experiment. Sofen, E. Book note by Shaw, F. 484
Micaud, C. A., Brown, L. C. and Moore, C. H. *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization*. Book note by Halpern, M. 199
Micaud, C. A. notes *Maroc 1943–1956: Le Conflit Franco-Marocain*. Bernard, S. 213
Milbrath, L. W. *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Book note by Dennis, J. 1026
Mill and Liberalism. Cowling, M. Book note by Fleming, T. B., Jr. 466
Miller, H. H. *The Case for Liberty*. Book note by Greenberg, M. 1022
Miller, W. D. *Mr. Crump of Memphis*. Book note by Goodman, W. 482
Miller, W. E., Converse, P. E. and Clausen, A. R. *Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election* 321
Millett, J. H. notes *Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy*. Finer, H. 1083
——— notes *Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century*. Fitzsimons, M. A. 216
Millis, W. *An End to Arms*. Book note by Yalem, R. J. 762
Minar, D. W. notes *John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American Politics with Selected Speeches and Letters*. Kirk, R. 1019
Mink, O. G., Amos, J. R. and Brown, F. L. *Statistical Concepts: A Basic Program*. Book note. 715
MINORITIES. See F68. See also RACE RELATIONS.
Mintz, J. S. *Mohammed Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism*. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 736
MODELS. See AA3.
The Modernity of Tradition: Rudolph, L. I. 975
Mohammed Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism. Mintz, J. S. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 736
Moore, C. H., Micaud, C. A. and Brown, L. C. *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization*. Book note by Halpern, M. 199
Moore, S. *Three Tactics: The Background in Marx*. Book note by Mayo, H. B. 150
Morey, R. D. *Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona*. Book note by Bindley, J. H. 1041
Morlan, R. L. *Foreign Local Government: A Bibliography* 120
MOROCCO. See B4331.
Morocco: Problems of New Power. Zartman, W. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 747
Morris-Jones, W. H. *Communication* on Sartori's *"Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion."* 439
Mosher, F. C. and Poland, O. F. *The Costs of American Governments: Facts, Trends, Myths*. Book note by Wengert, N. 483
Mosse, G. L. *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*. Book note by Ebenstein, W. 471
Muller, S. notes *Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History*. Freymond, J. 217
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. See B73.
Murphy, J. S. replies to Tinder's *Communication*. 692
——— reviews *The Crisis of Political Imagination*. Tinder, G. 460
Murphy, W. F. *Deeds Under A Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term*. 64
Murray, J. N. notes *Problems of the Trusteeship System*. Tullen, G. 530
MUSLIM WORLD. See B425, B433.

Namier, L. and Brooke, J. *The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754–1790*. Book note by Childs, J. B. 186
The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure Group. Crampton, J. A. Book note by Tomasek, H. J. 1033
The National Guard in Politics. Derthick, M. Book note by Green, C. R. 720
NATIONALISM. See B262.
Nationalism and Communism, Essays 1946–1963. Seton-Watson, H. Book note by Ballis, W. B. 195
Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. Harris, C. P. Book note by Kerr, M. H. 748

Nationalism in Iran. Cottam, R. W. Book review by Frey, F. W. 702
NATIONALIZATION. See N6.
Negley, G. *Political Authority and Moral Judgment*. Book note by McCleery, R. H. 1023
The Negro and the First Amendment. Kalven, H., Jr. Book note by Grossman, J. B. 722
Neufeld, M. F. *Poor Countries and Authoritarian Rule*. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 1062
NEUTRALITY. See D45.
The New Liberia: A Historical and Political Survey. Marinelli, L. A. Book note by Adam, T. R. 499
The New Meaning of Treason. West, R. Book note by Spitz, D. 473
New Nations in a Divided World, The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States. London, K. (ed.) Book note by Le Vine, V. T. 218
The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. The Yearbook of World Polity: volume III. O'Brien, W. V. (ed.) Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1091
The New States of West Africa. Post, K. Book review by Bates, M. L. 463
Neuman, P. *British Guiana. Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society*. Book note by Davis, H. E. 512
News and Notes. Lott, L. B. (ed.) 236, 543, 797, 1104
Niemeyer, G. notes *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*. Boorstin, D. J. 149
NIGERIA. See B4313.
NOMINATIONS. See F7.
Nomos VII: Rational Decision. Friedrich, C. J. (ed.) Book review by Flathman, R. E. 452
NON-VIOLENT RESISTENCE. See D713.
Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress. Malmström, V. H. Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056
North, R. C. notes *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China*. van Eekelen, W. F. 1094
NORWAY. See B4133.
Nove, A. *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary?* Book note by Jacobs, D. N. 194
Nuechterlein, D. E. *Iceland: Reluctant Ally*. Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056

Obligation and Consent, I. Pitkin, H. 990
O'Brien, W. V. (ed.) *The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. The Yearbook of World Polity:* volume III. Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1091
Oficina de Informacíón, Presidencia del Gobierno. *Guía de la administracíón civil del Estado*. Book note by Childs, J. B. 192
Ogul, M. S. and Keefe, W. J. *The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States*. Book note 174
Oh, J. C. H. notes *Korea: The Limited War*. Rees, D. 1092
Olton, R. notes *Education and Politics in Nigeria*. Weiler, H. N. (ed.) 741
——— notes *Federal Government in Nigeria* Awa, E. O. 741
The 1914 Case. Holsti, O. R. 365
Organizational Authority: Superior—Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizations. Peabody, R. L. Book review by Golembiewski, R. T. 140
Organski, A. F. K. notes *Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe*. Brzezinski, Z. .. 1080
Ostrower, A. *Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International Relations and International Law*. Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1092
Overacker, L. notes *Australian Party Politics*. Jupp, J. 500
Overstreet, Eugene D. *In Memoriam* 809
Overstreet, H. and Overstreet, B. *The Strange Tactics of Extremism*. Book review by Kuchel, T. H. 454

PAKISTAN. See B4256.
Palmer, N. D. reviews *How Nations Negotiate*. Iklé, F. C. 705
PAN-MOVEMENTS. See D74.
PARLIAMENTS. See G.
PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL. See F5.
PARTIES, POLITICAL. See F51.
Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Alford, R. R. Book review by Prothro, J. W. 1008
Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. Ranney, A. Book review by Christoph, J. B. 706
Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations. Doob, L. W. Book note by Verba, S. 468
Peabody, R. L. reviews *Home Place: The Story of the U.S. House of Representatives*. White, W. S. 699
———. *Organizational Authority: Superior-Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizations*. Book review by Golembiewski, R. T. 140
PEACE. See D71.
Pennock, J. R. reviews *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia*. Hartz, L. 697
——— notes *Public Liberties in the New States*. Bayley, D. H. 735
——— (ed.) *Self-Government in Modernizing Nations*. Book note by Young, R. 1063
The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership. Taylor, G. E. Book note by Wurfel, D. 223

Pirages, D. notes *Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War.* Burchett, W. G. 1081
Pirro, E. B. and Merritt, R. L. *Bibliography on Comparative Government and Cross-National Research* 207, 514, 749, 1072
Pitkin, H. notes *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others.* Translated by Gilbert, A. 715
———. *Obligation and Consent—I* 990
Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. Cross, R. C. and Woozley, A. D. Book note by Allers, U. S. 466
Ploss, S. I. *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia.* Book note by Ballard, A. B. Jr. 1054
——— notes *Russia after Khrushchev.* Conquest, R. 737
Poggi, G. *Il clero di riserva.* Book note by Barnes, S. H. 504
Poland, O. F. and Mosher, F. C. *The Costs of American Governments: Facts, Trends, Myths.* Book note by Wengert, N. 483
Political and Sociological Theory and Its Applications. Catlin, G. E. G. Book note by Barber, J. D. 708
Political Authority and Moral Judgment. Negley, G. Book note by McCleery, R. H. 1023
Political Awakening in the Congo. Lemarchand, R. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 746
The Political Institutions of Modern China. Tung, W. L. Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 203
Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? Milbrath, L. W. Book note by Dennis, J. 1026
Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. Eldersveld, S. J. Book review by Leiserson, A. 141
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G., Jr. Book note by Carter, G. M. 498
Political Parties in Norway. Valen, H. and Katz, D. Book note by Greenhill, H. G. . . 190
Political Parties in the American System. Sorauf, F. J. Book review by Bailey, S. K. 142
Political Power and Educational Decision-Making. Kimbrough, R. B. Book review by La Noue, G. R. 1004
Political Power: USA/USSR. Communication by Huntington, S. P. and Brzezinski, Z. on Almond's book review 446
Political Power: USA/USSR. Reply by Almond, G. A. to Huntington and Brzezinski's *Communication* 447
Political Science and Prevision. deJouvenel, B. 29
Political Succession in the USSR. Rush, M. Book note by Sullivant, R. S. 1055
Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona. Morey, R. D. Book note by Bindley, J. H. 1041
Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature. Bay, C. 39
Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960. Austin, D. Book review by Glickman, H. 1007
The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945–1962. Snyder, W. P. Book note by Epstein, L. D. 501
The Politics of Bureaucracy. Tullock, G. Book note by Friedman, R. S. 714
Politics of Change in Latin America. Maier, J. and Weatherhead, R. W. (eds.) Book note by Burnett, B. G. 205
The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age. Richter, M. Book note by Steintrager, J. 151
The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence. Lane, R. E. 874
The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law. Krieger, L. Book note by Cox, R. H. 1020
The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Wildavsky, A. Book review by Edelman, M. . . . 143
The Politics of Water in Arizona. Mann, D. E. Book note by Wengert, N. 166
Poor Countries and Authoritarian Rule. Neufeld, M. F. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 1062
Post, K. *The New States of West Africa.* Book review by Bates, M. L. 463
Power and Human Destiny. Rosinski, H. Book note by Cassinelli, C. W. 1023
Power and Politics in Labor Legislation. McAdams, A. K. Book note by Kofmehl, K. 167
Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System. Brook, D. Book note by Stoessinger, J. G. 1080
PRESIDENCY. See I2.
PRESSURE GROUPS. See AAA1, F53.
Presthus, R. notes *The Higher Civil Service: An Evaluation of Federal Personnel Practices.* Stanley, D. T. 724
———. *Men At the Top: A Study in Community Power.* Book note by Hays, F. 168
PRIMARIES. See F75, F8.
The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge. McEwen, W. P. Book note by Hobbs, M. 1020
Problems of the Trusteeship System. Thullen, G. Book note by Murray, J. N. 530
Professional Conferences 237, 546, 797, 1106
Prothro, J. W. reviews *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies.* Alford, R. R. 1008
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. B3.
Public Liberties in the New States. Bayley, D. H. Book note by Pennock, J. R. 735
PUBLIC OPINION. See AA3. F2,
Pulzer, P. G. J. *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria.* Book note by Braunthal, G. 502

Pye, L. W. reviews *Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Riggs, F. W. 456

———, Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H. and Weiner, M. *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas*. Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146

Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic. Rodman, S. Book note by White, B. 513

Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict. Record, W. Book note by Barker, L. J. 169

Race Relations. See AAA11, C4, C41 H211.

Randolph, John, of Roanoke: A Study in American Politics with Selected Speeches and Letters. Kirk, R. Book note by Minar, D. W. 1019

Ranney, A. (ed.) *Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography* 137, 448, 694, 1001

——— *Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain*. Book review by Christoph, J. B. 706

Raphaeli, N. *Bibliography on Comparative Public Administration* 211, 519, 755, 1077

The Rationing of Justice. Trebach, A. S. Book note by Fellman, D. 485

Ratner, S., Altman, J. and Wheeler, J. E. (eds.) *John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951*. Book note by Hagan, C. B. 468

Reapportionment. See F6.

Reason and Revelation in Hooker's Ethics. Faulkner, R. K. 680

Record, W. *Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict*. Book note by Barker, L. J. 169

Rees, A. M. and Smith, T. *Town Councillors: A Study of Barking*. Book note by Marquis, L. C. 185

Rees, D. *Korea: The Limited War*. Book note by Oh, J. C. H. 1092

Reich, D. R. notes *Germany, The Wall and Berlin: Internal Politics During an International Crisis*. Keller, J. W. 189

Reichley, J. and Others. *States in Crisis, Politics in Ten American States, 1950–1962*. Book note by Lockard, D. 170

Religion. See C4.

Religion and Politics in America. Stedman, M. S., Jr., Book note by Fuchs, L. H. 172

Reorganization, Executive. See I.

Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany. Boelling, K. Book note by Rie, R. 738

The Republican Party in American Politics. Jones, C. O. Book note by Crane, W. 1040

The Republican Party, 1854–1964. Mayer, G. H. Book note by Cotter, C. P. 167

Returns, Election. See F806.

A Review of Elections, 1961–1962. Institute of Electoral Research. Book note 207

Revolution. See B59.

Richardson, S. A., Dohrenwend, B. S. and Klein, D. *Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions*. Book note 715

Richter, M. notes *Tocqueville and England*. Drescher, S. 709

———. *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age*. Book note by Steintrager, J. 151

Rie, R. notes *Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany*. Boelling, K. 738

Riedel, J. A. notes *International Stability*. Hekhuis, D. J., McClintock, C. G. and Burns, A. L. (eds.) 528

Riemer, N. reviews *Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis*. Bluhm, W. T. 696

Ries, J. C. *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Forces*. Book note by Masland, J. W. 529

Riggs, F. W. *Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Book review by Pye, L. W. 456

——— notes *Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration*. Weidner, E. W. 1065

Rintala, M. notes *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative and Political Sociology*. Allardt, E. and Littunen, Y. (eds.) 737

——— notes *Finland in Crisis 1940–1941: A Study in Small-Power Politics*. Upton, A. F. 1057

——— notes *Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg*. Jeppesen, J. and Meyer, P. 505

Ripley, R. B. and Froman, L. A., Jr. *Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats* 52

The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. Pulzer, P. G. J. Book note by Braunthal, G. 502

The Road to the White House. Faber, H. (ed.) Book note 725

Rock, V. P. *A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Book note by Singer, J. D. 220

Rodman, S. *Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic*. Book note by White, B. 513

The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order. Falk, R. A. Book note by Gathings, J. A. 215

Roosevelt, Franklin D., and the New Deal, *1932–1940.* Leuchtenburg, W. E. Book note by Burke, R. E. 723

Rosberg, C. G., Jr. and Coleman, J. S. *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa.* Book note by Carter, G. M. 498

Rose, R. reviews *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century.* Russett, B. M. 1009

Rosenau, J. N. reviews *China and the Bomb.* Halperin, M. H. 1010

Rosinski, H. *Power and Human Destiny.* Book note by Cassinelli, C. W. 1023

Rubinstein, A. Z. *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963.* Book note by Junn, S. 221

Rudolph, L. I. *The Modernity of Tradition* .. 975

Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area. Havard, W. C. and Corty, F. L. Book note by Ebel, A. L. 721

Rush, M. *Political Succession in the USSR.* Book note by Sullivant, R. S. 1055

Russett, B. M., Alker, H. R., Jr., Deutsch, K. W. and Lasswell, H. D. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.* Book review by Banks, A. S. 144

Russett, B. M. *Communication* on Banks' book review of *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* 444

———. *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century.* Book review by Rose, R. 1009

Russia after Khrushchev. Conquest, R. Book note by Ploss, S. I. 737

Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress. Wolfinger, R. E. and Heifetz, J. 337

Salisbury, R. H. notes *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962.* Anderson, M. 478

———, Masters, N. A. and Eliot, T. H. *State Politics and the Public Schools.* Book review by Sorauf, F. J. 1005

Sartori, G. replies to Morris-Jones' *Communication* 441

Sayre, W. S. (ed.) *The Federal Government Service,* 2nd ed. Book note by Friedman, R. 1041

A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater, 1957–1960. Gray, C. H. 615

Scammon, R. M. *America Votes,* Vol. 5, 1962. Book note 174

Scandinavia. See B413.

Scarritt, J. R. notes *The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History.* Van Jaarsveld, F. A. 200

——— notes *The City of God and the City of Man in Africa.* Brookes, E. H. and Vandenbosch, A. 198

Schechter, A. H. *Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals.* Book note by Lawson, R. C. ... 1094

Schramm, W. *Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries.* Book review by LaPalombara, J. 457

Schubert, G. *Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis* 940

——— notes *Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process.* Jacob, H. 1038

Schull, G. L. notes *Church and State in Social Welfare.* Coughlin, B. J. 1032

Schulz, G. *Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republic. Vol. I. Die Periode der Konsolidierung und der Revision des Bismarckschen Reichsaufbaus 1919–1930.* Book note by Kirchheimer, O. 503

Schwandt, J. A. notes *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan.* Hood, F. C. 711

Schwartz, B. *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West.* Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 153

Science. See B11.

The Scientific Revolution and World Politics. Haskins, C. P. Book note by Fox, W. T. F. 527

Scientists and the Policy Process. Leiserson, A. (See p. 693 for corrections.) 408

Scigliano, R. *South Vietnam: Nation under Stress.* Book note by Chau, P. T. 522

The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. Bilinsky, Y. Book note by Armstrong, J. A. 193

See How They Run: The Making of a Congressman. Allyn, P. and Greene, J. Book note by Kofmehl, K. 158

Self-Government in Modernizing Nations. Pennock, J. R. (ed.) Book note by Young, R. 1063

Sequel to Colonialism: The 1957–1960 Foundations for Malaysia. Hanna, W. A. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 736

Seton-Watson, H. *Nationalism and Communism, Essays 1946–1963.* Book note by Ballis, W. B. 195

Seyler, W. C. compiles *Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science* 771

Shannon, J. B. notes *Studies in Money in Politics. A Series of Seven Monographs.* Alexander, H. E. (ed.) 1031

Shao, O. H. notes *Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years.* Ginsburgs, G. and Mathos, M. 759

Sharkansky, I. *An Appropriations Subcommittee and Its Client Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control* 622

Shaw, F. notes *The Miami Metropolitan Experiment*. Sofen, E. 484

Shklar, J. N. *Bibliography on Political Theory* 154, 474

——— *Legalism*. Book note by Aikin, C. 713

Sickels, R. J. *The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals*. Research note 100

The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections. Stiefbold, R. P. 391

Simon, Yves. *The Tradition of Natural Law, A Philosopher's Reflections*. Book note by Dodge, G. H. 1024

Sindler, A. P. notes *The American South in the 1960's*. Leiserson, A. (ed.) 163

Singer, J. D. notes *A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Rock, V. P. 220

Smith, F. E. *Congressman from Mississippi: An Autobiography*. Book note by Hamilton, C. G. 171

Smith, T. and Rees, A. M. *Town Councillors: A Study of Barking*. Book note by Marquis, L. C. 185

Smithburg, D. notes *Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model*. Gore, W. J. 469

Snyder, W. P. *The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945–1962*. Book note by Epstein, L. D. 501

The Social Democratic Party of Germany. Chalmers, D. A. Book note by Groennings, S. 187

The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions. Grzybowski, K. Book note by Cattell, D. T. 526

Sofen, E. *The Miami Metropolitan Experiment*. Book note by Shaw, F. 484

Somit, A. and Tanenhaus, J. *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline*. Book review by Van Dyke, V. 459

Sorauf, F. J. reviews *State Politics and the Public Schools*. Masters, N. A., Salisbury, R. H. and Eliot, T. H. 1005

Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons. Armstrong, J. A. 643

South Africa. See B434.

South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. Scigliano, R. Book note by Chau, P. T. 522

Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Barghoorn, F. C. Book review by Armstrong, J. A. 700

Soviet Union. See B414.

The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963. Rubinstein, A. Z. Book note by Junn, S. 221

Space Program. See N16.

Spain. See B412.

Spitz, D. *The Liberal Idea of Freedom*. Book note by Kendall, W. 472

——— notes *The New Meaning of Treason*. West, R. 473

Sprague, J. D. and Eulau, H. *Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence*. Book note by Grossman, J. B. 161

The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies. McCord, W. Book review by Emerson, R. 1006

Staff Changes 242, 551, 803, 1111

Stanley, D. T. *The Higher Civil Service: An Evaluation of Federal Personnel Practices*. Book note by Presthus, R. 724

Stanlis, P. J. notes *Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power*. Laszlo, E. 152

State Government. See B6.

States in Crisis, Politics in Ten American States, 1950–1962. Reichley, J. and Others. Book note by Lockard, D. 170

State Politics and the Public Schools. Masters, N. A., Salisbury, R. H. and Eliot, T. H. Book review by Sorauf, F. J. 1005

The States Rights Debate: Antifederalism and the Constitution. Mason, A. T. Book note by Aikin, C. 166

The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present. Book note 725

Statistical Concepts: A Basic Program. Amos, J. R., Brown, F. L. and Mink, O. G. Book note 715

Statistics. See AA2.

Stedman, M. S., Jr. *Religion and Politics in America*. Book note by Fuchs, L. H. 172

Steiner, H. A. notes *A Curtain of Ignorance: How the American Public Has Been Misinformed about China*. Greene, F. 202

Steiner, K. *Local Government in Japan*. Book note by Mendel, D. H., Jr. 1068

Steinmeyer, Reuben G. *In Memoriam* 809

Steintrager, J. notes *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age*. Richter, M. 151

Stern, C. *Ulbricht: A Political Biography*. Book note by Herz, J. H. 739

Stewart, J. translates *The Arabs: Their History & Future*. Berque, J. Book note by Ashford, D. E. 508

Stiefbold, R. P. *The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections* 391

Stoessinger, J. and Associates. *Financing the United Nations Systems*. Book review by Mangone, G. J. 147

Stoessinger, J. G. notes *Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System*. Brook, D. 1080

The Strange Tactics of Extremism. Overstreet, H. and Overstreet, B. Book review by Kuchel, T. H. 454

A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict between the United

States and the Soviet Union. Rock, V. P. Book note by Singer, J. D. 220
Strong, D. S. notes *Voting Patterns in a Local Election.* Boskoff, A. and Zeigler, H. 159
Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas. Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146
Social Science Research on Latin America. Wagley, C. (ed.) Book note by Busey, J. L. 740
Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg. Jeppesen, J. and Meyer, P. Book note by Rintala, M. 505
Sorauf, F. J. *Political Parties in the American System.* Book review by Bailey, S. K. 142
South Africa: Crisis for the West. Legum, C. and M. Book note by McKay, V. 744
The South African Economy. Hobart, D. Book note by Dale, R. 745
Studies in Money in Politics. A Series of Seven Monographs. Alexander, H. E. (ed.) Book note by Shannon, J. B. 1031
Sullivant, R. S. notes *Political Succession in the USSR.* Rush, M. 1055
SUPREME COURT, U. S., See C41, H211.
Survey Sampling. Kish, L. Book note. 1025
Syed, A. *Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics.* Book note by Colvin, M. 222
The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Edelman, M. Book review by Davies, J. C. 695
Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958. Torey, G. H. Book note by Gerteiny, A. G. 197
Szent-Miklosy, I. *The Atlantic Union Movement.* Book note by Ader, E. B. 1089

Tales Out of Congress. Young, S. M. Book note by Fenton, J. H. 487
Tanenhaus, J. and Somit, A. *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline.* Book review by Van Dyke, V. 459
Taylor, G. E. *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership.* Book note by Wurfel, D. 223
Teaching Political Science. Connery, R. H. (ed.) Book note by Harder, M. A. 1015
Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration. Weidner, E. W. Book note by Riggs, F. W. 1065
Telford, I. R. *Types of Primary and Party Responsibility.* Research note. 117
Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis. Bluhm, W. T. Book review by Riemer, N. 696
Thomasius, Christian: Enlightenment and Bureaucracy. Barnard, F. M. 430
Three Tactics: The Background in Marx. Moore, S. Book note by Mayo, H. B. . . . 150
Thullen, G. *Problems of the Trusteeship System.* Book note by Murray, J. N. 530
Tinder, G. *Communication* on Murphy's book review of *The Crisis of Political Imagination* 691
———. *The Crisis of Political Imagination.* Book review by Murphy, J. S. 460
Tocqueville and England. Drescher, S. Book note by Richter, M. 709
Tomasek, H. J. notes *The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure Group.* Crampton, J. A. 1033
Torey, G. H. *Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958.* Book note by Gerteiny, A. G. 197
Totten, G. O. notes *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki and the Sorge Spy Ring.* Johnson, C. 203
Town Councillors: A Study of Barking. Rees, A. M. and Smith, T. Book note by Marquis, L. C. 185
Towster, Julian. *In Memoriam* 1118
The Tradition of Natural Law. A Philosopher's Reflections. Simon, Y. Book note by Dodge, G. H. 1024
The Transformation of Alliance Systems. Dinerstein, H. S. 589
TREASON. See Q111.
Trebach, A. S. *The Rationing of Justice.* Book note by Fellman, D. 485
Triska, J. F. and Baxter, R. R. *The Law of International Waterways—With Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals.* Book note by Lawson, R. C. 212
The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. Kissinger, H. A. Book note by Holsti, O. R. 1086
Truman, D. B. (ed.) *The Congress and America's Future.* Book note. 725
——— *Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline* 865
Tsou, T. and Halperin, M. H. *Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior* 80
Tullock, G. *The Politics of Bureaucracy.* Book note by Friedman, R. S. 714
Tung, W. L. *The Political Institutions of Modern China.* Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 203
Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization. Micaud, C. A., Brown, L. C. and Moore, C. H. Book note by Halpern, M. 199
The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. Fall, B. B. Book note by Chau, P. T. 522
Types of Primary and Party Responsibility. Telford, I. R. Research note. 117

Ulbricht: A Political Biography. Stern, C. Book note by Herz, J. H. 739

Ulmer, S. S. *Bibliography on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences* 155, 475, 717, 1028
——— notes *Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection*. Grossman, J. B. 1037
The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy. Lerche, C. O., Jr. Book note by Donovan, J. C. 1040
The Uncommon Commoner: A Study of Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Dickie, J. Book note by Dugan, A. B. 184
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. See D211.
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. SEE EGYPT, SYRIA, OR YEMEN.
UNITED KINGDOM. See B411.
UNITED NATIONS. D613.
United Nations Forces. Bowett, D. W. Book note by Buehrig, E. H. 1079
The United States and the United Nations. Gross, F. B. (ed.) Book note by Elder, R. E. 760
The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator of the International Mails. Codding, G. A., Jr. Book note by Berdahl, C. A. 214
URBAN PROBLEMS. See B73, B79.
Upton, A. F. *Finland in Crisis 1940–1941: A Study in Small-Power Politics*. Book note by Rintala, M. 1057
Urquidi, V. L. *The Challenge of Development in Latin America*. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 205
Utley, W. T. notes *Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis*. Danielson, M. N. 1034

Valen, H. and Katz, D. *Political Parties in Norway*. Book note by Greenhill, H. G. 190
van der Veur, P. W. notes *The Formation of Malaysia; New Factor in World Politics*. Hanna, W. A. 508
Van Dorn, H. A. notes *China's Foreign Policy*. Dutt, V. P. 758
Van Dyke, V. reviews *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline*. Somit, A. and Tanenhaus, J. 459
van Eekelen, W. F. *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China*. Book note by North, R. C. 1094
Van Jaarsveld, F. A. *The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History*. Book note by Scarritt, J. R. 200
Vandenbosch, A. and Brookes, E. H. *The City of God and the City of Man in Africa*. Book note by Scarritt, J. R. 198
Vatcher, William H., Jr. *In Memoriam* 809
Verba, S. notes *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations*. Doob, L. W. 468
VIETNAM See B428.
Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War. Burchett, W. G. Book note by Pirages, D. 1081
Vogel, W. *Westdeutschland, 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verwaltungseinrichtungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzungszonen Teil II. Einzelne Verwaltungs Zweige: Wirtschaft, Marshallplan, Statistik*. Book note by Childs, J. B. 190
von Brentano, H. *Germany and Europe: Reflections of German Foreign Policy*. Translated by Fitzgerald, E. Book note by Winter, H. R. 521
von der Mehden, F. R. notes *Indonesia*. Grant B. 205
——— notes *Mohammed Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism*. Mintz, J. S. 736
——— notes *Sequel to Colonialism: The 1957–1960 Foundations for Malaysia*. Hanna, W. A. 736
VOTING. See AAA22, AA22, F7, F8.
VOTING, LEGISLATIVE. See G7.
Voting Patterns in a Local Election. Baskoff, A. and Zeigler, H. Book note by Strong, D. S. 159

Wagley, C. (ed.) *Social Science Research on Latin America*. Book note by Busey, J. L. 740
Wahlke, J. C. reviews *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life*. Barber, J. D. 698
Wallace, D. *First Tuesday*. Book note by Marvick, D. 486
The War—Peace Establishment. Herzog, A. Book note by Barber, H. W. 761
Ward, R. E. reviews *Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics*, vol. II, no. 3 (December, 1964), special issue of *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* 1002
——— Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas*. Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146
WASHINGTON OFFICE, APSA. See P7096.
Washington Office Newsletter 236, 544, 1104
WATER. See V4.
Weatherhead, R. W. and Maier, J. (eds.) *Politics of Change in Latin America*. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 205
Weiner, M., Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H. and Pye, L. W. *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas*. Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146
WELFARE POLICY. See Q.
Wengert, N. notes *The Politics of Water in Arizona*. Mann, D. E. 166
Westdeutschland, 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verwaltungseinrich-

tungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzugszonen Teil II. Einzelne Verwaltungs Zweige: Wirtschaft, Marshallplan, Statistik. Vogel, W. Book note by Childs, J. B. 190
Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History. Freymond, J. Book note by Muller, S. 217
Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe. Collier, D. S. and Glaser, K. (eds.) Book note by Hauptmann, J. 1082
Weidner, E. W. *Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration*. Book note by Riggs, F. W. 1065
Weiler, H. N. (ed.) *Education and Politics in Nigeria*. Book note by Olton, R. 741
Weiner, M. reviews *Anarchist Thought in India*. Doctor, A. H. 451
Wengert, N. notes *The Costs of American Governments: Facts, Trends, Myths*. Mosher, F. C. and Poland, O. F. 483
West, R. *The New Meaning of Treason*. Book note by Spitz, D. 473
Wheeler, J. E., Ratner, S. and Altman, J. (eds.) *John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951*. Book note by Hagan, C. B. 468
Where Science and Politics Meet. Wiesner, J. B. Book note by McCamy, J. L. 1042
White, B. notes *Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic*. Rodman, S. 513
White, W. S. *Home Place: The Story of the U. S. House of Representatives*. Book review by Peabody, R. L. 699
Who Speaks for the South? Dabbs, J. M. Book note by Irish, M. D. 480
Wiesner, J. B. *Where Science and Politics Meet*. Book note by McCamy, J. L. 1042
Wildavsky, A. notes *Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies*. Boyer, W. W. 479
———. *Leadership in a Small Town*, Book note by Dye, T. R. 172
———. *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*. Book review by Edelman, M. 143
Willhoite, F. H., Jr. notes *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence*. Gilbert, F. 710
Williams, J. *Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look* 665
Wilson, D. A. reviews *Internal War*. Eckstein, H. (ed.) 138
——— notes *The McNamara Strategy*. Kaufmann, W. W. 217
Wint, G. *Communist China's Crusade, Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution*. Book note by Chang, D. W. 1069
Winter, H. R. notes *Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*. Abendroth, W. 186
——— notes *Germany and Europe: Reflections on German Foreign Policy*. von Brentano, H. Translated by Fitzgerald, E. 521
Wolfinger, R. E. *The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting* 896
——— and Heifetz, J. *Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress* 337
Woozley, A. D. and Cross, R. C. *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary*. Book note by Allers, U. S. 466
World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith. Lowenthal, R. Book note by Ballis, W. B. 506
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Communication by Russett, B. M. on Banks' book review 444
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Russett, B. M., Alker, H. R., Deutsch, K. W. and Lasswell, H. D. Book review by Banks, A. S. 144
Wurfel, D. notes *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership*. Taylor, G. E. 223

Yalem, R. J. notes *An End to Arms*. Millis, W. 762
Yaney, G. L. *Law, Society and the Domestic Regime in Russia, in Historical Perspective* 379
The Yemen: Imans, Rulers, and Revolutions. Ingrams, H. Book note by Jwaideh, W. 196
Young, C. notes *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation*. Foltz, W. J. 1060
Young, R. notes *Self-Government in Modernizing Nations*. Pennock, J. R. (ed.) 1063
Young, S. M. *Tales Out of Congress*. Book note by Fenton, J. H. 487
YUGOSLAVIA. See B418.

Zartman, I. W. *Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society*. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 747
———. *Morocco: Problems of New Power*. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 747
Zeigler, H. *Interest Groups in American Society*. Book note by Flinn, T. A. 173
———. and Boskoff, A. *Voting Patterns in a Local Election*. Book note by Strong, D. S. .. 159
Zolberg, A. R. reviews *The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence*. LeVine, V. T. .. 462
Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republic. Vol. 1. Die Periode der Konsolidierung und der Revision des Bismarckschen Reichsaufbaus 1919–1930. Schulz, G. Book note by Kirchheimer, O. 503

SECTION TWO

Classified Section

AAA BEHAVIOR (see also specific subjects, such as election returns, F806, legislature, etc.)

Political Science and Prevision. deJouvenel, B. 29
Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature. Bay, C. 39
The American South in the 1960's. Leiserson, A. (ed.) Book note by Sindler, A. P. 163
The 1914 Case. Holsti, O. R. 365
Political Power and Educational Decision-Making. Kimbrough, R. B. Book review by La Noue, G. R. 1004
State Politics and the Public Schools. Masters, N. A., Salisbury, R. H. and Eliot, T. H. Book review by Sorauf, F. J. 1005
Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies. Handy, R. Book note by Marvick, D. 1017
Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? Milbrath, L. W. Book note by Dennis, J. 1026
The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956. Gates, R. L. Book note by Dilliard, I. 1035

AAA1 GROUPS

Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict. Record, W. Book note by Barker, L. J. 169
Religion and Politics in America. Stedman, M. S., Jr. Book note by Fuchs, L. H. 172
The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups. Hopkins, T. K. Book review by Davies, J. C. 470

AAA11 PRESSURE

Interest Groups in American Society. Zeigler, H. Book note by Flinn, T. A. 173
The National Guard in Politics. Derthick, M. Book note by Green, C. R. 720
Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection. Grossman, J. B. Book note by Ulmer, S. S. 1037

AAA12 UNORGANIZED

Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power. Presthus, R. Book note by Hays, F. 168
Leadership in a Small Town. Wildavsky, A. Book note by Dye, T. R. 172

AAA2 PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. Eldersveld, S. J. Book review by Leiserson, A. 141

AAA22 VOTING

The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe. Burnham, W. D. 7
Voting Patterns in a Local Election. Boskoff, A. and Zeigler, H. Book note by Strong, D. S. 159
Political Parties in Norway. Valen, H. and Katz, D. Book note by Greenhill, H. G. 190
Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election. Converse, P. E., Clausen, A. R. and Miller, W. E. 321
The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections. Stiefbold, R. P. 391
First Tuesday. Wallace, D. Book note by Marvick, D. 486
Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg. Jeppesen, J. and Meyer, P. Book note by Rintala, M. 505
The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. Wolfinger, R. E. 896
Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Alford, R. R. Book review by Prothro, J. W. 1008

AAA3 LEGISLATURE

Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats. Froman, L. A., Jr. and Ripley, R. B. 52
Power and Politics in Labor Legislation. McAdams, A. K. Book note by Kofmehl, K. 167
Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress. Wolfinger, R. E. and Heifetz, J. 337

Tales Out of Congress. Young, S. M. Book note by Fenton, J. H. ... 487
A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson, and Goldwater, 1957–1960. Gray, C. H. ... 615
An Appropriations Subcommittee and its Client Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control. Sharkansky, I. ... 622
The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life. Barber, J. D. Book review by Wahlke, J. C. ... 698
Home Place: The Story of the U. S. House of Representatives. White, W. S. Book review by Peabody, R. L. ... 699
A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes. MacRae, D., Jr. ... 909
The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee. Manley, J. F. ... 927

AAA4 LEGISLATURE

The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals. Research note by Sickels, R. J. ... 100
Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process. Jacob, H. Book note by Schubert, G. ... 1038

AAA5 COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas. Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. Book review by Hanna, W. J. ... 146
Town Councillors: A Study of Barking. Rees, A. M. and Smith, T. Book note by Marquis, L. C. 185
A Review of Elections, 1961–1962. Institute of Electoral Research. Book note ... 207
Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey. Gregg, P. M. and Banks, A. S. ... 602
Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons. Armstrong, J. A. ... 643
How Nations Negotiate. Ikle, F. C. Book review by Palmer, N. D. ... 705
Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology. Allardt, E. and Littunen, Y. Book note by Rintala, M. ... 737

AAA6 ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR

The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Wildavsky, A. Book review by Edelman, M. ... 143
Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model. Gore, W. J. Book review by Smithburg, D. 469
Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies. Boyer, W. W. Book note by Wildavsky, A. ... 479
Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons. Armstrong, J. A. ... 643
The Politics of Bureaucracy. Tullock, G. Book note by Friedman, R. S. ... 714

AA METHODOLOGY

Political Science and Prevision. deJouvenel, B. ... 29
Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. Blalock, H. M., Jr. Book review by Flanigan, W. H. ... 138
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Russett, B. M., Alker, H. R., Jr., Deutsch, K. W. and Lasswell, H. D. Book review by Banks, A. S. ... 144
Bibliography on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences. Ulmer, S.S. ... 155, 475, 717, 1028
The 1914 Case. Holsti, O. R. ... 365
Social Science Research on Latin America. Wagley, C. (ed.) Book note by Busey, J. L. ... 740
Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies. Handy, R. Book note Marvick, D. ... 1017
Survey Sampling. Kish, L. Book note ... 1025

AA1 CASE STUDIES

An Appropriations Subcommittee and its Client Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control. Sharkansky, I. ... 622

Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look. Williams, J. 665

Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area. Havard, W. C. and Corty, F. L. Book note by Ebel, A. L. 721

The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee. Manley, J. F. 927

AA2 STATISTICAL METHODS

Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in a Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation. Research note by Beyle, T. L. 111

Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey. Gregg, P. M. and Banks, A. S. 602

Statistical Concepts: A Basic Program. Amos, J. R., Brown, F. L. and Mink, O. G. Book note... 715

Data Processing: Applications to Political Research. Janda, K. Book note 715

Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions. Richardson, S. A., Dohrenwend, B. S. and Klein, D. Book note 715

The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956. Gates, R. L. Book note by Dilliard, I. 1035

AA3 MODELS

Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model. Gore, W. J. Book note by Smithburg, D. 469

A GENERAL REFERENCE

A2 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Foreign Local Government: A Bibliography. Morlan, R. L. 120

Bibliography on Political Theory. Shklar, J. N. 154, 474

Bibliography on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences. Ulmer, S. S. 155, 475, 717, 1028

Bibliography on American Government and Politics. Burdette, F. L. 175, 488, 726, 1043

Bibliography on Comparative Government and Cross-National Research. Merritt, R. L. and Pirro, E. B. 207, 514, 749, 1072

Bibliography on Comparative Public Administration. Raphaeli, N. 211, 519, 755, 1077

Bibliography on International Law and Relations. Merritt, R. L. 224, 531, 764, 1095

Bibliography on Political Theory. Kramnick, I. 715, 1027

Bibliographie retrospective des Publications Officielles de la Belgique, 1794–1914. De Weerdt, D. Book note by Childs, J. B. 1070

A22 PERIODICAL INDEXES

Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review, Volumes 1–57: 1906–1963. Janda, K. (ed.) Book note 154

A3 LITERATURE

A32 DICTIONARIES, GLOSSARIES

A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Gould, J. and Kolb, W. L. (eds.) Book note 154

A4 PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Le Suffrage Politique en France. Charnay, J. Book note 1071

A6 HISTORIES, CHRONOLOGIES

Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence. Gilbert, F. Book note by Willhoite, F. H., Jr. 710

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940.
Leuchtenberg, W. E. Book note by Burke, R. E. 723

A8 STATISTICAL MATERIAL

A81 CENSUS

The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present. Book note..... 725

B SOCIETY, THE STATE, GOVERNMENT

B1 SOCIOLOGY

Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey. Gregg, P. M. and Banks, A. S. 602
The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Edelman, M. Book review by Davies, J. C. 695

B11 CIVILIZATION, CULTURE AND SCIENCE

The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. Boorstin, D. J. Book note by Niemeyer, G. 149
Scientists and the Policy Process. Leiserson, A. 408
The Scientific Revolution and World Politics. Haskins, C. P. Book note by Fox, W. T. R. 527
Where Science and Politics Meet. Wiesner, J. B. Book note by McCamy, J. L. 1042

B12 POPULATION, POPULATION TRENDS

B124 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Who Speaks for the South? Dabbs, J. M. Book note by Irish, M. D. 480
The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. Wolfinger, R. E. 896

B1242 National Groups

Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. Cristoph, J. B. 629

B1243 Religious Groups

Religion and Politics in America. Stedman, M. S., Jr. Book note by Fuchs, L. H. 172

B2 THE STATE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL THEORY

Political Science and Prevision. deJouvenel, B. 29
Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature. Bay, C. 39
Bibliography on Political Theory. Shklar, J. N. 154, 474
The Cause is Mankind: A Liberal Program for Modern America. Humphrey, H. H. Book note by Gilbert, C. E. 162
Christian Thomasius: Enlightenment and Bureaucracy. Barnard, F. M. 430
Man's Quest for Political Knowledge—The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times. Anderson, W. Book review by Brecht, A. 449
Nomos VII: Rational Decision. Friedrich, C. J. (ed.) Book review by Flathman, R. E. 452
American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline. Somit, A. and Tanenhaus, J. Book review by Van Dyke, V. 459
The Crisis of Political Imagination. Tinder, G. Book review by Murphy, J. S. 460
Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. Cross, R. C. and Woozley, A. D. Book note by Allers, U. S. 466
Reason and Revelation in Hooker's Ethics. Faulkner, R. K. 680
Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis. Bluhm, W. T. Book review by Riemer, N. 696
Political and Sociological Theory and Its Applications. Catlin, G. E. G. Book note by Barber, J. D. 708
Tocqueville and England. Drescher, S. Book note by Richter, M. 709
The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan. Hood, F. C. Book note by Schwandt, J. A. 711
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others. Translated by Gilbert, A. Book note by Pitkin, H. 715
Bibliography on Political Theory. Kramnick, I. 715, 1027
Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline. Truman, D. B. 865
A Framework for Political Analysis. Easton, D. Book review by Converse, P. E. 1001
Teaching Political Science. Connery, R. H. (ed.) Book note by Harder, M. A. 1015
Benjamin Constant. Sein Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz. Gall, L. Book note by Dodge, G. H. 1016
Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences. Problems and Controversies. Handy, R. Book note by Marvick, D. 1017
Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics. Jaffa, H. V. Book note by Cassinelli, C. W. 1018
John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American Politics with Selected Speeches and Letters. Kirk, R. Book note by Minar, D. W. 1019

The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law. Krieger, L. Book note by Cox, R. H. 1020

The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge. McEwen, W. P. Book note by Hobbs, M. 1020

The Tradition of Natural Law. A Philosopher's Reflections. Simon, Y. Book note by Dodge, G.H. 1024

Poor Countries and Authoritarian Rule. Neufeld, M. F. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 1062

Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis. Schubert, G. 940

The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence. Lane, R. E. 874

Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs. Kirchheimer, O. 964

B20 POWER, AUTHORITY, JUSTICE

Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. Christoph, J. B. 629

Legalism. Shklar, J. N. Book note by Aikin, C. 713

Obligation and Consent,—I. Pitkin, H. 990

Political Authority and Moral Judgment. Negley, G. Book note by McCleery, R. H. 1023

Power and Human Destiny. Rosinski, H. Book note by Cassinelli, C. W. 1023

B21 THEORIES OF ORIGIN

The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Hartz, L. Book review by Pennock, J. R. 697

B23 THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT

Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideals. Mack, M. P. Book note by Cox, R. H. 149

Three Tactics: The Background in Marx. Moore, S. Book note by Mayo, H. B. 150

The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age. Richter, M. Book note by Steintrager, J. 151

Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power. Laszlo, E. Book note by Stanlis, P. J. 152

In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. Schwartz, B. Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 153

Nationalism and Communism, Essays 1946–1963. Seton-Watson, H. Book note by Ballis, W. B. 195

Law, Society and the Domestic Regime in Russia, in Historical Perspective. Yaney, G. L. 379

Democracy, Organization, Michels. May, J. D. 417

Anarchist Thought in India. Doctor, A. H. Book review by Weiner, M. 451

The Strange Tactics of Extremism. Overstreet, H. and Overstreet, B. Book review by Kuchel, T. H. 454

Mill and Liberalism. Cowling, M. Book note by Fleming, T. B., Jr. 466

John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951. Ratner, S., Altman, J. and Wheeler, J. E. (eds.) Book note by Hagan, C. B. 468

Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations. Doob, L. W. Book note by Verba, S. 468

The Liberal Idea of Freedom. Spitz, D. Book review by Kendall, W. 472

The Democratic Civilization. Lipson, L. Book note by Hacker, A. 520

B26 TYPES AND FORMS OF STATE

B262 NATIONAL STATES: NATIONALISM

Nationalism in Iran. Cottam, R. W. Book review by Frey, F. W. 702

B3 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Organizational Authority: Superior—Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizaitons. Peabody, R. L. Book review by Golembiewski, R. T. 140

Public relations in administration. I. Official Publications. General Report. Honoré, S. Book note by Childs, J. B. 192

Bibliography on Comparative Government and Cross-National Research. Merritt, R. L. and Pirro, E. B. 207

Bibliography on Comparative Public Administration. Raphaeli, N. 211, 519, 755, 1027

Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society. Riggs, F. W. Book review by Pye, L. W. 456

Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies. Boyer, W. W. Book note by Wildavsky, A. 479

Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G., Jr. Book note by Carter, G. M. 498
Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons. Armstrong, J. A. 643
The Politics of Bureaucracy. Tullock, G. Book note by Friedman, R. S. 714
The French Civil Service. Grégoire, R. Book note by Laponce, J. A. 1053
The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation. Goodnow, H. F. Book note by Beckett, P. L. 1058
The Civil Service in New African States. Adu, A. L. Book note by Friedman, J. R. 1059

B4 COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Foreign Local Government: A Bibliography. Morlan, R. L. 120
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Russett, B. M., Alker, H. R., Jr., Deutsch, K. W. and Lasswell, H. D. Book review by Banks, A. S. 144
Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas. Ward, R. E., Bonilla, F., Coleman, J. S., Hyman, H. H., Pye, L. W. and Weiner, M. Book review by Hanna, W. J. 146
Bibliography on Comparative Government and Cross-National Research. Merritt, R. L., and Pirro, E. B. 514, 749, 1072
The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Edelman, M. Book review by Davies, J. C. 695
Public Liberties in the New States. Bayley, D. H. Book note by Pennock, J. R. 735
Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology. Allardt, E. and Littunen, Y. (eds.) Book note by Rintala, M. 737
Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Alford, R. R. Book review by Prothro, J. W. 1008

B41 EUROPE

Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History. Freymond, J. Book note by Muller, S. 217
Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons. Armstrong, J. A. 643

B410 ITALY

Il clero di riserva. Poggi, G. Book note by Barnes, S. H. 504
Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence. Gilbert, F. Book note by Willhoite, F. H., Jr. 710
Poor Countries and Authoritarian Rule. Neufeld, M. F. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 1062

B411 GREAT BRITAIN

Town Councillors: A Study of Barking. Rees, A. M. and Smith, T. Book note by Marquis, L. C. 185
Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. Fitzsimons, M. A. Book note by Millett, J. H. 216
The Crisis of British Government in the 1960's. Crick, B. Book note by Catlin, G. E. G. 499
The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945–1962. Snyder, W. P. Book note by Epstein, L. D. 501
Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. Christoph, J. B. 629
Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. Ranney, A. Book review by Christoph, J. B. 706
Tocqueville and England. Drescher, S. Book note by Richter, M. 709
Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. Russett, B. M. Book review by Rose, R. 1009
The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754–1790. Namier, L. and Brooke, J. Book note by Childs, J. B. 186

B412 SPAIN

Guía de la administración civil del Estado. Oficina de Información, Presidencia del Gobierno. Book note by Childs, J. B. 192

B413 SCANDINAVIA

Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries. Andrén, N. Book note by Anderson, S. V. 1056

B4132 Denmark

Sofavaelgerne—Valgdeltagelsen ved danske foketingsvalg. Jeppesen, J. and Meyer, P. Book note by Rintala, M.... 505

B4133 Norway

Political Parties in Norway. Valen, H. and Katz, D. Book note by Greenhill, H. G.......................... 190
Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress. Malmström, V. H. Book note by Anderson, S. V................ 1056

B4134 Finland

Finland in Crisis 1940–1941: A Study in Small-Power Politics. Upton, A. F. Book note by Rintala, M......... 1057

B4135 Iceland

Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits. Davis, M. Book note by Anderson, S. V.............................. 1056
Iceland: Reluctant Ally. Nuechterlein, D. E. Book note by Anderson, S. V.................................. 1056

B414 SOVIET UNION

The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. Bilinsky, Y. Book note by Armstrong, J. A.. 193
Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary? Nove, A. Book note by Jacobs, D. N.. 194
The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963. Rubinstein, A. Z. Book note by Junn, S. 221
Law, Society and the Domestic Regime in Russia, in Historical Perspective. Yaney, G. L... 379
Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons. Armstrong, J. A... 643
Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Barghoorn, F. C. Book review by Armstrong, J. A............ 700
Russia after Khrushchev. Conquest, R. Book note by Ploss, S. I...................... 737
Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia. Ploss, S. I. Book note by Ballard, A. B., Jr... 1054
Political Succession in the USSR. Rush, M. Book note by Sullivant, R. S............... 1055

B4143 East Germany

Ulbricht: A Political Biography. Stern, C. Book note by Herz, J. H.. 739

B415 GERMANY

Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. Abendroth, W. Book note by Winter, H. R.. 186
The Social Democratic Party of Germany. Chalmers, D. A. Book note by Groennings, S... 187
Der Kampf um den Bau Des Mittellandkanals. Horn, H. Book note by Kirchheimer, O... 187
Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublic Deutschland. Ellwein, T. Book note by Kirchheimer, O.. 187
German Social Democracy 1918–1933. Hunt, R. N. Book note by Edinger, L. J.......... 188
Germany, the Wall and Berlin: Internal Politics During an International Crisis. Keller, J. W. Book note by Reich, D. R.. 189
Westdeutschland, 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verualtungseinrichtungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzungszonen Teil II. Einzele Verwaltungs Zweige: Wirtschaft, Marshallplan, Statistik. Vogel, W. Book note by Childs, J. B................ 190
The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections. Stiefbold, R. P............... 391
The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. Masse, G. L. Book review by Ebenstein, W.. 471
The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. Pulzer, P. G. J. Book note by Braunthal, G.. 502
Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republic. Vol. I *Die Periode der Konsolidierung und der Revision des Bismarckschen Reichsaufbaus 1919–1930.* Schulz, G. Book note by Kirchheimer, O..................... 503
Germany and Europe: Reflections on German Foreign Policy. von Brentano, H. Translated by Fitzgerald, E. Book note by Winter, H. R................................. 521
Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany. Boelling, K. Book note by Rie, R.. 738
Democracy in Germany. Erler, F. Book note by Heidenheimer, A. J...................... 1053

B4151 Netherlands

500 jaren Staten-Generaal in de Nederlanden. Van statenvergadering tot volksvertegenwoordiging. Andreae, S. J. F. and Hardenberg, H. Book note by Childs, J. B... 191

B416 AUSTRIA

The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. Pulzer, P. G. J. Book note by Braunthal, G. 502

B417 FRANCE

Maroc 1943–1956: Le Conflit Franco-Marocain. Bernard, S. Book note by Micaud, C. A. 213
The French Civil Service. Grégoire, R. Book note by Laponce, J. A. 1053
France and the European Community. Fisher, S. N. (ed.) Book note by Allen, L. A. 1085

B4171 Belgium

Bibliographie retrospective des Publications Officielles de la Belgique, 1794–1914. De Weerdt, D. Book note by Childs, J. B. 1070

B418 YUGOSLAVIA

History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Avakumovic, I. Book note by Gyorgy, A. 506

B42 ASIA

B421 INDIA

Anarchist Thought in India. Doctor, A. H. Book review by Weiner, M. 451
Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. van Eekelen, W. F. Book note by North, R. C. 1094
The Modernity of Tradition. Rudolph, I. 975

B422 CHINA

Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior. Tsou, T. and Halperin, M. H. 80
In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. Schwartz, B. Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 153
The Center of the World, Communism and the Mind of China. Elegant, R. S. Book note by Chang, D. W. 201
A Curtain of Ignorance: How the American Public Has Been Misinformed about China. Greene, F. Book note by Steiner, H. A. 202
The Political Institutions of Modern China. Tung, W. L. Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 203
China's Foreign Policy. Dutt, V. P. Book note by Van Dorn, H. A. 758
China and the Bomb. Halperin, M. H. Book review by Rosenau, J. N. 1010
Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade. Fraser, S. (ed.) Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 1067
Communist China's Crusade, Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution. Wint, G. Book note by Chang, D. W. 1069
Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. van Eekelen, W. F. Book note by North, R. C. 1194
Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years. Ginsburgs, G. and Mathos, M. Book note by Shao, O. H. 759

B4221 Tibet

Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years. Ginsburgs, G. and Mathos, M. Book note by Shao, O. H. 759

B423 JAPAN

An Instance of Treason: Ozaki and the Sorge Spy Ring. Johnson, C. Book note by Totten, G. O. 203
Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look. Williams, J. 665
Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics, vol. 11, no. 3 (December, 1964). *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* Book review by Ward, R. E. 1002
Local Government in Japan. Steiner, K. Book note by Mendel, D. H., Jr. 1068

B4231 Korea

Korea: The Limited War. Rees, D. Book note by Oh, J. C. H. 1092

B424 ISRAEL

Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System. Brook, D. Book note by Stoessinger, J. G. 1080

B425 MUSLIM ASIA

Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. Fitzsimons, M. A. Book note by Millett, J. H. 216

The Arabs: Their History & Future. Berque, J. Translated by Stewart, J. Book note by Ashford, D. E. 508

Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System. Brook, D. Book note by Stoessinger, J. G. 1080

B4251 Indonesia

Indonesia. Grant, B. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 205

Mohammed Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism. Mintz, J. S. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 736

B4252 Malaysia

The Formation of Malaysia; New Factor in World Politics. Hanna, W. A. Book note by van der Veur, P. W. 508

Sequel to Colonialism: The 1957–1960 Foundations for Malaysia. Hanna, W. A. Book note by von der Mehden, F. R. 736

B4253 Syria

Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958. Torey, G. H. Book note by Gerteiny, A. G. 197

B4254 Iran

Nationalism in Iran. Cottam, R. W. Book review by Frey, F. W. 702

B4255 Yemen

The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions. Ingrams, H. Book note by Jwaideh, W. 196

B4256 Pakistan

The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation. Goodnow, H. F. Book note by Beckett, P. L. 1058

B426 SOUTHEAST CRESCENT COUNTRIES

B4262 Vietnam

The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. Fall, B. B. Book note by Chau, P. T. 522

South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. Scigliano, R. Book note by Chau, P. T. 522

Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War. Burchett, W. G. Book note by Pirages, D. 1081

The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. Bouscaren, A. T. Book review by Cahill, R. S. 1013

B43 AFRICA

The City of God and the City of Man in Africa. Brookes, E. H. and Vandenbosch, A. Book note by Scarritt, J. R. 198

Africa's Quest for Order. Burke, F. G. Book note by Apter, D. E. 497

Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G., Jr. Book note by Carter, G. M. 498

East African Unity Through Law. Franck, T. M. Book note by Davis, C. D. 742

Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom. Hanna, W. J. (ed.) Book note 749

The Civil Service in New African States. Adu, A. L. Book note by Friedman, J. R. 1059

The African World, A Survey of Social Research. Lystad, R. A. (ed.) Book note 1066

B431 BRITISH COMMONWEALTH STATES

B4312 Ghana

Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960. Austin, D. Book review by Glickman, H. 1007

B4313 Nigeria

Federal Government in Nigeria. Awa, E. O. Book note by Olton, R. 741

Education in Politics in Nigeria. Weiler, H. N. (ed.) Book note by Olton, R. 741

B432 FRENCH SPEAKING COUNTRIES

The New States of West Africa. Post, K. Book review by Bates, M. L. 463

From French West Africa to the Mali Federation. Foltz, W. J. Book note by Young, C. 1060

B4321 Cameroons

The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence. LeVine, V. T. Book review by Zolberg, A. R. 462

B4322 Congo Republic of Leopoldville

Political Awakening in the Congo. Lemarchand, R. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 746

B433 ARAB AND MUSLIM STATES

B4330 Tunisia

Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization. Micaud, C. A., Brown, L. C. and Moore, C. H. Book note by Halpern, M. 199

B4331 Morocco

Maroc 1943–1956: Le Conflit Franco-Marocain. Bernard, S. Book note by Micaud, C. A. 213
Morocco: Problems of New Power. Zartman, I. W. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 747
Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society. Zartman, I. W. Book note by Cowan, L. G. 747

B4332 Egypt (United Arab Republic)

Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. Harris, C. P. Book note by Kerr, M. H. 748

B434 SOUTH AFRICA

The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History. van Jaarsveld, F. A. Book note by Scarritt, J. R. 200
Bantustan: The Fragmentation of South Africa. Hill, C. R. Book note by Dale, R. 743
South Africa: Crisis for the West. Legum, C. and Legum, M. Book note by McKay, V. .. 744
The South African Economy. Houghton, D. H. Book note by Dale, R. 745
An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa. Kuper, L. Book note by Glickman, H. 1061

B436 LIBERIA

The New Liberia: A Historical and Political Survey. Marinelli, L. A. Book note by Adam, T. R. 499

B44 LATIN AMERICA AND WEST INDIES (see also D612 U.A.S.)

Politics of Change in Latin America. Maier, J. and Weatherhead, R. W. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 205
The Challenge of Development in Latin America. Urquidi, V. L. Book note by Burnett, B. G. 205
Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America. Lieuwen, E. Book note by Anderson, R. W. 511
Social Science Research on Latin America. Wagley, (ed.) Book note by Busey, J. L. 740

B444 MEXICO

Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico. Johnson, K. F. 656

B445 COLOMBIA

Colombia Today—And Tomorrow. Holt, P. M. Book note by Kantor, H. 510

B448 JAMAICA

Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation. Bell, W. Book note by Fitzgibbon, R. H. 509

B449 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic. Rodman, S. Book note by White, B. 513

B46 AUSTRALASIA

B461 AUSTRALIA

A History of the Australian Country Party. Ellis, U. Book note by Joyner, C. 192
Australian Party Politics. Jupp, J. Book note by Overacker, L. 500

B463 PHILIPPINES

The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership. Taylor, G. E. Book note by Wurfel, D. 223
Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929–1946. Friend, T. Book note by Jacobini, H. B. 1066

B5 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, FORM AND CONDUCT

The American South in the 1960's. Leiserson, A. (ed.) Book note by Sindler, A. P. 163

B55 COMMUNISM

Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior. Tsou, T. and Halperin, M. H. 80
World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith. Book note by Ballis, W. B. 506

B59 CHANGES IN THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior. Tsou, T. and Halperin, M. H. 80
Internal War. Eckstein, H. (ed.) Book review by Wilson, D. A. 138
Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look. Williams, J. 665

B6 STATE GOVERNMENT

The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy. Lerche, C. O., Jr. Book note by Donovan, J. C. 1040

B60 HISTORY, COLONIES, TERRITORIES (see also D212)

Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence. Gilbert, F. Book note by Willhoite, F. H., Jr. 710

B65 GOVERNMENT OF PARTICULAR STATES

The Politics of Water in Arizona. Mann, D. E. Book note by Wengert, N. 166
States in Crisis, Politics in Ten American States, 1950–1962. Reichley, J. and Others. Book note by Lockard, D. 170
Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona. Morey, R. D. Book note by Bindley, J. H. 1041

B7 LOCAL GOVERNMENT, FORM AND CONDUCT

B72 TOWNSHIP GOVERNMENT

Leadership in a Small Town. Wildavsky, A. Book note by Dye, T. R. 172

B73 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962. Book note by Salisbury, R. H. 478
At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958. Lowi, T. J. Book note by Adrian, C. R. 481
Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis. Danielson, M. N. Book note by Utley, W. T. 1034

B79 SPECIAL DISTRICTS

Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area. Havard, W. C. and Corty, F. L. Book note by Ebel, A. L. 721
Political Power and Educational Decision-Making. Kimbrough, R. B. Book review by La Noue, G. R. 1004

B8 GOVERNMENT COOPERATIONS

The Miami Metropolitan Experiment. Sofen, E. Book note by Shaw, F. 484

B81 STATE RELATIONS

B811 FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

The States Rights Debate: Antifederalism and the Constitution. Mason, A. T. Book note by Aikin, C. 166

C CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW

C0 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

The Constitution of the United States. Dumbauld, E. Book note 174
Essays on the American Constitution. Dietze, G. (ed.) Book note by Mendelson, W. 481
Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look. Williams, J. 665

John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton. Konefsky, S. J. Book note by Faulkner, R. K. 712
The Case for Liberty. Miller, H. H. Book note by Greenberg, M. 1022

C4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics. Jaffa, H. V. Book note by Cassinelli, C. W. 1018

C41 CIVIL RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS

Deeds Under a Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term. Murphy, W. F. 64
The Rationing of Justice. Trebach, A. S. Book note by Fellman, D. 485
The Negro and the First Amendment. Kalven, H., Jr. Book note by Grossman, J. B. 722
Public Liberties in the New States. Bayley, D. H. Book note by Pennock, J. R. 735
The Case for Liberty. Miller, H. H. Book note by Greenberg, M. 1022

D INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo. Lens, S. Book note by Hacker, A. 164
Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics. Syed, A. Book note by Colvin, M. 222
Bibliography on International Law and Relations. Merritt, R. L. 224, 531, 764, 1095
The Transformation of Alliance Systems. Dinerstein, H. S. 589
Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. Russett, B. M. Book review by Rose, R. 1009
The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy. Lerche, C. O., Jr. Book note by Donovan, J. C. 1040
American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead. Campbell, J. C. Book note by Duchacek, I. D. 1071
Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe. Brzezinski, Z. Book note by Organski, A. F. K. 1080
The Exercise of Sovereignty: Papers on Foreign Policy. Marshall, C. B. Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1090
The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. The Yearbook of World Policy: volume III. O'Brien, W. V. (ed.) Book note by Fleiss, P. J. 1091

D1 DIPLOMACY, NEGOTIATION

The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy. Aron, R. Book review by Crabb, C. V., Jr. 703
How Nations Negotiate. Iklé, F. C. Book review by Palmer, N. D. 705
Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International Relations and International Law. Ostrower, A. Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1092

D100 FOREIGN OFFICES

A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rock, V. P. Book note by Singer, J. D. 221

D2 INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Changing Structure of International Law. Friedmann, W. Book note by Manner, G. 524
Law and Politics of the Danube. Gorove, S. Book note by Beck, C. F. 526

D21 SOVEREIGNTY

The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order. Falk, R. A. Book note by Gathings, J. A. 215

D211 FORMATION, DISSOLUTION, AND PARTITION OF STATES (see also B2)

New Nations in a Divided World, The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States. London, K. (ed.) Book note by Le Vine, V. T. 218
Les Nouveaux Etats dans les Relations Internationales. Duroselle, J. and Meyriat, J. (eds.) Book note by Le Vine, V. T. 218

The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963. Rubinstein, A. Z. Book note by Junn, S. 221
Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society. Riggs, F. W. Book review by Pye, L. W. 456
Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries. Schramm, W. Book review by LaPalombara, J. 457
International Stability. Hekhuis, D. J., McClintock, C. G. and Burns, A. L. Book note by Riedel, J. A. 528
The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Hartz, L. Book review by Pennock, J. R. 697
John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton. Konefsky, S. J. Book note by Faulkner, R. K. 712
East African Unity Through Law. Franck, T. M. Book note by Davis, C. D. 742
Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom. Hanna, W. J. (ed.) Book note 749
The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies. McCord, W. Book review by Emerson, R. 1006
Self-Government in Modernizing Nations. Pennock, J. R. (ed.) Book note by Young, R. 1063
The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. The Yearbook of World Polity: volume III. O'Brien, W. V. (ed.) Book note by Fliess, P. J. 1091

D212 DEPENDENCIES, SPHERES OF INFLUENCE LIMITATION OF STATUS

British Guiana. Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society. Newman, P. Book note by Davis, H. E. 512
Problems of the Trusteeship System. Thullen, G. Book note by Murray, J. N. 530

D22 GENERAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF STATES

D225 JURISDICTION OVER THE SEAS

The Law of International Waterways—with Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals. Bazter, R. R. and Triska, J. F. Book note by Lawson, R. C. 212

D3 COLD WAR, DISPUTES

The Cold War—And After. Lerche, C. O., Jr. Book note by Gibbs, H. S. 1089

D32 ECONOMIC PRESSURE

Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy. Finer, H. Book note by Millett, J. H. 1083

D4 WAR, FORMALITIES AND CONDUCT, KINDS OF WAR

Westdeutschland, 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verwaltungseinrichtungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzungszonen Teil II. Verwaltungs Zweige: Wirtschaft, Marshall-plan, Statistik. Vogel, W. Book note by Childs, J. B. 190
The Transformation of Alliance Systems. Dinerstein, H. S. 589
China and the Bomb. Halperin, M. H. Book review by Rosenau, J. N. 1010
Korea: The Limited War. Rees, D. Book note by Oh, J. C. H. 1092

D41 CAUSES OF WAR

The War—Peace Establishment. Herzog, A. Book note by Barber, H. W. 761
The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956. Gates, R. L. Book note by Dilliard, I. 1035

D6 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

In Pursuit of World Order: U. S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations. Gardner, R. N. Book note by Crabb, C. V., Jr. 525
The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions. Grzybowski, K. Book note by Cattell, D. T. 526
Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals. Schechter, A. H. Book note by Lawson, R. C. 1094

D61 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC UNIONS

D613 UNITED NATIONS

Financing the United Nations System. Stoessinger, J. and Associates. Book review by Mangone, G. J. 147
Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament. Marshall, C. B. 350
The United States and the United Nations. Gross, F. B. (ed.) Book note by Elder, R. E. 760
United Nations Forces. Bowett, D. W. Book note by Buehrig, E. H. 1079
Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System. Brook, D. Book note by Stoessinger, J. G. 1080
Law, Politics, and the Security Council—An Inquiry into the Handling of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations. Kahn, T. J. Book note by Engel, S. 1085
Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Haas, E. B. Book review by Claude, I. L., Jr. 1011

D614 NATO

The Atlantic Alliance. Cottrell, A. J. and Dougherty, J. E. Book note by Colvin, M. 757

D65 INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION, ARBITRATION

D652 COURT OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

The Court of European Communities: New Dimensions in International Adjudication. Feld, W. Book note by Gathings, J. A. 523

D7 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The Transformation of Alliance Systems. Dinerstein, H. S. 589
The War—Peace Establishment. Herzog, A. Book note by Barber, H. W. 761
The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. Coombs, P. H. Book note by Bennett, A. L. 761
An End to Arms. Millis, W. Book note by Yalem, R. J. 762
Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe. Collier, D. S. and Glaser, K. Book note by Hauptmann, J. 1082
The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. Kissinger, H. A. Book note by Holsti, O. R. 1086
The Atlantic Union Movement. Szent-Miklosy, I. Book note by Ader, E. B. 1089

D71 WORLD PEACE MOVEMENTS

D711 CONTROL AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT

Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament. Marshall, C. B. 350

D72 ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The European Community and American Trade. Hanshaw. Book note by Lindberg, L. N. 1087

D721 COMMON MARKET

The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe. Jensen, F. B. Book note by Lindberg, L. N. 1087
The European Community and Its Role in the World. Kohnstamm, M. Book note by Bishop, D. G. 529

D78 INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE

The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator of the International Mails. Codding, G. A. Book note by Berdahl, C. A. 214

D79 FOREIGN AID

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. Mason, E. S. Book note by Fernbach, A. 219

D792 TECHNICAL AID

Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration. Weidner, E. W. Book note by Riggs, F. W. 1065

F CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, ELECTIONS

Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries. Schramm, W. Book review by LaPalombara, J... 457

F1 PUBLIC OPINION

Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. Cristoph, J. B. 629
The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Edleman, M. Book review by Davies, J. C. 695

F15 PROPAGANDA

Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Barghoorn, F. C. Book note by Armstrong, J. A. 700

F5 POLITICS, POLITICAL ETHICS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe. Burnham, W. D. 7
Bibliography on American Government and Politics. Burdette, F. L. 175, 488, 726, 1043
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G., Jr. Book note by Carter, G. M. 498
Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. Cristoph, J. B. 629
Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany. Boelling, K. Book note by Rie, R. 738
Japanese Politics: Structure and Dynamics, vol. 11, no. 3 (December, 1964), special issue of *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan.* Book review by Ward, R. E. 1002
Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Alford, R. R. Book review by Prothro, J. W. 1008
Studies in Money in Politics. A Series of Seven Monographs. Alexander, H. E. (ed.) Book note by Shannon, J. B. 1031
The Republican Party in American Politics. Jones, C. O. Book note by Crane, W. 1040

F51 POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Types of Primary and Party Responsibility. Research note by Telford, I. R. 117
Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. Eldersveld, S. J. Book review by Leiserson, A. 141
Political Parties in the American System. Sorauf, F. J. Book review by Bailey, S. K. 142
The Democrat's Dilemma. Crane, P. M. Book note by Kessel, J. H. 160
The Republican Party, 1854–1964. Mayer, G. H. Book note by Cotter, C. P. 167
Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. Abendroth, W. Book note by Winter, H. R. 186
The Social Democratic Party of Germany. Chalmers, D. A. Book note by Groennings, S. 187
A History of the Australian Country Party. Ellis, U. Book note by Joyner, C. 192
Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election. Converse, P. E., Clausen, A. R. and Miller, W. E. 321
Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico. Johnson, K. F. 656
Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? Milbrath, L. W. Book note by Dennis, J. 1026

F53 PRESSURE GROUPS, ORGANIZED AND UNORGANIZED

Power and Politics in Labor Legislation. McAdams, A. K. Book note by Kofmehl, K. 167
Interest Groups in American Society. Zeigler, H. Book note by Flinn, T. A. 173
The National Guard in Politics. Derthick, M. Book note by Green, C. R. 720
The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure Group. Crampton, J. A. Book note by Tomasek, H. J. 1033

F55 BIOGRAPHIES OF POLITICIANS

Herbert Hoover: A Biography. Lyons, E. Book note by Binkley, W. E. 165
Congressman from Mississippi: An Autobiography. Smith, F. E. Book note by Hamilton, C. G. 171
The Uncommon Commoner: A Study of Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Dickie, J. Book note by Dugan, A. B. 184

The Adams Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. Butterfield, L. H. (ed.) Book note by Grimes, A. P. 465
Mr. Crump of Memphis. Miller, W. D. Book note by Goodman, W. 482
The Life of Lenin. Fischer, L. Book review by Aspaturian, V. V. 701
Ulbricht: A Political Biography. Stern, C. Book note by Herz, J. H. 739
The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. Bouscaren, A. T. Book review by Cahill, R. S. 1013

F7 NOMINATIONS

See How They Run: The Making of a Congressman. Allyn, P. and Greene, J. Book note by Kofmehl, K. 158
Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. Ranney, A. Book review by Christoph, J. B. 706
The Road to the White House. Faber, H. (ed.) Book note 725
The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. Wolfinger, R. E. 896

F75 PRIMARIES

Does a "Divisive" Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances? Research note by Hacker, A. 105
Types of Primary and Party Responsibility. Research note by Telford, I. R. 117

F8 ELECTIONS

The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe. Burnham, W. D. 7
Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. Ranney, A. Book review by Christoph, J. B. 706
The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. Wolfinger, R. E. 896
Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Alford, R. R. Book review by Prothro, J. W. 1008

F804 EXPENSE OF ELECTIONS

Studies in Money in Politics. A Series of Seven Monographs. Alexander, H. E. (ed.) Book note by Shannon, J. B. 1031

F806 RETURNS

Does a "Divisive" Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances? Research note by Hacker, A. 105
Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election. Converse, P. E., Clausen, A. R. and Miller, W. E. 321

F8062 General Election

America Votes, Vol. 5, 1962. Scammon, R. M. (ed.) Book note 174
A Review of Elections, 1961–1962. Institute of Electoral Research. Book note 207
Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in a Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation. Beyle, T. L. 111

F82 CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS

F825 BALLOTS

The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections. Stiefbold, R. P. 391

G THE LEGISLATURE, LAW

The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States. Keefe, W. J. and Ogul, M. S. Book note 174
A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater, 1957–1960. Gray, C. H. 615
A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes. MacRae, D., Jr. 909

G1 LEGISLATORS

The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life. Barber, J. D. Book review by Wahlke, J. C. 698
Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. Ranney, A. Book review by Christoph, J. B. 706

G2 LEGISLATIVE BODIES: UNICAMERAL AND BICAMERAL SYSTEMS

Congress: The Sapless Branch. Clark, J. S. Book note by Matthews, D. R. 159
Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress. Wolfinger, R. E. and Heifetz, J. 337
Congressional Reform: Problems and Prospects. Clark, J. S. (ed.) Book note 725
The Congress and America's Future. Truman, D. B. (ed.) Book note 725

G22 LOWER HOUSE

Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats. Froman, L. A., Jr. and Ripley, R. B. 52
The History of Parliament. The House of Commons, 1754–1790. Namier, L. and Brooke, J. Book note by Childs, J. B. 186
Home Place: The Story of the U. S. House of Representatives. White, W. S. Book review by Peabody, R. L. 699

G25 COMMITTEES

An Appropriations Subcommittee and its Client Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control. Sharkansky, I. 622
The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee. Manley, J. F. 927

G9 LAW

Legalism. Shklar, J. N. Book note by Aikin, C. 713

H THE JUDICIARY, COURTS, LEGAL PROFESSION

Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process. Jacob, H. Book note by Schubert, G. 1038

H1 JUDGES

H12 SELECTION

Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection. Grossman, J. B. Book note by Ulmer, S. S. 1037

H2 COURT SYSTEMS, COURT REFORM

H21 FEDERAL COURTS

H211 SUPREME COURT

Deeds Under a Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term. Murphy, W. F. 64
The Negro and the First Amendment. Kalven, H., Jr. Book note by Grossman, J. B. 722

H22 STATE COURTS

The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals. Research note by Sickels, R. J. 100

H9 LEGAL PROFESSION

Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence. Eulau, H. and Sprague, J. D. Book note by Grossman, J. B. 161

I THE EXECUTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

I2 THE EXECUTIVE, AND EXECUTIVE BODIES

I21 CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940. Leuchtenburg, W. E. Book note by Burke, R. E. 723
Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona. Morey, R. D. Book note by Bindley, J. H. 1041

I210 TRANSITION PERIODS

From Failing Hands, The Story of Presidential Succession. Feerick, J. D. Book note by Koenig, L. W. 1035
Political Succession in the USSR. Rush, M. Book note by Sullivant, R. S. 1035

I212 POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

A Scale Analysis of the Voting, Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater, 1957–1960. Gray, C. H. 615

I5 ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Governmental Agencies. Boyer, W. W. Book note by Wildavsky, A. 479
The Politics of Bureaucracy. Tullock, G. Book note by Friedman, R. S. 714

I51 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL, LEADERSHIP, INSPECTION

The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Wildavsky, A. Book review by Edelman, M. 143

I511 MANAGERAL AIDS: PLANNING, BUDGET, STAFFING

The Higher Civil Service: An Evaluation of Federal Personnel Practices. Stanley, D. T. Book note by Presthus, R. 724

J PLANNING

J7 CITY PLANNING

The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962. Anderson, M. Book note by Salisbury, R. H. 478

K PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

K1 THE PUBLIC SERVICE

The Federal Government Service, 2nd ed. Sayre, W. S. (ed.) Book note by Friedman, R. 1041

K12 MERIT SYSTEMS

The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation. Goodnow, H. F. Book note by Beckett, P. L. 1058
The Civil Service in New African States. Adu, A. L. Book note by Friedman, J. R. 1059
The Higher Civil Service: An Evaluation of Federal Personnel Practices. Stanley, D. T. Book note by Presthus, R. 724
The French Civil Service. Grégoire, R. Book note by Laponce, J. A. 1053

L PUBLIC FINANCE

L1 BUDGET

The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Wildavsky, A. Book review by Edelman, M. 143
The Costs of American Governments: Facts, Trends, Myths. Mosher, F. C. and Poland, O. F. Book note by Wengert, N. 483
An Appropriations Subcommittee and its Client Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control. Sharkansky, I. 622

N NATIONAL DEFENSE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, POLICE, FIRE PROTECTION, SAFETY

N1 NATIONAL DEFENSE

The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U. S. Armed Forces. Ries, J. C. Book note by Masland, J. W. 529
The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy. Aron, R. Book review by Crabb, C. V., Jr. 703

N100 DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING

The McNamara Strategy. Kaufmann, W. W. Book note by Wilson, D. A. 217
The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945–1962. Snyder, W. P. Book note by Epstein, L. D. 501

N11 MILITARY POLICIES

N119 CIVILIAN CONTROL OF MILITARY POLICY

Scientists and the Policy Process. Leiserson, A. 408
Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America. Lieuwen, E. Book note by Anderson, R. W. 511

N12 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

N121 ARMY ORGANIZATION

N1219 Reserves

The National Guard in Politics. Derthick, M. Book note by Green, C. R. 720

P EDUCATION, LIBRARIES

Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade. Fraser, S. (ed.) Book note by Kennedy, M. T., Jr. 1067

P00 DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION

P01 SUPERVISORY FUNCTION OF THE STATE

State Politics and the Public Schools. Masters, N. A., Salisbury, R. H. and Eliot, T. H. Book review by Sorauf, F. J. 1005

P002 SCHOOL DISTRICTS, CONSOLIDATED SCHOOLS

Political Power and Educational Decision-Making. Kimbrough, R. B. Book review by La Noue, G. R. 1004

P3 EDUCATION AND STATE (see also P01)

The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954–1956. Book note by Dilliard, I. 1035

P7 PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: THE PROFESSIONS

P70 ORGANIZATION OF THE PROFESSIONS

P709 PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS—THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

P7091 Appointments and Staff Changes

Appointments and Staff Changes 242, 551, 803, 1111

P7092 News and Notes

News and Notes. Lott, L. B. (ed.) 236, 543, 797, 1104

P7093 In Memoriam

Brown, Everett Somerville 247
McGovern, William Montgomery 554
Griffin, William M. 809
Jorrin, Miguel 809
Overstreet, Eugene D. 809
Steinmeyer, Reuben G. 809
Vatcher, William H., Jr. 809
Barron, Richard W. 1118
Burdick, Eugene 1118
Towster Julian 1118

P7094 Dissertations

Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science. Compiled by Seyler, W. C. 771

P7095 Conferences

Professional Conferences 237, 546, 797, 1106

P7096 Washington Office

Washington Office Newsletter 236, 544, 1104

Q WELFARE, DEPENDENCY, SOCIAL INSURANCE, CRIME

Church and State in Social Welfare. Coughlin, B. J. Book note by Schull, G. L. 1032

Q8 CRIME, CRIMINALS

Q81 CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES

Q811 Crimes Against the State

Q8111 Conspiracy, Treason, Flag Desecration, Etc.

An Instance of Treason: Ozaki and the Sorge Spy Ring. Johnson, C. Book note by Totten, G. O. 203

The New Meaning of Treason. West, R. Book review by Spitz, D. 473

V PUBLIC UTILITIES

V4 WATER, WATER UTILITIES

V403 Water Rights

The Politics of Water in Arizona. Mann, D. E. Book note by Wengert, N. 166

W TRANSPORTATION, TRAFFIC, COMMUNICATION

Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis. Danielson, M. N. Book note by Utley, W. T. 1034

Y NATURAL RESOURCES

The Politics of Water in Arizona. Mann, D. E. Book note by Wengert, N. 166

The American Political Science Review

BOARD OF EDITORS

Harvey C. Mansfield, Managing Editor,	Columbia University	Harold Stein,	Princeton University
Otto Kirchheimer,	Columbia University	Rowland Egger,	University of Virginia
Andrew Hacker,	Cornell University	Stanley Hoffmann,	Harvard University
J. Roland Pennock,	Swarthmore College	Robert E. Lane,	Yale University

VOLUME LIX
1965

Copyright, 1966, by
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

GEORGE BANTA COMPANY, INC.
MENASHA, WISCONSIN

CONTENTS

NUMBER 1—MARCH, 1965

The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe. *Walter Dean Burnham* 7
Political Science and Prevision. *Bertrand de Jouvenel* 29
Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature. *Christian Bay* 39
Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats. *Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley* 52
Deeds Under a Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term. *Walter F. Murphy* 64
Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior. *Morton H. Halperin* 80

RESEARCH NOTES

The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals. *Robert J. Sickels* 100
Does a "Divisive" Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances? *Andrew Hacker* 105
Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in a Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation. *Thad L. Beyle* 111
Types of Primary and Party Responsibility. *Ira Ralph Telford* 117
Communication 119

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CONTRIBUTION

Foreign Local Government: A Bibliography. *Robert L. Morlan* 120
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. *Austin Ranney (ed.)* 137
News and Notes. *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 236

NUMBER 2—JUNE, 1965

Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election. *Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen and Warren E. Miller* 321
Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress. *Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz* 337
Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, Under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament. *Charles Burton Marshall* 350
The 1914 Case. *Ole R. Holsti* 365
Law, Society and the Domestic Regime in Russia, in Historical Perspective. *George L. Yaney* .. 379
The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections. *Rodney P. Stiefbold* 391
Scientists and the Policy Process. *Avery Leiserson* 408
Democracy, Organization, Michels. *John D. May* 417
Christian Thomasius: Enlightenment and Bureaucracy. *Frederick M. Barnard* 430
Communications 439
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. *Austin Ranney (ed.)* 448
News and Notes. *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 543

NUMBER 3—SEPTEMBER, 1965

The Transformation of Alliance Systems. *Herbert S. Dinerstein* 589
Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross-Polity Survey. *Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks* 602
A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater, 1957–1960. *Charles H. Gray* 615
An Appropriations Subcommittee and Four Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision and Control. *Ira Sharkansky* 622
Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. *James B. Christoph* 629
Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons. *John A. Armstrong* 643
Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico. *Kenneth F. Johnson* 656
Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look. *Justin Williams* 665
Reason and Revelation in Hooker's Ethics. *Robert K. Faulkner* 680
Communications 691
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. *Austin Ranney (ed.)* 694
Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science. *William C. Seyler (comp.)* 771
News and Notes. *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 797

NUMBER 4—DECEMBER, 1965

Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline. *David B. Truman* 865
The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence. *Robert E. Lane* 874
The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. *Raymond E. Wolfinger* 896
A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes. *Duncan MacRae, Jr.* 909
The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee. *John F. Manley* 927
Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis. *Glendon Schubert* 940
Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs. *Otto Kirchheimer* 964
The Modernity of Tradition: The Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India. *Lloyd I. Rudolph* 975
Obligation and Consent—I. *Hanna Pitkin* 990
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. *Austin Ranney (ed.)* 1001
News and Notes. *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 1104
Index to Volume LIX. *Corinne Silverman* 1119

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
Gabriel A. Almond
Stanford University

President-Elect
Robert A. Dahl
Yale University

Vice Presidents

Manning J. Dauer
University of Florida

William T. R. Fox
Columbia University

Rupert Emerson
Harvard University

Secretary
John H. Kautsky
Washington University, St. Louis

Treasurer
Max M. Kampelman
Washington, D.C.

Executive Director
Evron M. Kirkpatrick
1726 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C., 20036

Associate Director
Don G. Tacheron

Managing Editor, APSR
Harvey C. Mansfield
Columbia University

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

Marver H. Bernstein
Princeton University
James S. Coleman
University of California, Los Angeles
David Easton
University of Chicago
Charles D. Farris
University of Florida
Ernst B. Haas
University of California, Berkeley
Warren E. Miller
University of Michigan
Joseph Tanenhaus
New York University
John C. Wahlke
State University of New York, Buffalo

James C. Davies
University of Oregon
Alex N. Dragnich
Vanderbilt University
Heinz Eulau
Stanford University
Samuel Hendel
City College of the City University of New York
Wallace Mendelson
University of Texas
Laurence I. Radway
Dartmouth College
William H. Riker
University of Rochester
Victor G. Rosenblum
Northwestern University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

Frank J. Goodnow
Albert Shaw
Frederic N. Judson
James Bryce
A. Lawrence Lowell
Woodrow Wilson
Simeon E. Baldwin
Albert Bushnell Hart
W. W. Willoughby
John Bassett Moore
Ernst Freund
Jesse Macy
Munroe Smith
Henry Jones Ford
Paul S. Reinsch
Leo S. Rowe
William A. Dunning
Harry A. Garfield
James W. Garner
Charles E. Merriam

Charles A. Beard
William B. Munro
Jesse S. Reeves
John A. Fairlie
Benjamin F. Shambaugh
Edward S. Corwin
William F. Willoughby
Isidor Loeb
Walter J. Shepard
Francis W. Coker
Arthur N. Holcombe
Thomas Reed Powell
Clarence A. Dykstra
Charles Grove Haines
Robert C. Brooks
Frederic A. Ogg
William Anderson
Robert E. Cushman
Leonard D. White
John M. Gaus

Walter F. Dodd
Arthur W. Macmahon
Henry R. Spencer
Quincy Wright
James K. Pollock
Peter H. Odegard
Luther H. Gulick
Pendleton Herring
Ralph J. Bunche
Charles McKinley
Harold D. Lasswell
E. E. Schattschneider
V. O. Key, Jr.
R. Taylor Cole
Carl B. Swisher
Emmette S. Redford
Charles S. Hyneman
Carl J. Friedrich
C. Herman Pritchett
David B. Truman

READY IN NOVEMBER!
The latest addition to the Great Histories Series



THE JEWISH WAR and Other Selections from FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS—Abridged, edited, and with an Introduction by Moses I. Finley. Translated by H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. A selection from the works of the classical Jewish historian of Roman times who witnessed the defeat of the Jews by Titus and Vespasian.
W1404 ($1.45)

How many other outstanding volumes from the Great Histories Series are you familiar with?

As a special introductory offer, any three can be yours for only $1.00

GIBBON—*The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Trevor-Roper, editor. Includes Gibbon's *Autobiography* and personal *Vindication* of his attack on Church history. W1108 (90¢)

GUICCIARDINI—*History of Italy* and *History of Florence*, Hale, editor. Translated by Cecil Grayson. Accounts of the dramatic, tumultuous years in Renaissance Italy. W1106 (90¢)

HENRY ADAMS—Selections from his *Education*, *Life of George Cabot Lodge*, *the U.S. Under Jefferson and Madison*, *Life of Albert Gallatin*, *John Randolph*, Saveth, editor. W1109 (90¢)

HERODOTUS—*History of the Greek and Persian War*, Forrest, editor. Translated by George Rawlinson. A magnificent panoramic view of ancient life, customs and history—in the spirited prose of "The Father of History." W1100 (90¢)

TACITUS—*The Histories* and *The Annals*, Lloyd-Jones, editor. One of the liveliest of Roman historians describes in detail the political chaos of the first 100 years of the Roman Empire. W1104 (90¢)

THUCYDIDES—*The Peloponnesian Wars*, Brunt, editor. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Stirring chronicle of the holocaust that destroyed Greece's Golden Age. W1101 (90¢)

VOLTAIRE—*The Age of Louis XIV*, *History of Charles XII*, and *Essays on Customs*, Brumfitt, editor. Great writings from the Age of Enlightenment. W1107 (90¢)

ABOUT THE EDITOR: *Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, general editor of the Great Histories Series, is the distinguished Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University. He is probably most well-known to American readers for his book, THE LAST DAYS OF HITLER, a classic in the field of modern German history. Professor Trevor-Roper is a specialist in sixteenth and seventeenth-century history and has published several notable works and contributed numerous articles on political and historical subjects to journals.*

Washington Square Press, Inc., Dept. PSR-12
Educational Division
630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10020
Please send me the three books listed below for only $1.00.

________ ________ ________
(Order by number)

In addition, I would like to purchase the following books:
____

Name ________
Address ________
City ________ State ________ Zip Code ________

☐ Please send me free a copy of your catalog listing all of the Washington Square Press titles.

NOTE: Check or money order only. Please do not send cash.

STRONGER BINDINGS. Because of added material in the binding, all Washington Square Press books last up to twice as *long as other paperbound books. Always look for this colophon on the books you buy or adopt for classroom use.*

WSP

Allyn and Bacon, Inc.—1966 publications

GOVERNING THE AMERICAN NATION

Richard H. Leach, Duke University

Describes the foundations, structure, and functions of the national government. Includes strong emphasis on change and development of the government. Timely—incorporates changes through the 88th Congress. Concise—designed as an introductory text, to present core material.

Tentative Contents: PART I: FOUNDATIONS. The Setting of Government in America. The Ends of Government in America. The Constitutional Basis of American Government. The Operational Basis of American Government: Popular Participation. The Operational Basis of American Government: Political Parties. PART II. Structure and Organization. The Congress: I. The Congress: II. The Executive Branch: Presidency. The Executive Branch: Administration. The Judiciary. PART III: Government at Work: Functions. Financing Governmental Programs. Governmental Programs: Defense of Human Rights. Governmental Programs: Security and Welfare. PART IV: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. Challenges and Prospects.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

A Reader in Substance, Theory, and Methodology

William J. Crotty, Unversity of Oregon
Donald M. Freeman, University of Arizona at Tucson
Douglas S. Gatlin, Florida Atlantic University

Presents the best materials available for the study of problems relevant to political parties. Emphasizes the evolutionary nature of major and minor parties in political history. Analyzes theoretical landmarks of parties in contemporary political science. Compares, through essays, American political parties and those of other countries.

WORLD POLITICS

Basic Concepts and Persistent Issues

Arend Lijphart, University of California (Berkeley)

Selects material from acknowledged experts—both classic and contemporary theorists and political practitioners. Includes balanced material on the modern state system, world conflict, the search for international order, the cold war, and peaceful coexistence.

Dept. KI, 150 Tremont Street, Boston, Mass. 02111

Recent texts in American Government

COMMUNISM IN PERSPECTIVE

Andrew Gyorgy, Boston University

Includes a comprehensive study of the role and problems of world Communism. Stresses both the cold war and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Offers a wealth of illustrative problems—from the Soviet "take over" of Eastern Europe to the Korean War. Traces origins of modern Communism—from Marx, Lenin, Stalin to Mao and Khrushchev. 1964 6 x 9 paperbound 269 pp. ". . . the project is well conceived and well executed, and a valuable teaching aid." **Professor Frederick Barghoorn, Yale University**

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA

Daniel R. Grant and H. C. Nixon, Emeritus
both of Vanderbilt University

Develops understanding of intergovernmental relationships. Presents a realistic portrait of government operations in actual practice. Emphasizes significant areas previously neglected—state constitutions as political documents, judges and politics. Discusses such timely issues as: the impact of the census reports, the Baker v. Carr reapportionment decision, latest findings in state legislative behavior, civil rights. 1963 6½ x 9 439 pp. "Best book ever published in this area: covers the right topics in just enough detail, has perfect format, students read it enthusiastically." **Paul F. Douglass, Rollins College**

THE JUDICIARY:

The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process

Henry J. Abraham, The University of Pennsylvania

Analyzes the role of the judiciary—particularly the Supreme Court—in the legal, governmental, and political process. Discusses, in topical treatment, the Court's role in civil rights and liberties. Treats court staffing and the Supreme Court's role in judicial review and judicial self-restraint. 1965 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 128 pp.

Allyn and Bacon, Inc.

Dept. K1, 150 Tremont Street, Boston, Mass. 02111



On June 3, 1875, Alexander Graham Bell first transmitted recognizable voice sounds on this ingenious instrument. It employed a tightly stretched membrane, called "goldbeater's skin," which was sensitive to sound waves.

90 years of telephone progress toward better, faster service!



This year, 1965, the area-by-area introduction of fast, convenient Touch-Tone® phoning is well under way. Modern push buttons speed calling and open up many new uses for your phone. For example: you may be able to shop by phone just by touching buttons to identify the merchandise you want—or pay bills through your bank the same way.

The 90 years between these two models have seen literally thousands of telephone designs developed. And behind them all has been a relentless search for new methods and materials that would carry the human voice farther, faster, more clearly—and as free from trouble as humanly possible. That's why your telephone and your telephone service will always keep changing—for the better.

Bell System

American Telephone and Telegraph
and Associated Companies

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN CHILE
by Ernst Halperin.
A valuable assessment of the crucial interaction among the three leftist parties in Chile, and an appraisal of the pivotal 1964 presidential contest.
160 pages, $7.50

CANDIDATES, ISSUES, AND STRATEGIES: A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THE 1960 AND 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,
Second Revised Edition,
by Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin.
Computer simulation for processing public opinion poll data saw its first political use during the 1960 campaign. This book reports the simulation as actually done, reports changes and refinements employed in 1964, evaluates successes in predicting outcomes of both elections. ix + 167 pages, $5.95; M.I.T. Paperback MIT-33, $2.45

NIGERIA: THE TRIBES, THE NATION, OR THE RACE — THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE
by Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Fresh, analytical view of recent political history in the African nation having more people *and* more ethnic groups than any other; thorough discussion of the racial, ethnic, and regional factors absolutely vital to understanding Nigerian politics. 320 pages, $10.00

THE POLITICAL CULTURES OF MASSACHUSETTS
by Edgar Litt.
An experienced observer and active participant views old and new cultures, institutions, and political patterns in shifting conflict. The outcome of that conflict will determine the Commonwealth's ability to govern effectively. 240 pages, $5.95


NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION
an inquiry into the foundations of nationality
KARL W. DEUTSCH

Now in MIT Paperback:
NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY *by Karl W. Deutsch*

This inquiry cuts across many fields and draws on research results and methods in several disciplines of the social sciences. Using four case studies — Finland, Bohemia, India, and Scotland — as an index of assimilation to ultimate nationality, the author applies some of the ideas of communication theory and cybernetics, and through this interdisciplinary approach, develops a structural quantitative analysis of nationalism." . . . opens new perspectives on the objective study of nationality and its relation to the problems of world unity."—*The United States Quarterly Book Review.*
M.I.T. Paperback MIT-34
x + 292 pages, $2.95

Cambridge, Mass. 02142

THE M.I.T. PRESS

UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FRANCE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FRENCH CHARGES *by Allan W. Johnstone.*
Weighs evidence of excessive management control of French subsidiaries by American companies; assesses French capabilities for regulation; anticipates future policies. xv + 129 pages, $4.00

NINE SOVIET PORTRAITS
by Raymond A. Bauer.
Based on hundreds of interviews with Soviet refugees, these vignettes offer compelling insights into men, women, and motivations behind the Iron Curtain.
viii + 190 pages, $7.50;
M.I.T. Paperback MIT-27, $2.45

THE EMERGING ELITE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CEYLON
by Marshall R. Singer.
This is the first intensive study of the political leadership of any South Asian country. Through analysis of historical data, it undertakes to determine traditional leadership patterns. Further, it evaluates attitudinal and biographical data on every individual to have held national political office in Ceylon since 1924. In many ways, Ceylon may be considered a case study illustrative of changes occurring within the political elites of many of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. While the data of this study is exclusively Ceylonese, implications to be drawn from it are not. xix + 203 pages, $7.50

THE TURKISH POLITICAL ELITE *by Frederick W. Frey.* This is an investigation of the social backgrounds of all 2,210 Deputies to the Turkish national legislature, from its founding in 1920 through 1957, with extended coverage along main dimensions down to 1960. Hence, this work deals with the political elite during the entire "First Republic" of Turkey. In a momentous four decades, Turkey followed a near-classic political course: nationalist revolution, benevolent dictatorship, true democracy, degeneration into single-party rule, and, finally, decisive military coup d'etat. This study is an impressive contribution to scholarship, standing in unique isolation. Moreover, it is well written, highly readable. 480 pages, $12.50

Under the general editorship of
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, DANIEL LERNER,
AND ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL

M.I.T. STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Advisory Board for the series includes:
Gabriel Almond, *Stanford;* Karl W. Deutsch, *Yale;*
W. T. R. Fox, *Columbia;* Allen Holmberg, *Cornell*; Herbert H. Hyman, *Columbia;*
Alex Inkeles, *Harvard;* S. M. Lipset, *California;* Robert C. North, *Stanford;*
Edward Shils, *Chicago;* Richard C. Snyder, *Northwestern.*

This series will focus on studies of ELITES and SYMBOLS, with the intention of reinvigorating and refining the research tradition established a decade ago under these general editors in the Hoover Institute Studies.

THE M.I.T. PRESS
Cambridge, Mass. 02142

LANGUAGE OF POLITICS: STUDIES IN QUANTITATIVE SEMANTICS
by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and Associates.
These papers offer a deeper understanding of political power through an analysis of the language of politics, and demonstrate the quantitative methods by which this language may be studied. Originally published by George W. Stewart, Inc., reissue of this work is occasioned by a renewed demand for the important technical papers it contains. Some were originally written for the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communication at the Library of Congress. xii + 398 pages, $10.00

WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES: STUDIES IN COERCIVE IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS
edited by Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner.
If the reader's interest lies in comparative politics, government, or law, this volume will invite attention. Included are four classic studies in the power elites of the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and of Kuomintang and Communist China. Long out of print and difficult to find, three of the four studies were originally done for the Hoover Institute at Stanford. 400 pages, $15.00

A CROSS-POLITY SURVEY *by Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor.* ix + 1405 pages, $30.00

LOST SOLDIERS: THE FRENCH ARMY AND EMPIRE IN CRISIS, 1947-1962 *by George Armstrong Kelly.* x + 404 pages, $10.00

AN AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA *by Walt W. Rostow.* xvii + 59 pages, paper covers, $1.50

LIMITED WAR AND AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY *by Seymour J. Deitchman.* x + 273 pages, $10.00

MOSCOW AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA: A STUDY IN THE POSTWAR EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST STRATEGY *by John H. Kautsky.* xii + 220 pages, $10.00

SOUTHEAST ASIA: PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES POLICY *edited by William Henderson.* xiv + 273 pages, $7.50

THE CULTURAL FRONTIERS OF THE PEACE CORPS *edited by Robert B. Textor.* 383 pages, March 1966, $5.95

THE M.I.T. PRESS

Cambridge, Mass. 02142

COMMUNISM IN EUROPE: CONTINUITY, CHANGE, AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, Volume I *edited by William E. Griffith*

Little systematic research has been published either on the changes in European Communism since Stalin's death or on the Sino-Soviet rift and its impact on European Communist parties. This book is the first of a two-volume study of European Communism and deals specifically with Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and Italy. The second volume will examine East Germany, France and Czechoslovakia.

Vol. I, available now, x + 406 pages, $12.50

Vol. II, expected in March 1966, $12.50

THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA *by Walt W. Rostow, with Richard W. Hatch, Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and Alexander Eckstein.* xx + 379 pages, $12.50

SOCIAL ORDER AND THE RISKS OF WAR: PAPERS IN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY *by Hans Speier.* ix + 497 pages, $10.00*

PERSONALITY AND CULTURE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS *by Dinko Tomasic.* 249 pages, $7.50*

*Reissue, originally published by George W. Stewart, Inc.

THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AN INDONESIAN TOWN *by Clifford Geertz.* 224 pages, $7.50

COMMUNISM IN NORTH VIETNAM *by Patrick J. Honey.* xiii + 207 pages, $6.95

THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT *by William E. Griffith.* 512 pages, $7.95; M.I.T. Paperback MIT-12, $2.95

ALBANIA AND THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT *by William E. Griffith.* xv + 423 pages, $10.00; in paper covers, $3.95

From ST. MARTIN'S

Two new studies in

St. Martin's Series in American Politics

Earl Latham, *General Editor*

Political Parties in the United States

By Allan P. Sindler, *Cornell University*

Emphasizing such topics as party functions, the relation of party to governmental system, and two-party as contrasted with one- and multi-party systems, Professor Sindler has written a tightly organized and closely reasoned analysis of the American party system. This study draws upon a wide range of empirical evidence and is designed for use in courses on American government and political parties.

Spring 1966. About 125 pp. $1.75 paper.

The New Congress

By Stephen K. Bailey, *Dean, Maxwell School, Syracuse University*

Drawing upon the wealth of scholarly material that has appeared in recent years on the subject of Congress and the American legislative process, as well as his own direct observations and interviews, Professor Bailey has sketched a full-length portrait of the United States Congress in the mid-1960's. This highly readable study will provide the student with valuable information on the workings of Congress, as well as an analysis of the basic influences affecting its operation during the 1960's.

Spring 1966. About 125 pp. $1.75 paper.

Already published:

The Convention and the Constitution

The Political Ideas of the Founding Fathers

By David G. Smith, *Swarthmore College*

1965. 128 pp. $1.75 paper.

A new text edition:

An Introduction to World Politics

Fifth Edition

By W. Friedmann, *Columbia University*

An introduction to the general theory and specific problems of contemporary international politics designed for the college student and the general reader.

1965. 509 pp. Text price: $6.75 cloth.

College Department
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010

International Relations: A General Theory

J. W. BURTON Jr

Dr Burton believes that in a changing world environment the study of international relations is entering a phase that brings it in sharp conflict with orthodox studies and policies.

In this book he gives his reasons for arriving at these conclusions: the role of force and power is decreasing while the role of decision-making is increasing; non-alignment is a relevant response to conditions of the nuclear age; a system not dependent on power is emerging, comprising independent states each pursuing policies designed to avoid involvement in the affairs of others, and the theoretical basis of this system is non-discrimination in political as well as economic relations. $7.50

The Pursuit of Certainty

SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN

A study of the relationship between changes in the understanding of political activity and in general views of human life during the last two centuries in England. Mrs Letwin examines this relationship through the work and thought of four writers who marked the crucial changes: David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Beatrice Webb. $9.50

NOW IN PAPERBACK–

Social Science and Political Theory

W. G. RUNCIMAN $1.75 (Cloth $3.95)

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Now Available . . .

INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th ed.

Charles G. Fenwick, *Pan American Union. 849 pp., $7.50*

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2nd ed.

Robert E. Cushman, *National Historical Publications Commission;* and Robert F. Cushman. *1965 Printing. 1007 pp., $8.95*

Ogg and Ray's ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 9th ed.

Edited by William H. Young, *University of Wisconsin. 1965 Printing, Illus., Paper, $4.95*

Ogg and Ray's ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, 9th ed.

Edited by William H. Young. *1965 Printing, Illus., Paper, $3.95*

Ready for Second Semester . . .

INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL FOR ALL OGG and RAY Editions

Ready January 1st. *Price to be announced.*

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: Beyond Utopianism and Realism

Donald W. Brandon, *University of San Francisco. January, 295 pp., Paper, $2.95*

EAST ASIA'S TURBULENT CENTURY; With American Diplomatic Documents

Young Hum Kim, *California Western University. January, 386 pp., Paper, $3.95*

PUBLIC POLICY AND THE MODERN CORPORATION

Edited by Donald Grunewald, *Rutgers University;* and Henry L. Bass, *Hunter College. January, 384 pp., Illus., Paper, $3.95 (tent.)*

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS

440 Park Ave. South, New York, N.Y. 10016

Spring publications . . .

ACC

Ogg and Ray's INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 13th ed.

Edited by William H. Young, *University of Wisconsin. April, 980 pp., Illus., $8.75 (tent.)*

Ogg and Ray's INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, 13th ed.

Edited by William H. Young. *April, 760 pp., Illus., $8.25 (tent.)*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 2nd ed.

Vernon Van Dyke, *University of Iowa. April, 600 pp., $6.50 (tent.)*

THE SUPREME COURT: Judicial Process and Judicial Politics

Arthur A. North, S.J., *Fordham University. April, 200 pp., Paper, $2.50 (tent.)*

MAIN CURRENTS OF THOUGHT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *State University of New York, Albany. April, 220 pp., Paper, $2.95 (tent.)*

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES and Related Documents

Edited by Martin Shapiro, *University of California at Irvine. Crofts Classics, April, 128 pp., Paper, $.50*

Recent . . .

BASIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 5th ed.

Hillman M. Bishop *and* Samuel Hendel, *both of the City College of New York. 603 pp., Paper, $3.25*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 2nd ed.

Clyde F. Snider, *University of Illinois. 735 pp., Maps, $7.50*

THE SOVIET SYSTEM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: Selected Western and Soviet Views

Edited by Harry G. Shaffer, *University of Kansas. 470 pp., Paper, $4.50*

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS

Division of Meredith Publishing Company

NEW DEAL MOSAIC

Roosevelt Confers with His National Emergency Council—1933-1936

New Deal Mosaic is a verbatim transcript of the Proceedings of the National Emergency Council, which Roosevelt established to help coordinate the increasingly complex functions of the Federal government. Now published for the first time, these proceedings, with introduction and notes by the editors, provide a fascinating insight into the early New Deal era. xxiv, 578 p. $10.00.

The book is a unique demonstration of a humane Chief Executive in action. Thirty years before the War on Poverty, he expressed his determination to help the desperately poor of America:

"The question comes up, are we licked in trying to help them in their living conditions? . . . We say, 'Will private capital help them?' They say, 'No, it can't, but we don't want the government to help them.' Are we licked in trying to help these people . . .? Their answer is, 'Yes, we are licked; we must not do anything to help them because we might interfere with private capital.' The answer is, 'No, we are not licked! We are going to help them!' "

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON BOOKS
EUGENE, OREGON 97403

PART-TIME WORK AVAILABLE

PH.D. preferred, M.A. considered, as a field interviewer for a market research organization specializing in interviewing "highly educated audiences."

In the course of an average year, Mendota interviewers see about one of ten of the nation's physicians and a large proportion of its lawyers, engineers, editors, administrators, business executives and school principals.

High interview rate plus bonus for complete assignments. Merit raises with experience. Work assignments adjustable to available time. Any location in the United States.

If you are interested and meet these qualifications, please write for application forms.

MENDOTA RESEARCH GROUP
31 Sylvan Avenue
ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NEW JERSEY

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 1965

Edited by PHILIP B. KURLAND

The Review is published annually to provide a forum for critical discussion centering on cases from the recent Court term. "It is this kind of stock-taking analysis—a look at where a series of case-by-case decisions is taking the Court and us—that will be the greatest service this publication can render to the Court and through it to society."—*American Bar Association Journal.*

$6.95

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

Edited by PHILIP B. KURLAND

A selection of essays from the first five issues of the annual *Supreme Court Review.* Contributors are Harry Kalven, Jr., Robert G. McCloskey, Phil C. Neal, Francis A. Allen, and Edward L. Barrett, Jr.

Paper, $2.45

THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION

By DAVID E. APTER

In discussing modernization in terms of politics, Apter emphasizes methods of comparing societies to study their political growth and adaptation and the meaning of political life in moral terms. He offers hypotheses about the causes of change, describes alternative political types that evolve during modernization periods, indicating the variables that move a system toward one type or the other, and examines the potentialities for democratic government in modernization.

432 pages, $7.50

BANTU BUREAUCRACY

A Century of Political Evolution among the Basoga of Uganda

By LLOYD A. FALLERS

"Dr. Fallers has written a provocative and illuminating book. Even though they may disagree with some of his points, readers will find it stimulates them to reconsider their thinking. Thus it should open new ground in the study of African political systems and for that matter political systems in other parts of the world."—*Rhodes-Livingstone Journal.* " . . . should be read by all who are concerned with modern African administration, for the dilemmas it discusses are general ones." —*Times Literary Supplement.*

Cloth, $5.00 *Paper, $1.95*

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
Chicago / London

Significant—from Syracuse

Public Administration and Democracy
Essays in Honor of Paul H. Appleby

Roscoe C. Martin, editor

Fifteen essays by distinguished colleagues in the fields of public administration, political science and economics explore vital issues relating to public administration, in this *festschrift* for a truly "public man." The final essay, from Paul Appleby's own writings, reflects his lifelong efforts to reconcile vigorous administration, which he held necessary, with democratic government, which he cherished. *$7.95*

The Two Parties and the Tariff in the 1880's

S. Walter Poulshock

Well-argued and thoroughly documented, this revisionist history identifies the tariff as the key political issue of the 1880's, an issue which enabled political leaders to organize their various factions into national parties, and which demonstrated basic differences between the Republican and the Democratic parties. *$5.00*

Freedom and the Public
Public and Private Morality in America

Donald Meiklejohn

Drawing from such current policy issues as integration and freedom of speech, this vigorous and eloquent discussion goes to the heart of the paradox in which "it is not America who is free—only individual Americans." *$4.95*

National Planning Series

Bertram M. Gross, general editor

This new paperbound series will analyze national economic planning in a variety of societies, and from a variety of viewpoints, to provide a broad picture of the complexities of guided social change in the modern world. The first three volumes have just been published:

1. **Venezuela:** ***From Doctrine to Dialogue, by John Friedmann***
   A study in depth of CORDIPLAN, Venezuela's national planning organization. *$2.95*
2. **Morocco-Tunisia:** ***Politics and Planning, by Douglas E. Ashford***
   Analysis of the political and social climates of the two countries to assess why one is failing and the other succeeding at planning efforts. *$2.75*
3. **Tanganyika:** ***Preplanning, by Fred G. Burke***
   A historical study of Tanganyikan plan formulation and implementation and its relevance for the new state of Tanzania. *$3.25*

From your bookstore or

Syracuse University Press
Syracuse, New York 13210

Fp

A new edition of a highly praised text

READER IN PUBLIC OPINION AND COMMUNICATION

Second Edition

Edited by Bernard Berelson, *Vice-President of The Population Council,* **and Morris Janowitz,** *University of Chicago*

Now completely revised and updated, this noted reader in the field of public opinion and communication presents a penetrating overview of the theory, substantive issues, and methodology of a rapidly expanding field. Fifty-four selections (of which more than half are new to this edition) are grouped in eleven major areas of investigation.

CONTENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Theory of Public Opinion. George Carslake Thompson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Harold D. Lasswell, Herbert Blumer, Daniel Katz. **Formation of Public Opinion.** Walter Lippmann, Seymour M. Lipset, Bruno Bettelheim, Morris Janowitz, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet. **Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy.** A. V. Dicey, V. O. Key, Jr., Bernard C. Cohen. **Theory of Communication.** Charles H. Cooley, George Herbert Mead, Edward Sapir, Robert E. Park, Harold D. Lasswell. **Communication Media: Structure and Control.** Raymond B. Nixon and Jean Ward, Wilbur Schramm, Zechariah Chafee, Federal Communications Commission. **Communication Content.** Harold D. Lasswell, Bernard Berelson, Ernst Kris, Nathan Leites, Kurt Lang, Gladys Engel Lang, Harold L. Wilensky. **Communications Audiences.** Gary Steiner, Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lewis Dexter, Frederick Barghoorn. **Communication Effects.** W. W. Charters, Carl I. Hovland, Arthur Lumsdaine, Fred D. Sheffield, Edward A. Shils, Morris Janowitz, Hilde Himmelweit, Elihu Katz, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Kurt Lang, Gladys Engel Lang, Joseph T. Klapper. **Public Opinion, Communication and Democratic Objectives.** Bernard Berelson, Edward A. Shils, The Commission on Freedom of the Press, The Royal Commission on The Press. **Toward Comparative Analysis.** Gabriel A. Almond, Sidney Verba, Alex Inkeles, Raymond A. Bauer, Edgar H. Schein, Lucian W. Pye. **Research Methods.** Herbert H. Hyman, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Carl I. Hovland, Arthur W. Kornhauser, Charles E. Osgood, Wilbur Schramm, William McPhee, Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph.

January 1966 800 pages $11.50

more from THE FREE PRESS ▶

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Fp

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF THE GREATNESS OF THE ROMANS AND THEIR DECLINE

By Montesquieu

Translated with Notes and an Introduction by David Lowenthal, Wheaton College

Unavailable in English for many years, this work is one of the few extended historical analyses written by a great political philosopher. Montesquieu considers the beliefs, practices, and institutions that enabled the Roman Republic to rule vast regions of the world, and reviews the causes that led to the downfall of that great dominion.

1965 253 pages $5.95

AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY
A Reader in Theory and Policy

Edited by Morton Berkowitz, *Brooklyn College*, and P. G. Bock of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*

This outstanding reader encompasses virtually all the more recent work of leading social scientists emphasizing the political aspects of national security and international politics. ". . . another addition—one of considerable importance—to books dealing with the problems of national security." —Hanson N. Baldwin, *The New York Times*

1965 496 pages $9.95

Two Volumes in the Studies in Contemporary Latin America, John J. Johnson, General Editor

ORGANIZED LABOR IN LATIN AMERICA

By Robert J. Alexander, *Rutgers University*

Fewer than a half-dozen books in English offer anything like this volume's detailed examination of organized labor movements in the twenty republics of Latin America. This study outlines the general aspects of labor relations in Latin America, and describes specific developments in legal theory and practice which directly influenced the development of labor movements in the area.

1965 284 pages $5.95

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA
A History of the Movement, 1917-1963

By Rollie Poppino, *University of California at Davis*

An objective analysis of one of the most disturbing and frequently misunderstood problems in inter-American relations. ". . . a first-rate piece of work by the foremost authority on the subject. It deserves a wide audience from an American public that too often receives only distorted views of Latin-American politics and the role of the Communists in the area."—Karl M. Schmitt, *The Annals*

1964 255 pages $6.50

CRISIS IN WORLD COMMUNISM
Marxism in Search of Efficiency

By Frank O'Brien, ***Assistant Director of Research, Committee for Economic Development***

This is a thorough analysis of what is known about the economic problems and policies of the Communist world today. The author argues that the Communists are currently failing in their efforts to surpass the capitalist world because of flaws inherent in Marxist doctrines, and because of over-blown and unrealistic standards the author terms "Marxist Romanticism."

1965 191 pages $4.95

COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

By Major John S. Pustay, ***U. S. Air Force Academy***

An eye-opening review of current methods of unconventional warfare and ways of improving our ability to respond to this unfamiliar but increasingly important form of military challenge. Advocating limited but continuous American involvement in counterinsurgency operations throughout the world, this volume outlines strategy that can be effectively employed by United States assistance missions to defeat insurgents.

1965 245 pages $6.95

INTERNAL WAR
Problems and Approaches

Edited by Harry Eckstein, ***Princeton University***

Thirteen distinguished social scientists highlight the major problems and possibilities for a systematic study of internal war using illustrations from past and current internal conflicts. Many perspectives, derived from the fields of political science, sociology, and economics, demonstrate how much *more* than an operational anti-guerrilla doctrine is needed before we can successfully cope with the revolutionary turmoil of our age.

1964 349 pages $6.95

IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT

Edited by David E. Apter, ***University of California, Berkeley***

A Volume in the International Yearbook Series of Political Behavior Research

This collection of papers represents an appraisal of the concept of ideology in the light of contemporary social and political change. Special emphasis is given to the role of ideology in the new nations as compared with its place in the older, highly developed countries. A series of case studies of events in the Middle East, Indonesia, Africa, Japan, and the United States illustrate the various functions of ideology today.

1964 342 pages $9.95

more from THE FREE PRESS

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

An Outstanding Series

FP

HISTORY AND SOURCES OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Andrew Hacker, *Cornell University,* General Editor

From Homer's antique Greece to the present . . . six narrative histories (in hardcover) and six companion sourcebooks (in paperback) systematically present the works that have molded Western political thought, and uncover the roots of the West's great political movements throughout history.

THE GREAT DIALOGUE:
A History of Greek Political Thought from Homer to Polybius
By Donald Kagan, *Cornell University*
1965 285 pages $5.95

SOURCES IN GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM HOMER TO POLYBIUS
Edited by Donald Kagan
1965 316 pages paper $1.95

CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE:
History of British Political Thought, 1593-1900
By W. Harrison, *University of Liverpool*
1964 281 pages $5.95

SOURCES IN BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1593-1900
Edited by W. Harrison
1964 320 pages paper $1.95

IN SEARCH OF AUTHORITY:
Twentieth Century Political Thought
By Henry S. Kariel, *Bennington College*
1964 270 pages $4.95

SOURCES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT
Edited by Henry S. Kariel
1964 319 pages paper $1.95

In Preparation

HISTORY AND SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT
By Ewart Lewis

HISTORY AND SOURCES OF CONTINENTAL POLITICAL THOUGHT
By Michael Walzer, *Princeton University*

HISTORY AND SOURCES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DOCTRINES
By Thoman P. Jenkin, *University of California,* Riverside

Available at your bookstore or directly from . . .

THE FREE PRESS
A Division of The Macmillan Company
60 Fifth Avenue, New York 10011

Cornell
UNIVERSITY PRESS

IMPORTANT NEW PUBLICATIONS

The City Planning Process

A Political Analysis

By ALAN A. ALTSHULER. What are the fundamental problems that confront the city planner in a democratic society? How have political and administrative obstacles hampered effective land-use planning in urban America? How effective, and how compatible with the integrity of the planning profession, are the various strategies that have been employed to help overcome these obstacles? These are just a few of the vital questions examined in this searching analysis of current city planning theory and practice. Building upon case studies and upon the broad literature on American urban planning and politics, Professor Altshuler offers a general critique of some important city planning theory. $8.50

Bill of Rights Reader

Leading Constitutional Cases—3rd Edition

Edited by MILTON R. KONVITZ. "... a noteworthy contribution to modern constitutional thought ... indispensable to those who desire currency in their comprehension of rights, obligations, and powers of individuals and authorities," said the *California Law Review* in commenting on an earlier edition of this well-known book. To bring the picture of our legal heritage up to date, 49 new cases have been added to this new edition, including some decided as recently as 1965. The opinions of the Court have been skillfully chosen for the light they shed on the significance of the controversies. $12.50

Negro Political Leadership in the South

By EVERETT C. LADD, JR. The patterns of Negro political leadership that have emerged in the urban South since the Supreme Court's historic school desegregation decision are examined in this timely and important study. The author explores the meaning of Negro leadership in light of changes in Negro political life and race relations over the past decade, contrasting developments in rim-South cities with developments in deep-South cities. He describes the styles of race leadership in the urban South and discusses the roles played by the various race-advancement organizations, noting that, as the Negro revolution moves on, the politics of desegregation in the South comes to resemble more and more closely that of the urban North. *Coming in January.* $7.50

Cornell University Press

Ithaca, New York

The Dorsey Press Announces

The Revised Edition of

MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

By Alex N. Dragnich, Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, *Vanderbilt University*

Thoroughly updated, the Revised Edition of *Major European Governments* continues to provide concise and compact coverage of the governments and politics of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union. As in the previous edition, the uniformity of treatment is achieved through a common outline. The Revised Edition reflects changes in all countries since the previous edition, particularly in the Soviet Union. A new analytical chapter has been added entitled "The Study of Comparative Government." New sections have been added and all materials have been brought up to date. More stress is placed on actual practice and on analysis. The introduction has been expanded and made more meaningful.

About 500 Pages *Ready in January* *Text Price: About $8.00*

New and Recent Dorsey Texts

COMPARATIVE POLITICS, Notes and Readings, *Revised Edition*

Edited by *Roy C. Macridis,* Brandeis University, and *Bernard E. Brown,* Brooklyn College of the City University of New York

705 Pages *1964* *Text Price: $6.75*

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The Making of World Order

By *Philip E. Jacob,* and *Alexine L. Atherton,* both of the University of Pennsylvania

739 Pages *1965* *Text Price: $9.00*

THE THEORY AND METHOD OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS

By *Eugene J. Meehan,* Rutgers—The State University

287 Pages *1965* *Text Price: $5.50*

IDEAS AND POLITICS: The American Experience

By *David W. Minar,* Northwestern University

447 Pages *1964* *Text Price: $7.50*

Write for Examination Copies Today

Published in: THE DORSEY SERIES IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Consulting Editor: *Norton E. Long,*
Brandeis University

THE DORSEY PRESS

HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS

PROTECTORS

These dedicated "pros" are members of a vital team. They are responsible for the personal safety of workers in every General Motors plant—much as police and fire departments protect the citizens of a city. They are serious-minded, hard-working men, thoroughly skilled at their jobs.

Shown here are the safety director, the fire chief, and police chief of a typical GM plant. Backed by a large plant-protection force and a volunteer fire brigade, plus an able medical staff, they perform a number of highly important duties. Fire prevention, traffic control and plant security are just a few of these. But perhaps their key function is the effective maintenance of GM's traditional "Seven Basic Principles of Safety." GM employes, as a result, are actually safer at their jobs than in their homes.

General Motors has led the way in the establishment of modern industrial safety procedures. Its record in this regard is exceptional in American industry. Thus, these security and safety experts are among GM's most valuable people. They produce no products but they are essential to the well-being of those who do.

General Motors Is People...

making better things for you

Seven Basic Principles of Safety
1 Provide Active Top Management Support
2 Maintain Adequate Safety Personnel
3 Develop Safety Instructions For Every Job
4 Instruct Each New Employe
5 Operate Through Supervision
6 Make Every Employe Safety Minded
7 Extend Efforts Beyond The Plant
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
FIRE
DRY CHEM

Coming Spring 1966—
A Collection of Readings Emphasizing
the Cultural Framework of Politics

THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION

Dialogues in Politics and Political Behavior

Edited by EDGAR LITT,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Designed for the introductory course, this annotated reader stresses the behavioral and cultural dimensions of political science. It integrates the contributions of empirical political science with the classic and humanistic concerns of political man. The readings especially emphasize the role of political beliefs and ideologies in an appraisal of politics. Moreover, their application to the foundations of political democracy and the formation of public policy (in education) provide the major conceptual linage in the book.

The selections are organized to convey the importance of dialogue and debate in intellectual and scholarly writings on politics. Dr. Litt has avoided presenting snippets of articles and books in order that the student may have enough of the author's thesis to make an intelligent evaluation. He has also refrained from the "great books" approach predicated on the mistaken notion that only authors who lived a century ago are classical. All of the selections reflect Dr. Litt's efforts to relate general theory, criticism, or speculation and specific empirical or case studies.

The book is divided into five parts; the first two deal with political beliefs and ideologies. Readings in the remaining parts cover political resources of democratic societies, modern and comparative political institutions and processes, and the public policies of education. Each part contains four sections, with three reading selections in each section prefaced by an introductory statement by the editor.

Approx. 576 pages, softbound

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY

Chicago Atlanta Dallas Palo Alto Fair Lawn, N.J.

Coming from **CHANDLER**

Collective Security

Edited by Marina S. Finkelstein and Lawrence S. Finkelstein

256 pp., 5½ x 8¼" paper $2.50, cloth $6.00

THE WORLD POLITICS SERIES Paul Seabury, Editor

Stockpiling Strategic Materials:
Politics and National Defense

By Glenn H. Snyder, State University of New York at Buffalo

285 pp., 5½ x 8¼" paper $3.00, cloth $6.00

Guide to the Study of International Relations

By J. K. Zawodny, University of Pennsylvania

144 pp., 5½ x 8¼" paper $1.75, cloth $5.00

Chandler Publications in Political Science Victor Jones, Editor

CHANDLER PUBLISHING COMPANY
124 SPEAR STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94105

FOUNDATION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SERIES

***Peaceful Co-Existence*—An Analysis of Soviet Policy**

No 3 by Wladyslaw W. Kulski, *Duke University*

A study of Soviet foreign policy since the Revolution in which Professor Kulski, former Polish Minister to London, examines the possibility of peaceful co-existence. **$12.50**

Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow

No 5 by William Montgomery McGovern, *Northwestern University*

An analysis of the actions of nations as they relate to the national economies, the ideology, and the cultural and ethnological characteristics of their peoples. **$4.00**

Berlin and the Future of Eastern Europe

No 7 edited by David S. Collier, *Foundation for Foreign Affairs*
and Kurt Glaser, *Southern Illinois University*

A definitive examination of the problem by twelve prominent scholars of international affairs from Europe and the United States. **$6.00**

Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe

No 9 edited by David S. Collier and Kurt Glaser

This book is based on twelve papers presented at the Wiesbaden conference in 1963 by political scientists, historians, journalists, professors, and governmental officials. **$6.00**

published by Henry Regnery Company in cooperation with

FOUNDATION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INC.
154 EAST SUPERIOR STREET • CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60611

From Harcourt, Brace & World

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
National, State, and Local Edition/National Edition

by EMMETTE S. REDFORD, DAVID B. TRUMAN,
ANDREW HACKER, ALAN F. WESTIN, and ROBERT C. WOOD

This major new text for the American government course, written by five distinguished scholars, presents a comprehensive survey of the workings of American democracy. The first part introduces the student to the government as it functions today and gives him some of the historical background he needs for a full understanding of these functions. Each of the following five parts treats a major area of government and politics. Part Two is a lively and colorful treatment of the political process: political parties, public opinion and interest groups, voting behavior, nominations, and elections. Part Three deals with the elected officials of the national government, the President and the members of Congress, as well as with the executive branch, the regulatory agencies, and the bureaucracy. Part Four treats of law and its enforcement, covering such vital issues as civil liberties, civil rights, and judicial review. Part Five considers the economics of government, regulation of business, fiscal policy, welfare, conservation, foreign policy, and national defense. Part Six (omitted in the National Edition) brings original research and fresh insight to the subject of state and local government. "This is clearly the finest text available in American government."—Robert S. Gilmour, Columbia University.

National, State, and Local Edition: 1,004 pages, illustrated, $8.95. National Edition: 874 pages, illustrated, $7.95. Instructor's Manual available.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

by LOUIS W. KOENIG

This incisive and comprehensive study offers the first full-scale treatment of the office of the Presidency. It examines the work of the Presidency in all its complexity, considering in detail the varied legal, political, and administrative aspects of the office. In particular, the author analyzes the continual tension between the loosely defined powers ascribed to the President and the real instruments of power that are available to him during his term of office. "A major contribution to our knowledge of the American Presidency."—Arnold A. Rogow, Stanford University, in *Book Week.* Text Edition: 435 pages, $7.50

POLITICAL PATTERNS IN TODAY'S WORLD

by D. W. BROGAN and DOUGLAS V. VERNEY

This distinguished text-supplement offers a fresh and thoroughly objective appraisal of the political processes of democracy and totalitarianism as they operate in five selected countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and the USSR. ". . . an outstanding book which should be of use in a variety of political and social science courses."—Herbert J. Doherty, University of Florida. Paperbound. 274 pages, $2.95

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Books for Political Science Courses

MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS: Fourth Edition

by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER and JOHN H. HERZ

A complete revision of the leading text in comparative government, the Fourth Edition offers a comprehensive survey of the political heritage and social background, the party systems, the foreign policies, and the legislative, executive, and judicial structures of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and France. With new maps and charts, and extensive, up-to-date bibliographies. ". . . this classic is still the best."—James M. Clark, University of Maine. 692 pages, $9.50

Now available: two complete sections from *Major Foreign Powers,* reprinted with all the maps, charts, and illustrations in separate paperbound editions:

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. 209 pages, $1.95

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION

by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. With a new 54-page section of seven principal Soviet constitutional documents. 181 pages, $1.95

POLITICS IN EUROPE: 5 Cases in European Government

Edited by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER and ALAN F. WESTIN

Five vividly reconstructed case studies explore the implications of contemporary European political systems in their theoretical and practical contexts. Each case tells a unique story that brings in a wide range of information about the workings of a particular system; contrasts the case event with the norm of events in that particular area; and analyzes pressures, policies, and power in Great Britain, Germany, the Common Market, and the USSR. "Each case is thorough, well-researched, clearly written, and demonstrates the well-known intelligence and capacities of the contributors."—John R. Schott, Wellesley College. A Harbrace Casebook in Political Science. Paperbound. 205 pages, $2.95

Distinguished Harbinger paperbacks

The Fifteen Weeks by JOSEPH MARION JONES / *Religion and Politics in America* by MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR. / *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies* by CLINTON ROSSITER / *The Symbols of Government* by THURMAN ARNOLD / *The Modern Researcher* by JACQUES BARZUN and HENRY F. GRAFF.

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

New York / Chicago / Burlingame

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

HISTORY TEXTS

Announcing

STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICS

A New Series of Readings in

AMERICAN HISTORY ● EUROPEAN HISTORY
AMERICAN POLITICS ● COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Each volume combines four elements

THEMATIC ORGANIZATION ● tracing the complete development of a major topic

PRIMARY MATERIALS ● enabling students to read and analyze source materials and essential documents

INTERPRETATIVE ESSAYS ● acquainting students with fresh, provocative interpretations by leading specialists

EDITORIAL NARRATIVE ● introducing parts and sections, and providing continuity as the topic is developed

Titles now published

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Roger W. Pethybridge, *University College, Swansea, England*

This volume traces the affairs of the Communist Bloc in East Europe and Asia from the closing stages of the Second World War up to 1960.
Paperbound 272 pages $2.25

CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY

John F. Wilson, *Princeton University*

This volume examines the relationship between Church and State in America from Colonial times to the present day.
Paperbound 256 pages $1.95

RUSSIA AND THE WEST FROM PETER TO KHRUSHCHEV

L. Jay Oliva, *New York University*

This volume explores the relations of Russia with its Western neighbors from the modernizations of Peter the Great to the fall of Khrushchev.
Paperbound 320 pages $2.50

Other Volumes in Preparation

D. C. HEATH
AND COMPANY
COLLEGE DEPARTMENT

Home Office: Boston, Mass. 02116
Sales Offices: Englewood, N.J. 07631
Chicago, Ill. 60616 San Francisco, Calif. 94105 Atlanta, Ga. 30324
Dallas, Tex. 75247 London W.C.1 Toronto 2-B

PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION

By JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

Mr. Nye's illuminating analysis of the East African experience provides an excellent representative example of the impact of Pan-Africanism, an ideology frequently expressed by African leaders, on the cooperative arrangements among new states and their efforts to form a federation. *Center for International Affairs.* $7.50

AFTER IMPERIALISM

The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931

By AKIRA IRIYE

In the first extensive and systematic study of Far Eastern international relations during the significant years of the 1920's, the author develops a framework within which the fundamental changes in individual foreign policies can be examined and understood in relation to the larger international problems of the time. *Harvard East Asian Series, 22.* $9.50

CITY POLITICS

By EDWARD C. BANFIELD and JAMES Q. WILSON

"A departure from the traditional treatise, *really* makes use of the latest materials, and actually *does* take a large and long-awaited step toward revitalizing an exciting and important but inexcusably weak area of political science . . . . a significant contribution to the field."—*The American Political Science Review. Joint Center for Urban Studies.* Second printing. $6.95

LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION

Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History

By LEONARD W. LEVY

"One of the indispensable contributions to the history of American freedom."—Henry Commager, *N. Y. Times Book Review.* "Levy is admirably impartial in setting the historical record straight . . . . he deserves praise . . . for doing much more than he intended."—*The American Political Science Review. Belknap Press.* Second printing. $6.50

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

ANNOUNCING NEW REPRINTS

Elmer Plischke — American Foreign Relations

A bibliography of official sources,

College Park, Md., 1955 (Reprint 1965)

Cloth bound $4.50

Available January

This compilation is primarily a guide to official printed source materials on American foreign relations, selected unofficial bibliographies, periodicals and unofficial collections of documents. Making reference only to English language materials, it is notable in its inclusion of bibliographical information concerning certain items and series which is not readily accessible in other printed sources.

William Cobbett

Parliamentary History of England from the Norman Conquest in 1066 to the Year 1803

Available 1966

36 volumes. London 1806-1820 / **Cloth bound set $1,000.00**
Per volume, cloth bound 30.00

Vol. 1 (1066-1625)	Vol. 10 (1737-1739)	Vol. 19 (1777-1778)	Vol. 28 (1789-1791)
Vol. 2 (1625-1642)	Vol. 11 (1739-1741)	Vol. 20 (1778-1780)	Vol. 29 (1791-1792)
Vol. 3 (1642-1660)	Vol. 12 (1741-1743)	Vol. 21 (1780-1781)	Vol. 30 (1792-1794)
Vol. 4 (1660-1688)	Vol. 13 (1743-1747)	Vol. 22 (1781-1782)	Vol. 31 (1794-1795)
Vol. 5 (1688-1702)	Vol. 14 (1747-1753)	Vol. 23 (1782-1783)	Vol. 32 (1795-1797)
Vol. 6 (1702-1714)	Vol. 15 (1753-1765)	Vol. 24 (1783-1785)	Vol. 33 (1797-1798)
Vol. 7 (1714-1722)	Vol. 16 (1765-1771)	Vol. 25 (1785-1786)	Vol. 34 (1798-1800)
Vol. 8 (1722-1733)	Vol. 17 (1771-1774)	Vol. 26 (1786-1788)	Vol. 35 (1800-1801)
Vol. 9 (1733-1737)	Vol. 18 (1774-1777)	Vol. 27 (1788-1789)	Vol. 36 (1801-1803)

Hertslet's Commercial Treaties

Vols. 1-31. (All published).
London 1827-1925

Cloth bound set	$1,520.00
Paper bound set	1,425.00
Vols. 1-5. Per volume, paper bound	25.00
Vols. 6-31. Per volume, paper bound	50.00

Volume 22 is general index to volumes 1-21; volume 31 is index to volumes 23-30.
Mudge-Winchell L665.

Available 1966

A collection of treaties and conventions between Great Britain and foreign powers, and of the laws, decrees, orders in council, etc., concerning the same, so far as they relate to commerce and navigation, slavery, extradition, nationality, copyright, postal matters, etc.

JOHNSON REPRINT CORPORATION
111 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003

Coming in '66

THE GOVERNING OF MEN: An Introduction to Political Science, *Revised Edition*

Austin Ranney, University of Wisconsin

This crisply written survey of contemporary political science focuses on the attitudes and activities of people as they engage in the political process. Makes excellent use of the many studies in public opinion and political behavior made in various nations during the past two decades. Highly readable and informative for both student and concerned citizen.

February 1966 — 688 pp. — $8.50 tent.

NATIONS AND MEN: International Politics Today

Ivo D. Duchacek, The City College of the City University of New York

A provocative study of the key factor in politics—*man*—as he is, not as he should be. Analyzes the complex interaction of the international system of states, nations and men, developing six major themes which include the nuclear stalemate and emerging China. A stimulating text for an introductory course in International Politics, and important reading for the interested layman.

February 1966 — 384 pp. — $4.95 (tent.) paper

UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY

Martin Needler, The University of Michigan

A straightforward survey of U.S. foreign policy—with a definite point of view. Balanced but not timid, this timely book deals with every relevant topic, from European integration to the current conflict in Vietnam. Excellent introduction to the field.

January 1966 — 288 pp. — $4.95 tent.

AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS: Essays and Readings

Donald G. Herzberg, Eagleton Institute of Politics
Gerald M. Pomper, Rutgers, The State University

In carefully organized discussions, the authors analyze a wide array of political activity. Their essays weld together this important collection of studies from leading books and periodicals in such a way that this reader will serve effectively as the student's basic introduction to American party politics.

March 1966 — 480 pp. — $5.50 (tent.) paper

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, inc.
383 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Benjamin Baker and Stanley H. Friedelbaum

This theoretically oriented text emphasizes the essentially pragmatic character of the American experience by demonstrating how our political institutions have changed over the years in response to the needs of American society. The first half of the book deals with the major *institutions* of American national government, while the second half discusses the major *functions* of the national, state, and local governments. A perceptive Introduction focuses upon current issues and their relationship to the American political value system, foretelling later discussion of such vital topics as (1) racial discrimination, (2) labor and immigration, (3) automation, and (4) the growth of metropolitan areas.

About 560 pages *A February 1966 Publication*
An Instructor's Manual by Robert Getz will be available.

THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: A Reader

Edited by Samuel Krislov and Lloyd D. Musolf

45 articles from scholarly journals, periodicals, and congressional transcript illustrate the reasons for and problems of the regulatory process. Taken together they provide a guide to the paths tread by the regulatory bodies among the executive branch, Congress, and interest groups.

261 pages *Paperbound* *1964* *$2.25*

COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS

Harold C. Hinton

Dr. Hinton's analytic interpretation of the objectives, methods, successes, and failures of Communist China's foreign policy and foreign relations is based on a decade of experience in studying and evaluating the primary and secondary materials on the subject. The book is divided into four major parts featuring: (1) a description of the historical, political, and ideological foundations of Communist China's foreign policy, (2) a consideration of her role in international politics beyond Asia, (3) a discussion of her role as an Asian power, and (4) an analysis of two interconnected events (the fall of Khrushchev and the first Chinese atomic test) and some reflections on how the U.S. might best cope with the challenge presented by Communist China.

About 525 pages *A January 1966 Publication*

Houghton Mifflin Company
BOSTON · NEW YORK · ATLANTA · GENEVA, ILL · DALLAS · PALO ALTO

HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Edited by J. DAVID SINGER • University of Michigan

Articles and excerpts by recognized sociologists, psychologists, and other social scientists are applied to international relations through introductions which correlate the selections to specific problems. Dr. Singer designates critical issues, indicates dangers, and discusses the uses and limits of a behavioral-science approach to international relations.

1965 • 466 pages

BEYOND THE COLD WAR

Edited by ROBERT A. GOLDWIN • The University of Chicago

Eleven authorities on foreign and military policy consider the future of world politics. Contributors: Charles Burton Marshall, Robert E. Osgood, Herman Kahn, Laurence W. Martin, Philip E. Mosely, Tang Tsou, Myron Rush, Gregory Grossman, Robert J. Alexander, Leonard Binder, Erich Hula.

1966

COMPONENTS OF DEFENSE POLICY

Edited by DAVIS B. BOBROW • Princeton University

Discusses strategic alternatives to war and the roles of various population segments in determining policy. This comprehensive, four-part discussion sets boundaries and catalogues problems within the social science section of defense analysis. The selections enumerate questions of defense policy, relate analysis to present knowledge, and locate gaps in the knowledge.

1965 • 445 pages • $3.95 paper

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE

Edited by WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR. • Massachusetts Insititute of Technology

An anthology of essays which examine obstacles to peace and suggested approaches to a strategy of peace. Immediate, medium-range, and long-term problems and prospects are considered.

1965 • 264 pages

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY
College Department • Box 7600 • Chicago, Illinois 60680

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

The author analyzes the ideological conflicts, discordant national interests and the social and economic factors that underlie today's revolutionary transformations. Close attention is given to the problems of the underdeveloped nations—the "Third World"—and their role in today's power struggle. "Of the perhaps dozen books on the subject that this reviewer has read in the past year, this is by far the most knowledgeable and useful. It can be recommended for student, intellectual and technician alike."—*America*

650 Pages **$6.95**

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: EAST AND WEST

KURT LONDON, George Washington University

The author scans the policy machinery of the main protagonists of the East-West conflict—United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. Special emphasis is given to the vital roles of intelligence and propaganda in the making and implementation of policy, and the agencies and media are carefully defined.

368 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

LA GUARDIA COMES TO POWER: 1933

ARTHUR MANN, Smith College

The author examines and puts into perspective the significant elements of the election that was a turning point in the history of American urban politics. ". . . contains the best account of an urban election we have ever had."—*Atlantic Monthly*

192 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

KARL W. DEUTSCH, Yale University; PHILIP E. JACOB, HENRY TEUNE, JAMES V. TOSCANO, WILLIAM L. C. WHEATON, University of Pennsylvania

Integrated political behavior at the metropolitan and international levels is explored in ten essays based on empirical studies in a wide range of fields, including communications, international tensions, planning and regional science, local government, social structure, social psychology and cultural anthropology.

314 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

JUSTICE AND THE SUPREME COURT

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI, Lehigh University

Focuses on civil rights aspects of the Court's work not covered by most texts. "Tresolini, in his eight cases, writes an entrancing story in terms of majority opinions and dissents as to the growth of our precious liberties."—*Morris L. Ernst*

205 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.45**

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY **College Department, East Washington Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105**

1792

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

LESTER W. MILBRATH • Northwestern University

In a direct and comprehensive manner, this text summarizes and integrates the literature about how and why people become involved in politics. Participation is studied in relation to environmental stimuli, personal factors, political setting, and social position.

1965 • 195 pages • $1.75 paper • $3.50 cloth

POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE

THEODORE L. BECKER • University of Hawaii

This monograph critically surveys main currents of judicial behavioralism from the viewpoint of a social scientist. The author tests the relationship between role-playing and decision-making and develops an empirically testable working theory of judicial decision-making.

1965 • 192 pages • $2.50 paper • $5.00 cloth

POLITICAL PARTIES: A Behavioral Analysis

SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD • University of Michigan

An intensive theoretical and empirical study of American party elites and major party structures in the metropolitan Detroit area. Combines sociological and psychological factors to explain the nature of party leadership and organization; concentrates on the environmental conditions of society; emphasizes the importance of the motivational basis of political leadership.

1964 • 613 pages • $8.00

THE PRESIDENT: Roles and Powers

Edited by DAVID E. HAIGHT and LARRY D. JOHNSTON • Hunter College

As a general introduction to the important aspects of the Presidency, the book deals with the historical development and the present characteristics of the office. Conflicting views and interpretations bring out controversial questions and encourage thoughtful discussion and debate. Suitable as text or supplementary reader.

1965 • 400 pages • $3.75 paper

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY
College Department • Box 7600 • Chicago, Illinois 60680

American Policy toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead

by John C. Campbell. An account and analysis of U.S. relations with Eastern European Communist nations since World War II and an outline of alternative future American policies. The author is a senior research fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former State Department official. With map. $4.50

Man's Quest for Political Knowledge: The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times

by William Anderson. A history of political study and teaching in the ancient societies of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Rome. "A major contribution." — *American Political Science Review.* $8.00

The City Man's Guide to the Farm Problem

by Willard W. Cochrane. A lucid discussion of the political and economic forces at work in the farm economy. The author is dean of international programs and professor of agricultural economics at the University of Minnesota and former director of agricultural economics in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Illustrated. $4.95

Southeast Asia: Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics

by Lennox A. Mills. A realistic account and analysis of developments in a critical area. "Disposes of numerous illusions and points up many realities." — *New York Times.* With map. $6.50

TO BE PUBLISHED SOON:

Law and the Social Sciences: The Second Half Century *by Julius Stone.* $4.50
The Market-Planned Economy of Yugoslavia *by Svetozar Pejovich.* $5.75
Britain, China, and the Antimissionary Riots, 1891-1900
by Edmund S. Wehrle. $5.50

At your bookseller or from

The University of Minnesota Press
2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis,
Minnesota 55455

IN CANADA: THE COPP CLARK PUBLISHING CO., LTD., TORONTO

Valuable McGraw-Hill Books

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, University of California, Berkeley, Consulting Editor.

GOVERNING OUR FIFTY STATES AND THEIR COMMUNITIES. By CHARLES R. ADRIAN, Michigan State University. 144 pages, $3.50 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

POLITICS AND VOTERS. By HUGH A. BONE, University of Washington, and AUSTIN RANNEY, University of Wisconsin. 144 pages, $3.50 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN MODERN SOCIETY. By JOHN J. CORSON, Princeton University, and JOSEPH P. HARRIS. 168 pages, $3.50 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS. By ROWLAND EGGER, University of Virginia, and JOSEPH P. HARRIS. 136 pages, $3.50 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

THE STUDY OF POLITICS: The Western Tradition and American Origins. By ANDREW HACKER, Cornell University. 112 pages, $3.50 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

AMERICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By CHARLES LERCHE, Jr., The American University. 128 pages, $3.50 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. By C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, The University of Chicago. 144 pages, $3.50 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

LIBERTY IN THE BALANCE: Current Issues in Civil Liberties. By H. FRANK WAY, University of California at Riverside. 136 pages, $4.95 (hard cover), $1.50 (soft cover).

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS

By CHARLES R. ADRIAN and CHARLES PRESS, both of Michigan State University. 756 pages, $7.95

A clear, systematic treatment of the decision-making process and its component parts—institutions, actors, ideology, the legal framework, interest groups, and the communications process.

AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

Third Edition

By HUGH A. BONE, University of Washington. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* 700 pages, $8.95.

Retaining the comprehensive coverage that has been a valued feature of previous editions, this book is completely rewritten, including much new survey data on voter perceptions, demography of voters, and characteristics of party activists.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Eighth Edition

By JOHN H. FERGUSON, Pennsylvania State University; and DEAN E. McHENRY, University of California, Santa Cruz. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* 750 pages, $8.95.

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Eighth Edition

By JOHN H. FERGUSON and DEAN E. McHENRY. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* 637 pages, $8.50.

A new edition of the Holloway and Ader STUDY GUIDE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ($2.25) and a new INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL ($2.00) are now available.

Send for your examination copies today

McGraw-Hill Book Company

330 West 42nd Street / New York, N.Y. 10036

THE ZANDE SCHEME

An Anthropological Case Study of Economic Development in Africa

by Conrad C. Reining

The Zande Scheme was a development program designed to make the Azande of the Sudan economically self-sufficient. Originally undertaken as a field study of the Scheme, the project which developed into this book was concerned not only with the economic and anthropological facts of the Scheme's early successes and ultimate failure, but also with the underlying influences of the Sudan's move to independence..

300 pages $8.95

GROWTH WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT

An Economic Survey of Liberia

by Robert W. Clower, George Dalton, Mitchell Harwitz, and A. A. Walters

This survey describes the Liberian economy, shows how traditional social and political institutions have impeded economic transformation, and makes policy recommendations. Included is the first set of national income accounts ever prepared for Liberia.

500 pages $8.95

THE JUDICIAL MIND

The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963

by Glendon Schubert

This is a study of the human elements that underlie the many major changes in national public policy which have come about as a result of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court during the middle decades of the twentieth century. The author has undertaken a rigorous examination of the Court's decision-making record between 1946 and 1963, subjected it to factor analysis and cumulative linear scaling, and constructed a composite multi-dimensional model of the group decision-making function for the Supreme Court.

"Professor Schubert's volume is a brilliantly sustained extension of neglected methods to the analysis of the most distinctive institution of the American system of public order. . . . [He] has launched a mighty craft in intellectual competition. . . ."—Harold D. Lasswell.

275 pages 70 equations, figures, tables $10.00

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

Evanston, Illinois

Oxford University Press

Confrontations

A Study of Indonesian Politics

By **Jan M. Pluvier,** *University of Malaya.* In the current welter of perplexing political and nationalist movements, none is more complicated than Indonesia's. This volume will be an invaluable guide to that maze, as the author examines forty years of events leading to the present crises in Malaysia. *Map. Paper. $1.20*

The Chinese Model

A Political, Economic and Social Survey

Edited by **Werner Klatt.** This book makes a special and original contribution to the study of the nature of the world-wide challenge and appeal of communism, and the direction it may take from now on. It explores, in essays by twelve specialists, China's claims to being the true model for progress, her efforts to press these claims on the underdeveloped nations, and the latter's receptivity to them. Her major political, economic and social policies are all closely analyzed in this connection. $4.00

Vatican Politics

By **George Bull.** The Second Vatican Council, called by Pope John XXIII in 1962, reflects a revolution in the thinking and attitudes of the Roman Catholic Church. This volume examines the conflicts which arose in the first three sessions of the Council, evaluates the extent of success achieved by the progressives and looks into the implications of the actual and potential weight of the still-powerful forces of conservative Catholic opinion.

Paper. $1.55

Documents on International Affairs 1961

Selected and edited by **D. C. Watt,** *with the assistance of* **John Major, Richard Gott** *and* **George Schöpflin.** This volume covers the first year of the Kennedy administration and the major assaults against it in Berlin, the Congo and Southeast Asia at the hands of the Soviet Union, which was also working to reduce the freedom of action of the U.N. Secretary-General. Both the Soviet and Western blocs experienced great internal strains; the Sino-Soviet rift broke into the open, and France pursued an increasing individual role in NATO. 1961 also saw the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion as well as the launching of the Alliance for Progress. The documents are arranged according to subject matter with the chronological list at the end. $17.60

Oxford University Press / New York

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

The Strange Career of Jim Crow

Second Revised Edition

By **C. Vann Woodward,** *Yale University.* Among the many books on racial segregation in the United States, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow,* first published in 1955, has become known as the definitive study of the subject. The Second Revised Edition brings the work fully up to date, covering the revolutionary changes at the very heart of the problem, taking advantage of the new perspective provided by recent years, and discussing recent scholarly contributions to the field. Much new and revised material on segregation in the North, and Negro life in Southern cities before the Civil War, is included.

January 1966 224 pp. Galaxy Books 6 paperbound $1.50 clothbound $4.50

Modern Capitalism: *The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power*

By **Andrew Shonfield,** *Royal Institute of International Affairs.* The author describes the various economic and political impulses behind the change that has occurred in Western capitalism since the thirties, finding clear traces of a common pattern of behavior in West European society and to a lesser extent in America. Implicit in the study is the question: how firmly based is the new order of capitalism, which seems to assure steady economic growth and to preclude violent swings of boom and slump.

January 1966 544 pp. paperbound $4.50 clothbound $10.50

Readings in American Democracy

Second Edition

Edited by **Gerald Stourzh, Ralph Lerner,** *and* **H. C. Harlan.** The Second Edition of this well-known book for courses in American government contains a new chapter on civil rights, in place of the section on government and the economy, but it has not been felt necessary to replace any other articles with more up-to-date selections since the book emphasizes argument rather than topical information. Among the other subjects are individual rights, the diffusion of power, the politics of democracy, the welfare state, and statesmanship in a free democracy.

January 1966 492 pp. paperbound $2.25

Readings in Economics and Politics

Second Edition

Edited by **H. C. Harlan,** *Chicago City Junior College.* In this collection of absorbing articles, clear and forceful statements of a variety of positions—some quite partisan, others more detached and analytical—constitute a kind of debate on twelve fundamental problems in politics and economics, among them agriculture, business, capital, labor, monetary and fiscal policy, and economic foreign policy. The Second Edition replaces the original chapter on inflation with a section titled "Tax Reform, Gold and Ideology" and includes several new articles elsewhere.

January 1966 800 pp. paperbound $2.75

Oxford University Press / 417 Fifth Ave. / New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The Democratic Civilization

By **Leslie Lipson**, *University of California, Berkeley*

1964 632 pp. $7.50

Free Government in the Making:

Readings in American Political Thought

Third Edition

Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Princeton University*

1965 952 pp. $7.50

Ideas and Diplomacy: *Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy*

Edited with Commentary by **Norman A. Graebner**, *University of Illinois*

1964 912 pp. $8.50

The Springtime of Freedom:

The Evolution of Developing Societies

By **William McCord**, *Rice University*

1965 344 pp. paperbound $2.25

The Evolution of American Foreign Policy

Second Edition

By **Dexter Perkins**

176 pp. Galaxy Books 159 paperbound $1.65

World Communism: *The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*

By **Richard Lowenthal**

320 pp. Galaxy Books 156 paperbound $1.75

Oxford University Press / 417 Fifth Ave. / New York, N.Y. 10016

World Politics in the General Assembly

by Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett

To test varying viewpoints of the role of the United Nations, Messrs. Alker and Russett use new quantitative techniques of political science to present a factual description of the political process in the General Assembly. From selected votes and speeches they have found a number of "super-issues," each underlying several specific controversies, on which voting alignments differ from the Cold War configuration and where foreign alliances provide little explanation of voting patterns. "A first-rate study."—Thomas Hovet. **$7.50**

Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Radicals

by Joseph Hamburger

The author of JAMES MILL AND THE ART OF REVOLUTION has now written a study of John Stuart Mill and the other disciples of Bentham and James Mill who engaged in parliamentary politics during the decade following the Reform Bill. Since their political activity was meant to be an expression of a philosophical position, they are examined both as philosophers and as politicians. **$7.50**

Letters from the Paris Peace Conference

by Charles Seymour

In 1918 young Charles Seymour sailed with President Wilson and other members of the Inquiry for the Paris Peace Conference. Throughout his stay, Seymour wrote long letters home. Published now for the first time, these letters from a perceptive young man who later became president of Yale and one of the most respected authorities on the Peace Conference offer a wealth of insights for the historian. Edited with Introduction and Notes by Harold B. Whiteman, Jr. **$7.50**

The International Law of Fisheries

by Douglas M. Johnston

To provide a framework for inquiry into the making of international policies regarding the use of fisheries that are or could be shared by two or more states, Mr. Johnston reassesses existing law from a functional point of view using the techniques of policy-oriented jurisprudence developed by Myres S. McDougal and associates. **$12.50**

available through your bookstore
Yale University Press
New Haven and London
in Canada: McGill University Press

PRAEGER

Important paperbacks in political science

THE STATE OF WAR

ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By STANLEY HOFFMANN. The well-known Professor of Government at Harvard explores the past, present, and likely future of international politics and foreign-policy decisions.
276 pp. U-591/$2.25

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A BOOK OF READINGS

Edited by HENRY A. KISSINGER. An incisive, thought-provoking collection of basic readings in national security, compiled and introduced by one of America's leading analysts of foreign policy and defense strategy.
ca. 500 pp. U-588/$3.95

AN ATLAS OF LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Maps by ROBERT C. KINGSBURY. Text by RONALD M. SCHNEIDER. A valuable presentation of essential information on the historical background and the current political, social, and economic scene in the region as a whole, as well as in the individual countries.
60 maps. 136 pp. P-124/$1.75

IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

By RICHARD N. GARDNER. "A lucid, readable, and authoritative account of the present status of international organization, its problems and its possibilities."—ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., in *The New Republic.*
281 pp. P-175/$1.95

U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

A SHORT HISTORY

By EDWIN LIEUWEN. The author of *Generals vs. Presidents* and *Arms and Politics in Latin America* surveys our involvement in Latin America from the 17th century to the 1960's, offering a penetrating analysis of both past and present relations.
ca. 150 pp. U-592/$1.75

THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE BALANCE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROSPECTS

Edited by NORMAN J. PADELFORD and LELAND M. GOODRICH. Leading authorities evaluate the United Nations' past successes and failures and discuss the problems that cloud its future. 482 pp. U-585/$2.95

THE NEW EASTERN EUROPE

THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA AND AFTER

By J. F. BROWN. A penetrating study of the highly significant changes—political, economic, social, and cultural—that have occurred in Albania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and "revisionist" Yugoslavia since 1956, the year of Stalin's death. March. ca. 320 pp. U-590/$2.25

COMMUNIST CHINA

THE EARLY YEARS, 1949-55

By A. DOAK BARNETT. The noted Professor of Government at Columbia analyzes the crucial early years in the revolutionary process following the Communist takeover. January.
336 pp. U-597/ca. $2.95

INDIA—A WORLD IN TRANSITION

REVISED EDITION

By BEATRICE PITNEY LAMB. "One of the finest introductions to India yet to appear, and its value is enhanced by a warm and lively style."—JOAN V. BONDURANT, in *The American Political Science Review.* January.
384 pp. P-116/ca. $2.75

FREDERICK A. Praeger PUBLISHERS
111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10003

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

SPECTRUM BOOKS *cover major areas in political Science . . .*

. . . *United States Politics and Government*

FREEDOM OF SPEECH: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review
by Martin Shapiro, University of California, at Irvine. Based on an analysis of the role of the Supreme Court within the American political process, this volume urges active protection of freedom of speech by the Supreme Court through its power of judicial review. *February 1966, S-135 (orig.), cloth $4.95, paper $2.45*

THE POLITICAL THICKET: Reapportionment and Constitutional Democracy
by Royce Hanson, The American University. Analytical in character, this new volume provides an insight into the reapportionment issue and thereby into the operation of the American political system as a whole. *March 1966, S-137 (orig.), cloth $4.95, paper $2.45*

. . . *International Relations*

THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF AFRICA
edited by Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, both of Harvard University. The foremost leaders and intellectuals of Africa—Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Tom Mboya, among them—speak out on the problems and potentialities of independence. *1965, S-124 (orig.), The Global History series, cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: The Reunification Problem
by Frederick H. Hartmann, University of Florida. Recounts the recent history of East-West rivalry over Germany from the end of World War II to the present. *1965, S-127 (orig.), cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

THE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by Bernard K. Gordon, The George Washington University. In this first study of its kind devoted to political and international problems peculiar to Southeast Asia, the author explores the historical roots and development of the region's often bitter arguments, and examines the prospects for peaceful settlement. *March 1966, S-134 (orig.), cloth $4.95, paper $2.45*

DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT: The Economics of Transition
edited by Roger E. Bolton, Harvard University. Asking not only whether we can afford to disarm but whether we can afford not to, the economists, industrialists, and policy-planners whose evaluations are collected in this volume, debate among themselves the complex problems and challenging possibilities of disarmament. *January 1966, S-133 (orig.) Modern Economic Issues series, cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
An American Assembly Book edited by Herbert Passin, Columbia University. Noted authorities on Far Eastern affairs examine the direction Japan is likely to take in world affairs and explore the problem of America's reaction to the new independence of a once dependent nation. *February 1966, S-AA-16 (orig.), cloth $3.95, paper $1.95*

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW AFRICA
by I. William Zartman. Examining the efforts of the new states of North and West Africa to achieve workable foreign policies, and cooperative relations among themselves, this book explores the patterns of relationship among them that have already developed and analyzes the factors influencing their foreign and domestic policy decisions. *April 1966, S-136 (orig.), cloth $5.95, paper $2.45*

POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS
by Fred R. von der Mehden, University of Wisconsin. Dealing with political problems common to all developing nations, the author views the role of political disunity and instability in relation to leadership groups, social and political environment, and ideologies. *S-88 (orig.) cloth $4.50, paper $1.95*

. . . *Ideas*

PARETO & MOSCA
edited by James H. Meisel, The University of Michigan. Talcott Parsons and C. Wright Mills, among others, reveal the inconsistencies, the fallacies, and yet the continuing relevance of Mosca's theory of the political class and Pareto's ideas of the "circulation of elites" and "residues." *1965, S-122 (orig.) Makers of Modern Social Sciences series, cloth $4.95, paper $2.45*

Available at your bookstore. College professors—review copies available from Prentice-Hall field representatives.

PRENTICE-HALL, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NEW JERSEY, 07632

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

State and Local Government:

Politics and Processes

G. Theodore Mitau, *Macalester College*

This text examines the most vital issues confronting state and local government today in order to illustrate and clarify the intricate machinery and complex interrelationships of these institutions. In discussing these governmental units, Professor Mitau makes clear their internal organization, their constitutional and legal basis, the scope of their powers, and the extent of their relationship with the federal government. He also shows the developments that are taking place as current problems are confronted and solved through the formulation of new public policy. Each chapter incorporates a set of practical problems for classroom discussion and includes a bibliography for further reading in areas of particular interest. The book concludes with a general bibliography and index. *1966. 625 pages. Tentative, $6.95.*

Proximate Solutions: Case Problems in State and Local Government

Edited by G. Theodore Mitau and Harold W. Chase

The first of two books of readings dramatically illustrating critical issues in state and local government through the presentation of actual state court cases. The fifty cases contained in this volume revolve around constitutional issues. With introductory essays, headnotes, and a glossary of terms. *1963. x, 337 pages. Paper. $3.50.*

Insoluble Problems: Case Problems on the Functions of State and Local Government

Edited by G. Theodore Mitau and Harold W. Chase

The fifty state court cases presented in this volume revolve around extra-constitutional issues. With introductory essays, headnotes, and a glossary of terms. *1963. x, 351 pages. Paper. $3.50.*

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT / 597 FIFTH AVENUE / NEW YORK

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Religion and Politics in Burma

By DONALD EUGENE SMITH. An examination of the interaction of Buddhism and politics in Burma, which claims leadership among the Theravada Buddhist countries of South and Southeast Asia. Burmese attempts to relate Buddhism to nationalism, democracy, and socialism are studied. Of particular importance is the question of whether Buddhism is reconcilable with Marxian communism. *332 pages. $7.50*

Zanzibar

Background to Revolution

by MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE. The twofold importance of this book is that it gives a detailed analysis of the causes of the revolution of January 1964 in Zanzibar, and provides a study of the process of modernization in a plural society. *320 pages. $7.50*

The Corfu Incident of 1923

Mussolini and the League of Nations

By JAMES BARROS. Working with newly available archival materials, the author gives a detailed account of Mussolini's occupation of the Greek island of Corfu in 1923 and the negotiations (among Italy, Greece, France, and Britain)—crucial to the inexperienced League of Nations and to Mussolini's future—that led to settlement of the crisis. *352 pages. $7.50*

Acción Democrática

Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela

By JOHN D. MARTZ. Enhanced by firsthand interviews with participants in Venezuela's politics and documents unavailable in the United States, this study probes into the nature and growth of one of Latin America's most important political parties. *448 pages. $12.50*

Functionalism and World Politics

United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development

By JAMES P. SEWELL. This book evaluates the functional approach to international organization as a theory and in relation to several programs within the United Nations system: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, and the U.N. Special Fund. *336 pages. $6.50*

The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs

With Special Reference to International Politics

By HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT. This work emphasizes the pervasiveness of environmental concepts and theories in all approaches to the study of human affairs. Focusing primarily on aspects of international politics, the Sprouts have attempted to examine critically all known modes of expressing man-milieu relationships and to exemplify the utilities and limitations of the concepts and theories examined. *240 pages. $6.50*

Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic

By LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN. The nature and development of French atomic policy during the Fourth Republic is examined here and the intricate history of policy making explored by Professor Scheinman. *268 pages. $6.50*

Princeton University Press

from
RANDOM HOUSE

In preparation ...

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

An Introduction to Political Science

Edited by JOHN C. WAHLKE, *University of Buffalo and*
ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University*

A collaborative effort by eight specialists, this new text combines description of political systems with analysis of the nature of political science itself. The resulting perspective affords a broad, systematic, and unified introduction to the whole field of political science.

Spring 1966; about 620 pages; about $7.50

Just published ...

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

An Interpretation

by ALFRED G. MEYER, *Michigan State University*

An examination and interpretation of the Soviet system which goes beyond formal institutions and politics and concentrates on all aspects of the Soviet way of life.

1965; 512 pages; $5.95

Recently published ...

THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST

Tradition and Innovation

Edited by BENJAMIN RIVLIN, *Brooklyn College of The City University of New York and* JOSEPH S. SZYLIOWICZ, *University of Denver*

The editors of this anthology have assembled more than fifty articles by the most important Western and Eastern writers, as well as by significant contemporary political figures. They present a thoroughly integrated approach to the process of political, social, and economic transition in the Middle East today.

1965; 568 pages; $7.95

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS *Revised Edition*

World Politics of Our Time

by JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College of The City University of New York*
Foreword by ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE

"It is a pleasure to read this well written text and to have the use of its unusually thorough chapter bibliographies. The organization is sound and reflects a judicious and relevant selection of issues and events. The final chapter contributes effectively to the conceptualization of international relations."

—Daniel S. Cheever, *University of Pittsburgh*

1965; 460 pages; $6.75

AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY *Revised Edition*

Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON, *The University of Michigan*

1965; 796 pages; $3.95 paperbound

For further information, write to:

RANDOM HOUSE, Inc.
The College Department 501 Madison Avenue New York 10022

from
RANDOM HOUSE

RANDOM HOUSE STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

A distinguished series of original works in paperbound editions.

Recently published . . .

THE POLITICAL PROCESS Executive-Bureau Legislative Committee Relations, Revised Edition, *by* J. LEIPER FREEMAN, *Vanderbilt University* PS13; $1.95

MARXISM AND COMMUNISM Essential Readings *Edited by* ROBERT V. DANIELS, *University of Vermont* PS49; $1.95

WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL A Case Study in the Judicial Process *by* WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University* PS50; $1.95

BIG CITY POLITICS A Comparative Guide to the Political Systems of Nine American Cities *by* EDWARD C. BANFIELD, *Harvard University* PS48; $1.95

Just Published . . .

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SUPERPOWERS United States-Soviet Interaction at the United Nations *by* JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College of The City University of New York* PS53; $1.95

THE REVOLUTION IN STATECRAFT Informal Penetration *by* ANDREW M. SCOTT, *University of North Carolina* PS51; $1.95

In Preparation . . .

THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION Representation, Political Power and the Supreme Court *by* GORDON E. BAKER, *University of California, Santa Barbara* February 1966; PS20; 192 pages; $1.95

AFRICA The Primacy of Politics *Edited by* HERBERT J. SPIRO, *Amherst College* with contributions by HENRY BRETTON, *The University of Michigan,* EDOUARD BUSTIN, *Boston University,* THOMAS HOVET, JR., *New York University* and CLEMENT HENRY MOORE, *University of California, Berkeley* February 1966; PS47; about 224 pages; about $1.95

VINTAGE PAPERBACKS

Just published . . .

THE VIET-NAM READER *Edited by* MARCUS G. RASKIN and BERNARD B. FALL V309 November 1965; $2.45

In preparation . . .

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICA LIFE *by* RICHARD HOFSTADTER V317; Spring 1966; about 440 pages; $2.45

TEN KEYS TO LATIN AMERICA *by* FRANK TANNENBAUM V312; Spring 1966; about 263 pages; $1.65

GIDEON'S TRUMPET *by* ANTHONY LEWIS V315; Spring 1966; about 272 pages; $1.95

For further information, write to RANDOM HOUSE Inc.

The College Department **501 Madison Avenue** **New York 10022**

In preparation

PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

by GRANT McCONNELL, *The University of Chicago*

Drawing his material from virtually the whole range of American political life, the author has made a searching study of the non-governmental forces that influence or control large areas of American public policy.

Spring 1966; about 400 pages; about $5.75

Recently published

THE STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

by A. F. K. ORGANSKI, *The University of Michigan*

A study in comparative government which follows the modern nation from birth to death, showing how and why political institutions change from age to age, and concentrating in particular on the contribution of politics to economic development.

1965; 256 pages; $3.95

SOVIET POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

A Reader

Edited with introductory note by RANDOLPH J. BRAHAM, *The City College of The City University of New York*

1965; 640 pages; $4.95 paperbound

BRITISH POLITICS IN THE COLLECTIVIST AGE

by SAMUEL H. BEER, *Harvard University*

1965; 384 pages; $5.95

INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT

by ROBERT RIENOW, *The State University of New York, Albany*

Third Edition, Revised; 1964; 568 pages; $7.95

For further information, write to

ALFRED A. KNOPF, *Publisher*

College Department 501 Madison Avenue New York 10022

Coming, Early 1966—

EUROPEAN POLITICS: The Restless Search

A Comparative Government Biennial

William G. Andrews, Editor; *Tufts University*

This text attempts to "bridge two gaps in government teaching: the time lag between last year's textbook and this morning's headlines, and the intellectual cleavage between the level of sophistication of text materials and that of scholarly journals." It con tains five essays by comparative government specialists who present scholarly and penetrating analyses of recent governmental issues in 4 major European powers; the contributors are Karl Friedrich: *A Theoretical Essay;* Stanley Hoffman and William G. Andrews on *France;* Anthony King on *Great Britain;* Elmer Plischke on *West Germany;* and Samuel Hendel on the *Soviet Union.*

Early 1966 245 pages paperbound about $1.95

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

SECOND EDITION

Russell W. Maddox, Jr., *Oregon State University*
Robert F. Fuquay, *Oregon State University*

The revised, Second Edition of this widely acclaimed text deals with the basic facts of governmental organization at the state and local levels. The authors have made major revisions to include the most recent developments in areas such as the judiciary, voter registration, poverty programs, old-age assistance, and equal opportunities in employment.

Early 1966 clothbound about 712 pages and $8.50

SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES: Inside Views

William G. Andrews, Editor; *Tufts University*

Sixty articles drawn from a variety of original Soviet sources give the reader a picture of Soviet views on the Russian government and politics. Official documents, speeches, publications, and propaganda provide a rich, colorful, "inside view."

Early 1966 paperbound about 400 pages and $4.00

Already published—

ISSUES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Selected Readings

Russell W. Maddox, Jr., Editor; *Oregon State University*

This concise collection of 78 readings, designed for basic courses in state and local government, seeks to acquaint the student with some of the major problem areas in the field. Contents: The States in the Federal System; State Constitutions; State Executives; State Legislatures; Law and the Courts; Political Processes; Finance and Personnel; Local Government; Metropolitan Areas; Programs and Policies.

1965 424 pages paperbound $4.75

D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

120 Alexander Street **Princeton, New Jersey 08540**

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Research Scholarships in Political Science

including Public Administration

Applications are invited for scholarships in Political Science, including Public Administration.

Applicants should be postgraduate students with capacity for research. Scholars will normally enrol for a Ph.D. degree, the course for which extends over three years. A scholarship is awarded initially for two years but will normally be extended for the whole period of the approved course.

The basic scholarship allowance is £1,165 per annum. Married scholars with dependent children receive additional allowances. Fares to and from Canberra are paid.

Application forms and further particulars are available from the University. Applications should reach the University by 31 January, 30 April or 30 September in any year, although special consideration may be given to applications at other times. Scholarships may be taken up at any time after award, subject to agreement of the Head of Department.

D. K. R. HODGKIN
Registrar
Institute of Advanced Studies.

Box 4 P.O., *CANBERRA, A.C.T. AUSTRALIA.*

INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Official Organ of the Indian Institute
of
Public Administration, New Delhi

(Published quarterly since Jan. 1955)
Subscription: Annual: Rs.12 or £1 10s.
Single Copy: Rs.3.00 or 7s.6d.

For fuller information and subscription, please write to: The Administrative Officer, Indian Institute of Public Administration, Indraprastha Estate, Ring Road, New Delhi-1.

Vol. XI, No. 3 (July-September)
Special Number on

COLLECTOR IN THE NINETEEN SIXTIES

PURCHASE OF BACK ISSUES OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

The following issues of the *Review* will be purchased by The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20036 for $1.00 each:

Vol.	*No.*	*Date*		*Vol.*	*No.*	*Date*	
1	1	November	1906	4	2	May	1910
1	2	February	1907	4	3	August	1910
1	3	May	1907	4	4	November	1910
1	4	August	1907	5	1	February	1911
2	1	November	1907	5	3	August	1911
2	2	February	1908	5	4	November	1911
2	3	May	1908	11	1	February	1917
2	4	November	1908	19	4	November	1925
3	1	February	1909	22	1	February	1928
3	2	May	1909	38	1	February	1944
3	3	August	1909	58	3	September	1964
3	4	November	1909				

APSA CHARTER FLIGHTS TO EUROPE

FLIGHT A—Approximately June 15 to September 1, 1966

FLIGHT B—Approximately August 1 to 31, 1966

For the seventh successive summer, the Association will provide chartered air service to Europe for its members.

Both flights will originate at New York International Airport and arrive on the continent of Europe. The cost per seat will be under $275.00

Final details will reach every APSA member in several weeks. Persons wishing to make reservations now may write directly to the Association, in care of the Director, Charter Flight Programs, 1726 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C.

INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

Allyn & Bacon, Inc.	1170, 1171
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.	1172
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.	1178, 1179
Australian National University	1218
Cambridge University Press	1177
Chandler Publishing Company	1191
University of Chicago Press	1181
Cornell University Press	1187
Dorsey Press	1188
Foundation for Foreign Affairs	1191
Free Press	1183, 1184, 1185, 1186
General Motors Corporation	1189
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.	1192, 1193
Harper & Row, Publishers Inc.	861
Harvard University Press	1195
D. C. Heath & Company	1194
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.	1197
Houghton Mifflin Company	1198
Johnson Reprint Corporation	1196
J. B. Lippincott Company	1200
McGraw Hill Book Company	1203
Macmillan Company	863
Mendota Research Group	1180
M. I. T. Press	1173, 1174, 1175
University of Minnesota Press	1202
National Analysts	Cover II
Northwestern University Press	1204
University of Oregon Books	1180
Oxford University Press	1205, 1206, 1207
Frederick A. Praeger	1209
Prentice-Hall, Inc.	864, 1210
Princeton University Press	1212, 1213, Cover IV
Rand McNally & Company	1199, 1201
Random House-Alfred A. Knopf	1214, 1215, 1216
Scott, Foresman & Company	1190
St. Martin's Press	1176
Charles Scribner's Sons	1211
Syracuse University Press	1182
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association	Cover III
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.	1217
Washington Square Press	1169
Yale University Press	1208

ooking for Your Best Buy in Life Insurance?

tiaa announces . . . .

New LOWER
Life Insurance Rates

Plus "QUANTITY SAVINGS" DIVIDENDS, which reflect the economies of issuing larger policies.

For example,

A $50,000 POLICY COSTS ONLY $98

at age 30. Here's how:

$50,000 20-Year Home Protection Policy

Age at Issue	25	30	35	40
Annual Premium *(Including Disability Waiver)*	$134.00	$159.00	$206.50	$290.00
Cash Dividend End of First Year*	55.50	61.00	70.50	88.00
First Year Net Premium	$ 78.50	$ 98.00	$136.00	$202.00

*These dividends are based upon the 1965 dividend scale and are, of course, not guaranteed.

This is a plan of level premium Term insurance which provides its largest amount of protection nitially, reducing by schedule each year over a 20-year period to recognize decreasing insurance eeds. Premiums are payable for only 16 years. There are several other insurance periods to eet any need that requires a great deal of life insurance coverage at very low cost. Home Protection policies are available at all ages under 56.

RE YOU ELIGIBLE FOR TIAA? Yes, if you are employed by a college, university, private school, or other onprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for TIAA eligibility.

end the coupon for he new Life Insurance uide and a personal llustration of TIAA policies for your age. TIAA s nonprofit and employs no agents.

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION G
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017
Please send the new Life Insurance Guide and personal Illustrations.

Name ____________________ Date of Birth __________
Address ____________________
Dependents' Ages ____________________
Nonprofit Employer ____________________
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

tiaa

"To have lived through the transition stage of modern Japan makes a man feel preternaturally old; for here he is in modern times, . . . and yet he can himself distinctly remember the Middle Ages."—BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN.

The Modernization of Japan

"The modernization of Japan is a phenomenon which cannot be viewed casually by any serious observer. Whether one looks upon it as some Westerners have done as the first phase in the rise of a new "peril from the East" or, on the contrary, as a miraculous example of progress from out of an Oriental Middle Ages; whether one sees it as the Japanese themselves have done as the triumph of their unique national will against great odds or as the dark story of autocratic domination leading to imperialist war, the observations are highly colored and strongly lined. For the observer who would maintain his impartiality, the facts of the last hundred years or so of Japanese history are available in great abundance and in rich detail. Yet the efforts to find meaning in these facts have been bafflingly varied."—John Whitney Hall, vol. 1*

STUDIES IN THE MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN, a five volume series published for the Conference on Modern Japan of the Association for Asian Studies, brings together in a systematic fashion the results of the variegated and intensive studies of Japan which have appeared since the end of the war.

*Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization, Edited by Marius B. Jansen. 546 pp., $9.00

The State and Economic Enterprise in Modern Japan, Edited by William W. Lockwood. 732 pp., $12.50

Social Change in Modern Japan, Edited by R. P. Dore. Forthcoming

Political Development in Modern Japan, Edited by Robert E. Ward. Forthcoming

Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture, Edited by Donald H. Shively. Forthcoming

Subscription orders for the series are invited

Princeton University Press